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Preface
Papers written by the author comprise parts of chapter 3 (McHale and
Husbands [2004c] and McHale and Husbands [2004b]) and chapter 4
(McHale and Husbands [2006]).
Software written in support of research described in this thesis com-
prises three iterations of evolutionary robotics simulation software
plus a generic software application framework. This application frame-
work is briefly described in appendix A. It was designed from the start
to support multi-threading, taking advantage of the multi-core pro-
cessors available in modern computer hardware. It is intended for use
as a generic simulation platform supporting; real-time visualization
and charting, neural network simulation, large-scale parameter edit-
ing, automatic serialization and simulation batch processing. It makes
use of a novel meta-program language which provides us with a means
of composing complex applications from discrete plug-ins through a
simple script. Over 80 console and 60 windows based test applications
have been written, totalling in excess of 350,000 lines of code. All this
is the sole work of the author.
Additionally, source code written in the C programming language
for the GasNet model was provided by Phil Husbands. This was re-
written by the author in C++ for use in parts of experiments described
in chapters 3 and 4. The Autosim dynamics package was used in
the simulation of bipedal locomotion described in chapter 3. This is
partially based on earlier work conducted in collaboration with Chris
Buckley. The comparative study of quadrupedal locomotion described
in chapter 3 makes use of the ODE open source rigid body dynamics
simulation library. Later robot experiments employ NVIDIA’s PhysX
rigid body dynamics simulation package (chapters 4 and 5). Robot
models used in chapters 3, 4 and 5 were constructed by the author
using Autodesk’s 3D Studio MAX. Exporters and parsers were written
by the author to support this. The Agent and Neural Graph Library
(employed in chapters 9 and 10) was written by the author, but makes
use of the Lemon Graph Library internally.
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Currently the central challenge facing evolutionary robotics is to determine
how best to extend the range and complexity of behaviour supported by evolved
neural systems. Implicit in the work described in this thesis is the idea that this
might best be achieved through devising neural circuits (tractable to evolutionary
exploration) that exhibit complementary functional characteristics. We concen-
trate on two problem domains; locomotion and sequence learning. For locomotion
we compare the use of GasNets and other adaptive networks. For sequence learn-
ing we introduce a novel connectionist model inspired by the role of dopamine
in the basal ganglia (commonly interpreted as a form of reinforcement learning).
This connectionist approach relies upon a new neuron model inspired by notions
of energy efficient signalling. Two reward adaptive circuit variants were investi-
gated. These were applied respectively to two learning problems; where action
sequences are required to take place in a strict order, and secondly, where action
sequences are robust to intermediate arbitrary states. We conclude the thesis
by proposing a formal model of functional integration, encompassing locomotion
and sequence learning, extending ideas proposed by W. Ross Ashby.
A general model of the adaptive replicator is presented, incoporating subsys-
tems that are tuned to continuous variation and discrete or conditional events.
Comparisons are made with Ross W. Ashby’s model of ultrastability and his
ideas on adaptive behaviour. This model is intended to support our assertion
that, GasNets (and similar networks) and reward adaptive circuits of the type
presented here, are intrinsically complementary. In conclusion we present some
ideas on how the co-evolution of GasNet and reward adaptive circuits might lead
us to significant improvements in the synthesis of agents capable of exhibiting
complex adaptive behaviour.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Work described in this thesis has one underlying goal. That is to develop tech-
niques and devise models that will allow us to create artificial brains capable of
supporting complex behaviour in physically simulated robots through the evo-
lutionary robotics methodology. This involves emulating both the process and
products of biological evolution. We do this through abstractions of evolution
in algorithms (the process) and abstractions of neural processes through the use
of artificial neural networks (the product). Implicit in the approach taken by
this thesis is the idea that we may be able to achieve significantly more complex
behaviours than previously demonstrated, through the use of neural network cir-
cuits that exhibit complementary functionality. Specifically, we explore GasNets
and other adaptive networks in support of locomotion and then seek to create
complementary circuits that support reinforcement learning.
The novel contribution of this thesis is in the creation of a neuron model
and corresponding circuits that exhibit reward adaptive behaviour. Whilst the
formalisms of reinforcement learning underpin our understanding of how such
systems may work in the brain, conventional solutions draw their approach from
dynamic programming models and control theory. In contrast, we propose a
biologically inspired model based on the role of dopamine in the basal ganglia.
We seek to explain the workings of biological reward adaptive systems through
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distinct neural modes that support action selection, exploration and exclusion
(the active suppression of a specific selection option). The resultant model shares
many similarities with that of the striatum and in particular the medium spiny
neurons found therein.
The neuron model is computationally efficient and the resultant circuits are
simple. The simplicity of these circuits is particularly appealing, since our goal
was to devise models that are tractable to evolutionary exploration. The char-
acteristic ability of these circuits to learn beneficial action sequences is comple-
mentary to that of GasNets and other adaptive networks that support legged
locomotion explored in the earlier stages of this thesis. It is hoped that this the-
sis lays down some of the foundations necessary to support the co-evolution of
these two distinct circuit types in future work.
Overall, this thesis strongly adopts the biologically driven modelling approach
displayed in figure 1.1. By this we mean that our preference is to look at bio-
logical systems and create models which are intended as suitable abstractions of
these systems. By suitable, we are referring in this context to models that are
computationally efficient and yet capture some significant feature of the biological
system that we are seeking to emulate. Generally in evolutionary robotics the
models chosen are less biologically realistic than those employed in computational
neuroscience, but more biologically plausible than neural network models gener-
ally employed in connectionist approaches to machine learning. Computational
efficiency is of particular importance due to the onerous simulation requirements
required by the evolutionary method.
1.2 Structure of the thesis
Figure 1.2 illustrates the structure of the thesis. The schemtic illustrates the
principle concepts addressed in each chapter.
The key contributions of each chapter are summarized as follows;
• Chapter 2: This chapter introduces the basic concepts of evolutionary
robotics. It describes in some detail the emergence of this field, reviews
work carried out by the principal research centres and researchers, and
2
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concludes with the reasons for the approach outlined in this thesis.
• Chapter 3: This thesis commences with comparative study of the prin-
cipal neural network models suitable for parametric encoding in a form
that is tractable to evolutionary search. We demonstrate how GasNets and
other adaptive networks are suitable for the generation of control circuits
to support locomotion in legged robots (bipedal and quadrupedal).
• Chapter 4: This chapter describes the application of these same techniques
to a ball-collection task. On order to shape the course of evolution, the
energy expended by the robot was included in the fitness function. The idea
was to promote implicitly intelligent behaviour through penalizing evolved
solutions that relied upon brute-force (highly energetic) solutions to this
problem. Despite this, GasNets were found to be less suitable for this task
than they were in supporting locomotion. The ball-collecting task is typical
of a class of problems that tractably through the decomposition of the task
into smaller sub-tasks, where each sub-task requires a sub-set of sensor
data and employs a sub-set of motor control outputs. In video games this
kind of problem is typically addressed by the construction of an finite-state
machine model. The lack of amenability to discovering such solutions via
the evolution of GasNets led us to consider what alternative neural network
formulations might be appropriate. This represents a significant divergence
from the prior line of enquiry.
• Chapter 5: A decision was made to hand-code a solution to the ball-
collection task. The goal here was to try and gain some insight into ar-
chitectural features and data flow patterns that might be of particular rel-
evance in solving this problem. We then compared such features of this
hand-coded model to those present in biological systems. The basal ganglia
was identified as potentially significant in solving such tasks.
• Chapter 6: A review of the basal ganglia was conducted, with a principal
focus on the role of dopamine in reward adaptation.
• Chapter 7: Following this review, we constructed a top-down model of the
basal ganglia and its associated systems. This was largely done as thought
5
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exercise to understand the important features that such a system might
incorporate. Whilst the ensuing model is appealing in itself, it represents a
goal or target of evolutionary search. Our requirement is to discern how such
a system can be evolved from less primitive circuits. One of the primary
tenets of evolutionary robotics is that the user should not pre-determine
the architecture of the system, but support the exploration of architectural
space through lower-level neural models. However, work in this chapter
is justified in that it helps us to appreciate the possible solution space of
architectures that should be accessible via our evolutionary methodology
• Chapter 8: With this in mind our focus shifts to models of neurons and
neural circuits that might be suitable substrates for evolutionary search.
In this chapter a new neuron model is proposed and a primitive circuit
based on this model is introduced. Whilst the previous chapter takes a top-
down view this chapter seeks to take inspiration from the purported role of
dopamine signalling from a bottom-up perspective. We commence by first
seeking to identify fundamental principles that might allow us to explain
certain phenomena observed in dopamine signalling. A hypothesis is con-
structed based on the idea that energy efficiency plays a significant role in
determining neuron and signalling characteristics. This assumes that evo-
lution preferentially selects energy efficient systems. Neural inhibition as it
exists in our model, occurs when a beneficial signalling pathway (i.e. one
which takes part in an identified chain of input-output pairings that lead
to a reward) has undergone adaptation. The effects of this inhibition are to
minimize the energy cost of signalling and to remove such pathways from
competitive activation when their inputs are inactive. One of the appeal-
ing aspects of this model is that it may provide us with some explanation
regarding the prevalence of inhibitory pathways in the basal ganglia.
• Chapter 9: We then carry out a number of experiments that correspond to
incremental adaptations in simple reward circuits based on this novel neuron
model. The problem class encompasses two types of sequence learning; hard
sequences, where actions taken in a unique sequential order elicit a reward,
and soft sequences where a reward is elicited based on an action sequence
6
1. Introduction
that might include a number of neutral intermediate actions
• Chapter 10: The principal results are described, with two circuit vari-
ants being identified as particularly suitable for solving both hard and soft
sequence problem respectively.
• Chapter 11: Biological plausibility is a cornerstone of the evolutionary
robotics methodology. Whilst it is recognized that we need to make some
sacrifices in the area of biological realism for the sake of computational
expediency, an attempt is made to seek to discover abstractions that in some
way capture some significant features of the biological systems that we are
seeking to emulate. In this chapter we compare our model with biological
systems. Our model shows significant similarities with the characteristics
of striatal medium spiny neurons (MSN) of the basal ganglia.
• Chapter 12: Since the work described in this thesis took place over an ex-
tended period, alternative approaches to modelling reinforcement learning
have emerged. We first recap some of the advances that have been made in
this area, in addition to reviewing some of the results of other researchers
that represent a continuation or extension of work conducted in the early
part of this thesis. The second part of this chapter seeks to propose an inte-
grative view on how GasNet (and similar models) might work in conjunction
with the reward adaptive circuits.
The thesis is best conceived as comprising four parts; firstly, an exploration of
existing evolvable neural network models; secondly, the determination of short-
comings in the use of these models; thirdly, the creation of biologically inspired
neural network models which undergo adaptation to rewards; and fourthly, an
integrative perspective on the relevance of these models to evolutionary robotics
their biological plausibility.
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Evolutionary Robotics
2.1 Introduction
Evolutionary Robotics comprises three key elements. The first is goal oriented.
It seeks to discover methodologies for developing control systems for real or sim-
ulated robots for use in practical applications. The second is methodological. It
draws inspiration from the biological systems that underpin intelligent behaviour
and crucially employs evolutionary approaches to the generation and develop-
ment of models which seek to capture the essence of these biological systems.
The third is theoretical. It is hoped that through the pursuit of this goal, us-
ing methodologies that are based on natural systems, that we are able to gain
a deeper understanding of the principles and processes that have resulted in the
emergence of intelligent life.
We start this chapter by outlining some of the basic ideas that underpin the
evolutionary robotics methodology, focussing on the processes of genetic adapta-
tion. The synthesis of ideas from; cybernetics (section 2.3.3), evolutionary theory
and the algorithms that seek to model it (section 2.3) and neural networks (sec-
tion 2.3.2), has precipitated what is arguably one of the most conceptually rich
areas of modern science. In order to explain why this is so, we spend some time
delineating the historical emergence of this field (section 2.3). Following this we
carry out a selective review of the work carried out at the major research centres
in Europe (Sussex, CNR and EPFL) and of the research conducted by prominent
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individuals in the USA (section 2.4).
This chapter constitutes a review of evolutionary robotics and the inspiration
for the work described in this thesis. We also carry out a review of literature
that relates to the basal ganglia (see chapter 6) since this underpins much of the
described in the second half of this thesis. The research described in this thesis
was undertaken over a prolonged period of time (largely from 2004 to 2012).
Whilst the work undertaken in 2004 is based on ideas prevalent in evolutionary
robotics at that time, later work described in this thesis diverges somewhat from
the path taken by other researchers. We shall summarise these developments in
a later chapter (see chapter 12).
We conclude this chapter by explaining the focus of this thesis; that of deter-
mining how we might support behavioural complexity greater than that which is
achievable through current methods.
2.2 Basic Concepts
Evolutionary Robotics employs evolutionary algorithms to obtain its results.
There are a wide range of evolutionary algorithms, referred to alternatively as
evolutionary programming, genetic algorithms, evolution strategies and genetic
programming. We shall review the differences between them in section 2.3.1.3.
What we wish to do here, is explain the common ideas that these algorithms
embody using a set theoretic approach. We shall define some terms differently
from how they are commonly used, but seek to highlight these differences where
appropriate.
2.2.1 Genotype Space
The notion of a genotype is central to evolutionary algorithms. In biology a geno-
type represents the totality of genetic information associated with an organism.
It comprises all the chromosomes that the individual possesses. These structures
contain alleles (alternative forms of genes, or allelomorphs) present at specific loci
along their length. It is therefore not just the chromosomes themselves, but the
particular combination of alleles comprising them that define the genotype of an
9
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individual.
It is sometimes said that a genotype codes for the individual. However, this
represents a computational analogue that is only appropriate for the simplest
of explanations. The sense in which a computer program is coded such that it
defines its operation in a deterministic fashion is not analogous to the way in
which a genotype determines an individual. The simple reason being that the
genotype underpins a number of adaptive processes, including development and
learning. It is the entirety of these processes that determine the phenotype; the
form, attributes and behaviour of the individual organism. This occurs as a result
of a coupling of these adaptive processes with the environment and the entities
that inhabit it. By this we mean that the environment itself is an input to the
functions that determine an individuals characteristics. The contributory nature
of these adaptive processes, that lend a degree of plasticity to the phenotype, has
no analogue in a computer program.
It is based on the differential variation of phenotypes within a population that
selection acts, thus determining the frequency of alleles in the population in sub-
sequent generations. The notion of a genotype space is central to the exposition
of evolutionary algorithms. A genotype maps to an individual (the phenotype
of a genotype), as if it contains the parameters of a function. It is through the
exploration of this parameter space that we are able to discover individuals with
particular traits that are deemed beneficial. In the case of evolutionary robotics
these are traits that are particularly suited to the tasks that we wish our robots
to perform. We are able to explore this space through the action of recombination
and mutation operators on the parameters encoded by the genotype.
A verbal exposition using terms heavily laden with biological significance lacks
the degree of clarity that we seek in attempting to elucidate the essential features
of an evolutionary algorithm. In biology ambiguities can arise since the term
gene is on occasion used to refer to an allele (without differentiating between
type or value) and on other occasions refers to a specific locus (or group of loci)
on a chromosome. For this reason we use a set theoretic approach. We seek
to abstract these biological concepts in a fashion that is relevant to explaining
the underlying structure of evolutionary algorithms. This requires a definition of
terms; gene, allele type, allele value, allele group, chromosome, genotype, and set
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of genotypes, in a set theoretic sense, broadly comparable to their use in biology.
The exposition described here is a primitive attempt to employ types in naive
set theory. A more rigorous approach might avoid this completely and use type
theory formalisms. Whilst it may not be particularly rigorous, it should at least
help to clarify the conceptual notions associated with evolutionary algorithms as
they are commonly used in evolutionary robotics. The essential features of this
approach are illustrated in figure 2.1.
The principal dimensions of this explanation are those of type, value and
structure. As an analogy we imagine a row of wooden blocks. Each block has
a hole in it. The shape of the hole varies from block to block (e.g. square,
rectangular, circular). Multiple blocks may have the same shaped hole. We also
have a number of bricks. We can partition these bricks into groups based on
their shape. The shape of the bricks is such that they may be inserted into the
appropriately shaped holes present in the wooden blocks. The bricks are painted
different colours. We are able to insert any coloured brick into a wooden block,
providing that it has the appropriately shaped hole.
In this analogy, we can refer to the shape of a brick and the same shape of
hole in a wooden block as a type. We can refer to the colour of each brick as a
value. We can refer to a particular arrangement of wooden blocks as a structure.
The structure corresponds to a syntax. The colour of bricks inserted into these
wooden blocks, endows the structure with values. These values correspond to
semantic information, in a system where the particular arrangement of structure
and values determines the characteristics of a subsequent process.
This concrete example helps us to appreciate the sense in which we are to use
the terms; type, value and structure in the following definition of terms;
• Gene (G): We define a gene as comprising two elements; an allele type
element and a set that holds a single allele value element. The value element
is an empty set. This makes the gene analogous to an empty wooden block.
The allele type element is analogous to the shape of the hole. The second
member, the set which holds the value element, is an empty set. This is
analogous to the empty hole in a wooden block. In our definition a gene
represents a structural component with a specific type property, but remains
absent of semantic value.
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• Chromosome (C): A chromosome is defined here as an ordered tuple of
dimension L, where each element is a gene. Whilst in biology an organism
may possess multiple chromosomes we use the term chromosome in a way
that assumes that a single organism only possesses one of them. In an
extension of the ideas implicit in our definition of a gene, a chromosome is
also a structural entity devoid of semantic information.
• Set of Allele Types (T): There exists a set comprising elements, each
of which corresponds to a separate allele type. The type of an allele is
analogous to that of the shape of a brick, and the shape of the hole in
which the wooden block in which it can be placed. In figure 2.1 we use the
dummy variable x to signify a member of the set T .
• Set of Allele Values (S): The value of an allele is analogous to that of
the colour of the brick. For each allele type, there exists a corresponding
set S, containing all the possible values that an allele may take. In figure
2.1 we use the dummy variable y to signify a member of the set Sx, where
x is a dummy variable corresponding to an allele type, taken from the set
T .
• Allele Group A: An allele group is a set that has as its first member an
allele type x, and its second member a set of all possible values that have
this type as a property (i.e. the set Sx).
• The Set of Allele Groups (B): The set of allele groups is the comprising
all possible allele groups.
• Genotype (E): A genotype corresponds to the result of an binary operator
that takes as its arguments the set of all allele groups and a chromosome.
This operator iterates through the each gene element of the chromosome.
It identifies the allele type member of the current gene, and from the cor-
responding allele group (i.e. that which has the same allele type as its type
member), extracts an allele value (from the set of allele values embedded in
the allele group). A genotype is analogous to a row of wooden blocks, where
the hole in the each block has been filled with a brick of the appropriate
shape. It therefore comprises both syntactic and semantic information.
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• The Set of Genotypes (D): We can imagine a set operator that is anal-
ogous to cartesian product, where we multiply a chromosome (C) with the
set of allele groups (B). In a given chromosome, the elements that it con-
tains (its genes), each have a specified allele type. Such a cartesian product
would ensure that each possible allele value, for each type, was present in
a set of genotypes (D). This set D corresponds to all the possible permuta-
tions of genotypes (E), where allele values are varied, but the gene elements
of the chromosome remain constant. This set encompasses the entirety of
all the possible arrangements of allele values in the specified chromosome.
To use the blocks analogue, the set of genotypes (D) corresponds to a set of
elements, where each element corresponds to a chain of wooden blocks with
all holes filled by colored bricks. There exists all the possible permutations
of coloured bricks inserted into these blocks (of defined type and order),
such that there each element is unique, and that all possible permutations
are represented.
What we are keen to do here, is to differentiate between concepts which pri-
marily relate to structure or syntax (the gene and chromosome in our terminol-
ogy), from those which relate to semantic value (in our case allele value). We
are then able to create derivative structures, through operations that rely upon
a shared property of allele type; such as the allele group and the genotype. Each
gene has an associated allele type. Each allele value has an associated allele type.
We end by defining a structure (D) that encompasses all the possible permuta-
tions of allele values consistent with the structure of a chromosome. Now that we
have defined a what we mean by a genotype space (i.e. the parameter space cor-
responding to the set of genotypes), we are in a position to outline the structure
of an evolutionary algorithm.
2.2.2 The evolutionary algorithm loop
A schematic for the evolutionary algorithm loop is shown in figure 2.2.
The evolutionary algorithm starts by sampling elements from the set of geno-
types (D). This takes place via an initialization operator, which generates mem-
bers of the population (H). Members of the population (H) comprise two elements;
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the first of which is an element taken from the set of individuals, and the second
a set that corresponds to a single genotype (E). Although the element taken from
the set of individuals (I) might simply correspond to an index (into an array of
data structures for example), there are alternative implementations where each
element might correspond to a more complex structure (such as a label denoting
species as well in addition to a unique index for example).
The elements of the population (H) represent the substrate upon which the
evolutionary algorithm acts. Typically it is only the distribution of allele values
amongst the population members that change over time. In more complex algo-
rithms, the structure of the chromosome is also subject to modification, as genes
are added or removed. Whilst the number of population members will commonly
remain constant in over the course of the algorithm iterations, this too may also
be subject to change in alternate implementations. The population(H) is a super-
set containing a tournament set (R), which in turn is s superset containing the
breeding set (V). Members of the tournament set (R) are mapped to a set of trial
phenotypes (Q). It is in this mapping that the semantic significance of the allele
values contained in the genotype plays a role. The following explanation high-
lights the structure of an evolutionary algorithm by focussing on set operators
(used to generate sets) and functions (that map elements of one set to another).
The characteristics of an evolutionary algorithm are determined by the im-
plementation of the operators and functions employed, the principal of these are;
• (D, I to H) Initialization Operator: The initialization operator gener-
ates the elements of the population (H). It does this through sampling from
the set of genotypes (D), combining each genotype with an element from
the set of individuals (I).
• (H to R) Tournament Operator: The tournament operator is essentially
a unitary operator that determines which of the members of the population
are to be included in the tournament set (R).
• (R to Q) Ontogenetic Function: The ontogenetic function is that which
maps elements of the tournament set (R) to the set of trial phenotypes
(Q). In the case of evolutionary robotics, the genotype contained in the
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population member usually maps to an artificial neural network (although
in more complex implementations robot morphology might also be deter-
mined). This mapping takes place via an ontogentic function that treats
allele values as parameters.
Sometimes we refer to direct or indirect encoding. Direct encoding is to be
employed where the allele values correspond to explicit features or param-
eters of the neural network model without modification. Indirect encoding
is employed in methodologies where the allele values comprise parameters
of a generative model. The generative model might be some abstraction
of a developmental process. Algorithm design has as its goal the efficient
exploration of parameter space, for the purposes of discovering the fittest
individuals. As a consequence, the decision to employ direct or indirect
coding cannot be determined in isolation. Other significant factors include
the recombination and mutation operators, as well as the functional char-
acteristics of the instantiated neural network phenotypes.
• (Q to U) Fitness Function: The fitness function is a mapping from each
member of the set of trial phenotypes (Q) to a member of the set of trial fit-
ness values (U). In evolutionary robotics, the neural network is instantiated
in a robot (corresponding to a member of the set of trial phenotypes) and a
metric of the success in completing a task is used to determine a value that
is a measure of the extent to which the robot successfully completed the
task. It is this value, (associated with the population member index) that
is stored in the set of trial fitness values (U). These values are important,
since the are used to parameterize subsequent set operations; the selection
and replacement operators.
• (R to V) Selection Operator: The selection operator determines which
members of the tournament set are to be included in the breeding set (V).
The set of trial fitness values (U) is employed in determining the outcome
of the selection operator. In its simplest form, we simply rank tournament
set members according to their corresponding fitness values (F). The fittest
are then allowed to reproduce.
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• (V to W) Recombination and Mutation Operators: These operators
are key in determining how new genotypes are created. The recombina-
tion operator (r) is a binary operator that requires two elements from the
breeding set (V) to generate a new member of the child group (W). The
recombination operator (r) does this through a principled mixing of the se-
mantic information contained in the genotypes (E) of both parent breeding
set members.
Such an operator might for example employ single-point crossover. This is
where a locus on the chromosome (C) is chosen at random. This locus is
used to partition the chromosome into two intervals; from the start of the
chromosome to the locus, and from the locus to the end of the chromosome.
The allele values corresponding to that of the first interval from one parent,
and the second interval from the other parent are copied over to the progeny
(member(s) of the child group (W)).
The allele values of this child group (W) member are then subject to further
modification by a mutation operator. This is a unary operator that changes
some or all of the allele values present in the child group (W) member’s
genotype (E) in some principled fashion, usually involving random pertur-
bation.
The recombination operator is intended to be analogous to processes em-
ployed in sexual reproduction. However, not all genetic algorithms employ
a recombination operator. Clonal genetic algorithms simply mutate the
genotypes of the breeding group, in a fashion that is analogous to asexual
reproduction.
• (W to H) Replacement Operators: Finally the replacement operator
ensures that the least fit member(s) of the tournament set are replaced by
members of the child group (progeny of the breeding set (V)). The set of
trial fitness values (U) is used to determine which population member(s)
present in the tournament set (R) correspond to members of the set of
trial phenotypes (Q) that performed the least successfully. The index of the
population member(s) so identified, is used to determine which member of
the population (H) has its allele values replaced by those of the child group
18
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2.2.3 Client-Server Architectures
Figure 2.3 illustrates how these concepts are applied in evolutionary robotics. We
shall address these issues in more detail in section 2.3.1.4. Whilst many problem
domains make use of evolutionary algorithms that match this pattern there are
two specific areas of implementation that are highly specialized when applied to
evolutionary robotics. These are; firstly the ontogenetic function which maps the
genotype to the neural network phenotype and secondly the fitness function.
The fitness function is based on a some measure of performance of the robot
in the simulation and is therefore implicit. Unless the researcher is addressing
collaborative or collective behaviour on the part of simulated robots, we can
create a very simple computer architecture based on a client-server model for
use in carry out the robot simulations used in the calculation of a fitness value
using this measure. A typical client-server architecture is illustrated in figure
2.3. The role of the server is to execute the initialization, tournament, selection,
recombination and mutation operators and to store the population. Once we have
a valid tournament set the server can send population member data (including
the genotype associated with this member) to a remote client computers. These
client computers carry out the onotogentic mapping from the genotype(E) to the
phenotype set (P). Typically this involves the instantiation of the neural networks
for robot control. The client will then, carry out the trial simulation that allows
us to calculate the genotypes corresponding fitness value. Once this has been
done, the results can be returned to the server, where they are collated in a set
of trial fitness values (U). The server then executes the selection operation on
the tournament set (R), to determine which of the tournament set members are
to be selected for breeding. Those selected comprise the breeding set (V). The
server then executes the recombination, mutation and replacement operations.
The distributed algorithm is shown in more detail in figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.4: Client-Server Networks for Calculation
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Figure 2.5: Distributed Evolutionary Algorithm
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2.3 The Anastomosus of Evolutionary Robotics
An anastomosis is a structure comprising a network of streams which branch
and reconnect (a term used in biology and geology). Warren Sturgis McCulloch
used the term anastomosus when seeking to characterize the complex origins of
cybernetics (Mcculloch [1974]). The image that he presumably had in mind was
that of science and particularly cybernetics, as a flow of ideas and concepts that
over time separate and recombine. What is true of cybernetics is even more
true of the field of evolutionary robotics, since it encompasses cybernetics and
its derivative streams in both thesis and antithesis (see figure 2.6 for a concept
map of the major themes and ideas that have contributed to this field). One
might justifiably argue that evolutionary robotics is one of the most conceptually
eclectic of all the sciences, incorporating ideas from;
1. Evolutionary theory and computational algorithms inspired by natural sys-
tems.
2. Cybernetics and the theory of control systems.
3. Neural networks (from the differing perspectives of connectionism, neuro-
science, neurobiology, neuropsychology).
4. The philosophy of artificial intelligence (largely building on ideas proposed
by Heidegger).
Whilst evolutionary robotics is constructed from these foundations, it is also
partially defined as the antithesis of the computational approach to artificial
intelligence. The notion of embedded cognition (see section 2.3.4) is key in high-
lighting the contrasting approaches of these two fields and does much to frame
the evolutionary robotics approach.
2.3.1 Evolutionary Theory
2.3.1.1 The Modern Synthesis
What is often referred to as the modern synthesis relies upon ideas described by
Charles Darwin in his book On the Origin of Species (Darwin [1859]). His work
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features some of the ideas previously expounded by Alfred Russel Wallace (Wal-
lace [1855]). Darwin himself acknowledges that he was aware of Wallace’s work
(for a detailed treatment of this subject see Beddall [1972]). Wallace describes the
gradual change of form and structure by species and the tree-like structure that
these changes exhibit over time. However, there is one key element that is miss-
ing, namely the process by which this change occurs. Darwin’s key contribution
is the notion that organisms undergo a process of natural selection analogous to
that of the process of artificial selection undergone by domesticated species due
to selective breeding. It is the idea that through competition, changes take place
in the distribution of characteristics in offspring as if nature were some arbiter of
those that should survive and reproduce.
Darwin at the time was unaware of the existence of genes, nor the principles
of inheritance that genes support. Gregor Mendel was the first to recognize that
the inheritance of characteristics by offspring, does not take place through the
blending of parental characteristics. Rather, certain characteristics are discrete
and are inherited in their entirety from one parent or another (Mendel [1865]).
The biological mechanism underlying this process was not identified until much
later. James D. Watson and Francis Crick, identified the structure of DNA to be
that of a double helix (for a historical treatment see Watson [1968]). The pro-
cess of inheritance was thereby understood to rely upon genetic recombination
and mutation (due to replication errors). Their work was based on X-ray crys-
tallography work carried out by Rosalind Franklin (for an account see Maddox
[2003]).
Modern evolutionary theory extends significantly on the ideas promoted by
Darwin. It encompasses the idea that nominally altruistic activities are consistent
with the persistence of a trait to the extent that it benefits those who share
the same genes (Hamilton [1964]). In the narrowest sense where this relates
to close family members this is termed kin selection, in the more general sense
where individuals share the same ancestor this leads to the notion of inclusive
fitness. The careful delineation of that which constitutes behaviour that will
be selected for is an important theme in evolutionary biology with both Charles
Williams (Williams [1966]) and Richard Dawkins (Dawkins [1976]) doing much to
clarify these issues. Both of these authors argue against unsophisticated models
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of group selection (Wynne-Edwards [1963]); the idea that altruistic behaviour
will be selected for when groups engage in competition. Their criticism relies
on the idea that altruistic traits (in excess of those implied by kin selection for
example) incur a cost, and that less altruistic members of the group, who do not
incur this cost, will proliferate. Simply put, altruistic populations are vulnerable
to parasitic invasion since natural selection operates at the level of the individual
rather than the group. Dawkins later introduced the notion that selection takes
place, not simply due to the physical attributes of the individual, but also due to
the effect that it has on its environment, referring to this as an extended phenotype
(Dawkins [1982]).
It is acknowledged that social mechanisms potentially support other forms of
altruism (see Alexander [1974] for an early review) through, for example reciprocal
altruism (Trivers [1971]). Under these circumstances a social contract between
two (genetically) unrelated individuals is supportive of altruistic acts to the extent
that the individual can expect such acts to be reciprocated. However, such forms
of altruism can be shown to rely upon the penalization of defectors (those who
might unilaterally renege upon their social obligation). This in turn requires the
existence of social practices that discriminate against those who do not penalize
the defectors (assuming that is, that the enforcement of punishment is not cost
free), in a potentially recursive fashion (see West et al. [2007] for a review of such
issues). The extent to which social activity within a group is consistent with
traits that will be selected for is an area which has received some elucidation
through the application of game theory to social situations. John Maynard Smith
deals with this subject comprehensively in his work Evolution and Theory of
Games (Maynard Smith [1982]). It includes the notion of an evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS); a strategy that when adopted by individual population members,
is impervious to displacement through invaders who might employ a variant of
this strategy. This work is based partially on ideas elucidated by George R. Price
(Smith and Price [1973]). The entirety of the ideas outlined here (in addition to
some others) is often referred to in brief as the modern synthesis.
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2.3.1.2 Further Developments
The ideas of natural selection, kin selection, inclusive fitness, evolutionary games
theory and the clarification of the issues that relate to group selection (as elu-
cidated by Williams and Dawkins), arguably constitute the core principles that
comprise the modern synthesis. However, there are four key areas where the mod-
ern synthesis (sometimes referred to as neodarwinism) is subject to continuing
analysis and debate, since;
1. It (arguably) understates the role of development and environmental feed-
back on the determination of traits.
2. It does not address the evolution of symbiotic mutualism and thus endosym-
biosis
3. It understates the complexity of lineages by failing to take into account
lateral gene transfer.
4. It is equivocal on the topic of multi-level selection.
Developmental biologists are particularly vocal on this first point (see for
example Kitcher et al. [2001]). The orthodox response would be to take the
position that phenotypic plasticity is a genetic trait and therefore is subsumed
under neodarwinism.
The remainder of these points, relate to what is sometimes termed interspecific
evolution (Hoffmeister and Martin [2003]), and are less easily dismissed. Sym-
biotic mutualism, is an area that has sometimes been avoided by neodarwinists
due to the difficulties of explaining it within the standard model. Dawkins for
example, focusses primarily on parasitic symbiosis (more readily explained under
the Darwinist model) when he discusses symbiosis in The Extended Phenotype
(Dawkins [1982]). Whilst it may be argued that mutualistic symbiosis is rela-
tively rare in living organisms, its impact is not insignificant. The concept of
endosymbiosis was proposed by Lynn Margulus (Sagan [1967], Margulis [1976])
to explain the emergence of eukaryotes through the symbiosis of prokaryotic an-
cestors. It is only relatively recently however that this notion has been accepted
as part of the modern orthodoxy (Margulis [1995]).
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The focus of the modern synthesis is on the individual, and the consequences
of the actions taken by the individual that effect reproductive opportunity the
subsequent survival of offspring. It is on the basis of this behaviour that selection
is made. The collective behaviour of a group, can only therefore be interpreted
as the macro effect of this constituent behaviours.
One might argue however, that whilst this might be true, it does not provide
us with a parsimonious explanation of the behaviour of populations that co-adapt.
An example of such a system occurring in nature, is that of bacterial popula-
tions and the plasmid replicators that they host. Plasmids are parasitic replica-
tors capable of carrying DNA between bacteria. Lateral gene transfer (Freeman
[1951]) is mediated by plasmids present in bacterial populations (for a review see
Davison [1999]). They are of benefit to a bacterial population due to their role
in; expressing resistance to rarely occurring toxins and in providing protection
from environmental stresses. This is a biological system that comprises two mu-
tualistic populations; where one population (in this case the plasmid population)
is dispersed amongst another population (the bacterial population).
It is examples such as these that imply the need for models of multi-level selec-
tion, since the survival of individual bacteria relies significantly upon a features of
the population as a whole. Under the standard model, one might expect individ-
ual bacteria to evolve with a degree of resistance to hosting plasmids (for which
there is a metabolic cost). However, in so doing, such a bacteria would be less
likely to take advantage of benefits denoted by the inclusion of plasmid DNA. If
we are to argue that the bacterial population in some sense acts as multi-cellular
individual, then we still need a model that accounts for darwinian selection at
the level of the individual, as well as that of the population.
This requires a further extension to the standard model (attempts to provide
such a framework include Bresch et al. [1980], Boucher and James [1982] and
Frank [1995]). Whilst these issues do not invalidate the core ideas of the modern
synthesis, the need for an extended model remains an issue of contention (Pigliucci
[2007], Brooks [2011]), potentially requiring a re-prioritization of lines of enquiry
within biology (Lewontin [2002], Tauber [2010]).
A extension of the modern synthesis to incorporate multi-level selection may
be of particular interest to evolutionary robotics researchers in the future. For ex-
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ample in models of adaptation that incorporate a population of robots coevolving
with a population of memes, in competition with other robot populations. Multi-
level selection models, may also be of interest to those robotics researchers looking
at cooperative activities (Baldassarre et al. [2003a]; Nitschke [2003]; Waibel et al.
[2009]) or the evolution of communication (Yanco and Stein [1993], Steels [2003],
Floreano et al. [2007], Greeff and Nolfi [2012]).
For the vast majority of research conducted in evolutionary robotics, the mod-
ern synthesis is largely sufficient as the basis for models that abstract evolutionary
principles in algorithms (since most of the work involved in evolutionary robotics
focuses on the behaviour of individual robots). However, as computational power
increases, allowing for more complex simulations, models of multi-level selection
will have an increasing relevance.
2.3.1.3 The Origin of Algorithms for Evolution
It is possible to identify four areas in which computational algorithms have been
inspired by biological theories of evolution (dating back to the 1950’s); artificial
life, computational biology, optimization and artificial intelligence.
• Artificial Life: Nils Aall Barricelli is arguably the first to conduct any-
thing resembling evolutionary simulations on a computer in experiments
carried out at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton in 1953, 1954
and 1956 (Barricelli [1962]). He published his early work (Barricelli [1954]
and Barricelli [1957]) in the Italian Journal Methodos whose primary topic
was that of symbolic logic. His experiments involved an idealized two-
dimensional space in the form of a grid inhabited by entities (each of which
corresponded to a single number).
The numeric value of an individual defines its phenotype; its movement
(akin to that of a chess peice) in the grid and spawning characteristics (for
a brief summary of this work see Fogel [2006a], for a wider historical con-
text see Fogel [2006b]). Barricelli’s work contributes less to the notion of a
genetic algorithm, than it does the idea of artificial life. He did not seek to
attain biological realism, rather he sought to abstract certain principles of
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biological organisms and explore them through computer simulation (Bar-
ricelli [1962]), and as such bears a close relationship to modern day work in
artificial life.
Barricelli was later to collaborate with Jon Reed, working at the Oslo Uni-
versity in Norway, in what is probably the first example of evolutionary
strategies being used in machine learning. Their paper describes the simu-
lation of an evolutionary algorithm for playing a simplified game of poker
(Reed et al. [1967]).
• Computational Biology: Some of the earliest examples of work that
we would recognize as resembling genetic or evolutionary algorithms, are
those described in a series of papers produced by A.S. Fraser and J. S. F.
Barker (working at the University of Sydney) between 1957 and 1960 (Fraser
[1957a], Fraser [1957b], Barker [1958b], Barker [1958a], Fraser [1960b],
Fraser [1960a]). One paper in particular describes what we might regard as
the general form of an evolutionary algorithm (Fraser [1960b]) but for the
failure to include a mutation operator;
1. Extract, without replacement, a pair of parents at random from the
given set of parents.
2. Form a set of progeny from these parents.
3. Determine the phenotypes of the progeny.
4. Select potential parents from the set of progeny.
5. Repeat (1)-(4) until all parents have produced the specified number of
. progeny.
6. Print out any required information.
7. Repeat (1)-(6) using the selected progeny as parents.
R.C. Lewontin was also to carry out simulations involving an evolution-
ary algorithm in experiments to model the evolution of various alternative
morphisms in house mice (Lewontin and Dunn [1960]). These examples
represent the earliest uses of evolutionary algorithms.
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• Optimization: Bremermann wrote a paper in 1962 describing experiments
applying evolutionary algorithms to numerical problems for the purposes
of optimization (Bremermann [1962]), however according to his account,
the results were not particularly impressive. Despite not being named as
a co-author, Bremermann refers to a; ‘Mr. Salaff, who has done all the
programming’ (page 101, Bremermann [1962]). The lack of implementation
details in the paper might lead us to question the extent of Bremermann’s
personal contribution.
Another German, Ingo Rechenberg carried out optimization work on wing
design (Rechenberg [1965]), developing what he termed evolution strate-
gies (together with Hans-Paul Schwefel), the subject of his doctoral thesis
(Rechenberg [1971]). Rechenberg’s work relied on the use of a mutation
operator without recourse to recombination. A solution to a problem was
be formulated in a fashion that allowed for random perturbation of solution
parameters. If the modified solution was superior to that of the unmodified
solution it would replace its parent, if not, then the original solution would
undergo further mutation.
• Artificial Intelligence: The field that we now refer to as artificial intelli-
gence was to originated largely from members of the cybernetics movement
who were to focus on a computational approach to intelligence.
The work of R. M. Friedberg (Friedberg [1958], Friedberg et al. [1959]), out-
lines an approach to producing computer programs through an automated
process that from a modern observers perspective bears some resemblance
to a clonal genetic algorithm. In this process a superior program would be
selected from a population of programs, which had undergone a modifica-
tion of certain program parameters in an iterative process. However, he
makes no specific reference to this as an evolutionary process, and fails to
draw an analogy with evolutionary systems.
Perhaps more significant was the contribution made to this field by L.J.
Fogel, A.J. Owens and M.J. Walsh (Fogel et al. [1966]), who coined the
term evolutionary programming. In their approach they would model a
problem with a finite-state machine, and in a fashion similar to that adopted
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by Rechenberg, would mutate the finite-state machine model, replacing the
original solution with the perturbed solution if superior. Recombination
played no role in this algorithm.
In ‘Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems’ (Holland [1975]) John
Holland describes an algorithm operating on of a population of genes, em-
ploying recombination and mutation operators, in a formulation that he
would termed genetic algorithms. He also sought to explain why such
algorithms work, through his notion of schema theory. In this theory he
models a solution as a string of bits, and seeks to explain why through the
use of genetic operators, those partial solutions (schemata) that contribute
to a solution that is above-average (in comparison with the population
fitness), will proliferate. John Holland’s formulation incorporates all the
features of an evolutionary algorithm (as described in section 2.2), as it is
commonly understood from the modern perspective.
N.L. Cramer (Cramer [1985]) proposed an algorithm whereby a simple com-
puter language, defining binary multiplication operators and their argu-
ments, could be evolved using genetic algorithms, to change the function
of a computer program, rather than simply its parameters. This was to
extended and generalized by John Koza (Koza [1989], Koza [1990]), refer-
ring to his approach as genetic programming. The essential idea is to
formulate a solution to a problem in a tree structures. In the tree, nodes are
functions and terminal nodes are function arguments. It is through the use
of recombination and mutation operators that a population of such struc-
tures undergo adaptation, based on the fitness of the solution represented
by the evaluation of the tree.
Here we have referred briefly to the origins of the terms; evolution strategies,
evolutionary programming, genetic algorithms and genetic programming, collec-
tively known as evolutionary computation (Eiben and Smith [2010]). A num-
ber of reviews exist that cover the topics mentioned in greater detail, including;
an historical snapshot of genetic algorithms (De Jong [1985]), the emergence of
evolution strategies (Beyer and Schwefel [2002]), genetic programming (Koza and
Poli [2003], Fogel [2006b]) and the early developments evolutionary computation
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(Fogel [2010b], Fogel [2010a]), genetic algorithms and evolution strategies (Dia-
nati et al.), and nature-inspired algorithms more generally (Zang et al. [2010]).
2.3.1.4 Issues in Evolutionary Robotics
Section 2.2 provides us with an overview of the structure of an evolutionary algo-
rithm in the most general terms. Section 2.3.1 starts will a similarly general ap-
proach in introducing evolutionary theory. In seeking to add more detail to these
general introductions, we shall first discuss the idea of a fitness landscape, before
going on to outline how this affects algorithm design in evolutionary robotics.
The notion of a fitness landscape was introduced by Sewall Wright (Wright
[1932]). Using the terminology that we defined in section 2.2, the set of genotypes
(all the possible allele values consistent with the structure defined by the chro-
mosome) maps to a notional set of phenotypes via the ontogenetic function. In
conjunction with the environment in which these phenotypes exist, we arrive at
the idea of a fitness landscape, representing the space of all possible fitness values
that might be attained from the set of phenotypes. An evolutionary algorithm
explores the fitness landscape. It seeks to discover peaks in this fitness landscape
corresponding to regions in genotype space that map to phenotypes with high
fitness values.
A recombination operator results in a discontinuous jump in this genotype
space, since it arbitrarily combines the allele values of disparate (prior to conver-
gence) parents. A mutation operator typically only changes a smaller number of
parameters (per iteration) via random perturbation. Depending upon the mag-
nitude of these perturbations, a mutation operator therefore allows for a finer
grained exploration of genotype space than that allowed for by the recombination
operator. A jagged fitness landscape is one in which small variations in allele value
result in a large variation of fitness in the associated phenotype. The problem
with a jagged fitness landscape is that the potential benefit of a mutation opera-
tor is reduced, since it is unable to climb a gradual slope of fitness improvement
through random perturbation.
If the parameter space that maps to high value fitness regions in the fitness
landscape is small, and the fitness landscape is jagged, the ease with which high
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fitness value genotypes can be discovered is significantly reduced. We become re-
liant upon the recombination operator to discover these narrow peaks by chance.
If genotypes existent in the population lack diversity or the population converges
too quickly, the chances of finding such peaks in the fitness landscape becomes
very small. In contrast, a smooth fitness landscape is one in which mutation oper-
ators in particular, are able to discover peaks corresponding to high fitness-values.
In a smooth fitness landscape, even if the space of genotype parameter space is
again small, it is at least discoverable through the finer grained exploration that
mutation operators allow. A smooth fitness landscape implies the existence of
pathways through the fitness landscape, towards regions of higher fitness, that
can be climbed through the random perturbation of allele values.
The notion of a fitness landscape, helps us to understand some of the core
issues that affect design decisions in evolutionary robotics. It is not simply the
functionality of the neural networks (that are a product of the ontogenetic func-
tion) that we need to consider, we also need to consider how recombination and
mutation operators affect the efficiency with which are able to explore genotype
space in the discovery of high-fitness individuals. What we shall do now, is to
focus on a small number of narrowly defined topics within evolutionary theory
that are particularly relevant to design decisions in evolutionary robotics; the
Baldwin effect, neutral networks, modularity and diversity.
• Baldwin effect: The Baldwin effect provides us with a model for under-
standing the relationship between learning and evolution (Baldwin [1896]).
Hinton and Nowlan conducted an influential experiment where they demon-
strated that ‘Learning alters the shape of the search space in which evo-
lution operates and thereby provides good evolutionary paths towards sets
of co-adapted alleles’ (page 495, Hinton and Nowlan [1987]). This work
was to become influential in the evolutionary robotics community, resulting
in a resurgence of interest in the Baldwin effect (Mayley [1996], Harvey
[1996], Nolfi [1997], Richards [2008], Lande [2009]). An interpretation of
Baldwin’s ideas from a modern perspective is that phenotypic plasticity re-
sults in a smoothing of the fitness landscape. The Baldwin effect requires
two components; firstly, that allele values within a genotype allow for some
variation in phenotype (plasticity), secondly, that there exists a feedback
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process whereby the potential benefit of phenotype plasticity is exploited
(e.g. if an organism can learn, and in so doing improve its fitness, there is
a mechanism that ensures that this will take place). Under such circum-
stances, an organism in the course of its interaction with its environment
is able (through the local search that its plasticity allows) to discover and
engage in high-fitness activity, attainable within the limits afforded by this
plasticity.
Baldwin’s simple point was that a trait that is subject to adaptation dur-
ing the life-time of the organism (a muscle strengthening under constant
use, for example), denotes an advantage to the organism in that it allows
it to take advantage of an opportunity that might not otherwise be subject
to exploitation. Whilst there may be a metabolic cost associated with a
more developed muscle, plasticity in the phenotype allows it to respond
to environmental changes and competition pressures in a flexible fashion.
The notion that learning endows an organism (or robot) with behavioural
plasticity (rather than just physical plasticity) provides us with a model of
how both learning and evolution interact in the pursuit of the evolution of
robots that are capable of executing complex tasks. Chalmers was one of
the first to demonstrate the evolution of connectionist networks capable of
demonstrating learning (Chalmers [1990]). Urzelai and Floreana demon-
strated the evolution of neural networks, whose dynamic properties were
subject to Hebbian learning in real robot experiments (Floreano and Mon-
dada [1996], Floreano and Urzelai [1998], Urzelai and Floreano [2000b]).
Work conducted as part of this thesis also involved the comparative stud-
ies of such networks in the evolution of locomotion in robot simulations
(McHale and Husbands [2004c], McHale and Husbands [2004b]).
• Neutral Networks: Motoo Kimura proposed an alternative mechanism
to natural selection to explain variations within and between species based
on a neutral theory of genetic evolution (Kimura [1983]) where variation
is primarily the consequence of random process. The idea that stochas-
tic variation might play a significant role in adaptation had been suggested
previously (Maynard Smith [1970]) but in less detail than that presented by
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Kimura. Under such circumstances, genetic diversity is created by variation
that does not result in improved fitness (as required for natural selection
under the Darwinian model). A diverse population arrived at through neu-
tral variation (i.e. mutation that does not reduce fitness) acts as a substrate
from which highly positive mutations might arise. This gives rise to the idea
that the search space of phenotypic variation, might be efficiently explored
via numerous pathways that exhibit no immediate increase in fitness, in
other words; neutral networks. Where this idea is somewhat controversial
(for a discussion see Leigh [2007]), is that whilst there is no reason under the
Darwinian model that stochastic events resulting in genetic mutations that
are neutral in their impact on fitness should be selected against, we can-
not ignore the effects of stabilizing selection (Waddington [1959], Maynard-
Smith [1983]), that results in a reduction in genetic diversity. The interest
in neural networks from an evolutionary robotics perspective (Harvey and
Thompson [1996]) relates to the idea that there may be benefits to devising
algorithms where multiple pathways are available for evolutionary search,
so as to improve the efficiency with which optimal solutions can be found
(for more recent theoretical work see Barnett [2000] and Ebner et al. [2001]).
• Modularity: The notion of modularity in biological systems is different
from the strict sense in which we might use it when referring to a physical
mechanism. What is of particular interest to researchers in evolutionary
robotics are the circumstances under which modularity can become a tar-
get for evolution (Wagner [1996]) and how this might influence decisions
made in the evolution of neural networks (Happel and Murre [1994], Cal-
abretta and Parisi [2005]). Ideally we would choose an encoding model and
mapping procedure that would allow us to preserve positive traits (that
might rely on some degree of functional modularity) so that we are able
to explore a range of complex behaviours in our evolutionary algorithms.
Indirect encoding (used in Cangelosi et al. [1994], Gruau [1994], Gruau and
Quatramaran [1997], Eggenberger [1996], Eggenberger [1997b], Astor and
Adami [2000], Bongard and Pfeifer [2003]) has the potential to preserve
modular features. In such approaches, ontogenetic functions support mod-
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ularity through some generative process, at a level which is not directly
affected by the disruption of a recombination operator in the same way that
direct encoding might be. The downside to approaches that are exclusively
indirect, is that this might limit the exploration of intra-module adaptation.
An example of an approach that combines both aspects of direct and indi-
rect encoding is that used by Phil Husbands in his GasNet model (Husbands
et al. [1998e]). In GasNets some allele values determine spatial sectors of
connectivity (neuron nodes are deemed to be spatially distributed). Mixed
encoding strategies formulations are potentially more robust to the preser-
vation of functionality, than pure direct encoding strategies where alleles
specify point-to-point neural connections, but yet still allow for the explo-
ration of intra-module connectivity. A number of reviews have been written
on the relative benefits of direct and indirect encoding (Cangelosi and Nolfi
[2003], Kuscu and Thornton [1994]), Durr et al. [2010]).
• Diversity: One of the challenges of evolutionary algorithms is to try and
maintain a degree of diversity in the population in an attempt to avoid
premature convergence to a solution and allow for an efficient search of
phenotype space (discovering novel behaviors). The maintenance of diver-
sity in biology, is closely related to models of speciation (White [1968]), since
speciation requires the long-term maintenance of diversity, ultimately lead-
ing to reproductive isolation (for a comprehensive treatment see Dieckmann
et al. [2004] and Coyne and Orr [2004], for a review see Chesson [2000]).
Speciation itself remains quite a controversial topic, with the origin of nov-
elty and the processes by which diversity is maintained being key issues of
debate (Baker [2005], Bolnick and Fitzpatrick [2007], Magnuson-Ford et al.
[2010], Thibert-Plante and Hendry [2011]). Of particular interest is how
reproductive quasi-isolation is maintained prior to adaptations that result
in the biological impossibility of interbreeding. There are two processes by
which diversity can be maintained; due to varying degrees of geographical
isolation (Bolnick and Fitzpatrick [2007]), or through assortative mating
(Ritchie [2007]). The role of a developmental mutation is of particular
interest as far as novelty is concerned, as a small mutation is capable of
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resulting in significant changes in phenotype.
Evolutionary algorithms make use of analogues of geographic isolation to
maintain diversity through the adoption of population models that incor-
porate the notion of spatial distribution. In some cases a tournament set
are selected from such a population, comprising the random selection of
genotypes that are spatially close to one another. This ensures that com-
petition is local, and allows for the preservation of dissimilar genotypes for
longer than would be the case of no limitations were placed in gene flow.
This is an analogue of parapatric speciation. This method was adopted in
experiments reported in this thesis (McHale and Husbands [2004b], McHale
and Husbands [2004c]). An alternative approach involves the reduction of
gene flow between robots that have different behavioural attributes, which
the authors term behavioural speciation (Trujillo et al. [2011]). Although
not explicitly recognized by the authors, this is an analogue of assortative
mate selection based on behavioural similarity. Other researchers jettison
biological plausibility completely and take the short-cut of modifying (or
replacing) the fitness metric by some measure of novelty (Risi et al. [2010],
Lehman and Stanley [2011a]).
2.3.2 Neural Networks
The evolutionary robotics perspective differs from the connectionist perspective
(for comprehensive texts on connectionism see Rojas [1996] and Haykin [1999]),
in that it draws quite heavily on findings in neurobiology. As such some of the
models used in evolutionary robotics can be closer to those used in computational
neuroscience (which seeks to model real neural processes) than to those conven-
tionally associated with connectionism (which seeks to create simple abstractions
that are computationally efficient). Examples of this include approaches in evo-
lutionary robotics inspired by neuromodulaton (Husbands et al. [1998a], Ishiguro
et al. [2003b]), developmental processes (Gruau [1994], Eggenberger [1997b], Rust
et al. [2001]) and dynamic plasticity (e.g. Urzelai and Floreano [2000b]).
Connectionism has traditionally focused on issues that relate to pattern recog-
nition (Bishop [2006]), function approximation (back-propagation models, Rumel-
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hart and McClelland [1986]), associative memory (Hopfield [1982]) and dimen-
sional reduction (e.g. self-organizing feature maps, Kohonen [1990]). Evolution-
ary robotics makes use of these models where appropriate, but it has historically
focussed on sensor-motor control systems (typically involving formulations of neu-
ral networks that were appropriate for continuous or discrete time simulation).
The goal in evolutionary robotics has been to seek to create entire agents capable
of exhibiting minimal behaviour (with a view to supporting complex behaviour),
rather than to address specific problem domains such as computer vision or nat-
ural speech recognition for example. The philosophy that underlies evolutionary
robotics is based on that of embedded cognition, and takes the viewpoint that
the agent is in a dynamic coupling with its environment. Connectionism does not
prioritize the agent oriented perspective.
In seeking to understand how evolutionary robotics has arisen from its tech-
nological and theoretical antecedents, we should first look at the roots of con-
nectionism; cybernetic, biological and ethological. There are a number of histor-
ical reviews that emphasize different aspects of connectionism; orthodox (Medler
[1998]), philosophical (Aizawa [1992]), and functional (Valentine [1989], Cowan
[1990], Bechtel and Abrahamsen [1991], Cowan and Sharp [2012]). Cordeschi
provides us with a rare insight into early connectionist machines and compares
them with those developed more recently (Cordeschi [2000]). Other authors re-
late connectionism to other fields, such as neuroscience and AI (Schwartz [1988]),
cognitive science (McCloskey [1991]), and psychology (Rowe [1995]). Of particu-
lar interest to us in seeking to explain the anastomosus of evolutionary robotics,
are the historical origins of the diverse conceptuals streams that have combined
to result in this field of research. Aizawa seeks to do this by identifying three
strains of research;
‘This might be divided roughly into: (1) the mathematical/com-
putational strain of connectionism following up the work begun by
Rashevsky, McCulloch, and Pitts; (2) the neuropsychological work by
Hebb and his colleagues; and (3) the more purely neuroscientific work
by, for example, Sir John Eccles’ (page 305, Aizawa [1992]).
We prefer a slightly different categorical framework. In order of roughly in-
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creasing abstraction from biological systems, we can identify four streams of re-
search;
1. Neurobiogical: Sir John Eccles was representative of a group of researchers
who sought to understand the biology of neural systems (Eccles [1953]).
As such, the preoccupation of these researchers was with the electrical and
chemical processes that might underlie the biological function of neural sys-
tems. The goal was not to build abstractions or models of these systems,
but to understand their operation in terms of more fundamental physical
principles.
2. Computational Neuroscience: Taking Rashevsky’s work as an example
(Rashevsky [1935]), it is clear that his goals are to seek a mathematical
basis for an understanding of the workings of the brain. Whilst his work
predates the advent of the modern computer, this perspective is very much
that of modern computational neuroscience. He seeks to use mathematics
to arrive at models of biological systems that underpin the workings of the
brain, writing papers (such as Rashevsky [1933]) that are similar to modern
papers in computational neuroscience (other than the fact that the graphs
are hand drawn, rather than computer generated).
3. Neuro-ethological: Hebb was clearly motivated by a desire to under-
stand and model the neurological basis of behaviour (Hebb [1949]). Ev-
idence of this interest in behaviour is indicated by other published work,
that addresses ‘Heredity and Environment in Mammalian Behaviour’ (Hebb
[1953]). Whilst Hebb’s work, sought to be biologically realistic, his focus
was on the behaviours and cognitive processes that simple models of neu-
robiology might help us explain. What we now call Hebbian learning, is a
simple principle, that whilst biologically plausible, does not typically require
the complexity of modelling that Rashevsky’s approach employs.
4. Cybernetic: The focus of the cybernetic movement (covered in more de-
tail in section 2.3.3) is on the underlying principles behind the mechanisms
and processes of control. The movement included those that had in inter-
est in building machines that might have some practical application. The
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early cybernetics movement had within it two themes, that typified by the
William Ross Ashby’s holistic perspective, and the computationalist theme
typified by the work of Alan Turing. The role that McCulloch and Pitts
would play within this movement, was to provide support to the computa-
tional clique, with a view of the brain as a computer (for a detailed analysis
see Michael and Arbib [2000]). They did so through work that demon-
strated neural nets as capable of supporting logical operations (McCulloch
and Pitts [1943]). The notion that the brain works as if it were a computer
might appear somewhat surprising from a modern perspective, however that
this was their view is unambiguous; ‘What we have said so far insures that
those neurons in a brain can be and are used as relays in a computer to
gate all-or-none impulses’ (page 190, McCulloch [1957]), and referring to
a conversation with Norebet Weiner in the early 1940’s ‘He talked also of
various kinds of computation and was happy with my notion of brains as,
to a first guess, digital computers, with the possibility that it was the tem-
poral succession of impulses that might constitute the signal proper’ (page
10, Mcculloch [1974]).
In contrast with other streams of research, their model represents a very
much simplified model of neurons and connections than that attempted by
Rashevsky for example. In this and extensions of this work, the functional
significance of these networks is deemed of more greater interest than theri
biological verisimilitude.
Although the notion of the brain as a computer is not given much credence,
the idea that the brain is in some sense is engaged in computation is something
that has persisted within the connectionist movement in the machine learning
community. Frank Rosenblatt introduced the perceptron (Rosenblatt [1958b])
neural network model, showing that a collection of perceptrons can act as a
pattern detector or linear discriminator. One way of abstracting Hebb’s idea is
through the notion of a weight. A weight is a single numeric value that can be
perceived as reflecting the strength of a connection between two neurons. We can
imagine a single layer of perceptrons connected to an input and output stage. The
input stage corresponds to a set of notional sensors, whose activation at any point
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in time reflects some sensory state. These inputs are connected to the perceptrons,
such that the activation of the perceptron is a function of the product of the each
input values and the weight of the connection between this input unit and a
specific perceptron. The output stage would, through selecting the perceptron
with the highest value for a given sensor input be able to differentiate between a
continuous range of sensor values, acting as a linear discriminator.
It is the value of the weights of connections between artificial neurons rep-
resenting an input pattern to the perceptrons that determine the output of the
preceptrons for a given pattern. Rosenblatt went on to suggest that the value
of these weights provided the basis for the incorporation of information in the
brain, supporting recognition and determining behaviour (Rosenblatt [1958a]).
The idea that brain activity might in some way be facilitated by the adaptation
of individual neurons to sensor inputs, and behaviour result from the functional
characteristics of individual neurons in collective activity is at the heart of con-
nectionism.
Unfortunately this line of enquiry was inhibited by the publication of a book by
Minksy and Pappert (Minsky and Papert [1969]) demonstrating the limitations
of the perceptron, namely, its inability to solve the XOR problem (in boolean
logic and a TRUE value occurs where both inputs are either true or false). The
reason for this is that a single layer perceptron is a linear discriminator, and the
discriminator boundary (a function of weights) between exemplars required to
appropriately classify them needs to be curved for the XOR problem. Whilst this
problem can be solved through the use of a two layer perceptron, this arguably
was not known, or was not publicized widely at the time of Minsky and Pappert’s
book. That Minksy and Pappert’s work was a deliberate attempt at derailing
the connectionist agenda in the competition for funding is effectively admitted
by Pappert 30 years later; ’By 1969, the date of the publication of Perceptrons,
AI was not operating in an ivory tower. Money was at stake’ (page 7, Papert
[1988]). For as long as neural networks provided support for the idea of the
brain as computer, it was of political value to those engaged in research involving
computation. As soon as it became apparent, that models of neural networks
might in some way present an alternative basis for addressing issues of artificial
intelligence, then competition for funding was to became an issue. That neural
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networks offered an alternative was made explicit in the paper ‘Computation in
Neural Nets’ (von Foesrter [1967]). It is perhaps also significant that Ross Ashby’s
comments were elicited and acknowledged by the author of this paper, giving
support to the notion of neural nets as an alternative to approaches favoured by
the computational clique.
Although Paul Werbos (Werbos [1974]) proposed a method of weight adjust-
ment in multi-layer perecptron networks that would allow perceptrons to solve
the XOR problem, it was not until almost a decade later that interest in this
area returned. This was largely due to work carried out by Rumelhart and Mc-
Clelland (Rumelhart and McClelland [1986]) and their letter published in Nature
entitled ’Learning representations by back-propagating errors’ (Rumelhart et al.
[1986]). Earlier papers outlining details of the Hopfield Network (Hopfield [1982])
for associate memory and the Self-Organizing Feature Map (SOFM) or Kohonen
Network (Kohonen [1982], Kohonen [1990]) also contributed to a resurgence of
interest in artificial neural networks. Despite this resurgence, the field would
continue to undergo attacks from the computationalist oommunity. Papert for
example continued to criticize ‘misleading attempts to use connectionist methods
in practical applications’ (page 5, Papert [1988]). In the same paper he goes on
to dismiss the (at that time) recent excitement over neural networks to be largely
down to cultural dynamics; what he characterizes as an attraction to holistic
thinking rather than rationalism. Connectionists would also see their work chal-
lenged by eminent biologists such as Francis Crick on the grounds of biologically
implausibility. He was sceptical of long-term prospects of this field (Crick [1989]).
The connectionist approach was also rejected by some psychologists, based on the
argument that the brain was not connectionist at the cognitive level (Fodor and
Pylyshyn [1988a]). Rodney Brooks was also to falsely characterize connection-
ism as primarily a solution to the problem of representations, an approach which
he deemed flawed in seeking to address issues of artificial intelligence (Brooks
[1991]).
Despite these objections, connectionist models, currently play a fundamental
role in evolutionary robotics (see section 2.3.5.3). History will be the judge of
Papert’s assertion that connectionism has no role to play in practical applications.
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2.3.3 Cybernetics
The origin of the word cybernetics is taken taken from the greek kybernetes,
meaning steersman (Wiener [1948]). Norbert Weiner, the author of ‘Cybernetics
or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine’ (Wiener [1949])
and one of the founders of the cybernetics movement defined cybernetics as fol-
lows;
Cybernetics is a word invented to define a new field in science. It
combines under one heading the study of what in a human context is
sometimes loosely described as thinking and in engineering is known
as control and communication. In other words, cybernetics attempts
to find the common elements in the functioning of automatic machines
and of the human nervous system, and to develop a theory which will
cover the entire field of control and communication in machines and
in living organisms. (page 14, Wiener [1948])
Ross Ashby, another founder of this field wrote ‘Introduction to Cybernetics’
(Ashby [1956]), and ‘Design for a Brain’ (Ashby [1960]). He characterizes these
works himself in the following fashion;
I. to C. is concerned with first principles, as they concern the top-
ics of mechanism, communication, and regulation; but it is concerned
with the principles and does not appreciably develop their applica-
tions. It considers mechanisms as if they go in small discrete steps,
a supposition that makes their logical properties very easy to un-
derstand. Design for a Brain, while based on the same principles,
mentions them only so far as is necessary for their application to the
particular problem of the origin of adaptive behaviour. It considers
mechanisms that change continuously (i.e. as the steps shrink to zero),
for this supposition makes their practical properties more evident. (p
vii,Ashby [1960])
Both scientists were to make references to we see references to stability and
feedback (ideas central to modern control theory), information theory (Shannon
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[1948]), and biological regulation. MucCulloch, presents a personal perspective
(as a member of the early cybernetics movement) (Mcculloch [1974]), whereas
Phil Husbands (Husbands et al. [2008]) puts the movement in a broader historical
context.
Whilst the field was initially united in its underlying focus on the mechanisms
and processes of control, there are two separate strains of thought that ultimately
would lead to a tortoise and hare like competition. The first strain, that of the
field of computation, is essentially work that is a derivative of the notion of the
Turing Machine and its extension in the Church-Turing thesis. This essentially
mechanistic approach to control accelerated quickly from its early origins, giving
rise to the field of artificial intelligence (for a historical perspective see Kline
[2011]).
In contrast, the second strain developed with an emphasis on an analogue
approach to control (where analogue is used in the sense of continuous variables).
Ross Ashby’s work on adaptive systems (Ashby [1960]) sought to determine on
general principles of control and regulation inspired by those discerned in organ-
isms (for an overview see Umpleby [2009]). His models of adaptive processes
were intended to reflect general principles that were equally applicable to artifi-
cial devices. He was to construct a physical implementation of these ideas in his
Homeostat;
(We can describe it either as ‘a machine to do our thinking for us’
or, more respectably, as ‘an analogue computer’) One was built and
called the ‘Homeostat’. (p99, Ashby [1960])
Simple robot agents were a theme of W. Grey Walter’s work; his turtles were
capable of autonomous motion, with brains of analogue electronics. They ex-
hibited rudimentary photo-taxis (Walter [1950]) and primitive learning (Walter
[1951]). This work is complementary to that of Ashby, in that it demonstrated
that primitive behaviours could be supported by analogue systems, without the
need for programming.
Although labelling these two strains as mechanistic and analogue understates
the complexity of the ideas encompassed by these two perspectives, they are con-
venient labels. The two approaches were to take divergent paths. This is despite
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their common interest in understanding the principles of; control, regulation and
adaptive behaviour, so that these principles might also be applied to the construc-
tion of artificial devices. Although the analogue line of enquiry was to fade in
comparison with that of the mechanistic line of enquiry, it has recently prospered
in the somewhat related form of nouvelle AI. Understanding both these paths
of enquiry is necessary for a complete understanding of the underlying concepts
inherent in evolutionary robotics, although they differ in substantially in their
contributions. The mechanistic approach is significant in that it represents in
some sense the anti-thesis of ideas inherent in the analogue approach (as exem-
plified by the work of Ashby in particular). However, it is through the perceived
limitations of the mechanistic approach, that alternative approaches have come
to be re-defined. It is as one potential solution to these limitations that has
resulted in the emergence of evolutionary robotics.
The foundations of this mechanistic approach were laid by Alonzo Church
and Alan Turing (Church and Turing [1937]). They proposed what would sub-
sequently be referred to as the Turing Machine concept, where a hypothetical
device capable of manipulating symbols on a strip of tape according to a table
of rules, is able act as an automatic computing machine. The Church-Turing
thesis (although not formally proven) is that everything that is algorithmically
calculable is calculable by a Turing Machine.
In 1945 Turing went on to design one of the worlds first computers. In his
book, ‘The Essential Turing’, Jack Copeland provides us with description of this
historical event (see Chapter 9 of Turing [2004]), together with a reproduction of
Turing’s 1947 Lecture on the Automatic Computing Engine. Cyberneticians Wal-
ter Pitts and Warren McCulloch (McCulloch and Pitts [1943]) were to consider
how the human brain might support logical calculus through neural activity (see
Moreno-Dı´az and Moreno-Dı´az [2007] for a perspective on McCulloch’s histori-
cal legacy). Piccinini (Piccinini [2004]) refers to McCulloch’s work as the first
computational theory of mind and brain.
In 1945 John Von Neumann was also to devise a computer in a form sub-
sequently referred to as the Von Neumann Architecture (von Neumann [1993]).
This laid the foundation for modern computers; a CPU containing registers (in-
cluding a program counter), memory to store instruction code and data, as well
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as support for mass storage together with input and output mechanisms. Whilst
Turing was aware of Von Neumann’s rather abstract paper, Turing’s own design
was less complex (Copeland and Proudfoot [1996]) and was detailed to the degree
that the electronic circuits required to implement his design were specified. This
computer he would call the Automatic Computing Engine (ACE).
Alan Turing was one of the principal founders of modern computing and gave
some consideration to the notion of computational intelligence (Turing [1950]).
Despite this, based on the content of private communications with Ashby (Tur-
ring [1946]), it is clear that he had some appreciation of how the computational
approach might differ from what Ashby was seeking to achieve. He states;
In working on the ACE I am more interested in the possibility
of producing models of the action of the brain than in the practical
applications to computing.
Turing addresses criticisms (presumably made by Ashby) that such a system
would be entirely uncritical when something goes wrong, and that it would be
devoid of originality, replying;
There is, however, no reason why the machine should always be
used in such a manner: there is nothing in its construction which
obliges us to do so. It would be quite possible for the machine to try
out variations of behaviour and accept or reject them in the manner
you describe and I have been hoping to make the machine do this.
This is possible because, without altering the design of the machine
itself, it can, in theory at any rate, be used as a model of any other
machine, by making it remember a suitable set of instructions.
Ashby was not to accept Turing’s request for collaboration, seeking instead
to the create the homeostat, an electronic device documented in his ‘Design for
a Brain’ (Ashby [1960]). As described by Peter Cariani (Cariani [2009]), the
homeostat was intended as the embodiment of adaptive control. We shall revisit
Ashby’s work in more detail in section 2.5.2.1.
The exchange between Ashby and Turing is indicative of a methodological
schism in the cybernetics movement. The Ashby perspective focusses on the
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system, and the underlying dynamics from which the coherency of the system
emerges. The dynamics of the system ensure a coupling of the agent with its
environment, such that an external event might engender a destabilization of the
system (eliciting a response, based on the interaction of potentially conflicting
sub-systems). Subsequent to this disturbance, the system would return either to
a neutral state, or an appropriate dynamic state. In his first edition of ‘Design for
a Brain’, Ashby used the term ultrastable to apply to a specific system comprising
two feedback loops, and multistable to apply to a variant incorporating more com-
plex connections. However by the second edition (Ashby [1960]) he would use the
term ultrastable to refer to the class of systems, incorporating everything from his
original concept to that of systems comprising an arbitrary arrangement of such
coupled sub-systems. The terms are therefore used somewhat interchangeably, as
in;
In other words, within a multistable system, subsystem adapts to
subsystem in exactly the same way as animal adapts to environment.
(p210, Ashby [1960])
In other places the term ultrastable is used in the same sense;
Exactly the same principle governs the interactions between three
subsystems. If the three are in continuous interaction, they form a
single ultrastable system which will have the usual properties. (p210,
Ashby [1960])
To differentiate between the two, it is perhaps convenient to refer to the
dynamic underlying these system changes as that of multistability, engendered by
the interaction of multiple ultrastable sub-systems.
Ashby seems resistant to Turings overtures, based on his suspicion that a
computational approach might be over-deterministic, lack spontaneity or origi-
nality, but most importantly fail to embody the necessary organizing principle
that might resolve competing computational instructions, that is at the centre of
Ashby’s ideas.
Ultimately this schism would become a chasm, as one of its branches outgrew
the others; namely, the ideas which related to the theory of computation and its
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derivatives. It is trivially simple to understand why this might be the case. If the
central issue was control, then this can be simply achieved by the construction of
a machine capable of executing instructions.
The problem with Ashby’s approach was evidenced in the his construction of
the homeostat. Training was achieved by the punishment (p110, Ashby [1960])
of the system, by an the introduction of an extreme disturbance that would
result over time in the adaptation of the system to the preferred response, at
which point the punishment would no longer be applied. In comparison with the
computational alternative, this is clearly far less direct. It also relies upon the
construction and connection of a machine which incorporates the necessary sub-
systems, capable of supporting an appropriate response, without explaining any
principle as to how this might be achieved. As will become evident later in this
section, it is as a potential solution to this problem that evolutionary robotics has
emerged. Artificial neural networks support the kind of dynamic interaction that
Ashby envisaged in the construction of his homeostat. Employing evolutionary
algorithms help us to explore the space of possible designs that might be receptive
to adaptation to external influences. Prior to the emergence of this field however,
the computational approach appeared to offer the simplest approach to achieving
the goals of the early cybernetics movement.
2.3.4 From AI to Embedded Cognition
2.3.4.1 Artificial Intelligence
The advent of Artificial Intelligence is commonly deemed to start from a con-
ference held at Dartmouth College in the summer of 1956 (for the conference
proposal see McCarthy et al. [1955]). Whilst both automatic Computers and
neuron nets were on the agenda, it was subsequent successes in the former that
attracted funding. A General Problem Solver computer program was written
as early as 1959 (Newell et al. [1959]). Shortly after this Minsky’s paper ‘Steps
toward artificial intelligence’ (Minsky [1961]) provides us with snapshot of the
issues that were deemed central to artificial intelligence research, the titles of key
sections appear as follows;
1. The problem of search
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2. The problem of pattern recognition
3. Learning Systems (success-reinforced decision models)
4. Problem Solving and Planning
5. Induction and Models
These issues were deemed solvable through developing mappings between the
real world and appropriate representations, and through the creation of algo-
rithms that could support the symbolic manipulation of these representations.
This emphasis on representation, symbolic manipulation, a focus on algorithms
and data structures (and a complete lack of requirement for embodiment), is now
referred to as GOFAI (Good Old Fashioned AI), a term coined by John Haugeland
(Haugeland [1985]), or alternatively classical or traditional AI, and depending on
context, machine learning. A review of the accomplishments of AI up to 1970
includes (Siklssy [1970]); axiomatic logic (1956), checkers (1959), propositional
logic (1959), plane geometry (1959), calculus (1961), geometric analogies (1963),
algebra word problems (1964), speech analysis (1966), speech synthesis (1968),
hand-eye coordination (1968), and a seeing program (1968). Although in many
cases the achievements referred to remain first attempts, they are an indication
of the variety of problems that were addressed through these GOFAI methods,
and a gradual change from tasks amenable to symbolic interaction, to ones that
were more applied (such as speech, vision and robotic control).
The confidence of researchers in the agenda described my Minsky around this
time, is indicated in the title of Newell and Simon’s paper: ‘GPS, A program that
Simulates Human Thought’ (Newell and Simon [1963]). However, it was not soon
afterwards that AI researchers would experience their first setback, as doubt in
the effectiveness of this approach to machine translation was questioned by a US
government appointed committee (Seitz [1966]), leading to a decline in funding
for this area of research for a period of approximately 10 years (Hutchins [2003]).
From an entirely philosophical perspective Hubert L. Dreyfus, rather presciently,
felt that this entire research agenda was fundamentally flawed (Dreyfus [1967]),
arguing that intelligence requires embodiment. The UK government at the start
of the 1970’s also came to a critical conclusion of the field, in what came to be
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known as the Lighthill report (Lighthill [1973]). Patrick Hayes (Hayes [1976])
made the point that general systems theory rather than computational intelli-
gence best fitted our understanding of brain science, one of the few critics of the
computational agenda from the academic community. Despite these criticisms,
it was hoped that the ever increasing performance of computer hardware (Moore
[1965], for a more modern perspective see Dongarra [2006]) would underpin future
successes in the computational approach to intelligence, as remains the case to
this day (Deb [2008]).
2.3.4.2 The Schism
A major schism in the AI community took place in 1990, when Rodney Brooks
criticized the last 30 years of mainstream efforts in Artificial Intelligence (Brooks
[1990]). He claimed that the central problem was that AI was not physically
grounded, and proposed a new software architecture that relied heavily upon the
physical embodiment of an intelligent agent. A position that is reminiscent of
the ideas propounded by Hubert L. Dreyfus more than 20 years earlier (Dreyfus
[1967]). Brooks sought to address these issues with his subsumption architecture,
eschewing centralized control, relying upon the hierarchical resolution of com-
peting reactive units. From a cybernetic perspective, one cannot but help see
this as a computational analog of Ashby’s notion of ultrastability, which others
have termed using a more modern vocabulary adaptive control (Cariani [2009]).
Brooks went further in criticising the core ideas of the computationalist agenda
with a paper attacking the notion that symbolic representation was required by
an agent exhibiting (from the distal observers perspective) intelligent behaviour;
It is only the observer of the Creature who imputes a central rep-
resentation or central control. The Creature itself has none; it is a
collection of competing behaviors. Out of the local chaos of their in-
teractions there emerges in the eye of the observer, a coherent pattern
of behavior (page 148, Brooks [1991]).
Catalysed by Brooks’ work, the 1990’s saw the start of a period where the
computationalist agenda was increasingly questioned. In sympathy with Brooks’
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position, Willshaw considers ‘Non-Symbolic Approaches to Artificial Intelligence
and the Mind’ (Willshaw et al. [1994]). Advocates of mainstream AI also saw the
need for soul-searching. Simon’s paper is interesting in that it gives us an insight
into the mindset of a classical AI researchers around this time;
Robotics is also a vigorous field, and also in danger of being too
far separated from mainstream AI. I viewed with mixed feelings the
establishment of a separate graduate program in robotics in my own
university. One of the common criticisms of much mainstream AI re-
search is that no distinction is made, in modelling problem situations,
between the actual, real-world, situation and the model of the situa-
tion stored in computer memory. As robotics cannot afford this luxury
of confusing the model with external reality, it must incorporate in its
systems feedback channels that can correct the models periodically
to reflect reality more accurately. Of course, this distinction can be
attained in AI modelling, by keeping in memory both an abstracted
model and a simulated real world, but the virtue of robotics is that it
makes the distinction a necessity instead of an option, and continually
reminds the system builder of the complexity of the real real world -
the one outside the computer (page 123, Simon [1995])
It is indicative of the classical AI mindset, that even within robotics Simon
saw the need for an internal model of the world, rather than Brook’s solution
which was to see the world as the best model of itself. Brooks may not have been
aware at the time that his work provided other researchers with the hammer that
would be used to attack those of the computationalist persuasion. He denied the
influences of Heidegger (whose work had informed Dreyfus’ views on the need
for physical embodiment, Dreyfus [1967]) on his work, and by implication failed
to recognize that his work might merit a significant change in the philosophical
underpinnings of AI. He saw the subsumption architecture merely as an engineer-
ing solution, to an engineering problem, in the section entitled ‘It isn’t German
philosophy’ he writes;
In some circles much credence is given to Heidegger as one who
understand the dynamics of existence. Our approach has certain sim-
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ilarities to work inspired by this German philosopher but our work
was not so inspired. It is based purely on engineering considerations
(page 155, Brooks [1991]).
In the preceding section he also states that ‘It isn’t connectionism’;
.. connectionists seem to be looking for explicit distributed rep-
resentations to spontaneously arise from their networks. We harbor
no such hopes because we believe representations are not necessary
and appear only in the eye or mind of the observer (page 154, Brooks
[1991]).
Whilst it is true that very few modern practitioners would recognise this de-
piction of connectionism, at the time the notion that connectionism supported
a form of sub-symbolic representation, was seen as a defence of connectionism.
This relates to a theoretical debate initiated by Fodor and Pylyshyn (Fodor and
Pylyshyn [1988b]). Their challenge was ‘to explain the existence of systematic
relations among cognitive capacities without assuming that mental processes are
causally sensitive to the constituent structure of mental representations’ (ab-
stract, Fodor and McLaughlin [1990]). Smolensky replied in defense of connec-
tionism;
In calling the traditional approach to cognitive modeling the sym-
bolic paradigm, I intend to emphasize that in this approach, cognitive
descriptions are built of entities that are symbols both in the seman-
tic sense of referring to external objects and in the syntactic sense
of being operated upon by symbol manipulation. These manipula-
tions model fundamental psychological processes in this approach to
cognitive modeling. The name subsymbolic paradigm is intended to
suggest cognitive descriptions built up of entities that correspond to
constituents of the symbols used in the symbolic paradigm; these
fine-grained constituents could be called subsymbols, and they are
the activities of individual processing units in connectionist networks
(page 3, Smolensky [1988]).
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It does rather appear as if Smolenksy had allowed himself to fall into an in-
tellectual trap. Those who supported the computationalist agenda (strong on
representation) chose to attack connectionism on this basis, whilst Smolensky
sought to defend it with a quasi-representation argument. This is despite under-
standing that ‘connectionist models considered are massively parallel numerical
computational systems that are a kind of continuous dynamical system.’ (ab-
stract, Smolensky [1988]). It is perhaps only in understanding the debate that
was raging at the time, that Brooks’ comments appear to make sense.
By eschewing connectionism however, he was to miss out on major new de-
velopments that would emerge from an entirely new conceptual framework; com-
putational neuroethology, ‘the use of modeling and simulation to study adaptive
behavior’ (synopsis,Chiel and Beer [2008]). Both Randall Beer (Beer [1990]) and
Dave Cliff (Cliff [1990]) were to combine ideas from; neuroscience (the study of
nervous systems) and ethology (the study of animal behaviour), with the pre-
fix computational indicative of the notion that the subject of study was to be
that of autonomous or simulated artificial agents (Cliff [2002]). Whilst both Beer
and Cliff sought to adopt the world as model perspective, their methodology was
strongly connectionist. Their emphasis was on the coupling achieved between the
robot and environment mediated by neural sensorimotor systems;
It has been argued that the connectionist paradigm is biologically
in vacuo and in this sense is no advance on the symbolic paradigm:
connectionism has acted merely as a palliative for several of the mal-
adies of symbolism. The solution to this problem is linking the model
neural network to the external world via a sensorimotor system, thus
grounding the symbols in the model. Such an approach is more in
line with the philosophy of the Maturana school. Cliff [1990]
Brooks admitted some concerns over the potential limits to his architecture
(Brooks [1991]) that would prove to be well founded. His principal concern was
over the number of levels that their designs were able to support. Thus limiting
the complexity of behavioural that they might be able to demonstrate. Intrinsic to
the subsumption architecture is the notion of a hierarchy, where each higher level
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corresponds to both a mediator and arbitrator of lower level modules. He also ad-
mitted that learning in his architecture had not been sufficiently addressed, and
that difficulties of integration arose when seeking to incorporate existing equip-
ment or software (due to the preconceptions that were inherent in their designs).
One might have imagined that the idea of using genetic or evolutionary algo-
rithms as a methodological approach would have appealed to Brooks. However
there is little indication that he did so. Although Brooks used the term evolve in
the title of his paper ‘A robot that walks; emergent behaviours from a carefully
evolved network’ (Brooks [1989]), the sense in which he used it appears to be
that of change rather than biological evolution. No details of the use of a genetic
algorithm are described in his paper. It was not until later (Brooks [1992]) that
Brooks speculated on the possible use of genetic programming to solve some of
these programs, but notable is the lack of any reference to the possibility of evolv-
ing neural networks (despite early published work in this area, which we discuss in
section 2.3.5.3). We can only speculate that this might be because this would be
tantamount to acknowledging the failure of his subsumption architecture, given
that it would represent not just a difference of methodology, but also undermine
any notion of the need for an explicit subsumption architecture.
Brooks failed to see the opportunity for a new philosophical perspective on Ar-
tificial Intelligence. He also failed to consider connectionism as an alternative ap-
proach to resolving these limitations. His work remains however significant, not so
much because of the new methodologies that he developed, but because he sought
to question the central idea inherent in classical AI; that representation and sym-
bolic manipulation are at the heart of artificial intelligence. His approached would
later be referred to more generally as behaviour based robotics(Arkin [1998]).
2.3.4.3 Embodied Cognition
In the early 1990’s we say the start of a dramatic shift in ideas relating to cogni-
tion, of such breadth, that it is not easy to identify the causal roots, nor to define
succinctly the new terms associated with this change in perspective. What we are
seeing is an example of something as close to Kuhn’s notion of a paradigm shift
(Kuhn [1996]) as can be imagined. Although ill-defined, the concept of embodied
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cognition is central to this shift in perception. From an evolutionary robotics
perspective, it is significant because it represents a radical shift in perspective
from that of classical AI to nouvelle AI;
Might it not be more fruitful to think of brains as controllers for
embodied activity? That small shift in perspective has large impli-
cations for how we construct a science of the mind. It demands, in
fact, a sweeping reform in our whole way of thinking about intelli-
gent behavior. It requires us to abandon the idea (common since
Descartes) of the mental as a realm distinct from the realm of the
body; to abandon the idea of neat dividing lines between perception,
cognition and action; to abandon the idea of an executive center where
the brain carries out high-level reasoning; and most of all, to abandon
research methods that artificially divorced thought from embodied
action-taking.
What emerges is nothing less that a new science of the mind: a
science that, to be sure, builds on the fruits of three decades’ cooper-
ative research, but a science whose tools and models are surprisingly
different- a cognitive science of the embodied mind. (page xiii, Clark
[1997])
Surprisingly, many of the ideas implicit in notions of embodied cognition are
not new. The agent oriented perspective, where consciousness is a function of
intentionality (in the sense that consciousness is directed towards goals, and that
the meaning or significance of objects is defined in the context of these goals)
was promoted by Franz Brentano in 1874 (Brentano and McAlister [1995]). An
extension of these ideas by Heidegger placed emphasis on the notion of Dasein,
whereby it is the context of the agent in their environment, and the imputed
meaning that the environment has for the existence of the agent that defines
consciousness (Heidegger [1962]). The psychologist Jerome Bruner identified the
value, need for and significance of objects (within a given cultural context) as the
principal factors in the construction of cognitive processes (Bruner and Good-
man [1947], Bruner and Postman [1948]). Another psychologist James J. Gibson
discussed the notion of affordances (Gibson [1977]), whereby cognition involves
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the direct perception of objects (within an ecological context) based on their
usefulness, value and potential to the agent. What is common to these ideas is
the notion of enaction, whereby it is through the process of interaction with the
environment that the agent’s construction of cognitive abilities takes place.
From a modern perspective, the filter through which these ideas are perceived
is that of embodied cognition, and the constituent notions of situatedness and em-
bodiment. If we are to identify the catalysts for this modern reconceptualization
of cognition, then the most likely candidates are the works carried out by Rod-
ney Brooks on his subsumption architecture (Brooks [1990], Brooks [1991]), and
the rather more abstract contributions made by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch
in their book ‘The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience’
(Varela et al. [1992]). A number of reviews have been written on this subject,
both from a cognitive science perspective (Wilson [2002]) and robotics perspec-
tive (Ziemke [2005], Anderson [2003], Froese and Ziemke [2009]). What we shall
do however, is to focus on the two flavours of embodied cognition, associated with
the catalysts that we identified earlier, which for shorthand reasons, we shall term
Brooksian and Varelian.
None of the words; situatedness, embodiment, situated, embodied appear in
Brooks’ seminal papers (Brooks [1990], Brooks [1991]). The word embodiment ap-
pears only once, but in the context of its general usage in english. A considerable
proportion of these papers describe details of specific robotic implementations of
his ideas. As mentioned previously section, he saw his principal contribution as
the subsumption architecture itself, a specific program architecture as a solution
to an to an engineering problem. Retrospectively, we have seen an attempt to
by other researchers to conceptualize his approach, through the notions of situ-
atedness, embodiment. In so doing, these notions have been of particular use in
the robotics community, in characterizing an approach, that is antithetical to the
computational approach to artificial intelligence.
Arkin uses the term behaviour-based robotics to identify this new approach,
employing as key principles (page 26, Arkin [1998]);
• Situatedness: The robot us an entity situated and surrounded by the real
world. It does not operate upon abstract representations of reality, but
rather reality itself.
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• Embodiment: A robot has a physical presence (a body). This spatial
reality has consequences in its dynamic interactions with the world that
cannot be simulated faithfully
An alternative but consistent description is implicit in Pfeifer’s design princi-
ples of autonomous agents, he states (page 7, Pfeifer [1996]);
• Principle 1c: The agents must be embodied, i.e. they must be realized
as a physical system capable of acting in the real world. Although simu-
lation studies can be extremely helpful in designing agents, building them
physically typically leads to surprising new insights. This point has been
forcefully made by Brooks (1991). Physical realization often facilitates solu-
tions which might seem hard if considered only in an information processing
context. An agent existing only in simulation would not be complete.
• Principle 1d: The agents must be situated, i.e. the whole interaction
with the environment must be controlled by the agent itself, i.e. the world
must always be seen from the perspective of the agent. Moreover, the agent
has to be able to bring in its own experience in dealing with the current
situation.
The Varelian flavour of embodied cognition is that proposed by Varela;
Let me explain what I mean by the word embodied, highlight-
ing two main points: (a) that cognition depends on the kinds of ex-
perience that come from having a body with various sensorimotor
capacities; and (b) that these individual sensorimotor capacities are
themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological and cultural
context(page 329, Varela [1995]).
Whilst the foundation of the Brooksian flavour is teleological, i.e. its concep-
tion relates to the construction of intelligent agents, the Varelian flavour has a
philosophical and psychological slant not present in the Brooksian perspective.
This is exemplified by his attempts to define what he terms an enactive approach
to cognition;
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In a nutshell, the enactive approach to cognition consists of two
key points: (a) that perception consists in perceptually guided action;
and (b) that cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensori-
motor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided (page
329, Varela [1995]).
It is the Brooksian flavour of embodied cognition that is generally applicable
to autonomous robotics. The Varelian flavour essentially subsumes the Brooksian
flavour, but at the same time places particular emphasis on the means by which
this embodiment and situatedness is intermediated; through perceptually guided
action supported by a neural substrate.
We recount here ideas on the subject of embodied cognition, largely because
it is part of the vocabulary of modern robotics, and because its emergence as
a concept (ill-defined as it is) represents a significant shift in perspective from
that of the disembodied view of intelligence represented by GOFAI. We shall
avoid subsequent reference to the term for two reasons. Firstly, since it lacks a
commonly accepted definition the usefulness of the term diminishes. Secondly, it
makes more sense to focus on the effects or manifestation of embodied cognition,
when we are seeking to determine how it might be synthesized. The notion of
adaptive behaviour, allows us to discuss the kind of behaviours that we are seeking
to create in artificial agents, encompassing as it does, all forms of adaptation be
they genetic, onotogenetic or related to learning. The idea that such adaptive
behaviours have arisen via an evolutionary process is far more parsimonious, than
any reference to embodidness and situatedness (since all evolved organisms have
bodies and are situated). The primary value of the term embodied cognition is
(at least as far as we are concerned in this thesis) in its antithetical meaning to
the ideas inherent in GOFAI.
2.3.4.4 From Autopoiesis to Evolution
Hubert L. Dreyfus criticized the computational approach to artificial intelligence
as early as 1967, based on its failure to incorporate the ideas of Heidegger on
enaction (Dreyfus [1967]). His retrospective of the failure of AI is therefore of
particular interest (Dreyfus [2007]).
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To paraphrase his arguments; he first states that traditional AI’s response to
the ‘common sense’ problem was to claim that more data storage was required.
When this failed to achieve results due to a lack of a framework for determining
appropriate data, the concept of a frame was proposed (supporting a context de-
pendent formulation of relevant data and affordances). Drefyus then claims that
problems arose due to the potential recursive nature of frames. Whilst Dreyfus
approved of the grounding that Rodney Brook’s robotics perspective allowed for,
he feels that the approach taken was overly ambitious in the long-term claims that
it made. Dreyfus’ claims that Brook’s ultimately failed, seems largely based on a
criticism of his implementation (that of the subsumption architecture, which relies
on converting stimulus input to reflex responses. Dreyfus identifies the dynam-
ics perspective (where the agent is perceived as being coupled with the external
world, and responses governed by neuro-dynamics) as the most appropriate basis
for future work.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Dreyfus fails to acknowledge the work of Mat-
urana and Varela on autopoiesis (meaning self-produced) in this historical per-
spective. Central to the ideas of autopoiesis are notions of circularity and the
structural coupling of the agent with its environment (which we shall describe
in more detail shortly). For those who have some familiarity with Ross Ashby’s
work (see section 2.3.3), their ideas may not necessarily appear particularly novel,
but that does not mean to say that they have not been influential.
It is difficult to say whether or not their work came to prominence because of
the requirement for a new philosophical basis for understanding the relationship
of the agent with its environment (in support of the new perspective on AI sug-
gested by Brook’s work), or simply because it was an ‘idea whose time had come’.
Certainly, the long gestation of these ideas dating back to the 1970’s (Maturana
[1970]) imply that it is the latter rather than the former. In either case, the pub-
lication of two books around this time (Maturana and Varela [1987] and Varela
et al. [1991]) certainly had an impact on the robotics community, and perhaps
more generally, in the shift in focus from disembodied to embodied cognition. Ir-
respective of the long-term value of the concept of autopoiesis and the philosophy
that has arisen around it, its role was to add an air of legitimacy to the notion
that there was something fundamental about the concept of embodied cognition,
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that would ultimately allow us to re-address the issue of artificial intelligence.
Even the idea of artificial intelligence was to be replaced by that of behavioural
complexity, in line with the notion that intelligence is something that is perceived
by the observer and is merely an distal observation of more fundamental processes
that govern organism activity (Keijzer [1998]).
There are a number of ideas implicit in the notion of autopoiesis proposed by
Maturana and Varela, and their thesis is extensive, since it relates to a theory
of life and cognition. It is not necessary to accept their agenda in its entirety
however, since within it there exist smaller digestible chunks, that we are able
to borrow, in seeking to present a philosophical justification for the use of evolu-
tionary robotics to achieve behavioural complexity in an artificial agent.
Although multiply and numerously defined and redefined by the authors, the
idea of autopoiesis remains a foundational concept. This relates to the organ-
ism as a self-maintaining (and potentially self-regulating) entity, supported by
homeostatic processes;
Living systems as they exist on earth today are characterized by
exergonic metabolism, growth and internal molecular reproduction,
all organized in a closed causal circular process that allows for evolu-
tionary change in the way the circularity is maintained, but not for
the loss of the circularity itself. (page 1, Maturana [1970])
This circular organization constitutes a homeostatic system whose
function is to produce and maintain this very same circular organi-
zation by determining that the components that specify it be those
whose synthesis or maintenance it secures. (page 2, Maturana [1970])
This concept of circularity persists in their ideas, and is expanded upon by
Thamoson and Varela in what they refer to as radical embodiment. They define
its dimensions as;
The relationship between neural dynamics and conscious situated
agents can be described in terms of the participation of neural pro-
cesses in the cycles of operation that constitute the agents life. Three
kinds of cycles need to be distinguished for higher primates:
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1. cycles of organismic regulation of the entire body;
2. cycles of sensorimotor coupling between organism and environment;
3. cycles of intersubjective interaction, involving the recognition of the inten-
tional meaning of actions and linguistic communication (in humans).
(page 2, Thompson and Varela [2001])
A second idea relates to the notion of the relationship that an entity has with
its environment, described as a structural coupling;
The relation between a living system and the medium in which it
exists is a structural one in which living system and medium change
together congruently as long as they remain in recurrent interactions.
I have called this relation structural coupling, and I have shown that a
living system flows in its living in the path of conservation of structural
coupling with a the medium that makes this possible, until the living
system dies. Living occurs in the path of structural changes that
continuously result in the conservation of autopoiesis and adaptation
or structural coupling.(page 24, Maturana [2002])
If we compare this with the conclusion made by Dreyfus in his criticism of
classical AI (Dreyfus [2007]), it is difficult not to come to the conclusion, that
their biological perspective might well provide us with a some clue as to how we
might best achieve, what Dreyfus terms ‘Heideggerian AI’;
There is, however, a big remaining problem. Merleau-Pontys and
Freemans account of how we directly pick up significance and improve
our sensitivity to relevance depends on our responding to what is
significant for us given our needs, body size, ways of moving, and so
forth, not to mention our personal and cultural self interpretation. If
we cant make our brain model responsive to the significance in the
environment as it shows up specifically for human beings, the project
of developing an embedded and embodied Heideggerian AI cant get
off the ground. Thus, to program Heideggerian AI, we would not
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only need a model of the brain functioning underlying coupled coping
such as Freemans; we would also needand heres the ruba model of our
particular way of being embedded and embodied such that what we
experience is significant for us in the particular way that it is. (page
265,Dreyfus [2007])
If we were to re-interpret the ideas of Maturana and Varela, we might do
this parsimoniously by saying that they seek to characterise the notion of an
organism. The organism exists through the regulation of processes that seek to
ensure its existence (not a circular argument, just a circular cycle). It is coupled
with its environment, such that these regulatory processes in some sense take into
account the environmental context of the organism. It is through the description
and identification of an organism in its environment that we are able to define
the contextual frame of reference Dreyfus’ deems so important in his analysis.
As such, it is this concept of organism-environment that presents us with one
solution to the problem of Heideggerian AI. If this is the case, then the central
challenge of AI is one of creating an artefact that embodies these principles, in
a fashion that is relevant to its environment. Ultimately the reason for both
Ashby’s and Brooks’ failure to create such artefacts, were essentially the same:
they were failures of implementation.
Ashby created the homeostat, a system comprising a composite of indepen-
dent homeostatic systems, where each sub-system was intended to map to some
kind of behaviour. A disturbance to the inputs of the system would result in a
re-arbitration of the appropriate behaviour through the dynamic competition of
these subsystems. Such an approach sought to avoid the brittle response of com-
putational systems, and also provide some basis for the emergence of properties
that had not been predetermined by a designer. The problem Ashby had, was
that he had no methodological framework by which he could ensure that the dy-
namics of system that he sought to create, were appropriate in their behavioural
response to environmental stimuli. The homeostat supported arbitrary dynamic
processes, rather than ones which had been shaped through a process of evolution
(in the biological sense of the word). Organisms however, exhibit constructive
behavioural dynamics through the as a consequence of the process of evolution.
The autopoietic organism is a product of evolution.
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Brook’s implementation problems again were methodological. The were due
to the requirement for the involvement of a human designer. Whilst his desire to
avoid representational world modelling firmly planted the robot in a structural
coupling (to use Maturana and Varela’s terminology) with its environment, his
subsumption architecture required that the competing processes (the mediators
of this structural coupling) be first imagined by its human designers and then
explicitly programmed. Whereas in classical AI, the problem was one of devising
appropriate data representations and symbolic manipulators (conceived of by the
programmer) with all its associated limitations, in Brooks’ case, the problem was
one of determining the appropriate reactive responses intermediated by an arbi-
trator (conceived by the programmer) that would support ‘intelligent’ behaviour.
How then might we be able to resolve this implementation problem? We wish
to avoid the need for a human designer making decisions that pre-determine which
constructive behaviours should be supported, and yet have an implementation
that can be imbued which characteristics that we might deem functionally useful.
The solution to this problem is almost trivially obvious. If an organism is capable
of fulfilling the requirements identified by Dreyfus, and we wish to avoid the
human role in design, we simply need to use a process that we know works
without a designer, and that process is evolution itself. Clearly, we still need
a substrate upon which an evolutionary process can operate. The methodology
of evolving neural networks is one that allows us to solve the implementation
problem that was to defeat both Ashby and Brooks.
As in the case of embodied cognition, we have sought here to introduce ideas
on autopoiesis, largely because they are deemed to be part of the conceptual
fabric of modern views on the synthesis of complex behaviour. Autopoesis as a
characterization of the organism-environment coupling and embodied cognition
as the basis for complex behaviour represent philosophical and cognitive frame-
works that help us to understand what principles are relevant to the construction
of an intelligent artificial organism, but they do not define a methodology by
which such entities can be synthesized. Evolution provides us with a model of
the process by which organisms have come to exhibit complex behaviour. Evo-
lutionary robotics in turn provides us with a methodology that allows to create
such systems through; (a) the application of evolutionary algorithms to (b) con-
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nectionist models of neural systems (c) embodied in real or physically simulated
agents, in a fashion that is entirely consistent with ideas on autopoiesis, embodied
cognition and Hubert L. Dreyfus’ ideas on Heideggerian AI.
2.3.5 Convergence
Simply put, the conceptual underpinnings of evolutionary robotics are evolu-
tionary theory and the notions of embedded cognition, and the philosophical ideas
relating to enaction. The methodological underpinnings are those of evolution-
ary algorithms, neural networks and real (or simulated) robots. The primacy of
evolutionary theory and biological plausibility is a characteristic of evolutionary
robotics, and represents a major divergence from machine learning approach to
artificial intelligence. This methodological difference has as its central premise
the idea that it is only through emulating the process of biological evolution,
that we are likely to develop systems of the requisite complexity (with no known
inherent limit) necessary to support intelligent behaviour. What we seek to do in
this section is to describe the convergence of the ideas described up to this point
that have resulted in the genesis of evolutionary robotics.
2.3.5.1 Evolving Neural Networks
Key in the emergence of evolutionary robotics was the realization that the genetic
adaptation of artificial neural networks (now referred to as neuroevolution) repre-
sents a viable methodology for solving a range of problems. Some of the earliest
examples of this work were carried out by W.B. Dress working at the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory. He presented his work at the first ‘IEEE international con-
ference on neural networks’ in 1987 (Dress [1987]) and with J.R. Knisley at the
‘IEEE international conference on systems, man, and cybernetics’ (Dress and
Knisley [1987]) in the same year. They employed a mutation operator on a net-
work description file and an ontogenetic function for network construction. Dress
was to recognize three key features of this approach; the reduced requirement for
an ‘omnsicient’ human designer, the potential for creating systems that were less
brittle than those offered by the computational approach, and the negative aspect
relating to the onerous computational overhead incurred in conducting such sim-
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ulations (Dress [1987]). From this date, we saw a gradual increase in the number
of papers published on this topic (e.g. Harp et al. [1989], Montana and Davis
[1989], Whitley and Hanson [1989]). However, it was not until 1990 that we see
such papers being more widely cited. Influential papers published at this time
include; the use evolutionary programming techniques to train back-propagation
networks (Fogel et al. [1990]), the use of genetic algorithms to discover weights
and topologies in feed-forward networks (Whitley et al. [1990]), the discovery of
learning rate, momentum and initial weight parameters for back-propagation net-
works (Belew et al. [1990], Schaffer et al. [1990]), and the evolution of parameters
in a developmental model, used for the purposes of generating neural networks
(Kitano [1990]).
In 1992 a workshop entitled ‘COGANN-92: International Workshop on Com-
binations of Genetic Algorithms and Neural Networks’ took place in Baltimore,
Maryland, sponsored by the IEEE Neural Networks Council. Papers presented in-
cluded; a review of current techniques (Schaffer et al. [1992]), the use of a genetic
algorithm for training dynamic artificial neural networks (Elias [1992]), a compar-
ison of recombination operators (Hancock), the genetic synthesis of boolean net-
works using a developmental model (Gruau [1992]) and an approach to evolving
both network structures and weights (Dasgupta and McGregor). Early reviews
of evolutionary techniques applied to neural networks were written by Xin Yao in
1993 (Yao [1993]) and by I. Kuscu and C. Thornton at the University of Sussex
(Kuscu and Thornton [1994]). A preliminary taxonomy of these techniques was
written in 1995 (Balakrishan and Honavar [1995]), in the same year that a review
of neural network genotypes was written (Nolfi and Parisi [1995b]).
2.3.5.2 Precursors to Evolutionary Robotics
Perhaps the first example of the use of evolutionary techniques with robotics was
conducted by researchers at the Wayne State University, in Detroit (Kirby and
Conrad [1986]). Google scholar (at the time of writing) indicates no more than
41 citations of this paper, which on closer inspection yield no names amongst the
early founders of evolutionary robotics. It may be that this paper was largely
overlooked by the robotics community, as its title (‘Intraneuronal dynamics as
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a substrate for evolutionary learning’) displays little indication that the paper
relates to a robot navigational task, nor is the choice of publication (Physica
D: Nonlinear Phenomena) one which is traditionally associated with robotics
or artificial intelligence. Their evolutionary algorithm is intended to model the
dynamic adaptation of enzymatic neurons described in Condrad’s earlier work
(Conrad [1974], Kampfner and Conrad [1983]). Their idea of neuronal adaptation
is analogous to that of experiential selection described in Gerald Edleman’s neural
darwinism hypothesis (Edelman [1987]).
Conceptually, this work is quite sophisticated. Most mainstream approaches
to evolutionary robotics focus on the process of genetic adaptation, as an analogue
of Darwinian evolution. i.e. where the adaptation takes place as a consequence
of sexual or asexual reproduction. The work conducted by Conrad, Kirby and
Kampfner incorporates the idea that dynamic adaptation takes place in neural
networks (i.e. learning) in a fashion that is analogous to Darwinian evolution.
There is no notion of a population of artificial genomes from which the neural
systems of robots are created, nor of the discrete adaptation that takes place
at reproductive events. As a consequence, it represents an interesting model
of learning in robots, rather than an early example of evolutionary robotics.
Conrad in a later speculative work ‘Towards an artificial brain’ (Conrad et al.
[1989]), describes an approach to building an artificial brain, which incorporates
an evolutionary learning algorithm such that;
The evolutionary learning algorithm may be interpreted either as
representing the mechanism of variation and natural selection acting
on a phylogenetic time scale, or as a conceivable ontogenetic adapta-
tion mechanism. (abstract, Conrad et al. [1989]),
This idea anticipates developments that would take place in evolutionary robotics
over the following years. Again, at the time of writing, this paper only elicits
52 citations on using the Google scholar website, with no citations from the
early developers of evolutionary robotics. Conrad’s work may well have been
accidentally over-looked by the robotics community.
One of the earliest examples of the use of the genetic algorithm to support
primitive motor controllers for simulated robots was work done by Hugo de Garis
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in 1990. He reports the use of genetic programming (as distinct from the neuroevo-
lution approach generally used in evolutionary robotics) to develop controllers for
a pointer (a jointed kinematic structure) and a walker (a 2d simulated stick fig-
ure). Unfortunately the paper lacks details of the physics models used in these
experiments, so it is difficult to assess the level of realism of these simulations,
and therefore difficulty of the described tasks. He describes a two stage pro-
cess where functional modules are first evolved independently, before they are
conjoined and functional parameters or weights adjusted in the secondary stage
(de Garis [1990]) of the evolutionary process.
Karl Simms was also to use an genetic programming approach initially in
evolving two-dimensional images (Sims [1991]), but would go on to evolve three-
dimensional physically simulated creatures capable of exhibiting primitive loco-
motion (Sims [1994]). Note that this later work occurred after the advent of
evolutionary robotics, but was highly influential in stimulating future research in
the use of evolutionary techniques to simulate virtual organisms. Simms work is
one of the first examples of the use of evolutionary techniques for the generation
of control systems and morphology.
2.3.5.3 The Birth of Evolutionary Robotics: 1992
Arguably, the year that might best correspond to that of the birth of evolutionary
robotics is 1992. There appear to be three groups of researchers who it appears
largely independently arrived at the methodology of evolving neural networks to
simulate simple behaviour. Randall Beer and John Gallagher working at the Case
Western Reserve University of Ohio published a paper recounting the evolution of
controllers for supporting chemotaxis, and in a seperate experiment, locomotion
in a hexapod (Beer and Gallagher [1992a]). Rather than a real robot, they used
a very simple physics simulation where the velocity of movement is proportional
to the force applied. Domenico Parisi, Stefano Nolfi, and Federico Cecconi work-
ing at the National Research Council in Rome (Parisi et al. [1992]) described
the evolution of a network, used to support the behaviour of a simple creature
living in a simulated grid world. The agent was evolved to accumulate food ob-
jects distributed in the grid. In a report written by Stefano Nolfi and Domenico
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Parisi entitled ‘Growing neural networks’, a very simple developmental model was
evolved for the purposes of food catching in the simplest of simulations (Nolfi and
Parisi [1991]), this report was republished in (Nolfi and Parisi [1994]), from where
it no doubt reached a wider audience.
Perhaps the most advanced work however was that carried out by Cliff, David
Cliff, Inman Harvey and Phil Husbands at the University of Sussex in Brighton,
where simulations of a wheeled robot with tactile sensors (Cliff et al. [1992]) and
a visually guided robot (Husbands and Harvey [1992]) were conducted. It is from
this group that we first see the term Evolutionary Robotics appearing (Harvey
[1992a]). The same group of researchers extended their work considerably in 1993
(Cliff et al. [1993a], Cliff et al. [1993b], Harvey et al. [1993a]), continuing in their
use of the term evolutionary robotics. Note that both Randall Beer (Beer [1990])
and Dave Cliff (Cliff [1990]) had both previously (and independently) coined the
term computational neuroethology (as referred to in section 2.3.4.2) in reference
to the notion of using neural networks as the basis for exploring the behaviour
of artificial creatures in simulation. The Sussex group also made use initially of
the dynamic neural network model proposed by Beer and Gallagher (Beer and
Gallagher [1992a]).
Whilst the cole Polytechnique Fdrale de Lausanne (EPFL) would become
a place of major work in evolutionary robotics, lead by Dario Floreano and
Francesco Mondada commencing two years later (Floreano and Mondada [1994],
Mondada and Floreano [1995]), in 1993 they were still doing work related to
Rodney Brook’s subsumption architecture (Mondada and Franzi [1993]). Other
of work in Switzerland that was complementary to that evolutionary robotics
movement took place at the University of Zurich under Rolf Pfeifer. Rolf Pfeifer
was to concentrate on the design principles important to robots that were to
operate under the notion of embedded cognition (Pfeifer [1996]), very much in
keeping with the ideas of evolutionary robotics. It was not until much later how-
ever, that evolutionary robotics work was to be carried out at Zurich (Bongard
and Pfeifer [2003]).
Following 1992 we would gradually see a significant increase in the use of
these techniques applied to robots. This included; gait synthesis in a simulated
hexapedal robot (Lewis et al. [1994]), a review of techniques to generate modular
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networks, including evolutionary approaches (Happel and Murre [1994]), the evo-
lution of modular networks generated via a developmental model in support of
hexapedal locomotion (Gruau [1994]), a model of gene regulation to generate net-
works in support of foraging activity (Cangelosi and Elman [1995]), locomotion
in a real hexapedal robot (Gallagher et al. [1996b]), cell interactions as a develop-
mental model for control purposes (Eggenberger [1996],Eggenberger [1997b]), the
evolution of morphologies (Eggenberger [1997a]), the evolution of Lindenmayer
systems to generate networks in support of competitive organisms in a simulated
environment (Channon and Damper [1997]), the simulation of locomotion in lam-
preys (Ijspeert et al. [1997]), gaits in quadrupedal locomotion Grasso and Recce
[1999], locomotion in a miniature humanoid robot (Nordin and Nordahl [1999])
and the use of incremental evolution to generate a controller for a real hexapedal
robot(Filliat and Kodjabachian [1999]). These represent just a sampling of early
work carried out in evolutionary robotics. Since then a number of reviews and
general overviews from differing perspectives have been written (Weiss [1993],
Gomi and Griffith [1996], Harvey et al. [1997], Yao [1999], Floreano and Urzelai
[2000b], Ruppin [2002], Nolfi and Floreano [2002], Pratihar [2003], Floreano et al.
[2004a], Floreano et al. [2004b], Miconi [2007],Floreano et al. [2008], Floreano and
Nolfi [2008], Nelson et al. [2009], Floreano and Keller [2010], Don [2011]).
2.4 Research in Evolutionary Robotics
There appear to be two broad groups of researchers interested in evolutionary
robotics. Those based in Europe and those in the USA. A considerable pro-
portion of the research output in Europe is concentrated in three main research
centres, the University of Sussex at Brighton, the Federal Polytechnic of Lau-
sanne (EPFL), and the National Research Council (CNR) in Rome (although
some work has also been done at the University of Zurich, its primary focus is on
autonomous robots rather than evolutionary robotics). In contrast, research in
the USA (possibly with the exception of Hod Lipson based at Cornell) appears
to be dominated by a dispersed group of individuals who have exhibited greater
mobility than their European counterparts.
Whilst it is probably true to say that Evolutionary Robotics research was
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quicker to start in Europe than it was in the USA, with two notably expections;
that of Randall A. Beer initially at Case Western Reserve University and Jordan
B. Pollack initially at The Ohio State University However since then growth of
research in the USA has been significant. Second generation researchers such as
Josh Bongard (now at Vermont University) and Keith Stanley (now at the Uni-
versity of Central Florida) and Hod Lipson (now at Cornell) have all started new
research groups. Evolutionary Robotics research in the USA is now comparable
with that in Europe, if it has not already surpassed it.
It is perhaps significant that two of the centres responsible for the emer-
gence of evolutionary robotics in Europe were multi-disciplinary research groups.
The researchers at Sussex in the Department of Informatics participate in cross-
departmental research groups, including the Centre for Computational Neuro-
science and Robotics (CCNR) and the Centre for Research in Cognitive Science
(COGS). The researchers at the National Research Council are part of the Insti-
tute of Psychology, despite their leading work in robotics. One might speculate
that the relatively slower start-up of research in the USA may be due to some form
of institutional inertia related to the dominance of Artificial Intelligence research
in the USA. Perhaps surprisingly, relatively little work has been done in Japan
on evolutionary robotics. Once again, given Japan’s historical commitment to
robotics, one might surmise that this is also related to institutional inertia, given
the relatively recent emergence of evolutionary robotics as a discipline.
This section is intended to give an overview of the work conducted by the
principal research centres. The focus on institutions in Europe and individuals
in the USA is not intended to diminish the work conducted by individuals at
other institutions, but simply to highlight some of the key topics of research
that are encompassed by certain individuals and institutions. It is intended as
a representative selection of work that has been and is currently being carried
out in the field, rather than a definitive review of all the work that has taken
place in evolutionary robotics. Work by individuals at smaller research groups is
under-represented although every attempt is made to mention relevant work in
its appropriate place in this thesis.
Although, papers that relate to locomotion, robot controllers, minimal be-
haviours, neural network formulations and the interaction between learning and
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evolution are of highlighted due to their relevance to this thesis, an attempt is
made to outline alternative goals and themes that are of interest to other re-
searchers in evolutionary robotics.
2.4.1 Europe
2.4.1.1 The University of Sussex, Brighton
It is probably fair to say that the researchers at the University of Sussex (David
Cliff, Inman Harvey and Phil Husbands) contributed the significant bulk of early
work in this area (Harvey [1992b], Cliff et al. [1992], Harvey [1992a], Cliff et al.
[1993a], Harvey et al. [1993a], Cliff et al. [1993b], Harvey et al. [1993b], Harvey
[1993b], Husbands et al. [1994], Husbands et al. [1995], Husbands et al. [1997],
Cliff et al. [1997]). Of these researchers, Phil Husbands remains at the University
of Sussex, Inman Harvey left in January 2011 (although remains a Visiting Senior
Research Fellow in Informatics), and Dave Cliff left much earlier in 1997. A core
focus at Sussex has been to seek to develop novel formulations of neural networks
that are particularly suited to supporting primitive behaviours in wheeled robots
with tactile sensors and primitive vision and locomotion in legged robots. A
large proportion of this work employs the GasNet formulation of neural network,
whose properties include a novel abstraction of neuromodulation. This work has
involved the use of GasNets in robotics simulations, as well as in studies closer to
those typical of computational neuroscience (Husbands et al. [1998e], Husbands
[1998b], Jakobi et al. [1998], Husbands et al. [1998d], Smith et al. [2001b], Smith
et al. [2001a], Husbands et al. [2001b]).
A considerable effort has been made in investigating the factors that determine
the evolvability of GasNets (Smith et al. [2002d], Smith et al. [2002c], Smith
et al. [2002a], Philippides et al. [2002], Smith et al. [2002e], Smith et al. [2003b],
Philippides et al. [2005], Vargas et al. [2008], Husbands et al. [2010]) particularly
by Tom Smith and Andrew Philippides in collaboration with Phil Husbands,
making use of the concept of neutral networks (see section 2.3.1.4).
Adrian Thompson was successful in extending evolutionary techniques to the
evolution of a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), representing one of the
first examples of the application of evolutionary techniques to computer hardware
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(Harvey and Thompson [1996], Thompson [1996], Thompson [1998]). Ezequiel
Di Paulo was responsible for carrying out work on the evolution of spiking neuron
models for primitive robot behaviours (Di Paolo [2002], Di Paolo [2003b]), and
conducting reserach of a theoretical nature related to homeostasis, embodiment
and autopoiesis (Di Paolo [2003a], Izquierdo-Torres and Di Paolo [2005], Di Paolo
[2006], Iizuka and Di Paolo [2007], Di Paolo [2008], Di Paolo and Iizuka [2008],
Egbert and Di Paolo [2009], Di Paolo [2010]). Theoretical work on the inter-
relationship between learning and evolution has also been a subject of research
(Harvey [1993a] Mayley [1996], Quinn et al. [2003], Harvey [1996]), representing
a resurgence of interest in the Baldwin effect (see section 2.3.1.4).
Homeostasis (an important concept in Ashby’s work in the early cybernetics
movement) has also been a focus of research interest by other members at the
Sussex (Moioli et al. [2008a], Moioli et al. [2009]). Although some work has been
done on the evolution of cooperative behaviour in robots (Quinn et al.,Quinn et al.
[2003]), the work is perhaps less extensive than that carried out at some other
centres such as at CNR and EPFL. In addition to bipedal (McHale and Husbands
[2004c], Harvey et al. [2004a], Vaughan et al. [2004], Harvey et al. [2004b]) and
quadrupedal (McHale and Husbands [2004b]) locomotion, insect navigation has
also investigated using evolved networks (Dale and Collett [2001]). More recently
a range of other models have been explored as the basis for cognitive activity,
including; reaction diffusion controllers (Dale and Husbands [2010]), spiking net-
works (Bush et al. [2010]), coupled oscillators Moioli et al. [2010], and explorations
of the potential use of chaotic dynamics (Shim and Husbands [2012]).
2.4.1.2 The National Research Council (CNR), Rome
As mentioned previously, Stefano Nolfi and Domenico Parisi based at the National
Research Council made a significant contribution to early work in evolutionary
robotics (Parisi et al. [1992], Cecconi et al. [1994], Nolfi et al. [1994a], Nolfi et al.
[1994b], Parisi and Nolfi [1994], Nolfi and Parisi [1995a], Nolfi and Parisi [1995c],
Nolfi and Parisi [1995d], Miglino et al. [1996], Nolfi and Parisi [1997a], Nolfi and
Parisi [1997b]), although it is probably fair to say that both Sussex and EPFL
have collectively made greater advances in the addressing the practical applica-
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tions this research. This is perhaps understandable given that both Stefano Nolfi
and Domenico Parisi are members of the CNR’s Institute of Psychology. That
is not intended to understate their contributions, which have been significant.
Work carried out at he institute has addressed; the interaction of learning and
evolution, the emergence of language (Parisi [2006], Tuci et al. [2011]), as well
as cooperative or group activity in evolved robots (Baldassarre et al. [2003a],
Baldassarre et al. [2003b], Dorigo et al. [2004], Baldassarre et al. [2007], Sperati
et al. [2011], Trianni and Nolfi [2011]).
The CNR has produced a number of novel models, where adaptation takes
place in a population of neural networks. Daniele Denaro produced a novel model
of adaptation in neural networks, through incorporating features of both Mendel-
lian and Lamarckian inheritence (Denaro and Parisi [1997]). Lamarkian inheri-
tance, whereby the life-time experience of parents is transmitted to their progeny,
is supported by the model a a culture. Angelo Cangelosi proposed a model where
a simple language is evolved and used as the basis of communication between
different population members (Cangelosi and Parisi [1998]). The issue of modu-
larity (see section 2.3.1.4) in neural networks has also been addressed (Calabretta
et al. [2000], Ferdinando et al. [2000]).
A number of more theoretical issues have also been the subject of study.
This includes; ideas relating to the importance of differing time-sacles on the
emergence of embodied cognition (Nolfi et al. [2002]), Piagets theory of cognitive
development (Mueller and Grobman [2003]), action-based theory of categorization
from a connectionist perspective (Borghi et al. [2005]), a comparison of designed
and evolved control solutions (Baldassarre and Nolfi [2007]), a perspective on
connectionism in artifcial life (Schlesinger and Parisi [2007]), and the evolution
of prediction in an embodied agents (Gigliotta et al. [2011]).
2.4.1.3 The Federal Polytechnic of Lausanne (EPFL)
EPFL (under Francesco Mondada and Dario Floreano) and Sussex, have probably
contributed the most in early research on the application of evolutionary robotics
techniques to real robots. However EPFL was slightly delayed in its entry to this
field compared to Sussex and CNR. The first evolutionary robotics papers pro-
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duced by EPFL were in the mid 1990’s (Floreano and Mondada [1994], Mondada
and Floreano [1995]) rather than 1992 as in the case of Sussex and CNR. However
work in this area was increased quite significantly towards the end of the 1990’s
( Nolfi and Floreano [1998], Floreano and Mondada [1998], Urzelai et al. [1998],
Floreano and Urzelai [2000a], Urzelai. and J. [2000]). Of particular interest (from
the perspective of this thesis) was the development of new forms of neural network
capable of online or dynamic adaptation, work which was conducted primarily by
Joseba Urzelai. Whilst neuromodulatory effects support plasticity in the GasNet
model (originated by Phil Husbands at Sussex), Urzelai was to propose the evo-
lution of networks capable of adapting dynamically via Hebbian learning (Urzelai
and Floreano [2001], Floreano and Urzelai [2001a], Floreano and Urzelai [2001b]).
With the departure of Joseba Urzelai in 2000 this work has not been investigated
nor extended to the extent that the work on the GasNet has at Sussex. Despite
this, neural network plasticity, during the life-time of the robot, was to remained
a theme of reserach at the laboratory (Floreano and Urzelai [2001b]). Particularly
impressive is work conducted at EPFL on a range of real robots; including small
wheeled robots, and a small aerial airship (Floreano et al. [2005], Zufferey et al.
[2006]) using controllers evolved from networks of spiking neurons. Like Sussex,
EPFL has also done some work on collective robotics (Hauert et al. [2008], Mitri
et al. [2011]), but again, not to the same extent as that conducted by CNR.
Dario Floreano has done much to publicize the field of evolutionary robotics,
writing a number of reviews and general papers, describing work done in evolu-
tionary robotics (Floreano and Urzelai [2000b], Nolfi and Floreano [2002], Flore-
ano et al. [2004a], Floreano et al. [2004b], Floreano et al. [2008], Floreano and
Nolfi [2008], Floreano and Keller [2010]).
2.4.2 America
2.4.2.1 Randall D. Beer et al
Randall D. Beer (formerly at Case Western Reserve University, currently at In-
diana University), is arguably the leading evolutionary robotics researcher in the
USA. His focus on the behavioural aspects of artificial agents is indicated by his
proposal of the notion of computational neuroethology (Beer [1990]), indepen-
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dently of D. Cliff at Sussex (see section 2.3.4.2), and his interest in the simulation
of adaptive behaviour (Chiel and Beer [1991]). He should rightly be regarded as
one of the fathers of evolutionary robotics (see section 2.3.5.3), due to the publi-
cation of a seminal paper in Adaptive Behavior (Beer and Gallagher [1992b]) in
which he described the simulation of primitive behaviours including chemotaxis,
locomotion using these techniques. His use of dynamical neural networks was a
highly influential methodological development that became common throughout
evolutionary robotics.
Randall D. Beer has been a strong advocate of the dynamic systems perspec-
tive in considering both the analysis and synthesis of autonomous agents (Beer
[1992], Beer [1997], Beer [1998], Beer [2000],Beer [b]). He is also supportive of
the ecological-darwinian and autopoietic philosophies underlying the notion of
embedded cognition (Chiel and Beer [1997]), Beer [2004]), and has produced pa-
pers that integrate these two perspectives (Williams et al. [2008], Beer [2008],
Beer [a]). Randall D. Beer’s emphasis on dynamics, however, delineates his work
somewhat from that of Phil Husbands, Inman Harvey, and Ezequiel Di Paolo at
Sussex, whose emphasis is more on Ashby inspired cybernetics and autopoiesis (
see section 2.4.1.1).
Randall D. Beer, has been an advocate of some of the simplest models dy-
namic neural networks (Beer and Gallagher [1992b]); including continuous-time
recurrent neural networks (Beer [1995a]) and centre-crossing recurrent neural net-
works (Mathayomchan and Beer [2002b]). He, together with his co-researchers
have applied them to a wide variety of problems. This includes; reactive and
sequential learning behaviour (Yamauchi and Beer [1994b], Yamauchi and Beer
[1994c]), minimal cognitive behaviour (Beer [1996]), the evolution of a controller
for a hexapod robot (Gallagher et al. [1996a]), the evolution of walking (Seys and
Beer [2004]), and chemotaxis in a model of a nematode work (Beer [2011]).
His work has also addressed a number of more general issues in evolutionary
robotics; such as the role of symmetry generation and genotype size in influencing
evolvability (Seys and Beer [2006]), the parameter space structure of continuous-
time recurrent neural networks (Beer [2006]), issues of sparse connectivity and
in neural network architectures (Psujek et al. [2006]), exaption (Seys and Beer
[2007]) and developmental models of genotype to phenotype mapping (Psujek
76
2. Evolutionary Robotics
and Beer [2008]).
Randall D. Beer started with the simulation on minimal cognitive behaviour
with a focus on locomotion. Having found solutions to these problems, more
recently he has been investigating issues that might help support more complex
behaviour, through the synthesis of neural models that address issues of cate-
gory learning (Williams et al. [2008]) and associative memory (Phattanasri et al.
[2007b], Izquierdo et al. [2008]).
These developments parallel the work conducted in this thesis. This thesis
starts with an initial focus on locomotion with a comparative study of the dy-
namic neural network approaches used by Randall D. Beer, Sussex and EPFL.
Following this, the focus shifts to models of neural networks supportive of re-
inforcement learning, that are tractable to incorporation within an evolutionary
robotics methodology. This is largely indicative of the development of the field
of evolutionary robotics in general; initially focussing on locomotion, and then
seeking to extend this to circuit forms that might be supportive of more complex
behaviour.
2.4.2.2 Jordan B. Pollack et al
Jordan B. Pollack (initially at The Ohio State University, now at Brandeis Uni-
versity) is of the same generation as Randall D. Beer. His work was originally
connectionist with a distinct flavour of classical AI (Pollack [1988]). However in
the 1990’s we start to see work related to the simulation of evolutionary pro-
cesses (Watson and Pollack [1992],Angeline and Pollack [1993],Angeline and Pol-
lack [1994]), before addressing the evolution of neural networks (Angeline et al.
[1994]). His group conducted one of the earliest works on the evolution of com-
munication (Saunders and Pollack [1996]) prior to that conducted by Cangelosi
at CNR (Cangelosi and Parisi [1998]). It is perhaps only towards the end of
the 1990’s however when he began to focus more on evolutionary robotics (Ficici
et al. [1999], Watson and Pollack [1999]). As such, it is probably fair to say that
his role has been less significant in the early development of evolutionary robotics
than that of Randall D. Beer. However, where he has been influential is in his
role as a mentor to a second generation of researchers, including; Richard Watson
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(Watson et al. [2002]), Hod Lispon (Lipson and Pollack [2000]) and Greg Hornby
(Hornby and Pollack [2001b], Hornby and Pollack [2001a], Hornby and Pollack
[2001c]) He continues to do innovative work in collaboration with more junior
researchers (Harrington and Pollack [2010], Harrington et al. [2012]).
2.4.2.3 Hod Lipson et al
Hid Lipson, worked as post-doctoral researcher for three years at Brandeis Uni-
versity supervised by Jordan B. Pollack. He then moved to Cornell University,
before becoming Associate Director, pf Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering in
2010. According to his personal website;
My relatively broad spectrum of research projects focus on what
I consider to be two grand challenges of engineering: (a) Can we
design machines that can design other machines, and (b) Can we
make machines that can make other machines.
This agenda is evident in the novel robots that he has developed, starting
with three generations of simple robots (Pollack et al. [2001]), termed respec-
tively Legobots, GOLEM, and Tinkerbots. This early work was followed by the
evolution of a control system for a hovering ornithopter (Regan et al. [2002])
and the evolution of gaits in a hexapedal robot (Bongard [2004]). This work has
been reviewed in a paper entitled ‘Evolutionary Robotics for Legged Machines
: From Simulation to Physical Reality’ (Lipson et al. [2006]). Given the grand
challenges that he has outlined, it is perhaps not surprising that a significant
proportion of his research efforts have focussed on issues of modularity (Lipson
et al. [2001] Lipson et al. [2002] Variano and Lipson [2004]) and hierarchy (Lipson
[2007]), together with practical work on self-replicating (Mytilinaios et al. [2004]
Zykov et al. [2007]) and modular robots (White et al. [2005]). He continues to ad-
dress novel physical robotics projects with work on the simulation of amorphous
robots (Hiller and Lipson [2010]) and the evolution of arbitrary shapes (Clune
and Lipson [2011]).
78
2. Evolutionary Robotics
2.4.2.4 Josh Bongard et al
Josh Bongard has had a broad-based education, having passed through The Uni-
versity of Sussex, the University of Zurich, and Cornell University, before arriving
at the University of Vermont. As such he has had the opportunity to work at two
major centres of evolutionary robotics research (Sussex and Cornell), together
with the University of Zurich which is a major centre for autonomous robotics
research.
Whilst his early work was significant in its attempts to evolve both morphol-
ogy and neural control systems (Bongard [2003]), his later work has deviated
from the biological imperative emphasized at Sussex. He has adopted a hybrid
approach where self-modelling is incorporated as a design feature of his robot
control systems (Bongard et al. [2006]).
The fundamentalist form of the evolutionary robotics seeks to discover the
processes by which evolution has arrived at intelligence as an adaptation. This
not only informs us about biological processes, but it also allows us to explores the
dynamics of a process which has open-ended complexity as one of its properties.
By introducing a pre-conceived notion of self-modelling, without discovering the
process by which such self-modelling might emerge in biological systems, risks
abandoning the potential of evolutionary robotics. Although it could be argued
that this hybrid approach allows us to achieve greater performance than that
which can be achieved through purely evolutionary methods. This may well be
justified from an engineering perspective, where a specific problem needs to be
resolved in the shortest possible time-scale. It also may be a pre-cursor to hybrid
systems that incorporate evolved and designed components. As such, it is worthy
of ongoing consideration. Josh Bongard’s work represents one of the few examples
of a hybrid approach, to problems of non-trivial locomotion and minimal cognitive
systems.
Bongard has explored the use of Kenneth Stanley’s work on NEAT and CPPNs
(Auerbach and Bongard [2010], (Auerbach and Bongard [2011]). He has also
conducted more theoretical work in efforts to improve the efficiency of the evo-
lutionary search process; crossover functions for genetic programming (Bongard
[2010]), methods to avoid premature convergence (Bongard and Hornby [2010]),
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adaptive fitness to improve early termination (Bongard [2011]) and structural
modularity (Bongard [2011]).
2.4.2.5 Kenneth Stanley et al
Kenneth Stanley started his work at the University of Texas at Austin, under
the supervision of Risto Miikkulainen, before moving to the University of Central
Florida. He is arguably one of the leading researchers in the evolution of neural
networks in support of minimally cognitive behaviour. His work tends to focus
more on the kind of simple simulated environments typically used artificial life
research, than on either physically simulation or real robotics. Areas of applica-
tion include the video entertainment industry, where evolved networks are used
to controle non-playable characters in video or computer games (Hastings et al.
[2009],Schrum and Miikkulainen [2009]).
Stanley’s initially proposed an approach to evolving neural networks, that
he labelled NEAT, standing for the NeuroEvolution of Augmenting Topologies
(Stanley [2002b], Stanley [2002a]). His work has been highly influential, perhaps
largely due to his practice of releasing the source code to his simulations, and
placing them in the public domain. This has resulted in a proliferation of his
techniques, resulting in the emergence of a number of variants on his original
work (e.g. pruning James and Tucker [2004]).
Of particular interest in his approach is the use of; a recombination oper-
ator that identifies suitable crossover points in a fashion that preserves some
functional characteristics, an approach to speciation that avoids premature con-
vergence, and an incremental approach to network complexity. The NEAT model
evolves both network weights and topology (as do the GasNet model developed
at Sussex and the Hebbian neural networks developed at EPFL). In addition to
node weight and connection information, the genotype also includes a historical
markers for each gene. These markers are used as the basis for determining ho-
mologous crossover points during recombination. Such a scheme tends to support
functional modularity. The same historical markings are used as the basis for a
measure of similarity between genotypes. This measure of similarity is then used
to associate each geneotype with a nominal species. The evolutionary algorithm
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then uses explicit fitness sharing (Goldberg and Richardson [1987]), where the
fitness of each individual is scaled relative to its performance within its species.
As a consequence, a genotype of low global fitness (i.e. absolute fitness com-
pared with all population members), but with high relative fitness, compared to
other members of its own species, still has the opportunity to reproduce. This
helps to maintain phenotype diversity and avoid premature convergence during
the evolutionary process. Similar techniques are commonly in multi-objective or
multi-modal function approximation (Petrowski [1996], Miller and Shaw [1996],
Sareni and Krahenbuhl [1998], Feng and Li [2006], Hsieh et al. [2008]). Instead
of seeding the population with networks that have random topologies, the initial
population of genotypes is uniform and minimalistic, networks are gradually aug-
mented through add node and add connection mutation operators. The problem
domain initially addressed by Stanley was that of pole-balancing. The evolved
networks were feed-forward networks. This circuit form is addressed at function
apporximation, and through the evolutionary algorithm, function optimization.
In contrast, Randall D. Beer, Sussex and EPFL use dynamic neural network vari-
ants for dynamic control and sensor processing. These forms are more appropriate
for the simulation of sensor-motor control systems in simulated robots.
Although initially an advocate of direct encoding (as initially employed in the
NEAT model), Stanley went on to conduct an extensive review of more com-
plex mappings analogous to developmental processes (Stanley and Miikkulainen
[2003]). Subsequent to this, Stanley developed what he termed Compositional
Pattern Producing Networks (CPPNs) for use in the evolution of complex two-
dimensional patterns (Stanley [2007]).
Based on this work he subsequently proposed a model termed HyperNeat
(Stanley et al. [2009]) which employs an abstract developmental model in the
process of mapping a neural network genotype to its corresponding phenotype
(i.e. an ontogenetic function). Under this model, an extension of the CPNNs are
used not for generating two-dimensional patterns, but for creating connectivity
patterns in spatially distributed nodes. The CPNNs themselves are subject to
evolution under an extension of the NEAT methodology.
In the generation of a two-dimensional patterns the original CPNNs take a
single point as their input. The key innovation in HyperNeat is to take two
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points, that correspond to the coordinates of two (neuron) nodes. The output
of the CPNN then represents a measure of connectivity. If this value is below a
certain threshold then the two nodes are not connected. If above this threshold,
the value is scaled between one and some maximum value, such that it defines a
connectivity weight. This approach can be generalized to take into account an ar-
bitrary coordinate space for the underlying nodes (for example node distributions
in grids, layers, or distributed in concentric circles). The use of this technique has
been successfully applied to problems of visual discrimination and food gathering
in a simple simulated environment (Stanley et al. [2009]).
Despite the high quality of his work, at least for the purposes of this thesis,
his early work is less applicable than that of work conducted by Randall D.
Beer, ar at Sussex and EPFL. The reason for this, is that the network models
employed by him, are not of the dynamic variety (deemed to be more suitable for
dynamic control of real or simulated robots). As a consequence these techniques
had not be used to address problems of locomotion. However, this has changed
in the last few years with researchers other than Stanley having applied the
HyperNEAT methodology to the evolution of gaits (Clune et al. [2009a],Clune
et al. [2009b],Yosinski et al. [2011]).
In the course of work carried out for this thesis, a generative model was initially
investigated as a possible solution to generating networks that exhibited different
functional characteristics. The conclusion of this work was that the search space
of possible topologies is extremely large, and that an exploration of this space
might not be particularly efficient. Rather a decision was made to first try and
conceive of circuit types that might have complementary functional attributes.
Theoretically, this would allow us to explore the space of function interaction
between these two (or more) complementary types, through some evolutionary
process. We knew from the early work that GasNets (and other networks were
suitable for locomotion), we ultimately sought to discover a simple circuit type
that might emulate characteristics of reinforcement learning, with a formulation
that might be tractable to evolutionary search.
An ideal evolutionary algorithm with matched neural network model would
be at its most efficient, if we were to explore the possible space of all behaviours
directly. Since this is not practical, our preferred solution is to seek to explore the
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space of complementary circuits, whose intrinsic characteristics were adaptive to
environmental features in support of locomotion (e.g. GasNets) and rewards (our
new model). This we believe is likely to be computationally far more efficient in
the pursuit of complex behaviours, than an evolutionary exploration of topological
space (comprising both connection weight and connectivity) as addressed by the
HyperNEAT model.
We speculate that Stanley has also recognized the inefficiency of this approach,
as more recent work has sought to modify the fitness function, so that behavioural
novelty is the target of evolution (Lehman and Stanley [2011b]). This presents
problems for a number of reasons; firstly, it does not change the fact that an
evolutionary exploration of a topological space might be inefficient, secondly, it
is then necessary to create a secondary stage where we determine which of these
novel behaviours is of value, and thirdly that it abandons the biological paradigm.
That is not to say that is not possible to create a biologically plausible model
that is supportive of behavioural diversity. This might be achieved through some
form of negative assortative mating (see section 2.3.1.4), where mate attraction is
some principled function of behavioural complementarity. Here we digress away
from the central point however, that evolutionary of exploration of topological
space may be intrinsically inefficient in seeking discover to behavioural novelty,
and thus support the evolution behavioural complexity (for a recent review of
techniques to support speciation in behavioral space see Trujillo et al. [2011]).
2.5 The Central Challenge
The central challenge facing evolutionary robotics researchers is to seek to ex-
pand the boundary of behaviours that we are able to support through neuroevo-
lution. Most evolutionary robotics experiments typically investigate only one
particular neuron model and circuit variety. Given the diversity of neurons and
wiring patterns found in the brain, it is not unreasonable to suppose that support
for complex behaviour might require some integration of functionally specialized
brain regions. In seeking to synthesize comparable systems through evolutionary
robotics, there are two key issues that need to be addressed. Firstly, at the micro-
level, we need to identify (and if necessary create) neuron and circuit models that
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support complementary functionality. Secondly, at the macro-level, we need to
create hypotheses that provide us with a framework for considering how such
circuits are organized and integrated. The second of these is arguably the harder
of the two. We already have a wealth of neural network models which we can
draw upon for inspiration regarding networks with complementary functionality.
We do not however, have established models of the brain as a single system. Such
a model can at best only be a hypothesis, since despite significant advances in
theoretical neuroscience, the gap between biological reality and holistic functional
models remains extremely wide.
Whilst much of the work described in this thesis addresses the micro-level
(i.e. models of neural networks), we also attempt to gradually build a concep-
tual model of the brain as a single system. This is seen in its most complete
form in chapter 12. It represents a ‘best-fit’ model based on the conclusions
ascertained from the areas of study encompassed by this thesis. Such a model
has the potential to help us to understand how to approach the co-evolutiuon of
complementary neural circuits. We use this model to explain why the two circuit
varieties (Gasnets and reward adaptive circuits) that we chose to investigate have
intrinsically complementary features. This is something to which we shall return
in the penultimate chapter of this thesis.
Our goal is to generate agents capable of exhibiting complex behaviour. We
term such agents adaptive replicators. In pursuit of this goal we seek to
create a synthesis of ideas from three distinct areas; the evolutionary robotics
methodology, neuron models and neural networks, and the functional integration
of neural sub-systems (illustrated schematically in figure 2.7). At a meta level,
we might describe these areas as relating to;
1. Process: how we generate adaptive replicators.
2. Implementation: how we implement artificial neural systems that confer
adaptive behaviour on these replicators.
3. Organization: how specialized neural sub-systems are functionally inte-
grated.
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Figure 2.7: Complementary Perspectives
In the following sections we outline some general ideas (that act a high-level
context), intended to frame the remainder of this thesis.
2.5.1 Process and Evolutionary Robotics
In seeking to address how greater behavioural complexity might be supported,
we need to understand the essential nature of the organism and how it is shaped
by its environment. The effect of evolution on replicators, is as a filter, passing
through those which act in a manner to promote self-survival and the survival of
their progeny. Ultimately all behaviour, is a derivative of the fulfilment of these
implied organism goals. In a recursive fashion, neural circuits that support such
behaviour are selected for, on the basis that they support the fulfilment of these
implied goals. Note that we use to term implied goals here, to distance ourselves
from any anthropocentric contamination. There is no intention of implying that
organisms act in any conscious sense as if survival and reproduction were their
goals, only that evolution will tend to favour those organisms that act as if that
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were the case.
2.5.1.1 Adaptation as a Unifying Principle
One of nature’s key solutions to this problems of competitive replication is the
endowment of the organism with properties of adaptation. We should be careful to
identify the two separate senses in which we the term adaptation is used. Adaptive
behaviour is that which the observer describes when they see an agent responding
appropriately to changes in external and internal state. It is a description that
corresponds to the perceived actions of the agent from the perspective of a distal
observer. Adaptive processes in contrast, are those processes that support change
in the organism, in support of its implied goals. It is this latter sense in which
the term adaptation is of particular interest to us.
There is a very simple way in which we can view adaptive processes; that
of a spectrum of processes that result in change in the organism in response to
external influences. At one extreme we might describe a process as generative,
where external influences have a limited impact on the changes that take place
in an organism, other than at some point of inception. At the other extreme
we might describe processes as receptive where the organism undergoes continual
change in response to external influences.
2.5.1.2 Adaptation and Evolutionary Robotics
Although this may not necessarily be the view of all evolutionary robotics re-
searchers, it is certainly our view that the evolutionary robotics methodology
encompasses this entire spectrum of adaptive processes. Evolution acts on the
organism in its entirety, it is in this sense that we use the term evolutionary when
we refer to evolutionary robotics. It is through the composition of a number
of interacting and coupled adaptive processes that the fitness of an organism is
determined. We focus on adaptation as spectrum of processes so as to provide
us with a coherent framework from which we are able to consider how disparate
processes interact in fulfilment of the same essential goal; that of survival and
reproduction. Within this framework, we are able to identify three key classes of
adaptive processes; genetic, ontogenetic and continuous adaptation (or learning).
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These three classes are depicted in figure 2.8. The classification of any given
adaptive process into one class or another is aided by the identification of the
principal dimensions in which they differ (as shown in figure 2.9).
One of the key characteristics of the evolutionary robotics methodology is that
circuits are evolved and not designed. A neural network circuit is the somatic
expression of the germ line cells that incorporate the genetic code. Direct encoding
ignores this for the sake of methodological expediency. In direct encoding the
chromosome contains explicit parameters of neurons and their interconnections.
Increasingly sophisticated approaches rely on indirect encoding, implying a two-
stage process. In this case the chromosome codes for parameters of a generative
process. It is this generative process that then determines the parameters of and
connections between neurons. Indirect encoding incorporates processes that are
analogous to ontogenesis in biological systems.
The complexity of this mapping (from chromosome to neural circuit) removes
the human agent from any role in explicit design of these circuits. The human
role is to ensure that our selected methods of mutation and recombination (that
change the genetic code), and the ontogenetic function that maps this code to the
neural circuit, has the capacity or theoretical capability of discovering our target
design through evolutionary exploration. This involves a convoluted process for a
‘robogenetic engineer’. Typically, it is necessary to envisage a target model, that
represents a class of systems that might be the result of an evolutionary process.
In a traditional engineering approach, we would seek to create a mechanistic
decomposition of such a target model, and define the constituent components
explicitly. For a robogenetic approach, the decomposition process involves the
identification of a simpler class of neurons or networks, that have the capacity,
through evolutionary search, to support the functionality that is inherent in our
target system.
This approach is reflected in chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 7 develops a hypothet-
ical target model for evolutionary search, that might support reward adaptation.
We are then forced however, to identify a far simpler circuit formulation that is
capable of acting as a substrate upon which evolutionary search will operate (see
chapter 8).
Figure 2.8 represents a bauplan for adaptive replicators. All experiments in
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evolutionary robotics incorporate at least one adaptive process. Methods that em-
ploy direct encoding (see section 2.2.2) omit ontogentic adaptation, whereas those
that employ indirect encoding make use of it (although typically most approaches
are entirely generative without being influenced by environmental factors). The
more sophisticated the implementation of an adaptive replicator, the greater the
number of elements that are incorporated. This bauplan allows us to compare
different models of neuroevolution and the circuits that they employ. What it
is intended to do however, is also provide us with a macro-level perspective of
the processes that interact in the generation of a phenotype capable of exhibiting
adaptive behaviour.
2.5.2 Organization and Functional Integration
Evolutionary robotics provides us with a process that allows us to generate adap-
tive replicators. As a method however it is entirely ambivalent, over the par-
ticular results generated, in any respect other than the fitness that a particular
neural system might confer to its agent host. As mentioned previously, one of
our primary concerns is the efficiency with which the solution space of behaviours
might be explored. Without the imposition of some high-level organization that
might support the coevolution of functionally complementary circuits, evolution-
ary exploration may not yield promising results in reasonable time scales. We
are particularly interested in the functional integration of specialized neural cir-
cuits. Without a macro-level perspective that allows us to envisage some degree
of functional specialization, the product of our evolutionary search is likely to be
little more than a largely (functionally) undifferentiated neural soup.
Here we are faced with a dilemma. One of the attractions of the evolutionary
robotics method is that it supports the discovery of unanticipated designs and
open-ended complexity. How do we therefore impose some degree of high-level
organization, without over-constraining evolutionary search? A second problem
relates to biological plausability. Since this remains our reference model, we have
no desire to impose constraints that might preclude the discovery of biologically
plausible solutions.
In attempting to consider how we might solve such a problem, we draw inspi-
90
2. Evolutionary Robotics
ration from Ross Ashby’s ‘Design for a Brain’ (Ashby [1960]). He attempted to
formulate some general principles of control and organization that might at some
fundamental level capture the essence of certain processes that support adap-
tive behaviour. This is entirely the level of abstraction that is of most use to
us. Whilst his work is intended to be biologically plausible, it does not seek to
work at the low-level of abstraction typical of neuroscience research, for example.
Whilst he proposes a single architecture as an iconic system, he allows for vari-
ations on this theme, whereby systems of arbitrary complexity may be coupled
together. Whilst we use Ashby’s model as a reference, we ultimately arrive at
our own formulation, that specifically relates to the primary goal of this thesis.
In particular, we are interested in how circuits that are of use in supporting loco-
motion, may be complemented by those that are subject to reward adaptation.
Our general model acts as a framework for explaining how these circuit varieties
may be functionally integrated (see chapter 12).
The remainder of this section reviews Ashby’s work, and explains why many of
the limitations of his model, are avoided through the adoption of the evolutionary
robotics methodology. We shall refer to Ashby’s ideas intermittently throughout
this thesis (briefly in chapter 5 and again in chapter 12). Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2
make use of some of Ashby’s ideas in modified form, where we seek to identify a
mapping from the architecture of a hand-coded solution to a ball collection task
to brain anatomy.
2.5.2.1 Ashby’s Design for a Brain
Despite being a significant member of the early cybernetics movement, Ashby’s
perspective differed substantially from those who followed the path of automatic
computation. He had little interest in symbols (or representations) and logic as
analogies of thought and thinking (see sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4). Rather, he saw
the brain as an organ not dissimilar from that of other organs in the body;
The biologist must view the brain, not as being the seat of the
‘mind’, nor as something that ‘thinks’, but, like every other organ in
the body, as a specialised means to survival. (p41, Ashby [1960])
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He sought rather to arrive at some general principles that might explain the
capacity of the organism to exhibit adaptive behaviour. In so doing he formu-
lated a model, comprising a specific architecture, that he termed an ultrastable
system (p98, Ashby [1960]). This architecture has defined elements, structure
and functionality, which ensures that certain essential variables (p42, Ashby
[1960]) remain within bounds necessary to support the survival of the organism.
Ashby uses the term environment to delimit arbitrary divisions within a com-
plex coupled system. He typically uses the term largely to differentiate between
that which is inherent in a functional sub-system, and that which is external
(although coupled) to it;
There it is intended to treat one group of neurons in the brain as
the environment of another group. These divisions, though arbitrary,
are justifiable because we shall always treat the system as a whole,
dividing it into parts in this unusual way merely for verbal convenience
in description. (p41, Ashby [1960])
Ashby’s original definition of an ultrastable system is illustrated in figure 2.10.
There are two key structural elements which he refers to simply as the first loop,
and the second loop. The first loop supports a process, which takes as its input,
some feature from the environment, and in turn engages in a suitable response.
The system that supports this is referred to as the reacting part (R). The second
key structural element is that of the second loop. The second loop accepts as
its input, sensor information from the environment and/or internal information
from the organism, and in turn seeks to ensure that certain essential variables
remain within a range of preferred values. A deviation from these bounds, results
in a change of parameters (S) that in turn modify the behaviour of the reacting
part (R). This continues until appropriate parameters (S) are selected, such that
these essential variables are once again within bounds. In Ashby’s words;
For convenience, its definition will be stated formally. Two systems
of continuous variables (that we called ‘environment’ and ‘reacting
part’) interact, so that a primary feedback (through complex sensory
and motor channels) exists between them. Another feedback, work-
ing intermittently and at a much slower order of speed, goes from the
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environment to certain continuous variables which in their turn af-
fect some step-mechanisms, the effect being that the step-mechanisms
change value when and only when these variables pass outside given
limits. The step mechanisms affect the reacting part; by acting as pa-
rameters to it they determine how it shall react to the environment.
(p98, Ashby [1960])
Whilst evolution is not a central focus of his work, it is incorporated to the
extent that he perceives three roles for a gene pattern (p134, Ashby [1960]);
1. Determining the essential variables and their limits.
2. As an input to the reacting part (R).
3. In the determination of the parameters (S), in both value and form (i.e.
the functional characteristics of the systems that act on the reacting part).
2.5.2.2 The Limitations of Ashby’s Approach
There are three principal difficulties in adopting Ashby’s approach;
1. Design: He outlines no principled means by which we might pre-determine
the capacity or capability of an ultrastable system, and thereby ensure that
it a given design is appropriate for a given task. In other words, we have
no basis for design. We do not know the outcomes that might result from
architectural decisions.
2. Training: His outline of training an ultrastable system is crude, relying
upon the repeated disruption of the system (which he describes as analogous
to punishment), until the system delivers the required behaviour.
3. Functional Specialization: The outlined model fails to identify the role
(if any) of specialized functional subsystems, and how they might influence
the behaviour exhibited by such a system.
This latter limitation is implicitly acknowledged by Ashby himself, when dis-
cussing the challenges of training an ultratstable system;
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The concept of ‘reward’ is more complex. It usually involves the
supplying of some substance (e.g. food) or condition (e.g. escape)
whose absence would act as ‘punishment’. The chief difficulty is that
the evidence suggests that the nervous system, especially the mam-
malian, contains intricate and specialised mechanisms which give the
animals properties not to be deduced from basic principles alone.
(p110, Ashby [1960]);
Reward adaptive systems are therefore not specifically addressed by his model,
since according to Ashby such processes are not easily defined through general
models, and therefore beyond the scope of his treatment.
Given that we are able to have arbitrary variants of the ultrastable system, and
yet we are unable to identify forms that might support specialized functionality,
and we have no efficient means by which we might train such a systems, it is
perhaps not surprising that computational approaches we seen as preferential for
the purposes of device construction.
2.5.2.3 Evolutionary Robotics as a Solution
The limitations of Ashby’s approach are in many ways circumvented by adopting
the evolutionary robotics methodology. The capacity or capability of a system is
tested during a fitness trial. The use of evolutionary algorithms to explore the
space of possible designs avoids the requirement for the need for an analytical
means of determining design capability. The role of the human designer is no
longer one of directly determining the behaviour of a system, but that of seek-
ing to support the efficient exploration of potential solutions via the process of
evolutionary search.
There are no limitations on the nature of the circuits that can be incorporated
within an evolutionary robotics solution (other than that they should be tractable
to evolutionary search). Circuits that are amenable to continuous adaptation
(i.e. learning) can easily be incorporated. This provides us with a means of
supporting training in a fashion that is more flexible than that exhibited by the
techniques employed by Ashby in his ‘training’ his homeostat. Finally, circuits
of any arbitrary functional specialization can be incorporated into such designs,
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without necessarily requiring a human understanding of how such circuits might
interact with other sub-systems.
Whilst the computational approach facilitates (and in fact requires) human
design input, the results are brittle. Small errors in implementation can result in
the non-graceful degradation of results. Ashby’s formulation is more attractive
to the evolutionary robotics approach, since the inherent hierarchy imposed by
the second-loop imposes stability at the macro-level of behaviour, thus avoiding
the potentially fatal errors due to minor variations. It thus presents us with a
smoother fitness landscape, than that offered through the evolutionary explo-
ration of computational systems alone.
Features of the Ashby approach that are consistent with evolutionary robotics
include the genetic determination of certain system features (as illustrated in
figure 2.10). Central to both Ashby’s notions of adaptation and evolutionary
robotics, is the centrality of the organism as a model for an artificial control sys-
tems and a focus on the capacity of the organism to exhibit appropriate responses
to changes in environmental circumstances;
The book is not a treatise on all cerebral mechanisms but a pro-
posed solution of a specific problem: the origin of the nervous system’s
unique ability to produce adaptive behaviour. (p v, Ashby [1960])
The evolutionary robotics methodology is inspired by biological systems and
the robot itself is seen as some analogue of an organism. However, Ashby’s
formulation is rather too general for our purposes.
Unlike Ashby, we include ultrastable genetic adaptation as a key adaptive pro-
cess. We would argue that the dual loop characteristic of Ashby’s ultrastable
systems model is preserved where we treat the gene population as the reacting
part (R), population culture as the parameters (S), and the essential variables
as those corresponding to energy and food supplies (for example). Such a sys-
tem is depicted in figure 2.11. Usually, the term genetic adaptation is used to
refer to changes in allele frequency in a population or a representative individ-
ual. We shall continue to use it in that sense. It seems preferable to use the
term ultrastable genetic adaptation only when we wish to emphasize this dual-
loop formulation. The concept of an ultrastable genetic adaptation is of value to
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evolutionary robotics since it provides us with a conceptual framework to address
issues such as; the emergence of language and communication and the coevolution
of memetic systems. However, we shall not specifically deal with these issues in
this thesis.
Whilst the system as depicted does not comply with Ashby’s definition of
an ultrastable system (in that cultural change would not strictly speaking be a
continuous process, and that no single gene pattern exists as an exogenous input
to the system), we would argue that it can be regarded as one if certain conditions
are relaxed.
The ontogenetic domain is of particular relevance to evolutionary robotics,
since it is through the ontogenetic function (see section 2.2.2) that the genotype
corresponding to an individual is mapped to the corresponding neural network.
Models that employ direct-encoding employ trivial mappings that bear little re-
semblance to the processes of gene expression and developmental programs. How-
ever formulations that make use of indirect encoding typically correspond to some
analogue of these processes.
It is the generative properties of the ontogenetic domain that determine those
processes that are created in the domain of continuous adaptation. At least
for the purposes of evolutionary robotics, we can identify a number of special-
ized circuits that comprise examples of adaptive sub-systems, that in conjunction
support the organism in the maintenance of essential variables. Examples of such
sub-systems include; unsupervised learning and the creation of mappings from
high-dimensional to low-dimensional spaces and feature clustering; supervised
learning for function approximation in a system that is rich in error feedback sig-
nals; reinforcement learning and the determination of beneficial action sequences
in a high-dimensional space. The domain of continuous adaptation might also
encompasses less primitive forms of learning such as facilitation and habituation,
as well as specialized circuits such as Hopfield networks for associative memory.
Our bauplan for an adaptive replicator (figure 2.8) represents a solution space
of possible architectures, under a modified notion of adaptation as used by Ashby.
In our pursuit of the central challenge of evolutionary robotics, are task is clear.
It is to determine or create; efficient methods for the exploration of this solution
space; models that support complementary functional activity. There is an in-
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trinsic order in which these issues can be addressed. We need to first determine
what circuits embody the complementary functional characteristics required to
support complex adaptive behaviour. The identification of suitable neuron mod-
els and circuits that are tractable to evolutionary search remains one of the core
areas of research in evolutionary robotics, and it is this issue that represents the
primary goal of this thesis. Once such circuits have been identified, future work
(beyond the scope of this thesis) will be necessary to discover how best these
circuits might be integrated through coevolution and exaption.
2.5.3 Implementation and Neural Networks
A key element in supporting complex behaviours is in identifying (and if nec-
essary creating) functional circuits that exhibit complementary characteristics,
whose key parameters can be explored via evolutionary search. Whilst our long-
term goal might be to integrate such circuits, our initial goal has to be that of
identifying which circuits might be of particular interest. Our approach to an-
swering this question is to consider different problem domains, and then establish
which circuit varieties are particularly suited to them. In particular we focus on
locomotion and reward adaptation;
• Locomotion: As we saw in section 2.4 the application of evolutionary
robotics to problems in locomotion is already well developed. Principal
amongst the approaches to supporting locomotion are neural network for-
mulations that include; GasNets (Husbands et al. [1998e]), continuous-time
recurrent neural networks (Mathayomchan and Beer [2002b]) and Hebbian
networks (Urzelai and Floreano [2001]). The starting point for research de-
scribed in this thesis was therefore to identify which of these models best
at supported locomotion in legged robots.
In these studies we sought to determine which of the features of these various
formulations are significant in influencing their performance. This involved
an extensive comparative study, using 12 computers with simulation times
alone requiring six months. A description of these comparative studies is
given in the next chapter (chapter 3).
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• Sequence-Learning via Reward Adaptation: Having established Gas-
Nets to be of particular use in supporting locomotion, we sought to apply
them to an alternative task; that of having a robot collect a number of balls
(chapter 4). Disappointing results prompted us to reconsider how such tasks
might best be solved through circuits tractable to evolution (chapters 5 and
7). The result was an investigation of sequence-learning via reward adap-
tation (chapters 9 and 10). This work is based on novel neuron model and
circuits that incorporate them (chapter 8) inspired by the role of dopamine
in the basal ganglia (chapter 6).
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Evolving Locomotion -
Comparative Studies
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Overview
This chapter describes two comparative studies designed to establish which formu-
lation of dynamic neural networks are best suited to the evolution of locomotion
in two physically simulated robots; a biped (with restricted degrees of freedom)
and a quadruped (with unrestricted freedom). It compares GasNets developed
at Sussex (see section 2.4.1.1), Plastic or Neural Networks developed (PNNs) at
EPLF (see section 2.4.1.3), Centre-crossing Continuous Time Recurrent Networks
(CCTRNs) developed at Case Western Reserve University (see section 2.4.2.1)
together with variations and combinations of these basic types. These different
formulations were chosen as the leading examples of evolvable networks in sup-
port of locomotion, GasNets originally developed by Phil Husbands (Husbands
[1998b], Husbands et al. [1998d]), PNNs developed by Urzelai and Florean (Urze-
lai and Floreano [2001], Floreano and Urzelai [2001a]), and CCTRNs based on
models proposed by Randall D. Beer. (Beer [1996], Mathayomchan and Beer
[2002b]). At the time of writing no significant studies had addressed this issue.
The simulation time alone required approximately 6 months using up to 12 com-
puters; 8 computers with Intel based CPU’s running at 2Ghz and 4 computers
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running at 3GHz.
There is an increasing body of work that has successfully applied these tech-
niques to the evolution of ANNs suitable for controlling bipedal and quadrupedal
locomotion. This includes earlier work (Reil and Husbands [2002]) which demon-
strates that it is possible to evolve a bipedal motor control in a physically sim-
ulated agent using a conventional Dynamic Recurrent Neural Network (DRNN)
without sensor input. Bongard and Paul have evolved bipedal locomotion in a
physically simulated agent through genetic encoding that comprises morpholog-
ical as well as ANN parameters (Bongard and Paul [2001]). Researchers have
evolved bipedal locomotion in a physically simulated robot that incorporates a
model of neuromodulation (Ishiguro et al. [2003a]). Billard and Ijspeert have
been successful in evolving quadrupedal locomotion in a real robot (Billard and
Ijspeert [2000]).
3.1.2 The Dimensions of Comparison
The first comparative study (section 3.2) seeks to compare 14 different varieties
of networks in support of bipedal locomotion. The reason for choosing such a
large number of varieties was to seek to determine heuristically which circuit
features might be significant in determining the evolvability of the networks. The
second comparative study sought to focus on the simplest implementations of
these circuits in support of quadrupedal locomotion (section 3.3). In doing so we
sought to explore the potential benefits or detriments of;
• Connectivity: Fully recurrent versus sparse connectivity (in the GasNet
model).
• Neuromodulation: The GasNet model of neural modulation (GasNet
with and without gas neuromodualtion).
• Hebbian Plasticity: The use of dynamically variable weights based on
Hebbian learning rules.
• Density: Neuron density (16 versus 32 neurons the GasNet model).
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• Hybridization: Hybrid variants (GasNet-PNN, CTRNN-PNN, GasNet-
CTRNN).
• Generality: The simplest forms of GasNet, CTRNN, PNN networks are
tested on both a biped and quadruped model in order to see if morphology
had a significant impact on network variant performance.
One significant area where we seek to maintain everything constant, is in the
genetic algorithm used. This study is not intended to say anything about the
optimal genetic algorithm that might be used with such networks.
3.1.3 Common Methods
For the purposes of comparison the genetic algorithm employed is invariant across
all tests. These comparative studies are not intended to address the performance
characteristics of differing genetic or evolutionary algorithms, but rather the fea-
tures of different formulations of neural networks.
3.1.3.1 Genetic Algorithm
The same distributed steady-state genetic algorithm is used on all networks. The
population grid has dimensions of 10 by 10, to yield a total of 100 individuals.
Competition is tournament based, with a tournament group comprising three in-
dividuals. A principal is selected at random from the grid. Two other population
members are selected by a random walk originating at the principal’s grid cell.
The length of the random walk is an integer value in the range 1-4.
If the principal is the fittest then the weakest member is replaced by a mutated
version of the principal. Otherwise the weakest member of the tournament set
is replaced by a recombination of the two fittest individuals (using single point
cross-over). This recombined genome is then mutated.
In these experiments the generation index is incremented after the evaluation
of 100 individuals (comprising a pseudo-generation). Each neural network type
was evaluated for 200 generations. This was carried out ten times with different
random seeds for each network type.
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Note that the approach to mutation (the frequent modification of parame-
ters by a small amount, and a less frequent mutation by a substantially greater
amount) is in line with previous GasNet experiments and that the use of an
asynchronous distributed style GA is intended to emulate early GasNet experi-
ments (Husbands et al. [1998e]). One significant difference from that of the early
work on GasNets, is that we are employing single-point cross-over as a recombi-
nation operator. Early GasNet work relies exclusively upon mutation operators
(Husbands et al. [1998e]). Note that in later work on GasNets a comparison of
the use of GasNet models with and without recombination operators was made;
recombination yields slightly superior results than the sole use of mutation op-
erators (Smith et al. [2002e]). Later GasNet experiments (such as in Husbands
et al. [2001b] and Philippides et al. [2002]) would use node addition and deletion
operators, which are not employed here. The number of nodes used in a given
network type is fixed. One of the reasons for this, is that we want to carry out
simulations where we compare the variation node density, in an attempt to de-
termine whether or not this is a significant factor in determining the performance
of a GasNet.
3.1.3.2 Genetic Encoding and Mutation
The genetic encoding strategy follows a similar approach for all networks. Net-
work parameters are stored on a node or cell basis. Each gene comprises a list
of real valued and integer parameters (comprising 16 parameters per node for a
conventional GasNet for example). Connection weights (where relevant) are also
stored on a per node basis.
Mutation takes place either after recombination, or after cloning of the princi-
pal tournament member (as described earlier). Mutation takes place at 20 percent
of the nodes (rounded to 3 in a 16 cell network) selected at random. A single
mutation event will result in the mutation of a single real or integer parameter in
each of the randomly selected nodes. The magnitude of this mutation corresponds
to 4 percent of the real valued parameters range with a probability of 0.2, and 1
percent of the parameters range with a probability of 0.8. In the case of integer
parameters we follow a similar strategy of small mutations with a probability
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of 0.8 and large mutations with a probability of 0.2. These mutation parame-
ters were chosen in preliminary experiments to avoid premature convergence and
maintain a reasonable degree of phenotypic diversity across the different network
varieties during evolution.
In addition to this, those networks where connection weights are under evolu-
tionary control (such as in CTRNNs) undergo further mutation. Each randomly
selected cell has all of its weights mutated (again by a factor of 4 percent with a
20 percent probability and 1 percent with an 80 percent probability).
Time constant initialization was devised to yield a wide range of of values.
An exponent f was randomly selected from the set:
f[−10,−8,−6,−4,−2, 0, 2, 4, 8, 10]
A second random variable r[0.0, 1.0] was then used to scale the value such that
the time τ constant is calculated from:
τi = 1.0 + ri(10
fi) (3.1)
The time constant mutation operator increments or decrements the exponent
by 1 with a probability of 0.2, and generates a new value of r[0.0, 1.0] with a
probability of 0.8.
3.1.4 Characteristic Equations
3.1.4.1 Center-Crossing CTRNNs
The characteristic equation of the conventional CTRNN (Beer [1995b]) is shown
below;
yt+1i = y
t
i +
T
τi
(−yti +
N∑
j=1
ωjiσ(y
t
j + θj) + Ii) (3.2)
i = 1, 2, ..., N
Where:
yt+1i is the activation of the i’th node at time t+ 1.
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yti is the activation of the i’th node at time t.
τi is the time constant for the i’th node calculated according to equation 3.2.
Ii a sensor input to the i’th node where I is either 1 (in contact with the floor)
or 0 (not in contact with the floor).
θj a bias term for the j’th node where θ ∈ [−2, 2].
T is the time slice (in this case T is set to 1).
ωji is the weight of the output from the j’th node to the i’th node where ω ∈
[−4.0, 4.0].
σ is the logistic activation function.
σ(z) =
1
(1 + e−z)
(3.3)
The network is fully interconnected. Node connection weights and bias are un-
der evolutionary control. This study uses a variant of the conventional CTRNN,
referred to as the Center-Crossing CTRNN Mathayomchan and Beer [2002a],
where initial biases are calculated such that:
θi =
−∑Nj=1 ωji
2
(3.4)
Mathayomchan and Beer suggest that populations seeded with center-crossing
networks may be more likely to yield a wider range of dynamics than a population
of random networks.
The incorporation of a single symmetry axis (as used in this study) results in
a final form, as described by;
yt+1i = y
t
i +
T
τi
(−yti +
N∑
j=1
ωjiσ(y
t
j + θj − zti) + Ii) (3.5)
i = 1, 2, ..., N
Where:
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zti is the activation of the corresponding i’th node in the symmetrical subnet-
work at time t.
N is the number of nodes in each subnetwork (in this case 8).
3.1.4.2 GasNets
GasNets are an example of a class of ANNs that seek to model aspects of neuro-
modulation. A key attribute of the GasNet model is that the transfer character-
istics of network nodes are modified via the influence of diffused gases (modeled
in a 2-dimensional plane). This network model is inspired by the action of Nitric
Oxide in biological systems (Husbands et al. [2001a]). Earlier work has shown
that GasNets are more evolvable than comparable networks that do not incor-
porate gas modulation, both in simulation and when used in real robots (Smith
et al. [2003a]).
In GasNets, node transfer functions can be modulated by local gas concentra-
tions in the vicinity of the node. Nodes can also act as chemical emitters, under
either gas or electrical stimulation. GasNet nodes exist in a geometric plane
where internode distances determine gas concentrations and (in conjunction with
additional genetic parameters) network connectivity. Under typical evolutionary
parameters the GasNet connectivity rules result in a sparsely connected network.
yt+1i = tanh[k
t
i(
∑
j∈Ci
ωjiy
t
j + Ii) + bi] (3.6)
Where:
kti is a time-varying transfer function modulator. The value of k varies with
gas concentrations at the i’th node, see equation 3.10.
Ci is the set of all nodes that have an input to the i’th node.
Ii a sensor input to the i’th node.
bi a bias term for the i’th node where bi ∈ [−2, 2].
The original GasNet diffusion model (upon which this implementation is
based) is controlled by two genetically specified parameters, namely the radius of
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influence r and the rate of build up and decay s. Spatially, the gas concentration
varies as an inverse exponential of the distance from the emitting node with a
spread governed by r, with the concentration set to zero for all distances greater
than r (Equation 3.7). The maximum concentration at the emitting node is 1.0
and the concentration builds up and decays from this value linearly as defined by
Equations 3.8 and 3.9 at a rate determined by s.
C(d, t) =
{
e−2d/r × T (t) d < r
0 else
(3.7)
T (t) =
{
H
(
t−te
s
)
emitting
H
[
H
(
ts−te
s
)−H ( t−ts
s
)]
not emitting
(3.8)
H(x) =

0 x ≤ 0
x 0 < x < 1
1 else
(3.9)
where C(d,t) is the concentration at a distance d from the emitting node at time
t. te is the time at which emission was last turned on, ts is the time at which
emission was last turned off, and s (controlling the slope of the function T ) is
genetically determined for each node. The total concentration at a node is then
determined by summing the contributions from all other emitting nodes (nodes
are not affected by their own concentration, to avoid runaway positive feedback).
For mathematical convenience, in the basic GasNet there are two ‘gases’,
one whose modulatory effect is to increase the transfer function gain parameter
(kti from equation 3.6) and one whose effect is to decrease it. It is genetically
determined whether or not any given node will emit one of these two gases (gas
1 and gas 2), and under what circumstances emission will occur (either when the
‘electrical’ activation of the node exceeds a threshold, or the concentration of a
genetically determined gas in the vicinity of the node exceeds a threshold. Note
these emission processes provide a coupling between the ‘electrical’ and ‘chemical’
mechanisms). The concentration-dependent modulation is described by Equation
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3.10, with transfer parameters updated on every time step as the network runs.
kti = k
0
i + αC
t
1 − βCt2 (3.10)
where k0i is the genetically set default value for ki, C
t
1 and C
t
2 are the concen-
trations of gas 1 and gas 2 respectively at node i at time t, and α and β are
constants. Both gas concentrations lie in the range [0, 1]. Thus the gas does
not alter the electrical activity in the network directly, but rather acts by con-
tinuously changing the mapping between input and output for individual nodes,
either directly or by stimulating the production of further virtual gas. The con-
centration dependent modulation can, for instance, change a node’s output from
being positive to being zero or negative, even though the input remains constant.
Any node that is exposed to a non zero gas concentration will be modulated.
This set of interacting processes provides the potential for highly plastic systems
with rich dynamics.
3.1.4.3 CTRNN/PNN Hybrid
One of the underlying concepts associated with Plastic Neural Networks is that
there is value in evolving artificial neural networks that are capable of exhibiting
learning through ontogenetic change (Floreano and Mondada [1996]). Let us
first start with a description of a basic PNN (Urzelai and Floreano [2000a]). A
key characteristic of PNN’s is that connection weights vary over time based on
Hebbian learning rules given by:
ωtji = ω
t−1
ji + η∆ωji (3.11)
Where η is a learning rate ( 0.0 < η <1.0 ) and ωji is the connection weight
of the input to node i from node j. The adaptation rule ∆ωji is genetically
determined for each node. All inputs to a given node are subject to the same
adaptation rule (referred to as node encoding by the authors).
Where x is the activation of node j, which is an input to node i (which has
an output activation of y), the adaptation rule is one of:
Plain Hebbian Rule
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∆ωji = (1− ωji)xjyi (3.12)
Post-Synaptic Rule
∆ωji = ωji(−1 + xj)yi + (1− ωij)xjyi (3.13)
Pre-Synaptic Rule
∆ωji = ωjixj(−1 + yi) + (1− ωji)xjyi (3.14)
Covariance Rule
∆ωji =
{
(1− ωji) if F (xj, yi) > 0
(ωji)F (xj, yi) otherwise
(3.15)
Where:
F (xj, yi) = tanh(4(1− |xi − yj| − 2) (3.16)
All nodes in the PNN are fully interconnected. The rate of learning η can
only assume one of four values (0.0, 0.3, 0.6, 0.9). The characteristic equation for
the PNN is shown below:
yt+1i = σ(
N∑
j=1
ωtji(y
t
j)) + Ii i = 1, 2, ..., N (3.17)
Where:
ωtji is the adaptive weight for the j’th input to the i’th node.
σ is the standard logistic activation function.
Ii a sensor input to the i’th node where I is either 1 (in contact with the floor)
or 0 (not in contact with the floor).
The CTRNN/PNN Hybrid is a variation on the conventional PNN. The differ-
ence being that activation signals are further modified by a node based time con-
stant under evolutionary control (in a similar fashion to conventional CTRNNs).
This variation was first introduced by the authors of this paper in an attempt to
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create a PNN that exhibited richer frequency dynamics than those of the conven-
tional PNN (McHale and Husbands [2004a]). The range of yi is [0, 2] for input
neurons and [0, 1] for hidden and output neurons (Blynel and Floreano [2002]).
It is modified again here such that the network comprises two symmetrical sub-
networks, with mutual inhibition;
yt+1i = y
t
i +
T
τi
(−yti +
N∑
j=1
ωtjiσ(y
t
j + θj − zti) + Ii) (3.18)
i = 1, 2, ..., N
Where:
ωtji is the adaptive weight for the j’th input to the i’th node.
zti is the activation of the corresponding i’th node in the symmetrical subnet-
work at time t.
N is the number of nodes in each subnetwork.
3.2 Experiment 1: Bipedal Locomotion
This section starts by describing the experimental set-up and the genetic algo-
rithm used on all networks. It then goes on to list the characteristic equations of
each network variety before finally reporting the results. A total of 14 different
ANNs are assessed in this study.
3.2.1 Experimental Setup
Parameters were chosen as outlined by the original authors wherever possible
(given the differences in genetic encoding). These original papers should be con-
sulted for further experimental details if more information is required. Variations
from their implementations are stated where relevant.
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3.2.1.1 Ab Initio
For the purposes of a fair comparison no assumption is made about the coupling of
the underlying network nodes. The chosen task is to achieve bipedal locomotion
ab initio, without assuming that nodes should be configured as coupled oscillators
(such as those in Matsuoka [1985]).
3.2.1.2 Physical Model
The computer code for the biped physical model was generated with the aid of a
product called Autosim (unfortunately no longer commercially available technical
details of the product are described in Sayers [1990]). Joints are simulated as
torsional springs. Strictly speaking the motor output is actually a control signal.
This signal is mapped to an angular displacement that corresponds to the rest
position of a torsional spring. A change in the angular displacement of this rest
position will result in a torque applied to the lower limb attached to the joint (as
the spring seeks to restore the joint to its new rest position).Clearly this is not in
any way biologically realistic. Earlier attempts to evolve bipedal locomotion using
a model based on antagonistic muscle groups (McHale [2000]) were unsuccessful.
The current approach is based on work outlined in Reil (Riel [1999]).
The kinematic root only has five degrees of freedom (two rotational and three
translational). The biped is physically incapable of rotating in its roll axis. This
prevents the biped from falling over on its side, although it is still free to fall
forwards and backwards. Whilst this is not entirely physically realistic, it is suf-
ficient for the purposes of this comparative study. This still remains a non-trivial
problem; feet are modelled as point contact points, resulting in a dynamically
unstable model after an initial displacement of the biped. Figure 3.1 shows a
diagram of the model’s dimensions, weights, joint angular limits and torsional
spring constants.
3.2.1.3 Fitness Calculation
Each fitness assessment starts with the biped in a stable standing position. The
trial lasts a simulated 20 seconds. The fitness of the individual is taken to be
the minimum of the distance travelled by either of the biped’s feet, or hips. This
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0.6 m
0.5 m
0.3m
5.6 kg
3.0 kg
1.39 kgFront View
Left  View
5.6 kg
3.0 kg
89 degrees
84 degrees 101 degrees
Spring Damping (d) 
4.0 N-m-s/degree
Spring Constant (k) 
10.0 N-m/degree
Figure 3.1: Biped Physical Model: dimensions, weights, joint angular limits
and torsional spring constants.
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choice of fitness measurement seeks to avoid assigning a high initial fitness value
to those bipeds that simply take a large lunging step.
Outputs of the neural network nodes were passed through a low-pass filter
before being mapped to the torsional angular displacement signal. This was to
prevent the biped from moving simply by vibrating its feet at high frequency
(this can result in motion similar to that of a washing machine when it enters its
spin cycle and starts moving across the floor).
Each time-step for the neural network update lasts 0.025 seconds (or 1/40th
of a second). Thus a 20 second trial corresponds to 800 neural network time-
steps. The physical simulation uses forward Euler integration with a time-step of
50 micro-seconds (i.e. there are 500 dynamics time-steps for each neural network
time-step). The small physical time-step was necessary to ensure the stability of
the physical simulation.
The trial was terminated if the biped fell below 50 percent of its original height
and a fitness value assigned based on the distance travelled up to that point in
time.
3.2.1.4 Sensorimotor System
Motor output signals are taken from the 1st 5th, 9th, and 13th nodes in the
network . These nodes were used to control the rest position of the torsional
springs in the biped’s left hip, right hip, left knee and right knee respectively.
The output of these nodes was mapped to a range of -94 to 101 degrees angular
hip displacement, and 0 to -89 degree angular knee displacement.
There are two sets of sensor configurations used in this experiment (nominally
referred to as R and I configurations). The majority of simulations were carried
out with a regular connection pattern (R configuration). Sensor input from the
right foot contact sensor occurs at the 2nd, 6th, 10th and 14th nodes. Sensor
input from the left foot contact sensor occurs at the 3rd, 7th, 11th and 15th nodes.
Sensor input consisted of a binary 1.0 or 0.0 value depending upon whether or
not the feet of the biped were in contact with the ground.
Additional simulations were carried out on GasNet networks with an irregular
sensor connection pattern (I configuration). In this case sensor signals were input
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to the 8th, 9th and 10th nodes for the right foot, and the 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th
nodes for the left foot. One of the reasons for this second sensor configuration
was to see if there were any significant changes in the performance of circuits
where sensor nodes were connected directly to motor nodes (i.e. in the case of
the 9th and 13th nodes in the I configuration). These node assignemnets are
summarized in tables 3.1 and 3.2.
Table 3.1: Biped Motor Nodes
Joint Motor Nodes
Left Hip 1
Right Hip 5
Left Knee 9
Right Knee 13
Table 3.2: Ground Contact Sensor Nodes
Body Sensor Nodes Regular(R) Sensor Nodes Irregular (I)
Left Foot 3,7,11,15 11,12,13,14
Right Foot 2,6,10,14 8,9,10
3.2.2 Network Variants and Characteristic Equations
This section describes the network details of each of the varieties of networks
tested. The focus is on the characteristic equations that govern the dynamics
of each network variety. Equation notation most closely resembles that used by
Beer (Beer [1995b]). In some cases it is necessary to deviate from the original
author’s notation so as to try and maintain a consistent notation over different
network varieties.
A list of the network types is shown in Table 3.3. Each network type is
assigned an index for reference purposes numbered between 1 and 14. The R
letter denotes the regular sensor configuration; the I denotes the irregular sensor
configuration. Each network type is assigned an arbitrary index for reference
purposes.
It should be noted that conventional GasNets comprise nodes that are spa-
tially distributed. A parametric coding strategy is used where connections are
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Table 3.3: Summary of Network Types
Type Description
1R Conventional CTRNN
2R Center-Crossing CTRNN
3R Basic PNN
4R Gas-Modulated PNN
5R CTRNN/PNN Hybrid
6R Conventional GasNet
7R Fully Recurrent GasNet
8R CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid no Gas
9R CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid with Gas
10I Conventional GasNet 16 Cell
11I Conventional GasNet 32 Cell
12I Fully Recurrent GasNet
13I CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid no Gas
14I CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid with Gas
determined for each node based on genetic parameters that define geometric arcs
originating at each node. A node that falls within an excitatory or inhibitory
arc is deemed to be electrically connected to the node at origin of the arc (see
Husbands [1998a] for specific details). The consequence of this, is that conven-
tional GasNets are only sparsely connected. This approach is used in the the
following network types; 6R, 8R, 9R, 13I and 14I. All other network types are
fully interconnected.
3.2.2.1 Conventional CTRNN - type 1R
This is a conventional CTRNN based on the work of (Beer [1995b]). Node self-
recurrency is allowed. Node connection weights and bias are under evolutionary
control.
yt+1i = y
t
i +
T
τi
(−yti +
N∑
j=1
ωjiσ(y
t
j + θj) + Ii) (3.19)
i = 1, 2, ..., N
Where:
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yt+1i is the activation of the i’th node at time t+ 1.
yti is the activation of the i’th node at time t.
τi is the time constant for the i’th node calculated according to equation equa-
tion 1.
Ii a sensor input to the i’th node where I is either 1 (in contact with the floor)
or 0 (not in contact with the floor).
θj a bias term for the j’th node where θ[−2, 2].
T is the time slice (in this case T is set to 1).
ωji is the weight of the output from the j’th node to the i’th node where
ω[−4.0, 4.0].
σ is the logistic activation function.
σ(z) =
1
(1 + e−z)
(3.20)
3.2.2.2 Center-Crossing CTRNN - type 2R
The characteristic equation of the Center-Crossing CTRNN from Mathayomchan
and Beer [2002a] is the same as that of the CTRNN (type 1). However initial
biases are calculated such that:
θi =
−∑Nj=1 ωji
2
(3.21)
These authors suggest that populations seeded with center-crossing networks may
be more likely to yield a wider range of dynamics than a population of random
networks.
3.2.2.3 Basic PNN - type 3R
This implementation is based on the description given by Urzelai and Floreano
(Urzelai and Floreano [2000a]). The key characteristic of PNN’s is that connection
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weights vary over time based on Hebbian learning rules given by:
ωtji = ω
t−1
ji + η∆ωji (3.22)
Where η is a learning rate ( 0.0 < η <1.0 ) and ωji is the connection weight
of the input to node i from node j. The adaptation rule ∆ωji is genetically
determined for each node. All inputs to a given node are subject to the same
adaptation rule (referred to as node encoding by the authors). Whilst equation
3.22 denotes the general form of the equation used to determine weight changes,
the specific form of the adaptation rule ∆ωji for each node is one of four types
described below.
Where x is the activation of node j, which is an input to node i ( which has
an output activation of y), the adaptation rule is one of:
Plain Hebbian Rule
∆ωji = (1− ωji)xjyi (3.23)
Post-Synaptic Rule
∆ωji = ωji(−1 + xj)yi + (1− ωij)xjyi (3.24)
Pre-Synaptic Rule
∆ωji = ωji(−1 + yi) + (1− ωji)xjyi (3.25)
Covariance Rule
∆ωji =
{
(1− ωji) if F (xj, yi) > 0
(ωji)F (xj, yi) otherwise
(3.26)
Where:
F (xj, yi) = tanh(4(1− |xi − yj| − 2) (3.27)
All nodes in the PNN are fully interconnected (with self-connections also
supported). The rate of learning η can only assume one of four values (0.0, 0.3,
0.6, 0.9). The characteristic equation for the PNN is shown below:
yt+1i = σ(
N∑
j=1
ωtji(y
t
j)) + Ii i = 1, 2, ..., N (3.28)
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Where:
ωtji is the adaptive weight for the j’th input to the i’th node.
σ is the standard logistic activation function.
Ii a sensor input to the i’th node where I is either 1 (in contact with the floor)
or 0 (not in contact with the floor).
The term ”basic” is used to differentiate it from that used by Tuci and Quinn
(Tuci and Quinn [2003]) where an additional bias input was used for each node.
In common with the implementation described by Blynel and Floreano (Blynel
and Floreano [2002]) the range of yi is [0, 2] for input neurons and [0, 1] for hidden
and output neurons.
3.2.2.4 Gas-Modulated PNN - type 4R
This is essentially the same as the basic PNN (type 3) with the exception that
nodes whose weights are genetically determined to be modified by the Plain Heb-
bian Rule, or Post-Synaptic Rule, have their weights modified by diffused gases
(the gas diffusion is described in Husbands et al. [1998b]). For these two varieties
of nodes, the weight modification rule becomes:
Gas Modified Plain Hebbian Rule
∆ωji = (
ct1i
ct1i + c
t
2i
)(1− ωji)xjyi (3.29)
Gas Modified Post-Synaptic Rule
∆ωji = (
ct2i
ct1i + c
t
2i
)(ωji(−1 + xj)yi + (1− ωij)xjyi) (3.30)
Where:
ct1i is the concentration of gas 1 at the i’th node.
ct2i is the concentration of gas 2 at the i’th node.
The significance of these equations is that the rate of change in the weights of
the inputs to these nodes will vary continuously with changes in the relative
concentration of these two gases. When both gases have zero concentrations
there is no change in weight.
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3.2.2.5 CTRNN/PNN Hybrid - type 5R
This is a modification of the conventional PNN, with activation signals modified
by a node based time constant under evolutionary control (in a similar fashion
to conventional CTRNNs).
yt+1i = y
t
i +
T
τi
(−yti +
N∑
j=1
ωtjiσ(y
t
j + θj) + Ii) (3.31)
i = 1, 2, ..., N
Where:
ωtji is the adaptive weight for the j’th input to the i’th node.
3.2.2.6 Standard GasNet - type 6R
The implementation in this report is based on GasNet work reported in (Husbands
et al. [1998b]).
In GasNets, node transfer functions can be modulated by local gas concentra-
tions in the vicinity of the node. Nodes can also act as chemical emitters, under
either gas or electrical stimulation. GasNet nodes exist in a geometric plane
where internode distances determine gas concentrations and (in conjunction with
additional genetic parameters) network connectivity. Under typical evolutionary
parameters the GasNet connectivity rules result in a sparsely connected network.
yt+1i = tanh[k
t
i(
∑
jCi
ωjiy
t
j + Ii) + bi] (3.32)
Where:
kti is a time-varying transfer function modulator. The value of k varies with
gas concentrations at the i’th node.
Ci is the set of all nodes that have an input to the i’th node.
Ii a sensor input to the i’th node.
bi a bias term for the i’th node.
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3.2.2.7 Fully Recurrent GasNet - type 7R
The fully recurrent GasNet uses the GasNet model of gas diffusion but adopts a
fully recurrent connectivity model. Whereas a conventional GasNet is sparsely
connected, this network is fully connected.
yt+1i = tanh[k
t
i(
N∑
j=1
ωji y
t
j + Ii) + bi] (3.33)
i = 1, 2, ..., N
3.2.2.8 CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid no Gas - type 8R
This is a variation of the conventional CTRNN. In this case inter-node connec-
tivity is determined by the approach used in GasNets. It uses a sigmoid transfer
function, with bias and node time constants under evolutionary control.
yt+1i = y
t
i +
T
τi
(−yti + tanh[Ki(
∑
jCi
ωjiy
t
j + Ii) + bi]) (3.34)
Where:
Ki is a transfer function constant.
T is the time slice constant.
τi is the time constant for the i’th node.
3.2.2.9 CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid with Gas - type 9R
This is another variation of a conventional CTRNN, but in this case it is more
extensively modified along the lines of GasNets. The network nodes transfer
function is gas modulated, and network connectivity is based on the GasNet
model. What remains of the the original CTRNN is the node time constant.
yt+1i = y
t
i +
T
τi
(−yti + tanh[kti(
∑
jCi
ωji y
t
j + Ii) + bi]) (3.35)
Where:
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kti is a time-varying transfer function modulator. The value of k varies with
gas concentrations at the i’th node.
3.2.2.10 Conventional GasNet 16 Cell - type 10I
This network is based on the Conventional GasNet (type 6R) but uses the irreg-
ular sensor configuration. Another difference is that bias values are set such that
bi[−4, 4].
3.2.2.11 Conventional GasNet 32 Cell - type 11I
Other than the number of cells in this network, all other parameters are the same
as those of the 16 cell gas net (type 10I). Note that of all the networks tested,
this is the only one that is comprised of 32 cells or nodes.
Given the nature of the GasNet connectivity algorithm, 32 cell GasNets are
likely to be more highly inter-connected than 16 cell GasNets. The size of the
plane remains constant, so a higher number of cells means a higher cell density.
A larger number of cells will tend to fall within a given connection arc, thus
resulting in a higher number of inter-cell connections per cell.
3.2.2.12 Fully Recurrent GasNet - type 12I
This network is based on the Fully Recurrent GasNet (type 7R) but uses the
irregular sensor configuration. Another difference is that bias values are set such
that bi[−4, 4].
3.2.2.13 CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid no Gas - type 13I
This network is based on the CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid without Gas (type 9R)
but uses the irregular sensor configuration. Another difference is that bias values
are set such that bi[−4, 4].
3.2.2.14 CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid with Gas - type 14I
This network is based on the CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid with Gas (type 9R) but
uses the irregular sensor configuration. Another difference is that bias values are
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set such that bi[−4, 4].
3.2.3 Results
Table 3.5 shows the peak fitness of the best individual in the ten evolutionary
runs for each network type. Table 3.6 shows the average peak fitness value across
all runs for each network type. Table 3.7 gives some indication of the phenotypic
variation of the peak fitness across all runs for each network type.
To put these fitness values in perspective, 2.5 meters is attainable through a
fast walk in about 10 seconds (attained by the Conventional GasNet type 10I),
and through a slow walk in about 20 seconds (attained by the Conventional
GasNet type 6R). Bipeds that have travelled around 1 meter have typically taken
around two steps. The worst performing Basic PNN typically only extended one
leg, before slightly drawing the lagging leg forward.
Figure 1 shows three snapshots of the biped walking. This rendering is based
on the results obtained from the 16 cell GasNet (type 10I).
3.2.3.1 Principal Results Summary
We can summarize the most important results as follows:
1. Conventional GasNets were the only networks to achieve cyclical bipedal
locomotion.
2. Conventional GasNet peak fitness was typically more than twice that of the
other networks.
3. Center-Crossing CTRNNs achieved the second highest peak fitness after
the conventional GasNets.
4. Center-Crossing CTRNNs and CTRNNs attained the highest average fit-
ness values.
5. Center-Crossing CTRNNs marginally outperformed conventional CTRNNs
in peak and average fitness.
6. Basic PNNs without dynamic attributes performed the worst.
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7. Both a CTRNN/PNN Hybrid and a Gas Modulated PNN improved on the
performance of the Basic PNN.
8. The CTRNN/PNN Hybrid achieved comparable results to the Conventional
CTRNN.
9. Fully Connected GasNets perform badly compared to Conventional Gas-
Nets. GasNet performance seems to decline with increased inter-connectivity
(see type 11I vs 10I and 6R).
10. Conventional GasNets exhibit a higher variation in phenotype fitness than
other network types. Conventional CTRNNs exhibit relatively low pheno-
typic variation.
11. Gas Modulated networks generally outperform their un-modulated counter-
parts (see type R8 vs R9 and I13 vs I14).
12. GasNet performance is largely unaltered by minor sensorimotor configura-
tion changes (see R vs I sensor configurations).
These results are generally consistent with those reported by GasNet re-
searchers and the comparative studies cited earlier.
3.2.3.2 The Fittest
The two fittest networks (type 10I and 6R) were both Conventional GasNets.
Despite both achieving almost identical fitnesses, the phenotypic solutions were
qualitatively different. Gases were actively oscillating in the 10I network, whereas
they remained at constant levels in the 6R network. This is a strong indication
of the ability of GasNets to discover alternative pathways to a given fitness level.
Whilst Figure 3.2 (type 10I) may appear to imply a simple oscillatory be-
haviour, analysis of network activity shows that biped motion is substantially re-
active. The transition in foot contact sensor data from not-touching to touching
(a 0.0 input value to a 1.0 input value at the sensor nodes) triggers a substantial
change in network activity. The left foot in a raised position suddenly touching
the ground will elicit a change in the control signal applied to the right hip, such
that it begins to rise.
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Figure 3.2: GasNet Biped Kinematic Data: (Upper) Left Hip and Right Hip
(Lower) Right Knee and Left Knee
Table 3.4: Combined Results
Network Rank Max. Avg STD
6R Conventional GasNet 1 2.63 0.97 0.70
10I Conventional GasNet 16 Cell 2 2.62 0.92 0.66
2R Center-Crossing CTRNN 3 1.63 1.13 0.24
11I Conventional GasNet 32 Cell 4 1.31 0.94 0.29
5R CTRNN/PNN Hybrid 5 1.27 0.90 0.33
14I CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid with Gas 6 1.25 0.92 0.21
1R Conventional CTRNN 7 1.24 1.11 0.15
9R CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid with Gas 8 1.22 0.95 0.25
8R CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid no Gas 9 1.18 0.90 0.23
4R Gas-Modulated PNN 10 1.06 0.57 0.30
7R Fully Recurrent GasNet 11 0.98 0.35 0.09
13I CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid no Gas 12 0.72 0.61 0.13
12I Fully Recurrent GasNet 13 0.53 0.47 0.21
3R Basic PNN 14 0.24 0.23 0.01
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Figure 3.3: Renderings of the fittest GasNet biped at 5.0, 5.875 and 6.25 seconds.
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Table 3.5: Distance Travelled by the Fittest Individual (meters).
Network Rank m
6R Conventional GasNet 1 2.63
10I Conventional GasNet 16 Cell 2 2.62
2R Center-Crossing CTRNN 3 1.63
11I Conventional GasNet 32 Cell 4 1.31
5R CTRNN/PNN Hybrid 5 1.27
14I CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid with Gas 6 1.25
1R Conventional CTRNN 7 1.24
9R CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid with Gas 8 1.22
8R CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid no Gas 9 1.18
4R Gas-Modulated PNN 10 1.06
7R Fully Recurrent GasNet 11 0.98
13I CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid no Gas 12 0.72
12I Fully Recurrent GasNet 13 0.53
3R Basic PNN 14 0.24
Table 3.6: Average of Distances Traveled by the Fittest individual in each of the
ten runs (meters).
Network Rank m
2R Center-Crossing CTRNN 1 1.13
1R Conventional CTRNN 2 1.11
6R Conventional GasNet 3 0.97
9R CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid with Gas 4 0.95
11I Conventional GasNet 32 Cell 5 0.94
14I CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid with Gas 6 0.92
10I Conventional GasNet 16 Cell 7 0.92
5R CTRNN/PNN Hybrid 8 0.90
8R CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid no Gas 9 0.90
13I CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid no Gas 10 0.61
4R Gas-Modulated PNN 11 0.57
12I Fully Recurrent GasNet 12 0.47
7R Fully Recurrent GasNet 13 0.35
3R Basic PNN 14 0.23
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Inspection of the graph shows that the gait is asymmetric. The right hip
oscillates between approximately 15 and 73 degrees, whereas the left hip oscillates
between 26 and 47 degrees. The lower left leg remains at an almost constant
angular displacement to the upper leg, whereas the right knee-joint oscillates in
an anti-phase relationship with the right hip-joint.
3.3 Experiment 2: Quadrupedal Locomotion
3.3.1 Introduction
3.3.2 Network Descriptions
Put in the simplest terms, Continuous Time Recurrent Neural Networks (CTRNNs)
(Yamauchi and Beer [1994a]) represent the “plain vanilla” form of DRNN’s, Gas-
Nets represent an approach to incorporate neuromodulation into a form of DRNN
(Husbands et al. [1998b]), and Plastic Neural Networks (PNNs) seek to incorpo-
rate Hebbian dynamics (Floreano and Mondada [1996]). The particular variants
used in this experiment are described in detail in this following section.
One thing that should be noted is that for each network, network morphology
has been constrained to correspond more closely to that associated with coupled-
oscillator circuitry. All networks comprise a total of 16 nodes or cells. An initial
population is seeded with networks that have a single symmetry axis, such that
we have two subnetworks of 8 nodes, each with identical parameters. In the case
of GasNets (where nodes have a physical location in a 2 dimensional plane) the
position of each node from one subnetwork is mirrored in an axis that divides
the plane. This is shown more clearly in Figure 3.4. The mirrored nodes are
interconnected via mutually inhibitory connections. Whilst initial populations
comprise symmetrical networks, mutation and crossover results in the introduc-
tion of asymmetries over a period of time (symmetry is only enforced in the initial
population).
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Table 3.7: Standard Deviation of the distance travelled by the fittest individual
in each of the ten runs.
Network Rank SD
6R Conventional GasNet 1 0.70
10I Conventional GasNet 16 Cell 2 0.66
5R CTRNN/PNN Hybrid 3 0.33
4R Gas-Modulated PNN 4 0.30
11I Conventional GasNet 32 Cell 5 0.29
9R CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid with Gas 6 0.25
2R Center-Crossing CTRNN 7 0.24
8R CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid no Gas 8 0.23
14I CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid with Gas 9 0.21
12I Fully Recurrent GasNet 10 0.21
1R Conventional CTRNN 11 0.15
13I CTRNN/GasNet Hybrid no Gas 12 0.13
7R Fully Recurrent GasNet 13 0.09
3R Basic PNN 14 0.01
Figure 3.4: Schematic of the symmetrical distribution of GasNet nodes
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3.3.3 Experimental Setup
A screen-shot of the quadruped used in this experiment is shown in Figure 3.5.
Whereas the previous (bipedal locomotion) study used a physics package called
AutoSim, this study uses an open source package called Open Dynamics Engine
(ODE).
Figure 3.5: Physically Simulated Quadruped
The quadruped torso is simulated with 6 physical degrees of freedom (unlike
the previous biped study, where the biped was physically incapable of falling
sideways). The quadruped comprises 9 rigid bodies, two rigid bodies for each
leg, and a single rigid body for the quadruped torso. Lower limbs are connected
to the upper limbs via a limited hinge joint with a single rotational degree of
freedom. Upper limbs are connected to the torso again with a limited hinge joint
with one degree of freedom. The angular limits are shown in a scale diagram of
the quadruped in Figure 3.6.
The assessed fitness of each individual is simply taken as the absolute distance
travelled by the quadruped in a fixed time interval. The neural network is up-
dated at half the frequency of the physics simulation, for a total of 5000 updates
(approximately 20 seconds of real-time simulation).
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Figure 3.6: Scale drawn diagram showing joint angular limits (in degrees)
Table 3.8: Sensor Nodes
Limb Sensor Nodes
Right Rear 0,1
Left Front 5,6
Left Rear 8,9
Right Front 12,13
Sensor input to the neural network comprises simple contact sensors associated
with each lower limb. When a lower limb is in contact with the ground, the sensor
value is 1. At all other times it is zero. Each contact sensor is connected to two
network nodes as shown in Table 3.8.
Motor output nodes are shown in Table 3.9. The output signal of each motor
node is mapped linearly into the hinge angular range. This becomes a target
angular displacement. A velocity value for the joint is then calculated, based on
the difference between the current angular displacement and this target displace-
ment. The physics engine than applies torque necessary to arrive at this joint
velocity, constrained by a maximum torque value.
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Table 3.9: Motor Nodes
Joint Motor Nodes
Hip Right Rear 0
Knee Right Rear 2
Hip Left Front 4
Knee Left Front 6
Hip Left Rear 8
Knee Left Rear 10
Hip Right Front 12
Knee Right Front 14
3.3.4 Results
The results of each evolutionary run are shown in Table 3.10. The distance
travelled is normalized by the body length of the quadruped so as to present
the data in a more intuitive fashion. A distance travelled of 1.3 body lengths
simply corresponds to the quadruped falling forwards. Between 2 and 3 body
lengths, typically one or two steps have been taken. Distances greater than 4
body lengths usually correspond to a slow or unstable gait. Distances greater
than this correspond typically to cyclical gaits. The global fitness peak is likely
to be around 14 body lengths.
Although the results for GasNets and the hybrid CTRNN/PNN are very simi-
lar, there are differences in the stability of evolved gaits, with those of the GasNets
exhibiting greater stability. Over all, the fittest individual was evolved using
GasNets, however the CTRNN/PNN achieved a marginally higher average fit-
ness measure. The results for the Center-Crossing CTRNN were generally poor.
However, one of the runs did discover the same gait as the fittest GasNet and
CTRNN/PNN. As a consequence the fittest Center Crossing CTRNN individual
attained a fitness very close to that of the other two networks considered.
3.3.5 Discussion
Although not obvious from Table 3.10, the quality of motion exhibited by the
quadruped varied substantially with different networks. The fittest CTRNN
driven quadruped exhibits motion that is similar to what we might expect from
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Table 3.10: Distance Travelled by the Fittest Individual (normalized to
quadruped body length). Letter superscripts correspond to distinct gaits de-
scribed in the text.
Rank CTRNN GasNet CTRNN/PNN
1 11.7a 13.7a 13.6a
2 1.5 7.2b 7.2f
3 1.4 5.2c 6.2e
4 1.4 4.6 6.2
5 1.4 3.4d 5.7e
6 1.4 3.2 4.9
7 1.4 3.0 4.2
8 1.4 2.7 1.6
9 1.3 2.6 1.5
10 1.3 2.5 1.3
11 1.3 2.0 1.3
12 1.3 2.0 1.3
13 1.3 2.0 1.3
14 1.3 1.7 1.1
Average. 2.1 4.0 4.1
Median. 1.4 2.8 2.9
Maximum. 11.7 13.7 13.6
a Central Pattern Generator. The gait is symmetrical and the frequency of os-
cillation appears to be relatively stable. The CTRNN produces a stable gait
that continues for a prolonged time period after the end of a trial (if allowed to
continue).
In contrast, the gaits generated by the CTRNN/PNN hybrid appear to be
highly reactive, with little evidence of forced oscillations (excluding that of the
fittest CTRNN/PNN individual). Although the order of stepping may assume a
regular pattern, there is considerable variability in the speed of subsequent steps.
In this respect motion closely resembles irregular passive dynamic walking. The
GasNet demonstrates gaits which exhibit aspects of reactive behavior together
with forced oscillations (producing the fasted quadruped within the evaluation
time period).
The GasNet and CTRNN/PNN Hybrid exhibited the widest range of gaits.
The CTRNN/PNN exhibited some gaits that were not discovered by GasNet,
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although the CTRNN/PNN gaits were relatively unstable. If we consider the form
of the CTRNN/PNN network, it is clear that connection weights will gradually
decline if there is a lack of coincident activity. In such a dynamic environment, rich
external sensory input may play a more significant role than it would in networks
that exhibit strong intrinsic dynamic activity (such as self-oscillation). This may
well go some way to explaining why the gaits exhibited by the CTRNN/PNN
appear to be more reactive, but seem to lack strong oscillatory activity.
The evolved quadrupeds exhibit a variety of of the gaits, and body config-
urations. The quality of the motion varies from driven-oscillatory to ballistic-
reactive. Some of the most distinctive patterns are described below (the letters
correspond to that which appears next to the fitness value in Table 3.10).
a The front legs hit the ground together, then the back legs, corresponding to
the bound gait.
b The quadruped jumps from its rear limbs, stopping itself with its fore-limbs,
before returning to a squatting position. This cycle then repeats. This does
not correspond to any of the commonly observed animal gaits.
c In this case the left fore-limb remains in a forward position, whilst the right
fore-limb remains in a rearward position. Rear limbs push off from the
ground in a coordinated fashion. Motion resembles that of the three-legged
bound gait.
d In some runs, the quadruped assumes a crawling configuration. Early in the
evolutionary run a suspended walking gait is evident. Two diametrically
opposed limbs are always in contact with the ground.
e This motion pattern most closely resembles ballistic walking. It is a highly
irregular gait, with little evidence of regular oscillatory movement.
f This is another bounding gait. However it makes use of “elbows” rather than
“hands/feet” in its fore-limbs.
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3.4 Summary
3.4.1 An Idealised Comparative Study
An ideal comparative study would resemble an ecosystem of creatures in their
environment. They would compete amongst themselves, and compete with other
organisms in pursuit of survival and themselves and their offspring. They would
discover for themselves what activities were necessary for survival through the
process of dynamic or continuous learning in addition to undergoing genetic and
ontogenetic adaptation. An environment of this complexity could conceivably be
constructed, and its architecture would resemble that of a massive multiplayer
on-line role playing game (MMORG), since it would require both distributed com-
putation and distributed simulation (i.e. the simulation environment is common
to client machines). Unlike a MMORG there would be no requirement for human
intervention. In such a simulation, comparable neural networks could be evalu-
ated as separate species, and their population would prosper or decline in as a
consequence of the evolutionary processes embedded in the simulation. In such an
idealized study, the dimensions of comparison highlighted in section 3.1.2 would
be parametrized, and would themselves be the subject of evolutionary search. In
is conceivable that such studies could be carried out in the future, although not
without the significant concentration of software development efforts on a single
project.
The studies described here represent the limits of what is practically achiev-
able by working in isolation over a prolonged period by a single researcher. This
involves a sampling of neural network architectures based on a matrix of neu-
ral network parameters with dimensions of; connection density, neural density
(in the case of spatial models such as the Gasnet), alternative functional mod-
els (GasNet, Hebbian networks and continuous time recurrent neural networks),
hybrid variations of these functional models, and morphology (in this case only
bipedal and quadrupedal). In considering the contribution of this work, it is
important to remember two things; firstly that at the time that this study was
conducted no one had carried out any comparative studies of this scope in evolu-
tionary robotics and secondly that the functional models compared represented
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the most sophisticated models existent at that time (excluding those employing
ontogenetic models).
A factor completely ignored in these studies, is the impact that the use of
alternative genetic algorithms might have on the relative performance of these
networks. The efficiency with which we are able to explore phenotype space, is a
complex function of the encoding strategy, ontogenetic function (where relevant
in the case of indirect encoding), recombination, and mutation operators. What
we have done in this comparative study is to compare the functional character-
istics of the evolved neural networks, and implicitly the coding strategies and
ontogenetic functions associated with each network model. What we have not
done, is to explore the impact of alternative mutation and recombination opera-
tors on the evolvability of each network form. An exploration of these dimensions
would require a further significant increase in the requirement for computational
resources. An ideal study would however also incorporate an investigation of
effects of variations in these evolutionary algorithm operators.
There is a limit to that which it is worthwhile exploring at this stage. These
networks are applied only to one problem domain, that of locomotion. Since
our stated goal is of discovering techniques to extend the bounds of behavioural
complexity that might be simulated, there is a limit to how much time we should
focus on arriving at an optimal formulation for locomotion. Such a formulation
may or may not integrate well with other neural networks having complementary
functional characteristics. What we require at this stage is a rough measure of the
relative performance of available network formulations for locomotion. Based on
this, we can start to consider further lateral investigations involving alternative
problem domains.
3.4.2 Discussion
3.4.2.1 Temporal Adaptivity and Evolvability
It is claimed that GasNets have a high evolvability due to their high capacity
for temporal adaptation (Smith et al. [2002b]). The coupling of electrical and
gas dynamics is discussed in some detail by Philippedes et al (Philippedes et al.
[2002]). In this work the authors showed that reducing the likelihood that a node
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pair are both chemically and electrically coupled can improve the evolvability of
the GasNet network even further. In particular they state;
.. systems involving distinct yet coupled processes are highly evolvable
when there is a bias towards loose coupling between the processes;
this allows the possibility of ’tuning’ one against the other without
destructive interference.
The relatively poor performance of fully connected GasNets, where a high degree
of coupling is forced into the network, tends to support this claim. Philippides
et al. also refer to the multiple redundancies inherent in loosely coupled GasNets
which potentially lead to increased numbers of routes through the evolutionary
search space. These factors may help to account for the relatively high variance
in GasNet fitness in comparison with CTRNNs, as well as the significantly higher
peak fitness. The inherent dynamics are being shaped and explored in a very
different way.
In the case of the one of the fittest GasNet bipeds (type I10) the reactive re-
sponse of the right hip to the transition from non-contact to contact of the left foot
appears to be primarily gas-mediated. In contrast the joint angular displacement
dynamics are governed primarily by electrical activation signals. Whilst this may
be an over-simplification (GasNets are integrated systems with co-dependencies
between both gas and electrical signalling), it is easy to imagine circumstances
in which there are independent phenotypic processes that have intrinsic time dy-
namics associated with them. The ability to explore these phenotypic temporal
dynamics in parallel may be a significant factor in the evolvability of GasNets.
Concepts such as of temporal adaptivity and system coupling may be useful
concepts in helping us to understanding the dynamics of such systems. However
we still need to try and identify the specific characteristics of these networks that
support temporal adaptivity. Two of the most obvious areas to consider are the
frequency and phase characteristics of the GasNet.
3.4.2.2 Phase Space Exploration
Phase relationships between signals in an articulated agent are extremely impor-
tant to achieve coordinated activity. One aspect of GasNets is that nodes are
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physically distributed in a virtual 2-dimensional space. A variation in the dis-
tance between nodes (through mutation for example) results in a phase lag or
lead in the modulation of gas-coupled nodes. In this sense phase relationships
are under direct evolutionary control. None of the other networks investigated
in this study embody these characteristics. Simply put, in GasNets, node posi-
tion mutations are operating directly in phenotype phase space (where nodes are
chemically coupled).
In direct encoding, if a single parameter maps onto a specific phenotypic at-
tribute that is largely independent of other attributes, this is likely to aid the
efficient exploration of phenotypic space via mutation operators, since it may
result in a smoother fitness landscape. In the case of articulated bipedal lo-
comotion, we might imagine that the phase relationship between hip joints is
a significant phenotypic attribute that affects overall fitness. A network model
that can explore this phase relationship through mutation operators may exhibit
greater temporal adaptation than one that cannot.
3.4.2.3 Frequency Space Exploration
Examination of the motor output signals of GasNets compared to other net-
works indicates that GasNets generate motor control signals with a wide range
of frequency components (particularly high frequency). It is easy to imagine that
a network that exhibits significant oscillatory behaviour over a wide bandwidth
may have some advantage in seeking to discover a solution suitable for articulated
motion.
In an attempt to analyze this further, five additional simulations were carried
out based on the Conventional CTRNN (type 1R). In this case neural net updates
took place at five times the frequency of the the tests described here (4000 neural
net time steps in a 20 second period instead of 800). Peak fitness attained was
1.30 and average fitness was 1.19. These values are very similar to those of a
CTRNN operating at a the lower frequency. This may imply that it is not just
frequency ranges that are significant, but also the diversity of signal frequencies
intrinsically present in the network, that help to determine temporal adaptivity.
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3.4.2.4 Temporal Dynamics and PNNs
It should be stated that there is no reason to expect that the Basic PNN should
have performed particularly well in this problem domain. The environment re-
mains constant over evolutionary time. As such there is no additional benefit to
be gained by in-trial learning. Limited sensor stimulation may have resulted in a
rapid decay in node activity in this implementation. However, the modification
of the Basic PNN to incorporate richer time dynamics (e.g. type 4R and 5R
networks) can improve the performance of PNN networks.
3.4.3 Biped versus Quadruped Results
In the previous study, which considered bipedal locomotion, GasNets appeared to
offer the best solution (the only network to achieve cyclical bipedal locomotion)
followed by Center-Crossing CTRNNs. For detailed analysis of GasNet dynamics
and performance, the reader is referred to (Smith et al. [2003a]) and (Philippedes
et al. [2002]). In this respect the results for the GasNet are broadly in line with
those of the previous study.
In this study, only one of the CTRNN runs resulted in locomotion. This is in
keeping with prior work (Reil and Husbands [2002]) where CTRNNs were evolved
for bipedal locomotion control. Only 10% of runs generated oscillatory activity
that resulted in bipedal locomotion. No stable cyclical gaits were generated for
the biped in the previous comparative study using CTRNNs.
Compared to the previous study, the biggest difference is in the relative perfor-
mance of the Hybrid CTRNN/PNN. Whilst at best mediocre in the prior study,
the results when applied to quadrupedal locomotion are comparable with those
of the GasNet. There are two possible explanations that spring to mind. Firstly,
modifying the original Hybrid CTRNN/PNN, so that it more closely resembles
a coupled-oscillator, may result in dynamic activity that is more suitable to os-
cillation and locomotive control. Note that in the previous study networks were
single heterogeneous networks with no axis of symmetry. Secondly, quadrupedal
locomotion may be more amenable to reactive solutions than the intrinsically less
stable problem of bipedal locomotion.
CPGs are currently the dominant motor control paradigm. Work has shown
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that it is possible to model all the common quadrupedal gaits using a network of
eight cells (Buono and Golubitsky [2001]). The results described here may lead us
to question whether or not reactive responses are just as important in generating
locomotive activity.
3.4.4 Conclusion
The value of a comparative study such as this is that it enables us; to verify the
models of other researchers, determine whether or not there are trivial hybrid
variants that might be superior to those models proposed, and to explore some of
the design dimensions of these networks to determine if there are some principal
factors that are the most significant. The variants that were tested represent a
very sparse sampling of the total space of possible genotypes. However, doing
substantially more than this would have required significantly greater computa-
tional resources (typically 12 computers were used for approximately 6 months
to obtain these results).
An important factor to keep in mind when considering these comparative stud-
ies is that we are only addressing one problem domain, that of legged locomotion.
The comparatives studies shown here indicate for the problem domain that we in-
vestigated, that the standard GasNet model represents a good solution (amongst
those tested), although Hebbian (or PNN) networks also show comparable results
in some cases. Since our goal is to establish how behavioural complexity can be
best supported, it is sufficient for our purposes to establish that this is the case,
since our goal is to investigate a number of problem domains. We are less inter-
ested in the optimal solution to locomotion, than the best approach to evolving
networks capable of addressing a number of problem domains, and through their
composite solution support behavioural complexity. There is not need necessarily
at this stage to address locomotion further. An obvious question to ask at this
stage is, ‘are Gasnets suitable for other problem domains?’. Work described in
the chapter 4 seeks to answer this question.
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3.4.5 Subsequent and Recent Developments
The work conducted in this chapter was published in conference proceedings in
2004 (McHale and Husbands [2004c] and McHale and Husbands [2004b]). Since
then there are been a number of developments in this field. We might best break
these down into three seperate areas. The first relates to work that increases
our understanding of the factors that determine the evolvability and performance
in GasNets compared with other approaches (see for example Philippides et al.
[2005], Magg and Philippides [2006] and Husbands et al. [2010]). The second
relates to a diversification of the techniques used to address the evolution of sys-
tems capable of supporting locomotion or minimally cognitive behaviour, through
largely dynamic processes; an Artificial Homeostatic System (AHS) comprising
Non-Spatial GasNet (NSGasNet) and Artificial Endocrine Systems (AES) (see
Moioli et al. [2008b] and Moioli et al. [2008a]), systems capable of supporting
minimal cognitive behaviours supported solely by chemical models (Dale and
Husbands [2010]), a hormone diffusion based model (Hamann et al. [2010]), ku-
ramoto phase-based Models (Moioli et al. [2010]), the Essential Variable Monitor-
ing GasNet (Lowe et al. [2010]), work extending Urzelai’s Plastic Neural Networks
(Hoinville et al. [2011]), work extending Randall Beers work on CTRNNs such
as Adaptive Centre Crossing CTRNN’s (Campo and Santos [2010], Santos and
Campo [2012]), and novel approaches based on chaotic dynamics (Shim and Hus-
bands [2012]).
The investigations that help to explain GasNet features and evolvability to-
gether with the new model classes are all worthy of significant attention. Unfortu-
nately the scope of this thesis sacrifices depth in this particular area for breadth.
It is noticeable that of the references quoted above, many represent extensions
of circuit classes that we have already explored in this chapter. Since this thesis
attempts to outline circuit varieties that are intrinsically complementary (taking
inspiration from biological systems), the work outlined in this chapter is sufficient
for our purposes.
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Chapter 4
Experiment: Simple Ball
Collection Experiment
4.1 Introduction
The results of our work described in chapter 3 indicate that GasNets offer us a
good solution for locomotion in legged robots. Our original intention here was
to simply determine the extent to which its properties were suited for alterna-
tive problem domains. Work described in this chapter focusses on one particular
experiment. This experiment involves the collection of balls by a robot in a three-
dimensional physically simulated environment. Such a task is typically solved (in
the video games industry for example) by constructing Finite State Machines
(FSM) that decompose a task into smaller problems, that are by themselves rela-
tively trivial to solve. We might imagine an ‘intelligent’ solution to this problem
would be for the robot to wander until discovering a ball. To then orient towards
the ball, and then to approach it for collection. Early results produced by Gas-
Nets were not promising. As a consequence, the focus of attention shifted. The
new goal was to determine whether we could evolve more intelligent behaviour
by penalizing energy inefficiency in the fitness function. Chapter 5 goes on to
examine this problem domain in greater detail, and determine what kind of cir-
cuit is best suited to solving such a problem and by implication determining the
characteristics of the problem that makes it less amenable to solution by the
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GasNets.
Often in such simulations the energy constraints placed on a simulated or-
ganism are implicit, either due to the physical design of the robot and its power
supply, or through parameters chosen for actuators in physical simulation. Typi-
cally there is no cost penalty associated with higher energy use in the completion
of a task, nor benefit in engaging in energy efficient activity. As a consequence,
the behaviour exhibited by the evolved robots is often not typical of behaviour
exhibited by living organisms, which clearly do have energy budgets determined
by their activities and metabolism. This problem is of interest to evolutionary
roboticists for two reasons; clearly energy efficient robots have greater economic
value than those that are wasteful, and it may be more difficult to evolve intelli-
gent behaviour where energy supplies are relatively unconstrained.
4.2 Energy and Life
At the macro level Energy processes are of major importance in driving Eco-
logical Systems (Jorgensen and Bendoricchio [2001]) whilst at the micro level,
energy governs the biological reactions that support life (Haynie [2001]). Within
this broad spectrum of work, Biophysics and Biomechanics are amongst the most
relevant areas to scientists seeking to evolve life-like robots or artificially simu-
lated creatures. Interesting examples of the application of Biophysics to predict
animal behaviour include that by D. M. Gates, who uses energy based models to
predict lizard activity patterns, and predator-prey relationships (Gates [2003]).
In the field of Biomechanics the extensive works of R. McNeill Alexander are of
particular relevance to scientists considering locomotion in living organisms from
an energy perspective (Alexander [2003]).
There are three key questions that are of pragmatic interest to researchers in
Evolutionary Robotics. These are:
1. How do energy constraints influence behaviour?
2. How can we generate appropriate locomotor control systems that are energy
efficient?
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3. Does the imposition of energy constraints make it easier or more difficult
to evolve effective integrated sensor-motor control systems?
Quite clearly the questions raised above are very broad in their scope. This
paper describes a starting point and a basic methodology from which it is hoped
that we can start to address some of these issues in greater detail. The focus of
this paper is on the effect of the imposition of energy constraints on the relative
utilization of motor and sensor facilities in solving a simple task.
4.3 Experimental Setup
Previous work (Husbands et al. [1998c]) involved evolving a GasNet based neural
network for a real and simulated Robot, with the goal of moving towards a tri-
angle and ignoring a rectangle. The experiment reported here differs in its focus
on energy efficiency rather than the successful execution of a simple sensor-motor
task. The following section describes the experimental set-up, together with de-
tails on the GasNet implementation and the evolutionary algorithm used. Whilst
the following section describes the key experimental parameters, additional pa-
rameters that relate to the generation of the GasNet morphology are discussed
in more detail in the source cited above.
4.3.1 The Robot and Its Environment
A model was made of a ‘toy’ robot with minimal sensor and motor capacity. The
robot exists in a physically simulated 3d world. Motion is achieved through the
application of linear and rotational forces to the robot at its centre of mass. A
GasNet (described in more detail below) comprising 16 nodes is evolved to provide
the motor signals for the application of forces to the robot. Each node represents
a neuronal cell. Four of these nodes act as motor neurons. The rotational torque
is determined by the sum of two motor output neurons. Torque is applied to
the robot around a vertical axis centred at the robots centre of mass. The linear
force is the sum of two motor output neurons, oriented in the robots forward
direction, and passing through the robots centre of mass. As a result, the robot
144
4. Ball Collection
is capable of rotating clockwise and counter-clockwise, as well as moving forwards
and backwards.
The robot has four sensors. These comprise raycasts into the physically sim-
ulated world. This data is minimally pre-processed before passing to two sensor
neuron inputs. One sensor input simply registers whether or not an object has
been hit. Any of the rays striking an object will result in an input value of +1
applied to the sensor neuron input, and -1 when no objects are detected. The
second sensor neuron receives a value that corresponds to the average distance
from the ray source to the detected object across all sensor rays when an object
is within sensor range. If a sensor ray detects no object, then the distance mea-
sured by the robot’s sensor rays is taken to be the maximum value of the raycast’s
sensor range. The average distance value for all rays is mapped to value within
the range [+1,-1]. Effectively we have two sensor modalities; the first neuron will
detect any objects within the robot’s visual range; the second sensor neuron will
be activated when the robot is close to a target object. The raycast sensors and
robot can be seen in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Side View of Robot and Sensor Rays
The robot exists in a planar world within which, in initial experiments, 24 large
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spheres are placed. The jaws of the robot are slightly wider than the width of the
spheres. The width of the robot jaws is 16 units; the spheres have a diameter of 15
units. The spheres are randomly distributed within a two-dimensional annulus.
An additional exclusion corridor (70 units wide) is created, such that a robot
travelling straight forward or backwards will not collide with any spheres. The
length of the robot is approximately 48 units, the range of sensor rays 100 units,
the inner radius of the annulus is 95 units and the outer radius 400 units. The
aim of the task is to capture a sphere in the robot’s jaws.
4.3.2 Trial Description and Fitness Function
Each trial consists of 10 sub-trials. At the start of each sub-trial the robot is
placed at the origin (the centre of the annulus), and 24 spheres are randomly
distributed within the annulus (with the exception of the exclusion corridor de-
scribed above). Typically one or two spheres would be within sensor range if
the robot were to rotate 360 degrees around its vertical axis. Due to the high
variability in the distribution of spheres in each sub-trial, a large number of sub-
trials are required to establish a representative fitness value. Figure 4.2 shows
the distribution of spheres for a typical sub-trial.
There are two forms of the fitness function used in this experiment. The first
form is used in tests where there is no cost penalty for using the maximum energy
available to the robot. In this case the fitness value of the robot is taken to be the
relative closeness of the sphere as measured by the robots sensor rays (measured
as a fraction of the total ray distance) at the termination of a trial. The trial
is terminated if the robot closes to within 10 percent of its total ray distance
(i.e. 10 units from the origin of the sensor rays). This corresponds to the sphere
entering completely into the robot’s jaws (which constitute a channel that is 20
units deep). Each sub-trial is weighted to be a 10th of the total fitness sum of
the trial. The maximum theoretical fitness of the robot is 1.0, corresponding to
10 trials where the robot acquires a sphere target in its jaws. However, due to
the early termination condition, practically the maximum fitness attainable is
0.9 plus a small value corresponding to the distance travelled in one physically
simulated time-step, prior to the early termination condition being detected.
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Figure 4.2: Top View of Robot in its Environment
The alternative form of the fitness function penalizes the robot for the ex-
cessive use of energy. Energy expenditure of the robot is measured indirectly by
considering the energy of the entire system. At each time step the kinetic and
potential energy of the system is calculated for all objects. The total energy of
the system at the prior time-step is saved, so that we can observe any increases in
the total energy of the system (Ec in Equation 4.1 below). The total energy of the
system can decline due to energy dissipation occurring in non-elastic collisions,
or in work done against friction. Since the only source of energy in the system is
that provided by the application of forces to the robot, all positive increases in
the energy of the system are attributed to energy expenditure by the robot. Since
there are no springs in the robot, we do not need to consider the transference of
kinetic energy to that of potential energy in joints.
This approach yields only an approximate estimate of energy used by the
simulated robot, as it neglects work done by the robot in decelerating bodies in
the system. However, it is likely to be sufficient for making estimates of relative
energy expenditure between simulated robots when averaged over 10 sub-trials.
We use this value ( Ec ) to calculate an Energy Efficiency Factor ρ, that tends to
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one for low energy usage and zero for high energy usage in accordance with the
function;
ρ =
e−(Ec−k1)/k2
(1 + e−(Ec−k1)/k2)
(4.1)
Where:
ρ is the Energy Efficiency Factor.
Ec is the cumulative positive changes in kinetic plus potential energy of the
system.
k1 is a bias term chosen to be 600.
k2 a scale term that is chosen to be 150.
The Energy Efficiency Factor is multiplied by the fitness term used to calcu-
late fitness in systems that are not energy constrained. For example, in the case
where the robot acquires 10 spheres in 10 trials and attains an unadjusted fitness
value of approximately 0.9 (due to the early termination condition), this value
is multiplied by the Energy Efficiency Factor ρ. If the Energy Efficiency Factor
evaluates to 0.5, then the fitness of the robot is taken to be 0.45. The values
of k1 and k2 were chosen heuristically so that a wide range of sensor-motor “be-
haviours” were not excessively penalized, but those that appeared to rely largely
on exploiting the maximum motor output capacities of the robot were heavily
penalized. The values were chosen such that in an initial population most indi-
viduals would typically exhibit an Energy Efficiency factor of between 1.0 and
0.5. Robots that made continuous use of the maximum linear and rotational
forces available to the robot would typically exhibit an Energy Efficiency factor
of less than 0.1.
The genetic algorithm employed is the same as that described in chapter 3.
The neural network formulation corresponds to that of the conventional GasNet
described in the same chapter.
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4.4 Experimental Results: Initial Results
Initially three scenarios were tested;
1. No Energy Penalty, Ray Sensors.
2. Energy Penalty, Ray Sensors.
3. No Energy Penalty, No Ray Sensors.
The graphs shown in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 show the performance of the
robot with and without the fitness function which penalizes excessive energy use
(scenarios 2 and 1 respectively). They display the average results of 5 trial runs
over 80 generations. The maximum theoretical fitness is 1.0, although this is
practically limited to nearer 0.9 due to the early exit condition utilized. In both
cases average and peak absolute fitness values were very similar. However, robots
that were not penalized for the excessive use of energy expended nearly twice the
energy of robots that were subject to penalization in the case of excessive energy
use. This demonstrates that we were able to achieve results that are considerably
more energy efficient by incorporating an energy penalty without sacrificing ab-
solute performance. It is suggested by these results that consideration of energy
expenditures in evolving gaits for legged robots may well benefit from the use of
fitness function that takes into account energy expenditure.
Robots that were not energy constrained did not appear to be making use of
sensory data in achieving their high level of fitness, but appeared to rely upon
energy intensive motor activity. The fittest individuals achieved a high fitness
score by rotating rapidly whilst spiralling outwards from the origin. We may
have expected robots to exhibit angular deceleration and an increase in forward
motion towards detected spheres, if they were making use of their sensory data.
In order to test this hypothesis, we carried out further tests where sensors
were disabled (in robots that were not subject to energy penalties), listed above
as scenario 3. Over 60 generations, an average fitness level of 0.849 (versus
0.842) and an efficiency (fitness over energy expended) of 2.01 (versus 1.94) were
achieved. Qualitatively, the behaviours exhibited by the fittest individuals with
sensors disabled were indistinguishable from those with sensors enabled. The
149
4. Ball Collection
Figure 4.3: Absolute Fitness
Figure 4.4: Fitness Per Energy Expended
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qualitative and numerical similarity of results in scenarios 1 and 3 suggest that
the robots which were not subject to energy penalties made little use of their
sensory data.
4.5 Experimental Results: Secondary Results
Initial results suggested that there were two possible routes by which high levels
of fitness could be attained; either with energy intensive motor activity or through
active use of sensor data. In order to explore this hypothesis further a second set of
scenarios were tested. This time the results were calculated over 35 generations
with 5 trials for each scenario. It was hypothesized that factors affecting the
relative importance to fitness of exploiting sensor data might include the utility
of the sensory data, and the sparseness of prey in the environment (in this case
prey being the spheres themselves). In order to investigate this, the value of the
sensor data was improved, by inhibiting rotational movement on the detection of
a sphere. It was assumed that an optimal low-energy strategy would involve a
two stage process, where the robot would initially orientate in the direction of a
detected sphere and then engage in linear motion towards the sphere. In effect, by
coupling the raycast sensors to lateral inhibition, we were attempting to increase
the ‘value’ of sensor inputs. Additionally the number of spheres was reduced from
24 to 18. Under these experimental conditions the following scenarios were tested
and results obtained:
1. No Energy Penalty, No Sensor Data; Average Fitness 0.77, Fitness/Energy
1.33.
2. Energy Penalty, No Sensor Data; Average Fitness 0.69, Fitness/Energy
2.36.
3. Energy Penalty, Sensor Data; Average Fitness 0.89, Fitness/Energy 6.03.
These results help to corroborate the idea that at least under these experi-
mental circumstances energy intensive motor activity (in scenario 1 above) can
more than compensate for a lack of sensory data (scenario 2), since we are able
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to achieve a higher level of fitness without sensor data, when there is no penalty
for excessive energy use. In scenario 3 however, we see that the improved value of
the sensor data ensures that in absolute terms, even with energy intensive motor
activity, the same absolute levels of fitness cannot be achieved. This preliminary
result suggests that incorporating energy penalties into fitness measures may be
a useful strategy in encouraging the use of sensors in evolved behaviours, which
in turn may help with the evolution of more complex sensorimotor capabilities.
4.6 Future Work
An obvious extension of this work is to incorporate measures of energy efficiency
into fitness functions used for the evolution of locomotion in legged robots. Sim-
ulations involving the evolution of locomotion in legged robots typically employ
fitness functions that assign the highest fitness to solutions which enable the
robot to travel the furthest distance in a fixed amount of time. Clearly this
biases results to gaits that make use of the maximum available energy. Experi-
ments have shown that horses select the most energy efficient gait appropriate to
a given speed (Hoyt and Taylor [1981]). Similar results have also been found for
humans, and kangaroos Alexander [2003]). Incorporating energy efficiency into
fitness functions should allow us to evolve gaits that are optimized for energy
efficiency.
Another challenge is in evolving neural circuitry that is capable of autonomously
switching between gaits to minimize energy expenditure over a range of speeds.
There are two parts to this problem. This first part relates to a mechanism of
switching, so that we can modify neural networks dynamically to produce the
required range of gaits. One possible solution is to continue with neural net-
works that incorporate models of neuromodulation. Neuromodulators such as
dopamine, octopamine and serotonin are known to have the capacity to chem-
ically ‘re-wire’ motor circuits (Kiehn and Katz [1999]). A modification of the
GasNet model described in this paper may be of value in developing such switch-
ing circuits.
The second part of the problem relates to a requirement to provide the robot
with a simple metabolism, or at least a method of providing some input into the
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artificial neural network that reflects energy expenditure. By incorporating the
“proprioception” of energy expenditure within the model, we are providing an
evolutionary pathway by which energy conservative gaits can be evolved. Neural
sensors that detect excessive energy use could be used as switches to trigger
alternative motor gaits.
4.7 Discussion
We can perhaps imagine a continuum of experimental scenarios with variations
in the scarcity of prey, and the acuity and utility of sensors. In an environment
where prey is abundant and there are readily accessible supplies of energy, then
the value of energy intensive motor activity in improving fitness may well diminish
the importance of sensors. Conversely in an environment with sparse prey, the
relative value of sensors in improving fitness is increased. This has repercussions
if our primarily goal is to seek to evolve agents that make full use of sensory data
in the solution of a task.
The imposition of an energy constraint changes the fitness landscape, such
that robots which do make use of sensory data have an evolutionary advantage.
A failure to impose energy penalties in evolutionary simulations reduces selec-
tion pressure on evolved entities, such that they may not necessarily take full
advantage of the sensory data that is accessible to them, but may discover energy
intensive motor solutions to achieve the same effective fitness. This is a strong
indication that imposing energy penalties may well play a useful role in helping
us to achieve ‘intelligent’ agent activity.
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Chapter 5
Experiment: A Hand-Coded
Finite State Machine
5.1 Introduction
This chapter relates to an experiment to hand-code a solution to the ball col-
lection experiment described in the previous chapter. Evolved neural network
control solutions did not result in behaviour that we would typically describe as
‘intelligent’. By hand-coding a solution (described in this chapter), we are able
to identify architectural features are required to solve this class of problems. By
suggesting this a working hypothesis for some attributes of brain anatomy, we
attempt to identify homologous brain regions.
The motivation for this chapter is simply explained. The failure of GasNets
to present with a convincing solution to this class of problems, implies that we
are lacking circuit models that better suited to this problem class. Since the
over-riding goal of the work described in this thesis is; to identify complementary
circuits suitable for coevolution; to seek to devise circuits that are inspired by
biological systems, identification of the brain region that is implicated in the
solution of such problems is of particular value. Through concentrating on this
brain region, we are then able to gain some inspiration for models that might
allow us to abstract the necessary characteristics, in a form that is ultimately
tractable to evolutionary search.
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5.2 Experimental Task
In a similar fashion to that described in Chapter 3, the experiment involved the
acquisition of balls by a robot in a physically simulated environment. In terms
of the simulation, the physical structure of the robot was simplified as shown in
figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Perspective View of robot and Sensor Rays
5.3 Code Implementation
The schematic displayed in figure 5.2 shows details of the structure of the hand-
coded solution. No attempt was made to ensure that the implementation was
biologically realistic or plausible, only that its behaviour should appear relatively
intelligent and energetically efficient. The implemented solution was intended to
reflect the conception of a nominally optimal solution. The robot should wander
when there is no food within sensor range. Once food is detected, the robot should
seek to minimize its translational velocity and orient itself with the food so that
the food lies directly ahead. Once it is appropriately oriented it approaches the
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food. When the food is discerned as being within the extents of the robot’s claws,
it seeks to remaining stationary until the food is “eaten”.
Sensor data is first pre-processed, so that information from the array of sensor
rays is converted into a form that is readily of use. We have a low-level sensor
buffer that stores information which relates to whether food is detected to the
left, to the right or directly in front of the robot. Additionally we have a high-
level sensor buffer that stores data which relates to whether or not food (i.e. a
ball) has been detected, and separately, whether or not food is within the extents
of the robot’s claws. The sensor data is effectively pre-processed such that the
dimensionality of the data is reduced, and salient signals extracted.
At the output stage, we have a motor buffer that accepts control signals from
the robot. These control signals relate to the ability to apply a linear or rotational
impulse. These actions are effectively independent and are not mutually exclusive.
We can apply a rotational impulse at the same time that we apply a linear impulse.
Each motor activity has its own sub-program. They are two key commands that
relate to stopping linear motion, and stopping radial rotation. These ensure that
the motor sub-programs seek to attain a specific control variable value, that of
zero translational velocity and zero rotational velocity respectively.
The contents of the high-level sensor buffer are used to determine a behaviour
mode. These are hard-coded as;
• Wander
• Approach
• Orient
• Eat
These behaviour modes correspond to a single state variable that determines
which control sub-programs are executed, and what interrupts are relevant to
changing state. Once we are in one behavioural mode, we do not escape until
prescribed signals have been detected. These signals may relate either to a suc-
cessful completion of a task or the failure of a task. To give a concrete example,
when we are in “Eat” Mode, if the contents of the high-level sensor buffer indicate
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Figure 5.2: FSM robot Schematic
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that we are no longer within eating range of the ball, we examine the high-level
sensor buffer to see if we remain appropriately oriented. If so, we switch into
“Approach” mode, otherwise we switch into “Orient” mode. If for some reason
we are out of range of the ball altogether, then we switch into “Wander” mode.
The Wander mode itself has sub-modes associated with it, corresponding to sub-
control programs. Note that any of the sub-modes can be interrupted by the
detection of food.
The code implementation efficiency of decomposing the task into these sub-
modes arises from the fact that, for each sub-mode we only have to consider a
sub-set of all sensor data that is relevant, and execute only a sub-set of all possible
motor control programs. Initially, the converse approach was taken where we
examined the entirety of the sensor data to determine the appropriate motor
response. This proved to be less efficient, since it does not in itself easily support
a chain of events. Intrinsically, if we are in “Orient” mode, and we lose contact
with a ball, then the only alternative is to enter “Wander” mode. We are able
to bring domain specific knowledge, which enables us to minimize the number
of sensor states that we need to consider, before entering the next behavioural
sub-program.
Another area where we are using domain specific knowledge is in the decision
to create low-level and high-level sensor buffers. The behavioural control program
does not need to know if there is food on the left or the right. It only needs to
know if food has been detected, and how close it is, to determine whether or not
to change behavioural modes. The motor control programs, however, make direct
use of this low-level data. If we are in “Orient” mode, the motor control program
will determine in which direction it should turn, by looking at this low level data.
Part of the code implementation is shown in the listing 5.1.
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Listing 5.1: The “Approach” Switch Clause
case eCPNRB_Approach :{
// Confirmatory State.
// (a) If food has been detected forward and
// we are currently stationary or moving ,
// and the food has not been acquired.
if( (pNStatus[eSTATUS_FLAGS] & eSDV_Food_Detected )
&& (pNStatus[eSTATUS_FLAGS] & eSDV_Oriented )
&& !( pNStatus[eSTATUS_FLAGS] & eSDV_Food_Acquired )
){
pNMotors[ eCMD_LIN ] = eMDCL_Translate_Forw;
}
else if( (pNStatus[eSTATUS_FLAGS] & eSDV_Food_Detected)
&& !( pNStatus[eSTATUS_FLAGS] & eSDV_Oriented)
&& !( pNStatus[eSTATUS_FLAGS] & eSDV_Food_Acquired)
){
// BEHAVIOR CHANGE to eCPNRB_Orienting
// (b) We are not longer aligned , but we
// can still detect the food. In this
// case we need to re -align.
pNMotors[ eCMD_LIN ] = eMDCL_Translate_Forw;
pNStatus[ eSTATUS_BEHAVE ] = eCPNRB_Orienting;
}
else if(( pNStatus[eSTATUS_FLAGS] & eSDV_Food_Acquired )
){
// BEHAVIOR CHANGE to eCPNRB_Eating .
// Start eating if the food is acquired.
pNMotors[ eCMD_LIN ] = eMDCL_Translate_Stop;
pNMotors[ eCMD_ROT ] = eMDCR_Rotate_Stop;
pNStatus[ eSTATUS_BEHAVE ] = eCPNRB_Eating;
}
else if( !( pNStatus[eSTATUS_FLAGS] & eSDV_Food_Detected) ){
// BEHAVIOR CHANGE to eCPNRB_Wander .
// Start wandering if the food cannot be detected.
pNMotors[ eCMD_LIN ] = eMDCL_Translate_Stop;
pNMotors[ eCMD_ROT ] = eMDCR_Rotate_Stop;
pNStatus[ eSTATUS_BEHAVE ] = eCPNRB_Wander;
pNStatus[ eSTATUS_SUBMDE ] = eCPNRS_NULL;
}
}break;// Behavior eCPNRB_Approach
Note that there are two key buffers; the Status Buffer, pointed to by pN-
Status, from which data is extracted, and the Motor Buffer, pointed to by
pNMotors, into which data is written. Although there is also a Sensor Buffer,
it is not needed in this switching clause, since the data in the Sensor Buffer has
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been pre-processed, with the results placed in the Status Buffer. This is an ex-
ample of dimensionality reduction. The clause itself relates to the “Approach”
behaviour mode. As we enter this clause, we check certain Status Buffer flags. De-
pending upon the contents of these flags, we then either issue Motor Commands
(by writing to the Motor Buffer), or change the behaviour mode by writing to
the Status Buffer.
The Motor Commands themselves, correspond to high-level commands, for
example, when we update the Motor Buffer slot;
eCMD_LIN
with the value;
eMDCL_Translate_Stop
we are ensuring that that the motor control program adjusts the linear velocity
of the robot to zero ( through the appropriate application of linear impulses). In
parallel with this, we can also update to the Motor Buffer slot;
eCMD_ROT
with the value;
eMDCR_Rotate_Stop
which will ensure that a separate control program reduces the rotational velocity
of the robot to zero. There is no need to conflate the command clause with either
low-level sensor data or low-level command data.
5.4 Results
Although no numerical comparison was made between the experimental results
achieved in Chapter 3, the qualitative results conform far more to what we would
might regard as intelligent behaviour.
Screenshots of the robot engaged in three of the behaviour modes are shown
in the following figures; Wander 5.3, Approach 5.4 and Eat 5.5.
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Figure 5.3: FSM robot in “Wandering” Mode
Figure 5.4: FSM robot in “Orient” Mode
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Figure 5.5: FSM robot in “Eat” Mode
The goal of the work described in this chapter was to see if we could gain
some insight into deficiencies in the evolvable neural network models that, whilst
successfully applied to locomotion (in chapter 3), appear to be of less use in
addressing problems that are more easily solved through a Finite State Machine
(FSM) like architecture. In the solution of this problem, we are able to discern a
number of architectural features that may be of value;
• Behaviour is divided into behaviour-modes, where only sensor data is con-
sidered and appropriate motor units activated that are relevant for the
mode.
• Behaviour-mode changes take place due to mode specific interrupt condi-
tions.
• Sensor data is dimensionally reduced prior to processing by the unit that
governs mode switching.
• Some low-level sensor data is fed directly to motor programs without being
considered by the behaviour mode switch.
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• Motor sub-programs running in parallel are activated by signals from the
behaviour mode switch.
• Low-level motor-programs typically operate by seeking to maintain control
variables at certain values. The relevant control variable at any time is set
by the higher-level motor control,
5.5 Discussion
5.5.1 A Modified Ashby Perspective
These represent features of a system that is essentially mechanistic. It seems rea-
sonable to consider how we might map the architectural features of this program
to some kind of analogue system. Despite the fact that we have constructed a
mechanistic solution to the problem, there may be something about the struc-
ture of information through the system that would be invariant with an analogue
interpretation. Figure 5.6 shows how might interpret the program architecture
from a modified Ashby perspective (see section 2.5.2). Note that in this diagram
only some of the motor programs are illustrated.
We are able to identify certain aspects of the program that are immediately
recognizable as corresponding to Ashby’s notion of an ultrastable system (see fig-
ure 2.10). In the diagram, these are motor programs that relate to orientation and
reducing rotational and linear velocities to zero. The diagram in its current form
illustrates the activation of two motor programs (orientation and stopping). This
corresponds to the orientation ‘behaviour’ mode. Under these circumstances the
robot has already detected food, and has some measure of the difference between
the robots current orientation direction and that of the food itself. This measure
represents an essential variable to use Ashby’s terminology. For the purposes of
ensuring that the appropriate orientation is achieved, the the motor program re-
sponsible for orientation, adjusts the parameters (S), so that the essential variable
for this ultrastable unit tends to zero. In order that this is achieved efficiently the
motor program for reducing the linear velocity of the robot to zero is also active.
In this case the essential variable corresponds to the linear velocity, in which case
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Figure 5.6: The architecture from a modified Ashby perspective: (E)
represents the environment, (R) represents the reacting part, (S) represents the
parameters, (V) represents the maintenance of essential variables, (I) represents
part of a feedback loop for internal information. Note that the Stop Rotation
motor program is deactivated in this example, whilst ‘orient’ and ‘stop linear
motion’ sub-programs are activated.
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parameters (S) of this ultrastable system are adjusted so that this value tends to
zero.
The next significant feature that we are able to distinguish is that of the second
loop. The second loop in Ashby’s model corresponds to the secondary feedback
loop associated with changing the parameters of the reactive part (R). Here we
differ somewhat from the standard model of an ultrastable system in that the
parameters of the second loop correspond to motor program activation switches.
Rather than a single reactive part (R), we have multiple motor programs oper-
ating in parallel. It is not conceptually difficult however to imagine these motor
programs as comprising a single reactive part (R), at least from the perspective
of the second loop.
Note that in the second loop, the essential variables that we are maintained,
are those that correspond effectively to the behaviour mode states; Wander, Ap-
proach, Orient, Eat. This is where we deviate again from the conceptual model
employed by Ashby. Ashby’s conception of essential variables, were those state
variables that were maintained for the purposes of supporting survival. Ashby’s
notion assumes that these variables are to be maintained for the duration of a
given task (in the case of the homeostat for example). Ashby’s model has no
explicit notion of state sequences as the possible building blocks of adaptive be-
haviour. Yet such sequences are possible through the persistent perturbation
of essential variables outside of their predetermined values. Implicit in Asby’s
perspective is the feeling that the goal of the system is to maintain these stable
states. Without changing the architecture of an ultrastable system it is also pos-
sible to conceive of an alternative interpretation. Such an interpretation might
regard dynamic instabilities in the system as ‘good’, since it is these instabilities
that might in themselves elicit state sequences that correspond to adaptive be-
haviour. Under such circumstances the focusses switches from the preservation
of essential variables, to the appropriate support for state interrupts, that allow
for the construction of action sequences.
This requires an elaboration of Ashby’s notion of an ultrastable system. In our
modified perspective, the essential variables correspond to a pattern that is to be
associated with a given set of interrupts. All this takes place within in the second
loop. Ashby’s notion of essential variables that are to be maintained, is replaced
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by the notion of essential state, that is preserved until the necessary interrupts
destabilize this state. In a system capable of supporting adaptive behaviour it
should be the case that there exists a mechanism (if it is not genetically pre-
determined) whereby the subsequent state (and its associated interrupts), after
destabilization, is that which supports the organisms goals of survival.
Note that we have not arrived at such a conceptual model arbitrarily. What we
have done is to describe the conceptual model corresponding to the hand-coded
solution that we have implemented. In our case, the essential state transitions
are deterministic and predetermined. However, there is no reason why the same
conceptual model might not be implemented in some fashion whereby the state
transitions are able to be learned.
5.5.2 The Brain - A First Approximation
We do not seek to create solutions that might appear attractive and expedient
from a computational or mechanistic perspective, since we are already aware of
the limitations of such an approach (see sections 2.3.4.2 and 2.3.4.4). Rather, our
intent is to gain an insight into biological process, so that we might determine
an appropriate abstraction of them. With this in mind, we shall take the naive
perspective of considering, to a first approximation, how the architecture illus-
trated in figure 5.6 and described in the previous section, maps to the brain. The
results of such a thought experiment are illustrated in 5.7.
A justification for the diagram illustrated in figure 5.7 requires an understand-
ing of the role of the brain physiology particularly as it relates to the basal ganglia
and thalamus. We carry out a review of the basal ganglia and its relationship
with the thalamus and cerebral cortex in the next chapter (chapter 6). The
results depicted are based primarily on the connection patterns and functional
characteristics of the differing brain regions. Note, that we are not making any
definitive claims regarding the functional role of brain anatomy. We are simply
stating that if our hand-coded architecture captures some of intrinsic features re-
quired to support behaviour sequences, and if our functional description captures
some of these features (based on a modified Ashby perspective), then figure 5.7
represents a reasonable mapping of these functional features to brain anatomy.
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Figure 5.7: The Brain from a modified Ashby perspective: (E) represents
the environment, (R) represents the reacting part, (S) represents the parameters,
(V) represents the maintenance of essential variables, (I) represents part of a
feedback loop for internal information.
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5.6 Conclusion
What should be readily apparent when considering brain anatomy is that there
is a macro-level structure, and micro-level structure. Different brain regions com-
prise neurons that have functional characteristics that are very typical of their
local region, but atypical of neurons found in other regions. Some regions are
relatively homogeneous in their neuron types, others are highly diverse.
Despite this, most evolutionary robotics experiments typically only explore
one particular circuit form, with neurons that are relatively homogeneous in
functional characteristics. Very little consideration is given to the prospect of
creating variation at the macro-level, supporting functional diversity at in differ-
ing brain regions. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that evolving complex
behaviour can be difficult. Given the suitability of GasNets in support of locomo-
tion, it would be rather surprising if the same circuit formulation was universally
applicable to all problem domains. There is a reason why different brain macro-
structures have different neuronal composition, and that is to support a range of
specialized processes.
In a hand-crafted solution to a finite-state-machine like problem, we arrive at
an architecture that maps quite well to macro-structures in the brain (cerebellum,
thalamus, cerebral cortex and the basal ganglia), and conceptually bears some
similarity to a modified version of an ultrastable system. As we outlined in section
2.5, the central challenge in evolutionary robotics is to extend the boundaries
of complex adaptive behaviour. Our preferred solution to this problem is to
identify (or create) circuits that might provide us with complementary functional
characteristics.
Taking a very simplistic view, we know of the existence of circuit forms that
in some sense resemble characteristics of the cerebellum (e.g. supervised learning,
GasNets in support of locomotion), and the cerebral cortex (e.g. unsupervised
learning, self-organizing feature maps). The thalamus is known primarily for its
routing functionality, analogous in some sense to a complex matrix communica-
tions channel switch. This leaves us with the basal ganglia. Whilst it is deemed
to be functionally implicated in reinforcement learning, we lack connectionist
models to the same extent that they exist in modelling other brain regions.
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In chapter 4, we failed to evolve GasNets to solve this task in a fashion that we
might regard as ‘intelligent’, analysis of our hand-crafted solution and potentially
homologous structures in the brain, implies that circuits functionally analogous
to those of the basal ganglia might help us to solve this problem.
Our premise is that adaptive behaviour is best supported by circuits that
exhibit complementary functionality. We already have a solution to locomotion
in the form of GasNets. Circuit models for the cerebellum and cerebral cortex
already exist. Some model of the basal ganglia tractable to evolutionary search,
might provide us with the last remaining building block. If we are able to coe-
volve systems that exhibit both macro structure and functional specialization at
the micro-level, we might be able to significantly increase the level of complex
adaptive behaviour that we are able to achieve through evolutionary robotics
methods.
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The Basal Ganglia and Dopamine
Signalling
6.1 Overview
Biological studies relating to dopamine (Schultz [1998]), and machine learning
models of artificial intelligence (AI) which exhibit reinforcement learning (Sutton
and Barto [1998]), represent a very powerful synthesis of ideas in helping us to
understand behavioural adaptation in response to rewards. Specifically, the pha-
sic activity of dopamine neurons shows a strong correspondence to the Temporal
Domain error signal, associated with reward prediction errors in reinforcement
learning models (see Vitay et al. [2009] for a review or biological models of rein-
forcement learning). More recent studies paint a more complex role of dopamine
in the brain (see more details later in this chapter), but do not fundamentally
undermine the validity of the current orthodoxy. Rather they offer more detail,
new perspectives, and highlight ancillary roles for dopamine as a signalling agent.
In Chapter 6 we compare our conceptual model with these reinforcement learn-
ing formalisms, but we also suggest Karl Friston’s Free Energy (prediction error)
Model as a possible alternative formalism (Friston [2010]).
The fundamental goal of this research is to devise reward-anticipatory neural
network models that may be tractable to evolutionary exploration for use in sup-
porting more complex robot behaviour. Unfortunately existing computational
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models, either biologically plausible models of the dopamine system or abstract
models based on reinforcement learning, are typically monolithic and complex.
Solving this problem necessitates a return to biological systems, with a view to
understanding the underlying principles which may have given rise to the reward
anticipation circuits referred to in the title of this thesis. This requires a re-
consideration of some fundamental issues (such as the role of energy efficiency in
signalling regimes) and, through consideration of current reward systems, involves
seeking to turn back the evolutionary clock, with a view to understanding how
existing reward-anticipatory circuitry might have emerged. Whilst such an ap-
proach might seem to require a consideration of primitive organisms, the extensive
availability of literature on the role of dopamine in the mammal brain, and the
contrary signalling uses of dopamine in more primitive organisms (e.g. dopamine
signalling is associated with aversive reinforcement in drosophila melanogaster,
the common household fly, Waddell [2010]), make such an approach less attrac-
tive. However since inspiration for the devised models is drawn from studies of
the human and monkey brain, we are able to arrive at some ideas that relate to
the functional significance of certain brain areas in the basal ganglia.
Although there are four significant dopamine systems recognized in the brain
(Moore and Bloom [1979]), we focus on that which corresponds to the projection
of dopaminergic neurons from the substantia nigra pars reticula to the striatum
of the basal ganglia, as the most prominent of these. This system is termed the
nigrostriatal pathway. There are three other systems that we do not address
directly. These comprise; the tuberoinfundibular (projections from the arcuate
nucleus to the median eminence of the hypothalamus), mesolimbic (projections
from the ventral tegmental area to the nucleus accumbens and amygdala) and
mesocortical (projections from the venreal tegmental area to the prefrontal cor-
tex) systems.
There is some support to the idea that the basal ganglia is an evolutionary
solution to the action selection problem amongst vertebrates ( Redgrave et al.
[1999b] and Stephenson-Jones et al. [2011] ). We should be somewhat careful
here as to how we delineate the scope of this research. The term action selection
is extremely broad, in that it may includes higher level cognitive function related
complex behaviour.
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The focus of the work described in this thesis is more akin to that encom-
passed by the hand-coded model described in chapter 5. When behaviour modes
are referred to, we were essentially referring to distinct connectivity patterns of
selective sensor consideration and relevant motor program activation, which re-
sult in functionality distinct activities. It is only in this limited sense that the
term “behaviour” or “behavioural modes” is employed within the context of this
thesis.
In this chapter we highlight key areas of research that relate to the basal
ganglia and dopamine, and make some reference to their relationship with the
work carried out in this thesis. In order to conceptualize these areas more easily,
we break them down into three sections;
1. A “top-down” perspective that sees the basal ganglia as a system (see chap-
ter 7).
2. A “bottom-up” perspective focusses on the significance of dopamine sig-
nalling and its role in circuit adaptation to rewards (see chapter 8).
3. Computational models that represent an integration of these perspectives.
6.2 The basal ganglia perspective
Traditionally the basal ganglia has been associated with motor functions, in ar-
eas such as motor coordination and learning (Hikosaka [1991]), partly due to its
association with movement disorders such as Parkinsons disease (see Wichmann
and Dostrovsky [2011] for a recent review). The current orthodoxy is that the
basal ganglia is functionally significant in the task of sequence learning, in con-
trast with the Cerebellum which is more closely associated with low-level motor
control and continuous motor adaptation (Doyon et al. [2009]), although their
functionality is closely integrated. More recently however, its role in non-motor
functions is also widely recognized. Figure 6.1 shows a morphological illustra-
tion of the basal ganglia and its connections (Wilson [2004]). Figure 6.2 shows
an augmented version of the conventional schematic (Bar-Gad et al. [2003]). A
number of key concepts that are particularly relevant to this thesis are described
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below in the following subsections. We shall return to these issues in Chapter 10
when we contrast the model proposed in this thesis with our knowledge of the
basal ganglia.
6.2.1 Direct, Indirect and Hyperdirect Pathways
There are a number of pathways associated with the basal ganglia system, each of
which is deemed functionally significant (see figure 6.3). The two most commonly
referred to constitute part of the cortico-striato-thalamic loop, and are termed
the direct and indirect pathways (Albin et al. [1989] and Alexander et al. [1990]).
Both of these pathways deemed to originate from the striatum. Note that the
striatum takes its input from the cortex and thalamus. The direct pathway
relates to projections from the striatum directly to the substantia nigra pars
reticula (SNr). The indirect pathway refers to projections from the striatum
to the substantia nigra pars reticuala via a route that visits the globus palidus
external section (GPe) and the subthalamus nucleus (STN). Nambu (Nambu et al.
[2002]) proposed a slightly different definition from that which is commonly used.
In so doing, Nambu sought to draw attention to the functional significance of the
subthalamic nucleus, which in addition to the striatum, also receives projections
direct from the cortex. He supports the idea that the subthalamus nucleus (STN)
has a role in modulating the pathway from the striatum to the substantia nigra
pars reticuala via the globus palidus external section (GPe). Since the functional
role of the basal has yet to be conclusively determined, understanding of the
potential role of cortical modulation supported by the STN has received even less
attention. However by adopting Nambu’s nomenclature, we are at least allowing
space for future work that provides us with a more complete picture. For this
reason, in the context of this thesis, the terms direct and indirect pathways will
correspond to those proposed by Nambu.
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Figure 6.1: Morphological illustration of the basal ganglia and its con-
nections. Note that this includes the thalamo-striatal pathway that is often
excluded from schematic drawings of the basal ganglia and its connections. Note
also that the GPi and SNr are physically distinct. This is also not obvious from
most schematic diagrams. Abbreviations: GPe, globus palidus, external segment;
GPi, globus palidus, internal segment; SNr, substantia nigra, pars reticula; SNc,
substantia nigra, pars compacta; STN, subthalamic nucleus. Adapted from Wil-
son [2004].
174
6. The Basal Ganglia
Striatum
SNc
Thalamus
Reward
GPe
STN
SNr GPi
“Direct” 
Pathway
“Indirect” 
Pathway
Cortex
Dopamine 
neurons
Figure 6.2: Schematic of the basal ganglia and Associated Pathways.
Although this represents a conventional schematic it includes the thalamo-striatal
pathway that is often excluded from such diagrams. Glutamatergic synapses
(excitatory) are denoted by empty circles, GABAergic synapses (inhibitory) by
black-filled circles . Abbreviations: GP, globus palidus, SNr, substantia nigra,
pars reticula, SNc, substantia nigra, pars compacta, Sth, subthalamic nucleus.
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6.2.2 Parallel Cortical Loops
The basal ganglia appears to be a striking example of the process of exaption
(the functional reuse of prior entities through adaptation under evolution). This
is most evident in the parallel loops that pass through the basal ganglia (Garret
E.Alexander, Mahlon R. DeLong [1986], Garret E.Alexander, Mahlon R. DeLong
[1986], Haber and Calzavara [2009]). These pathways are largely segregated,
and are recognized to support distinct limbic, motor and executive (sometimes
further divided into Sensor and Associative) systems, in large loops encompassing
the cortex, striatum, substantia nigra, palidum and thalamus.
6.2.3 Subcortical/Nauta-Mehler Loop
A second single loop is that which links the striatum, globus palidus interior seg-
ment and the Thalamus, in what has been termed a “Subcortical Loop” (McHaffie
et al. [2005]). This loop is sometimes termed the Nauta-Mehler Loop, in recog-
nition of the seminal work carried out by Nauta and Mehler (Nauta and Mehler
[1996]) identifying key pathways in the basal ganglia. Although this pathway has
been recognized by a number of researchers ( Kim et al. [1976], Gime´nez-Amaya
et al. [1995], Mengual et al. [1999a] and Lanciego et al. [2004]), it receives far less
attention than the Cortical Loops, and is often completely absent in schematics
of the basal ganglia. This route is implicated in responding to novel events that
are not explicitly reward related. This is something that we shall return to in
Chapter 11.
6.2.4 Contrasting Views of the SNr and GPi
Perhaps one of the reasons for the failure to take into account the Nauta-Mehler
Loop in most accounts of the basal ganglia, is that conventionally the substantia
nigra pars reticula (SNr) and globus palidus interior segment (GPi) are often
perceived as fulfilling the same role. They are similar in cellular structure, and
developmentally originate from the same source. Most schematics (including that
by Nambu displayed in figure 6.3) combine the two, despite their being physically
distinct (see figure 6.1). Whilst some researchers argue for an independent view
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Figure 6.3: Direct, Indirect and Hyperdirect Pathways. A variation on
the conventional “Direct” and “Indirect” Pathways is that proposed by Nambu
(Nambu et al. [2002]) intended to highlight the conjectured role of the subthlamaic
nucleus as a modulator of the Indirect pathway. Abbreviations: Cx, cortex;
GPe, globus palidus external segment; GPi, globus palidus interior segment; SNr,
substantia nigra, pars reticula; STN, subthalamic nucleus; TH, thalamus; glu,
pathways that employ glutamatergic synapses (excitatory); GABA pathways that
employ GABAergic synapses (inhibitory). Source Nambu et al. [2002].
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of the globus palidus interior segment (GPi) and substantia nigra pars reticula
(SNr) (Parent and Hazrati [1993]) this perspective can be quite strongly opposed
(Hironobu Tokuno [1993]). Although this is the minority view, we take the posi-
tion that they should be seen as distinct bodies. Despite a very close similarity
at the cellular level, their outputs imply that they support different functionality.
Again, this is an issue that we shall return to in Chapter 11.
6.3 The Dopamine Perspective
The basal ganglia perspective focusses on its role from a holistic perspective,
with an emphasis on connectivity with other brain systems. As such it can
be regarded as a “top-down” view. As far as dopamine is concerned, we are
principally interested in the role of the dopaminergic neurons that project from
the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) to the striatum. Such a view could
be characterized as a “bottom-up” view of the basal ganglia. Clearly the two
perspectives address many of the same issues. Much of our insight into the role
of the basal ganglia has been gleaned from consideration from this “bottom-up”
perspective.
The number of papers listed on PubMed that relate to dopamine is currently
around 100,000 (Bjo¨rklund and Dunnett [2007]). The classical neurotransmit-
ters arranged in order of the number of papers currently produced each year are;
dopamine, serotonin, acetylcholine, noradrenaline. Whilst the annual publication
of research papers that concentrate on acetlycholine and noradrenaline is cur-
rently running at around 2,000 a year, the number is double that for dopamine
(and serotonin) at 4,000.
In seeking to synthesize the results of these papers, we are helped by the fact
that a significant theme running through this research is the functional role of
dopamine in the brain and core ideas that were laid down in the 1990’s, indi-
cating that dopamine phasic activity in the basal ganglia corresponds to Reward
Prediction Error (Schultz et al. [1998]). The emergence of ideas on reinforcement
learning (Sutton and Barto [1998]) as a significant formalism in the Machine
Learning community occurred at around the same time. These ideas provided
the biological community with an explanatory framework for the interpretation
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of their results. Conversely the Machine Learning community was able to refer
to results in neuroscience which imply that processes of this kind are relevant
to biological systems. The complementary nature of these two fields, and the
correspondence in particular between the role of dopamine and aspects of models
of reinforcement learning, has had a significant impact both in neuroscience and
in the application of these findings to Artificial Intelligence.
Over the last 20 years, a considerable amount of work has been carried out
that has broadly expanded these initial findings. This includes changes in our
understanding of dopamine from neuro-chemical (see Bjo¨rklund and Dunnett
[2007] for a review), neurocomputional (see Cohen and Frank [2009] for a review)
and reinforcement learning perspective (see Vitay et al. [2009] for a review), which
in turn has resulted in increasingly refined ideas. A number of reviews have been
written that relate to these shifting paradigms (e.g. Salamone [2007]), including
one by Wolfram Schulz (Schultz [2010]).
Some of the key contributions in this area are referred to herein in order to
help illustrate the complexity of this field. Some criticism of the original in-
terpretation of results has been made on the grounds that dopamine response
time is too short to coincide with prediction errors (see Redgrave et al. [1999a]
and Redgrave et al. [2008]). Other researchers have proposed alternative inter-
pretations, such as that of “Incentive Salience” (Berridge [2007]), rather than
reward prediction error, as a more appropriate interpretation of dopamine pha-
sic activity. More complex models have emerged that seek to relate dopamine
to rewards, aversive behaviour and motivational control (Bromberg-Martin et al.
[2010]) and “Partial Observability” (Daw et al. [2006]). Other researchers have
placed more emphasis on the role of dopamine in: selective attention (Nieoullon
[2002]), the modulation of decision making (Doya [2008]), synaptic plasticity and
working memory (Durstewitz et al. [1999], Jay [2003] and Kennerley and Wallis
[2009]), the interaction between contextual novelty and reward representations
(Guitart-Masip et al. [2010]), impulsive behaviour (Pine et al. [2010]), the tem-
poral precision of reward prediction (Fiorillo et al. [2008]), high-level cognition
(Cools [2011]), learning and motivation (Shohamy [2011]) and decisions under re-
ward uncertainty (Huettel et al. [2005], Tan and Bullock [2008] and Schultz et al.
[2008]). Through ideas that dopamine signalling underpins beneficial behavioural
179
6. The Basal Ganglia
decisions made by an agent, we have seen a crossover to economics (Caplin and
Dean [2008]), since such signals may be deemed to have some correspondence to
to the economic concept of Marginal Utility (Pine et al. [2009]). This field has
assumed the label Neuroeconomics (Schultz [2008]).
In addition to these conceptual shifts in the role of dopamine, we have also
seen an increase in the breadth of research, such that dopamine is now implicated
in feeding behaviours (Narayanan et al. [2010] and Palmiter [2007])and in a de-
velopmental role in the formation of the retina (Reis et al. [2007]). Other studies
seek to integrate our knowledge of the role of dopamine in the basal ganglia, with
other brain systems such as the hippocampus (Kumaran and Duzel [2008]).
Our goal is to arrive at simple circuits that capture essential features of the role
of dopamine. Whilst it is useful to have a perspective on the varied interpretations
of this role, at least for the purposes of the research described in this thesis, we
are more interested in seeking to capture some of the key attributes than we are
in explaining its role in all its complexities. For this reason, we take the approach
of going back to basics, concentrating on the initial findings of Schultz and his
co-researchers (Schultz et al. [1998]). These key attributes are described in more
detail in Chapter 7. This has the advantage of avoiding the need to pre-judge
which interpretation is the most accurate at this stage. We can simply seek to
capture some of the essential characteristics of dopamine signalling, and generate
circuits based on these models. Once we have done this we are in a position to
revisit these alternative explanations which we do in Chapter 10.
6.4 Integrative Neurocomputational Models
From our perspective, we are limited in the degree of complexity of the compu-
tational model of reward anticipatory circuitry that we are able to use. It has to
be simple enough so that ultimately we are able to encode features of the circuit
into a genome that we can evolve using evolutionary algorithms. This precludes
us adopting highly detailed models that, whilst they may be biologically plausi-
ble, are less tractable to parametric encoding. Nevertheless, these computational
models are able to provide us with some perspectives on features of the system
that we should be seeking to model, and provide us with a basis for comparison.
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Despite extensive research attempts to model the basal ganglia, we have yet to
arrive at a coherent orthodoxy as to the functional significance of its constituent
parts ( for a review of models see Cohen and Frank [2009] and Chakravarthy et al.
[2010]).
One of the more developed of the neurocomputational models is the PVLV
model (Hazy et al. [2010]). This model comprises two key elements. The first is
a Primary Value (PV) system which governs how dopamine neurons respond to
a reward, and a Learned Value (LV) system, which governs how dopamine cells
respond to a conditioned stimulus. We shall come back to this model later in the
thesis when we compare the results of our model with some of the insights gained
from theirs. The development of the PVLV model is an extension of earlier work
conducted by O’Reilly (O’Reilly and Frank [2006]). This model focusses on the
role of the striatum (in the anticipation of rewards), thalamus (in the failure of
reward anticipation), the amygdala (in learning the value of stimuli that may
correspond to reward predictive stimuli) and the hypothalamus (as the origin of
the Primary Reward signal). The scope of this model is comparatively broad
compared to other models that focus more closely on the striato-thalamo-cortical
loop (see Humphries and Prescott [2010] for a similarly broad review)
Another sophisticated model is presented by Joseph (Joseph et al. [2010]),
which he refers to as the ACE (Actor-Critic-Explorer) explorer model. This is of
interest since it emphasizes the potential role of the subthalamic nucleus (STN)
and the globus pallidum (GP) in the “exploration” mode, typical and character-
istic of many Machine Learning solutions to the value assignment problem. This
is not something that is specifically addressed by the PVLV model as it offers a
complementary perspective.
Novel models that deal with the integration of the basal ganglia with other
brain systems include the role of the basal ganglia in memory retrieval associated
with rewarded visual memory tasks (Vitay and Hamker [2010]), action selection
and refinement in subcortical loops (Houk et al. [2007]), and a model that fo-
cusses primarily on the striatum (Grosse-Wentrup and Contreras-Vidal [2007]).
Reinforcement learning oriented models (for a review see Niv [2009] and Samson
et al. [2010]) include; the role of the cortex and striatum (Frank and Claus [2006]),
hierarchical reinforcement learning (Ito and Doya [2011]), and the development
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of pre-frontal cortex representations (Reynolds and O’Reilly [2009]). In Chapter
6 we briefly discuss reinforcement learning and how it relates to models that are
proposed in this thesis, but we also point out that Karl Friston’s Free Energy
Model (Friston and Stephan [2007]) also has some relevance.
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Chapter 7
A Hypothetical Reward
Adaptation Machine
7.1 Introduction
Figure 7.1 helps to put this chapter in context. Our over-riding goal is to de-
termine or devise models of neural networks with complementary characteristics.
These networks are intended to comprise parts of a functional ‘vocabulary’ nec-
essary to support complex adaptive behaviour. New networks have to satisfy
two criteria; they should be tractable to evolutionary search and biologically
plausible. Devising such networks is conceptually difficult. Our approach is to
break this problem down into simpler sub-tasks. Throughout this thesis we are
intentionally taking alternate and complementary perspectives, mechanistic, bio-
logical, evolutionary, holistic and deconstructionist, so that we might understand
how a primitive circuit might evolve into one which has some of the functional
characteristics of a developed brain.
Throughout this thesis we intermittently make use of mechanistic models;
either as working models (such as in chapter 5) or hypothetical models, such as the
case in this chapter. In this chapter for example, we make absolutely no attempt
to conceive of this model as one which is tractable to extension or complexification
through an evolutionary algorithm. Rather we try and imagine how existing
neural networks could conceivably work as a reinforcement learning machine,
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Figure 7.1: A Concept Map for the Role of this Chapter: We are attempt-
ing to devise new models that are biologically plausible and tractable to evolution.
This chapter describes a non-evolvable model that is intended to correspond to
a hypothetical target for evolutionary search. Through a holistic design we try
to identify the necessary attributes that we might wish to see emerge from the
evolution of more primitive circuits.
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such that the result bears some relationship (albeit remote) to the functional
elements of known biological systems. It is intended that this similarity is attained
through seeking emulation of the biological systems at two levels. Firstly, at
the macro-level it should behave in a fashion that is comparable to classical
conditioning. Secondly, at the micro level changes in the system should be elicited
by signals that are analogous of those that are known to exist in biological systems
(specifically those of the dopamine neuron responding to rewards).
7.2 Identifying Key Attributes
The next two sections describe in more detail the elements that we are seeking
to emulate at both the macro-level and micro-level.
7.2.1 Macro-Level: Psychological Conditioning
Our hypothetical reward adaptation machine is to intended as mechanistic ana-
logue of the biological systems that underpin reward adaptation. The machine (if
it were to be constructed) once constructed should behave, as far as an external
observer is concerned, in a fashion that resembles biological entities in one key
area; that of psychological conditioning.
The field of psychology differentiates between two kinds of learning that are
termed classical and instrumental (or operant) conditioning. Classical condition-
ing refers to the modification of behaviour that occurs due to the recognition of
a stimulus (conditioned stimulus) which consistently precedes an unconditioned
stimulus associated with an unconditioned response. After a period of condition-
ing an animal or human gradually responds in a fashion to the conditioned stim-
ulus as if it is integral with the unconditioned stimulus. In Palovs experiments,
that led to the emergence of this field of research, a dog became conditioned to
salivate (the unconditioned response) at the sound of a bell (the conditioned stim-
ulus CS) which occurred prior to the presentation of the food (the unconditioned
stimulus - US). The second kind of learning is that of operant or instrumental
conditioning, where behaviour is modified due to the presentation of a reward or
a punishment following a response.
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The model presented here does not differentiate between classical and oper-
ant conditioning in its implementation. Both kinds of learning are demonstrated
through the modification of behaviour due to the presentation of a reward. Note
that the model does seek to incorporate all aspects of classical and operant learn-
ing, since it does not address behaviour modification that occurs in response to
the presentation of a negative stimulus presented as the unconditioned stimulus,
or a punishment in response to a stimulus that we wish to diminish. Although the
model does not differentiate between classical and operant conditioning, it does
capture aspects of both, in response to the presentation of a positive stimulus (as
the unconditioned Stimulus) or the presentation of a reward following a response
that we wish to encourage.
The part of the model that emulates classical conditioning is inspired by
the activity of dopaminergic neurons (in the basal ganglia) in response to the
presentation of a trigger stimulus (CS) prior to the presentation of a reward (US).
This is based on observations made by Wolfram Schultz (Schultz [1997]). Various
computational models have been proposed to model classical conditioning, since
that proposed by Rescorla and Wagner (Rescorla and Wagner [1972]), including
those by Grossberg and Schmajuk (Grossberg and Schmajuk [1989],Schmajuk
and DiCarlo [1991]) and Buhusi (Buhusi [1999]). The proposed model bears
some similarities to these earlier works, but is intended to be simpler, and is not
intended to model all aspects of classical conditioning that are observed in the
experimental results with humans and animals.
7.2.2 Micro-Level: Brain Signalling
If our hypothetical reward adaptation machine is to provide us with an insight
into biological systems, then it should rely only on analogues of signals in biolog-
ical systems to elicit change. No change should take place in the system, unless
it is elicited through a signal that has some biological counterpart. The signals
in which we have a particular interest include; dopamine signalling in the basal
ganglia (e.g. Schultz [1997]); novelty response in the perirhinal cortex (Bogacz
et al. [2001]); and tonic anticipatory activity in the cortex and striatum Suri
and Schultz [2001]. Florentin Wo¨rgo¨tter and Bernd Porr have written an excel-
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lent review of how these signals are implicated in temporal sequence learning,
prediction, and control (Wo¨rgo¨tter and Porr [2005]). We shall seek to generate
comparable signals in our hypothetical mechanism, and in so doing imply the ex-
istence of certain functionality entities in the brain. On our model these signals
are regarded as certain measures of key metrics of system state. Both singly and
in combination these signals elicit changes in model state, that correspond to the
workings of the mechanism.
7.3 Conceptual Model
Our reward adaptation machines comprises three features (described in more
detail in the following sections);
• Reward discovery and expectation mappings (see figure 7.2).
• The construction of action chains (see figure 7.3).
• The readjustment of expectation mappings due to state prediction errors
(see figure 7.4).
7.3.1 Reward discovery and expectation mappings
A common formulation for reinforcement learning problems start with the Bell-
man’s equation. One of the ways that it expressed is shown in equation 7.1
(Bellman [1957]);
J∗(i) = min
u
E[g(i, u, j) + J∗(j)|i, u] for all i. (7.1)
Typically we imagine a graph where an agent exists at a node corresponding
to the current state i, and the agents selects a control u that determines the path
selected to arrive at the next state j. The cost of selecting this path is given by
the function g(i, u, j) and E[∗|i, u] corresponds to an expectation operator. The
choice of control u is selected so as to minimize the cost of the next path selected
and the costs associated with subsequent optimal selections in a recursive fashion.
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Figure 7.2: Agent States and Action Graph: (a) Prior to discovering a
reward the agent randomly explores alternative paths (e.g. a1, a2, a3). (b) In
discovering a reward state, the agent internalizes prior path selections through
two means. The first is through storage of the path choices, which results in
them being known. The second is through some value that corresponds to an
expectation mapping, for each path selection that led to the reward state.
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This particular formulation of Bellman’s equation is taken from Bertsekas and
Tsitsiklis’ book entitled ‘Neuro-Dynamic Programming’ (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis
[1996]). Although we do not use this approach directly, the idea of a graph, where
each node corresponds to a position in state space and each path corresponds to
a feasible actions that might be taken by an agent at a node is quite a useful
formulation.
In our model, rather than considering costs that are incurred at each node
transition (associated with a path selection), we are more interested in how a
mechanism that determines control selection u might adapt its behaviour in a
fashion that supports the exploration of state space and the discovery of primary
rewards. We use the term primary rewards to refer to exogenous rewards attained
by the agent through the attainment of some terminal state.
Prior to discovering a reward the agent randomly explores alternative paths
(e.g. a1, a2, a3) as illustrated in figure 7.2(a). In discovering a reward state, the
agent internalizes prior path selections through two means. The first is through
storage of the path choices, which results in them being known. The second is
through some value that corresponds to an expectation mapping, for each path
selection that led to the reward state (see 7.2(b)). When we refer to an expec-
tation mapping, we imagine a value that is associated with the action selection
choice taken at a given point in state space and the subsequent outcome of this
choice (i.e. the next point in state space). It is the value of this expectation
mapping is used in determining future action choices, when the same point in
state space is rediscovered. The purpose of internalizing this state data is to
bias future path selections such that the likelihood or rediscovering the reward is
increased.
7.3.2 The construction of action chains
The discovery of a single pathway (for example, a sequence of motor selection
choices to a reward from a point in state space) that leads to a reward whilst
beneficial, may be sub-optimal. We wish to ensure that alternative pathways are
also explored, and alternative reward paths also internalized. This is supported by
an enlargement of the set of known states, and the storage of a values correspond
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(c) Enlargement due to reward discovery
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Figure 7.3: Known State Enlargement: There are two means by which new
reward paths are internalized; (c) through the discovery of an alternate reward
path, or (d) through the discovery of a known state from an unknown state.
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to action-selection expectations corresponding to this new path (as illustrated in
figure 7.3(c)).
A node in state that is known, is that which has through past exploration
been discovered to be a node on a path that is expected to result in a reward.
Nodes in state space that are not known, are by definition ones which have yet to
be demonstrated as comprising a node on a path leading to a reward. However,
we should like to incorporate some mechanism by which states that are currently
known, when discovered from an arbitrary node in state space that is not known
are incorporated into the path. This allows us to extend the length of path, and
include states that may bear some causal relationship to the final reward outcome
(as illustrated in figure 7.3(d)). Note that this latter facility corresponds to the
phenomena that we observe in conditioning where dopamine activation signals
migrate to the earliest occurrence of features that show a correlation with the
final reward.
7.3.3 Readjustment of expectation mappings
Finally our model should be robust to errors. It should undergo some re-adaptation
if a path that had previously been determined to lead to a reward no longer ap-
pears to do so. Without this re-adaptation the agent would be biased to repeating
action selection choices after only one successful occurrence. There are two mech-
anisms by which we imagine that such re-adaptation could take place (illustrated
in figure 7.4). The first is through an adjustment in expectation mappings. Note
that it is the expectation mapping value that biases subsequent action selection
choices. By reducing this value we are reducing the probability that a given path
will be taken. Over a prolonged period of time, we should also support a second
mechanism whereby after repeated failures, the particular path that was previ-
ously shown to result in a reward is removed from the set of known states. This
will ensure that the subsequent discovery of these states from unknown states,
does not lead to an enlargement of the path.
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Figure 7.4: Readaptation on failure: (e) In circumstances where the expected
outcome of an action selection taken at a given state does not result in the ex-
pected outcome, we need to (f) re-adjust expectation mappings. This involves
reducing the value of the expectation mapping for the failed outcome, and in-
creasing it for the new outcome. Ultimately a path that has been discredited
repeatedly should be removed from the set of known states.
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7.4 Machine Architecture
The features that we would like to see in our hypothetical reward adaptation
machine have already been elucidated. Our challenge is to conceive of how such
a system might be implemented through the configuration of conventional neural
networks. One possible solution is illustrated in figure 7.5. It illustrates the
key components of the mechanism, and indicates the signals that are used to
elicit change in the system. In this section we outline the key elements of its
architecture. In section 7.6 we shall describe how it works from a functional
perspective. There are four key components; a Sensor memory bank, a SOFM of
sequence patterns, an expectation mapping array, and a motor program activation
switch. There are three signals in the system that correspond to measures of the
extent to which a sensor state is; novel, known, and expected. We also assume the
existence of signal indicative of a delay in an expected state.
7.4.1 Sensor Memory Buffer
The first element in our design is that of a short-term memory buffer. The role
of this memory is to record the state data (propriceptive and exteroceptive) asso-
ciated with recent actions and their outcomes. The construction of the memory
buffer represents rows of state data, where each row corresponds to a different
node in the state graph. When we transition from one node to another, the sen-
sor data is passed along the buffer in a fashion similar to a pipeline. When an
action is taken all data is shifted along the pipeline prior to the new state data
being written to the top row. This data is transient. The contents of this sensor
memory buffer are processed either when a primary reward has been detected, or
a known state is discovered from an unknown state.
7.4.2 SOFM of temporal sequences
We us a self-organizing feature map (SOFM) is to store pattern sequences. When
a primary reward is detected (or a known state discovered from an unknown
state), the entire contents of the sensor memory buffer are deemed to correspond
to a sample vector that is presented to the SOFM. In this way the SOFM is used
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Figure 7.5: Machine Architecture - Overview: There are four key compo-
nents. (1) sensor memory, organized to store sensor data in a temporal or pattern
sequence order. (2) A SOFM which stores pattern sequences (the winning pat-
tern corresponds to the current known state). (3) A corresponding expectation
mapping array (where each cell of the SOFM has a corresponding entry). (4)
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194
7. Reward Adaptation Machine
only to store pattern sequences that are directly associated with rewards, or the
discovery of states that correspond to pattern sequences that have in the past
lead to rewards.
7.4.3 Expectation mapping array
For each entry in the SOFM, there exists a corresponding entry in the expectation
mapping array. The function of this array is to determine, given the current
winning vector in the SOFM, the next node in the state graph. Note that the
values associated with an expectation mapping, determine the probability that
certain actions will be repeated (since motor actions are stored as proprioceptive
values on the sensor memory buffer). Since only path sequences are stored when
they have previously resulted in the attainment of a reward, this biases the agent
into repeating those actions.
7.4.4 Motor program activation switch
The SOFM of temporal pattern sequences has a ’winning’ entry that corresponds
to the nearest known state to the current sensor state. This in turn allows us
to identify the expectation mapping identifying the next states, and the motor
signals necessary to activate the appropriate control values. It is the role of the
motor program activation switch to ensure that these motor control signals are
used to activate and deactivated low-level motor control programs.
7.5 Machine Internal Metrics
Figure 7.5 shows an over-all schematic of the model. There are four important
metrics shown that are used internally in the model to elicit changes in the system
when certain criteria are reached. These metrics are described in the following
sections. In the model that we present here, we are not particularly interested in
specifying the exact functions that implement these metrics. Our hypothetical
model is intended as a class of systems that may have alternative functional
forms, but yet operate in the same general fashion (as outlined in this chapter).
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We shall however give examples of functions that might implement such metrics
for the purpose of explaining how we might expect such a machine to operate.
7.5.1 Novelty Metric
We describe a buffer for sensor memory in section 7.4.1. In the schematic shown
in figure 7.5 we illustrate the buffer as containing samples of environmental and
proprioceptive data at discrete intervals. Our model for this buffer is as a pipeline
of sensor data, where new data enters at to top and old data is pushed out
the bottom. The first slot in the buffer corresponds to sensor data that was
latched into the buffer, on the last occasion that a significant state change was
detected. Since we imagine a mechanism of finite memory, comprising discrete
sensor samples, we have to make a design decision regarding when or under what
circumstances new sensor states should be latched into the buffer (i.e. all buffer
entries pushed down the pipe, and the current). We do so based on the a measure
of the extent to which current sensor values are new or novel compared to the
most recent data in the first slot of the buffer. We imagine the existence of a
novelty metric (or novelty function) of the form;
yN = ‖vS0 (t)− vS1 (t− τ1)‖ (7.2)
where yN corresponds to a novelty value, v
S
0 (t) corresponds to an array of
environmental (and proprioceptive) sensor values at the current time, and vS1 (t−
τ1) corresponds to the prior sensor values latched into the ‘most recent’ slot of the
sensor buffer. When this novelty value corresponds to a measure of the euclidean
distance between the current sensor state, and that which is regarded as our most
recent memory. When this exceeds some arbitrary value, current sensor data is
latched into the buffer.
The decision to use of novelty rather than simply the passage of time is based
on two ideas; firstly, significant events may take place sparsely over time, secondly,
it allows us to segment continuously varying data into equally spaced chunks. An
ideal system would only latch in those sensor states that corresponded to nodes in
the space of significant action states (illustrated in 7.2). However, we do not know
in advance what states are significant. We can conceive of situations where no
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observed state change occurs, but some action is required after some interval. To
support such situations, we would envisage an internal indicator that integrates
the passage of time, such that when a certain ‘distance’ has been reached (i.e.
time has elapsed), then this is treated as a state change.
A new sensor state is latched into memory as long as it exceeds a certain
novelty threshold. This threshold itself could be variable, corresponding to some
function of arousal or sensitivity (as it is signalled in the brain by serotonin for
example, e.g. Jing et al. [2008]). Another reason for incorporating the notion
of novelty into our model, is that there is wide-spread evidence to suggest that
novelty plays a significant role in learning in biological systems (Xiang and Brown
[1998], Bogacz et al. [2001], Wittmann et al. [2008], Guitart-Masip et al. [2010]).
7.5.2 Known Metric
In addition to this short-term memory buffer, the model has a self-organizing
feature map (SOFM), which stores sequences of state data that are associated
with a chain of events leading to a reward. For this reason we refer to this SOFM
as the SOFM of reward state-sequence patterns. The known metric corresponds
to some measure of the extent to which a given entry in the short-term memory
buffer resembles an existing entry in the SOFM. Note that it is only when a chain
of events leads to a reward, that we update the SOFM. So the very fact that an
entry in the sensor buffer is known, implies that it is part of a reward sequence.
The metric for determine whether or not a current state is known may take the
form of some minimum distance between the current sensor state, and all entries
in the SOFM;
yK = min
i
‖vS0 (t)− vKi ‖ for all i (7.3)
where yK is the corresponds to the known value, v
S
0 (t) corresponds to data in
the most recent sensor slot in the sensor buffer, and vKi corresponds to the sensor
data stored in the SOFM at cell index i.
We originally described the SOFM of reward state-sequence patterns as being
initialized with random small valued vectors. However, an alternative imple-
mentation might store pre-determined patterns that are associated with terminal
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rewards. Such entries could be genetically determined. Such a sensor pattern
might correspond to the eating food for example. Random exploration of the
environment would ultimately lead to the discovery of this predetermined sensor
state. The very first time a sensor state latched into the short-term memory
buffer that corresponds to this state would be detected as known. Since a prede-
termined entry in the SOFM already exists. However, since this is the first time
that this state is detected as known, the corresponding entry in the expectation
mapping array would indicate, that this state is unexpected. The discovery of a
known state, from an unexpected generates a trigger signal. The trigger signal
elicits functionality whereby the contents of the short-term memory buffer are
latched into the SOFM of reward state-sequence patterns, and the expectation
mapping array is updated accordingly. Since this functionality is a significant
aspect of the model, we deal with this in more detail in the following section.
7.5.3 Expected Metric
Each entry in the SOFM has a corresponding cell in the expectation mapping
array. This cell has three elements. The first in an indicator of the index of
the SOFM entry that is expected to proceed the current state. The second is a
measure of the strength of this expectation. The third is an indicator of the index
of the SOFM entry that precedes the current cell.
If an entry in the sensor buffer is known, then by definition there exists a
corresponding entry in the SOFM of reward state-sequence patterns. This entry
will in turn, have a corresponding cell in the expectation mapping array. Since
this cell stores the index of the SOFM entry that precedes the current known
state (from which we are also able to determine an expectation strength), we are
able to determine whether or not the entry in the sensor buffer that precedes the
current known state, also matches that of the SOFM cell indicated as that which
precedes the current cell (stored in the expectation mapping array). In this way,
we can determine if any known entry in the sensor buffer, is also expected.
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7.5.4 Reward Delay Metric
The reward delay metric is a used to measure the elapse of novel state sequences
after a new input to the sensor buffer has been determined to correspond to a
known state. If the current reward delay value exceeds a certain threshold value,
without a sensor data transition to the new expected state (as determined by
the expectation mapping array), then this is indicative of a failed expectation. A
failed expectation will then result in an adjustment to the expectation mapping
array entry for the known state.
7.6 Machine Function
Up until this point we have described the structure of the reward adaptation
machine and functions for determining key values. It is this section that we give
examples of circumstances under which certain value conditions result in change
in the machine.
7.6.1 Updating the SOFM
When an unanticipated reward is discovered, we ‘unwind’ the contents of the
sensor buffer and update the SOFM. This process is illustrated in figure 7.6 and
figure 7.7.
The sensor memory is traversed in a sequential manner, such that each buffer
row (or buffer segment) in the sensor memory is presented to the SOFM in a
retrospective fashion. By this we mean that an arbitrary time/sequential chunk
of sensor data in the sensor memory is presented as an exemplar to the SOFM.
Once this has been completed, and the weight vectors of the SOFM adapted
in line with conventional competitive learning, the next oldest time/sequential
chunk of sensor data is presented as an exemplar to the SOFM. In this way,
the SOFM is updated with sensor patterns that precede a terminal pay-off. All
entries in the SOFM are potentially significant as they relate to a chain of events
that has resulted in a terminal pay-off.
The determination of the current known state (corresponding to the current
winner of the SOFM buffer), allows us to determine the expected sensor state,
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from the corresponding entry in the expectation mapping array. A comparison
of the current sensor state and the expected sensor state gives us an expected
metric. If a Primary reward stimulus is detected, coincident with an unexpected
signal, then circuit adaptation occurs. This comprises two parts. In figure 7.6(1)
The current Sensor State is presented to SOFM as a winning vector, resulting in
SOFM adaptation using the conventional model. Each entry in the SOFM is said
to be a known state. In figure 7.6(2) We pass through each entry in the sensor
memory Buffer, determining the corresponding entry in the SOFM buffer. From
here we are able to update the Expectation Mapping in the Action Selection
Array. The strength of the mapping of consecutive known pattern state entries
is increased. Since each Expectation Mapping entry is associated with a specific
motor pattern, state sequences that result in a Primary Reward are entrained.
7.6.2 Updating Expectation Mappings
A second important adaptation takes place as a consequence of the discovery
of a known state that is unexpected. This is illustrated in figure 7.8. Even if no
Primary Reward is present, the discovery of a known state from an unknown state
(i.e. one that does not have a corresponding entry in the SOFM), results in the
same adaptation processes that would occur to a Primary Reward. We know that
all known state entries have been presented to the SOFM, since they constitute
part of a reward chain of anticipated state sequences that may lead to a Primary
Reward. Discovery of a known state from an unknown state updates the SOFM,
so that the unknown state is now known. At the same time, expectation mappings
between this state and the known state are strengthened. The discovery of known
state from an unknown state constitutes an implied reward, that results in the
same circuit adaptation as a primary reward. Since the expectation mappings
between the new known state and existing known states are strengthened, we are
effectively lengthening the chain of pattern sequences that are expected to lead
to a Primary Reward.
When each sensor data entry in the short-term memory is presented to the
SOFM, we are able to identify a winning entry in the SOFM. This entry also cor-
responds to a cell in the expectation mapping array. As we traverse the contents
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of the sensor memory, and present chunks to the SOFM, we discover the closest
entry in the SOFM that corresponds to this chunk. The sequential presentation
of these chunks will result in sequential winners that have a defined temporal/se-
quential relationship with one another. The winning cell in the SOFM (corre-
sponding to an older stimulus chunk) will have an anticipated mapping to the
winning cell that follows it (in a temporal or sequential sense). The weights asso-
ciated with these ‘anticipated’ sensor state transitions are strengthened through
a modified Hebbian process. Repeated presentations of the same winning SOFM
cell entry pairs, will thereby result in a stronger expectation mapping between the
two entries (the results of which are stored in the expectation mapping array).
This is illustrated in figure 7.7.
Note that in a more complex system the pattern of activation in the SOFM
could itself be treated as sensor memory. Such a system would maintain hier-
archies of SOFM, each of which would hold data corresponding to coarser levels
of temporal or sequence granularity. Such a system would have the capacity to
store events at different time-scales. Those SOFM buffers which stored data with
a longer period, could be used to provide us with temporal context. Such a system
would be capable of learning reward sequences that relied upon this context, in a
fashion that would complement recent or short-term state changes.. An attrac-
tive attribute of using the SOFM in this fashion, is that we are only presenting
exemplars that are known to have a likely temporal/sequential relationship with
a terminal reward pay-off. An SOFM coupled directly to the sensor input would
be biased towards the statistical representation of all sensor inputs, irrespective
of their relationship to a terminal reward. We effectively achieve an efficiency of
memory through this model, by only storing sequences that lead to a reward.
A significant feature of the model as presented here, is that there is no dif-
ferentiation between genetically pre-determined reward states (e.g. those sensor
reward patterns that may have been discovered via evolutionary search and con-
stitute pre-coded entries in the SOFM) and dynamically allocated known states.
Note that when we discover one of these terminal reward states, we transfer the
contents of the Sensory Memory into the SOFM, such that states that precede a
terminal reward state become known states themselves.
The effect of this is that with the discovery of any known state, from a state
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that has a low expectation value associated with it, we then engage in exactly the
same process as we would if we had discovered a terminal reward state. That
is, we are treating one of the precursor sensor states as if it is itself a reward
stimulus state. In the process we latch the contents of the sensor memory into
the SOFM, update the winners sequentially, and then update the expectation
mappings associated with each SOFM entry. In this way we can build up a
map of known states that precede a reward state, without directly needing to
experience the reward.
This potentially has the danger of misclassification. It is conceivable that one
of the sensor chunks that was latched into the SOFM has no temporal/sequential
significance. We might imagine that the discovery of potential pre-cursor states in
the fashion described above should not lead to an adaptation in the SOFM, until it
has been determined that the current sensor chain definitely results in a terminal
pay-off. Such a modification, whilst making the system more complex, does not
make it intractable. However, at this stage it is not intuitively obvious that the
model as it described here is insufficient to capture the necessary dynamics that
we are seeking.
It may well be the case that the statistical presentation of the non-relevant
sensor state to the SOFM as an exemplar would be insufficient, over a period of
time, to ensure that it persisted as a significant entry. It should be remembered
that the SOFM is updated every time a reward is experienced, and its associated
precursor states are also updated.
An important aspect of a robust reinforcement learning system is the capacity
to re-adapt to changing environmental circumstances, or to re-learn erroneously
discovered expectations. A comparison of an expectation with the current sensor
state, together with the inclusion of a value that increases with time as the ex-
pected reward fails to appear (the reward delay metric), allows us to re-adapt the
system to failed expectations. We can do this simply by adjusting the expecta-
tion mapping (i.e. weakening the expectation mapping between the current and
anticipated states). It is conceivable that the expectation mappings constitute
an array of weights to all potential sensor states, such that we choose that which
has the highest value when seeking to discover an expected state. The repeated
failure of an expected state corresponding to a fixed current state will naturally
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result in a decline in the strength of its expectation mapping.
7.6.3 Selection of an action
Up until this point we have neglected discussion of how determination of cur-
rent state, and its potential to lead to a terminal reward, is tied-in with motor
activation.
There are number of alternatives here. Whilst this may appear a rather
vague statement, it is actually of benefit to us from an evolutionary robotics
perspective. One of the challenges is to imagine how such a system may fit
within an evolutionary robotics framework.
The output of the expectation mapping array could be used in a number of
ways. In its simplest form it could act as additional input to a pre-evolved or
co-evolved neural circuit, making simple inhibitory or excitatory connections. A
more powerful implementation could see us using the output of the Expecta-
tion Mapping array to select a weight vector which corresponds to the coupling
weights of individual sensor-motor pairs. This in itself would be sufficient for us
to demonstrate behaviour analogous to that exhibited by a Finite State Machine
in the generation of sequential activity, and possibly powerful enough to simulate
invertebrate control systems.
An even more sophisticated approach could see us engaging in real-time local
search or optimal motor activity. The exciting aspect of this idea is that the
reinforcement learning model will potentially break down the reward achievement
process into sensor states, with expected sensor transitions discovered through
random exploration. Once we have a known current state, and a known expected
state, we can engage in a local search of motor space, either to seek a better
motor pattern that fulfils expectations (e.g. energy optimization), or to discover
other known states, preferable to that associated with the current mapping.
7.6.4 Changes due to failed expectations
Note that the process of failed expectation in the model that we describe above
will naturally lead to a random exploration of state space in an immature robot.
Failed expectations will result in the diminution of weights associated with the
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incorrect mappings, resulting in alternative sensor states (an their associated
motor actions) being explored.
The last diagram (below) seeks to explain some of the principles incorporated
by the described model in a schematic fashion, by considering the state space
of all sensor states. Within the state space of all sensor states, we are seeking
initially to discover significant sensor states, i.e. those that have the potential to
lead to a terminal reward. In the process, through repetition, and through the
discovery of states that lead to rewards in a consistent fashion, we are able to
build up an expectation mapping that in itself allows us to choose an appropriate
motor action for a given sensor context.
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winners have corresponding 
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Figure 7.6: Conceptual Model - Initial Adaptation to An Unanticipated
Reward: The determination of the current known state (corresponding to the
current winner of the SOFM buffer), allows us to determine the expected sen-
sor state, from the corresponding entry in the Expectation Mapping Array. A
comparison of the current sensor state and the expected sensor state gives us an
expected metric. If a Primary reward stimulus is detected, coincident with an
unexpected signal, then circuit adaptation occurs. This comprises two parts. (1)
The current Sensor State is presented to SOFM as a winning vector, resulting
in SOFM adaptation using the conventional model. Each entry in the SOFM is
said to be a known state. (2) We pass through each entry in the sensor memory
Buffer, determining the corresponding entry in the SOFM buffer. From here we
are able to update the Expectation Mapping in the Action Selection Array. The
strength of the mapping of consecutive known pattern state entries is increased.
Since each Expectation Mapping entry is associated with a specific motor pattern,
state sequences that result in a Primary Reward are entrained.
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Figure 7.7: Conceptual Model - Update Expectation Mappings: This
schematic shows in more detail the adaptations that take place when an un-
expected reward is detected. Sequentially we unwind the contents of the Sensor
Buffer, so that we are able to update the strength of the mappings between known
sensor states that have resulted in this unexpected reward.
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Figure 7.8: Conceptual Model - Lengthening the Reward Chain: Even if
no Primary Reward is present, the discovery of a known state from an unknown
state (i.e. one that does not have a corresponding entry in the SOFM), results
in the same adaptation processes that would occur to a Primary Reward. We
know that all known state entries have been presented to the SOFM, since they
constitute part of a reward chain of anticipated state sequences that may lead to a
Primary Reward. Discovery of a known state from an unknown state updates the
SOFM, so that the unknown state is now known. At the same time, expectation
mappings between this state and the known state are strengthened. The dis-
covery of known state from an unknown state constitutes an Implied Reward,
that results in the same circuit adaptation as a Primary Reward. Since the
expectation mappings between the new known state and existing known states
are strengthened, we are effectively lengthening the chain of pattern sequences
that are expected to lead to a Primary Reward.
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Figure 7.9: Conceptual Model - Adaptation To A Failed Expectation:
Under any circumstances where motor actions taken in a known sensor state, do
not result in the expected known sensor state, expectation mappings are weak-
ened. In a sophisticated system, the trigger for this adaptation would take place
after a certain subjective time period had elapsed. Note that we use the term
subjective time rather than absolute time, since this may relate to the passage
of event patterns that are deemed to be relevant. For example, if a reward was
gained through pushing a button to open a door, the absolute time period taken
for the door to open may not be significant. If after pressing the button, a window
was to open, this might be interpreted as a significant event that corresponds to
a increment in the passage of qualitative time experienced.
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Figure 7.10: Conceptual Model - Expectation as Action Selection:
Strengthening of expectation mappings occurs due to (1) an unexpected reward
and (2) discovery of a known state. Weakening of expectation mappings occurs
on a failed expectation. If we associate each known state entry with a motor
command, then we create a closed loop where subsequent activities are based on
motor commands that have in the past resulted in the attainment of rewards. The
agent ‘does’ what it ‘expects’ to do. Since only known state patterns that lead to
a reward are stored in the SOFM, the detection and execution of motor command
sequences that correspond to our expectation mappings can be expected to lead
to a reward. We have labelled the components (in brackets) with their nearest
functional analogue in the brain.
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7.7 Alternative Approaches to Understanding
Reward Adaptation
The main motivation of this chapter, was to try and understand the processes of
change that take place in the brain, that underpin behavioural complexity as they
relate to reward adaptation. Ultimately we wish to devise a model that might
have be subject to evolutionary change, in keeping with the evolutionary robotics
methodology. An understanding of other perspectives on reward adaptation, that
differ from the hypothetical model described here, helps to informs us on these
future design decisions. Two areas that are of particular interest are those of
reinforcement learning and Friston’s free energy model. Whilst neither of these
two topics provide us with a design for the constructing neural networks that
might support them, they do provide us with alternative conceptual models for
understanding the kind of processes that are deemed to take place in biological
systems, and how they complement the hypothetical model that we have outlined
here.
Dopamine signalling is closely associated with the reinforcement learning
model (Sutton and Barto [1998], see Samson et al. [2010] for a recent review).
Specifically dopamine phasic activity is said to correspond to the prediction error
in the Temporal Difference approach to reinforcement learning.
In recent years however, we have seen the emergence of a ‘grand theory’ of
brain organization in the form of the free energy model (Friston and Stephan
[2007]). Somewhat confusingly, ‘free energy’ is used in an information theoretic
sense, in a fashion that corresponds to prediction error. The emphasis on predic-
tion and anticipation, and a system wide perspective, potentially offer a formal
framework that is complementary to that offered by reinforcement learning alone.
For this reason, it is worthwhile highlighting how the Free Energy model relates
to the conceptual model proposed herein. Whilst Friston has gone as far as ques-
tioning the need for reinforcement learning as an explanatory model of behaviour
(Friston et al. [2009]), it is probably fair to say that both perspectives have some-
thing to offer; reinforcement learning for the simplicity of its models, and Free
Energy for its systemic scope.
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7.7.1 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning has at its roots the concept of a graph where the vertices
of the graph correspond to states, and the edges of the graph relate to the possible
transitions from one state to another. An agent traversing the edges of the graph
incurs costs (usually associated with a specific edge) and receives rewards (usually
associated with arrival at a state). The decisions that determine a path through
the graph are the result of a policy. A policy is a mapping from the perceived
state of the agent to actions to be taken when in that state. In the general case
the action corresponds to the selection of a path amongst a set of possible path
choices. A path through the graph corresponds to a set of edges. An optimal
policy corresponds to one which ensures that the maximum rewards are acquired
( for reasons of analytical tractability this concept if often phrased in terms of the
minimization of costs, as in this case the optimal cost is always zero). Initial work
carried out on solving this class of problems was conducted by Bellman (Bellman
[1957]) leading to the field of dynamic programming. More recently reinforcement
learning (Sutton and Barto [1998]), has emerged, offering alternative methods and
algorithms supporting the solution of such problems.
In addition to the policy, there are three additional elements of a reinforcement
learning system; a reward function, a value function and optionally a model of
the world or environment. The reward function maps a single state (or state-
action pair) to a single value. The reward function implies the goal of the agent
as the reinforcement learning system will seek to maximize long-term rewards.
The reward value reflects the immediate benefit that is gained or acquired at the
current state of the agent. In contrast, the value function reflects the long-term
benefit of a state (or state-action pair). The value function factors in not just
the immediate benefit, but also the long-term benefit that can be acquired or
gained from the transition to a specific state or the choice of a specific action in a
given state. Whilst entering a room might provide us with a reward of gold, the
value of entering the room is low if we know that exiting it will trigger a bomb
explosion. The policy decision takes as its input the result of a value function
evaluation, which in turn seeks to incorporate the results of current and future
rewards.
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Reinforcement learning problems can be solved through the use of Temporal
Difference methods (Sutton and Barto [1998]) and Q-Learning methods (Watkins
and Dayan [1996]). In Temporal Difference methods the value function takes
into account the different reward values associated with the alternative states
reachable from the current state. In Q-Learning the value function uses reward
values assigned to a specific state-action pairs. The solution of reinforcement
learning problems using these methods relies upon state value function policies,
and action value function policies respectively. The state value function policy
seeks to assign a value to a state. Solutions that make use of this, do so by
selecting an edge ( corresponding to an action ) that ensures that the next state
has the highest value amongst the alternative states. In contrast, the action-value
function policy seeks to assign a value to an action ( edge selection ) given the
current state.
Typical implementations involve the generation of a tables of values associ-
ated with specific states (Temporal Difference methods) or actions in specific
states (Q-Learning methods) acquired through the random exploration of state
(or action state) alternatives. Whilst exploration is initially random, the degree
of randomness declines over time as reward values are accumulated. The tension
between exploration and value driven state or action state choices over time is a
central theme in reinforcement learning research. More sophisticated approaches
support a world model internal to the agent the accuracy of which is improved
over the course of agent-world interaction. The internal world model is then used
by the agent in the process of evaluating the anticipated consequences of actions.
Although the concepts of reinforcement learning methods remain valid in help-
ing us understand the model proposed in this thesis, there are few direct compar-
isons that can be made. reinforcement learning methods place great emphasis on
the value function, the results of which underlie the decisions that comprise agent
polices. Although multi-layered perceptrons are sometimes used, for example in
mapping sensor state variables to reward values (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [1996]),
they are employed for the purposes of function approximation, not for any at-
tempt at biological realism. In the Temporal Difference method, value estimates
are continuously updated due to the difference between the anticipated value of
a state and its experienced value.
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In our proposed model adaptation in the network only takes place once a
reward has been detected. The balance between the random exploration of states
and value driven state selection is an emergent property of the neural models
used. This contrasts directly with many reinforcement learning methods where
the degree of exploration over time and very often the learning rates themselves
are set to vary explicitly over the course of a single trial. Although a mapping is
made between sensor state and selected actions, these are implicit in the dynamic
connections made within our neural model. There is no explicit value function.
As a consequence, no analogue between the relationship of the value function
with the policy. The reward function is implicit in the world simulation itself, so
is taken as given. Essentially what this thesis describes is a biologically inspired
model of reward adaptation with very little in common with the formal methods
of reinforcement learning. In the primitive neural circuits proposed, no internal
model is constructed of the world.
7.7.2 The Free Energy Model - ‘Prediction Error’
The theoretical biologist placed Anticipation as a fundamental concept in biology
Rosen [1985]. He sought to promote the idea that all living organisms were in
some sense Anticipatory Systems. Although this idea may have failed to gain a
significant foothold in his lifetime, there are an increasing number of scientists
who are prepared to advocate the idea that anticipation and prediction are po-
tentially highly significant ideas for understanding the organization of the brain
(Graybiel [1998], Bar [2009], Friston and Kiebel [2009]). Of these, perhaps the
most ambitious framework is that proposed by Karl Friston. The presentation of
his ideas, whilst somewhat daunting in its scope, is worthy of mention, given the
benefits of comparing the model described herein with the more formal framework
proposed by Friston.
Central to the idea of “Action Selection as Anticipation” is that, by default,
we follow a chain of actions that are deemed to anticipate the acquisition of
a Primary Reward. The accidental discovery of Primary rewards results in a
backwards induction of sensor-action predictive mappings, which ensure that the
action sequences that resulted in achieving this state are replayed whenever any
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point in the action sequence is rediscovered. It is only on failed expectations
that these action mappings are re-adjusted. By seeking to internalize predictive
mappings that include only those action sequences that on average are expected
to yield rewards, we reduce the dimensionality of the search state space.
There are two quotes taken from one of his more accessible papers (Friston
[2010]) that are of interest for comparison purposes;
Optimizing the sufficient statistics (representations): “Op-
timizing the recognition density makes it a posterior or conditional
density on the causes of sensory data: this can be seen by expressing
the free energy as surprise Inp(s, |m) plus a Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence between the recognition and conditional densities (encoded by
the internal states in the figure). Because this difference is always
positive, minimizing free energy makes the recognition density an ap-
proximate posterior probability. This means the agent implicitly in-
fers or represents the causes of its sensory samples in a Bayes-optimal
fashion. At the same time, the free energy becomes a tight bound on
surprise, which is minimized through action”.
Optimizing action: “Acting on the environment by minimizing
free energy enforces a sampling of sensory data that is consistent with
the current representation. This can be seen with a second rearrange-
ment of the free energy as a mixture of accuracy and complexity.
Crucially, action can only affect accuracy (encoded by the external
states in the figure). This means that the brain will reconfigure its
sensory epithelia to sample inputs that are predicted by the recogni-
tion density in other words, to minimize prediction error”.
Whilst the language may not be very easy to understand without considering
his work in some detail, there are two ideas here that are well represented in the
conceptual model presented;
• Optimizing the sufficient statistics: The use of the SOFM is employed
as a means of ensuring the efficient storage of salient data in two regards.
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The first is in the conventional use case, where high dimensional sensor
data is represented in a far lower dimensional space. The second is based
on the fact that we only latch data into the SOFM when a sensor event
has contributed to a chain of events that has resulted in a Primary Reward.
This allows us to have an efficient representation of salient data necessary
for action.
• Optimizing action: The representation of known state data is minimized
through the use of the SOFM. In turn, these known states are mapped to
channel switching units which ensure that relevant sensor source data is
routed to appropriate motor target units, in a fashion that seeks to limit
activity to that which in the past has been demonstrated to be beneficial
when sensor-motor pair sequences are linked together. It does this in a
fashion such that failed expectations are used to modify the system, so that
improved predictions can be employed in the future.
7.8 Conclusion
The model described in this chapter might to be of use as working functional
model to researchers wanting to hand-code a reinforcement learning system. How-
ever, this is not our goal. Our goal in this chapter was to try and build a highly
abstracted model of how the basal ganglia, thalamus and cerebral cortex working
in conjunction to support reinforcement learning.
The approach taken here, mirrors that of the methodology demonstrated in
chapter 5, where we hand-coded a finite-state machine model intended to solve
the ball collection task. In chapter 5 the goal was to determine if there were
intrinsic features of our hand-coded solution to the problem that might have
brain homologues. By doing so, we were able to identify the basal ganglia as
an area of particular interest. In a crude sense, we built a mechanistic model
and then used this as a working hypothesis of the functional anatomy required
to solve this class of problems. In this chapter, we are doing the inverse. We are
taking insights from biology (based on our review of the basal ganglia described
in chapter 6), and seeking to determine how we might implement characteristics
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of these systems in a mechanistic model.
We stop short of coding this mechanistic solution however, since our goal is
to arrive at a analogue solution that is tractable to evolutionary search. In the
process of devising such a model as described in this chapter, we are creating
an abstraction that represents a potential target for evolutionary search. In so
doing we are tracing out the degrees of freedom that a more primitive circuit has
the potential to explore through evolutionary search. To implement the model as
described leads us to a circuit form that is intractable to evolution. However, a
simpler model (incorporating some of the characteristics of this target), could be
evolved without the inherent limitations of a hand-coded solution. The basis for
such a solution (again inspired by biological systems) is explored in the proceeding
chapter.
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Chapter 8
Energy, A Neuron Model and
Simple Circuits
8.1 Introduction
Whilst the previous chapter took a ‘top-down’ perspective, this chapter takes
a ‘bottom-up’ perspective. We focus on one particular aspect of dopamine sig-
nalling as a starting point; the depression of phasic activity after the circuit has
become conditioned to expect a reward, but the reward is not presented (see
figure 8.2), in other words a failed expectation.
We take the unconventional route of considering what role, if any, energy ef-
ficiency might have to play in the emergence of these characteristics. Following
this, we present a novel neuron model, which through the modulation of ex-
citability, is able to represent some of the observed characteristics of dopamine
neurons. We then present a minimalist circuit, that might present us with a
good starting point in building reward anticipatory circuits (whilst still broadly
complying with the framework described in the previous chapter summarized in
the schematic shown in figure 8.1).
Before we go into the details, we will first present a brief review of current
ideas on the role of energy efficiency in the brain.
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Figure 8.1: Intrinsic Action Loop: Unless we experience a failed expectation,
action selection is automatic, based on past experience.
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8.2 Energy and the Brain
It is self-evident that all replicators require energy and materials to maintain
their integrity and reproduce. The efficiency with which an organism acquires
and makes use of the resources that it ingests will therefore have an impact on its
preferential selection (in an evolutionary system). Whilst one might argue, for
example, that success in hunting is a key determinant of fitness, and therefore far
more important than the energy expended in achieving hunting success, it does
not follow from this that energy efficiency will not be selected for.
A simplistic understanding of evolution might lead us to see adaptations as
either functional or energetic. The reality is that evolution doesn’t care. If a
particular mutation is functionally beneficial and at the same time, it improves
energy efficiency, we are not able to assign exclusive credit to either ‘cause’, when
this mutation is preferentially selected. An important point to note here, is that
in identifying a particular characteristic of neural signalling, a good functional
understanding of this characteristic, does not preclude an alternative explanation
from the perspective of energetics. In this sense, there may well be numerous
examples of dual explanations of neural activities, that are neither redundant
nor mutually exclusive. This is particularly relevant to us in this thesis, as the
biological role of dopamine is well researched, but its functional significance is not
understood in any detail other than that it might be involved in reinforcement
learning. An energetic explanation for the signalling dynamics of dopamine does
not in any way subtract from interpretations of its functional significance.
In animals with the same hunting abilities, all that is required for evolution to
preferentially select one set of alleles over another is any difference between the
fitnesses of the phenotypes that correspond to each set of alleles. For this reason
it is not surprising that energy efficiency is seen to play a role in; ecologicial
organization (Jorgensen and Bendoricchio [2001]), cell dynamics (Haynie [2001]),
ethology (Gates [2003]) and biomechanics (Alexander [2003]).
It seems reasonable to assume that energy efficiency is an important factor in
the evolution of the brain. The brain is regarded as highly efficient in its support
of neural signalling by some authors (see Laughlin and Sejnowski [2003] for a good
overview, with support from Achard and Bullmore [2007]). Note that this does
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not mean that energy utilization is minimized, as additional energy expenditure is
incurred to offset signalling errors (Levy and Baxter [1996], de Polavieja [2002]).
Therefore energy efficiency in signalling is the trait that is selected for, rather
than simply energy minimization. Coding regimes are not uniform across all brain
regions, as the functional requirements of the brain also shape the cost benefits of
one signalling regime over another (Kreiman [2004]). However, there is evidence
that synaptic efficiency is key in retinal processing (Vincent [2003]). Evidence also
supports the hypothesis that; ion channels in a wide variety of neurons minimize
energy expenditure in their normal range of spiking (Hasenstaub et al. [2010]);
that dendritic processing is energy efficient (Migliore and Culotta [1998]) and that
energy efficiency is a factor in the organization of vision (Vincent et al. [2005])
and other sensor systems (Niven and Laughlin [2008]).
One might argue that energy efficiency is seen not only at the micro scale in
the brain, but also the macro scale through the phenomena that are said to exhibit
repetition suppression (Grillspector et al. [2006], Schacter et al. [2007], Suzuki and
Johnson [2008], Horner [2008], Constantino et al. [2008], Garrido et al. [2009], and
Leo´n-Carrio´n et al. [2010]). Repetitive suppression refers to the decline in neural
activity that takes place over the course of repetitive cognitive tasks. Whilst this
may well be an emergent property of multiple low-level homeostatic processes,
the results appear to be energy conservative, and as such, may play a role in
contributing to overall fitness.
The energetic costs of single neuron spike is high. There are estimates that
this may limit the human cortex to fewer than 1 percent of the number of neurons
that can be substantially active at the same time (Lennie [2003]). Rather than
an abundance of signalling, the lack of activity in the brain has given rise to the
notion of the ‘dark matter’ of neuroscience (Shoham et al. [2006]), since we have
difficulty in accounting for such low levels of signalling. It could be argued that
low activation levels are consistent with the idea of an energy efficient brain.
An argument that is sometimes presented in support of the idea that the
brain is not energetically efficient, and therefore unlikely to have been the target
of selection for energy efficiency, is that the energy used by the brain at rest is
not significantly different from that of the brain at full use. This is a specious
argument. If a computer consumes close to the same amount of energy on standby
220
8. New Model
as it does in normal operation, it could either be incredibly efficient or incredibly
inefficient. Energy efficiency cannot be determined without determining a basal
metabolic rate of energy expenditure and using this as our reference rate. Reports
that suggest that the brain uses approximately 50 percent more energy when
conscious compared to when it is under deep anaesthesia (Laughlin and Sejnowski
[2003]), still does not give us enough information to say whether or not this is
‘high’ or ‘low’, since we have no basis of comparison. If the base metabolic cost
is minimized, then knowing that the brain uses 50 percent more energy when
conscious than when unconscious does not imply that the brain is inefficient.
If we were to find a popular car, with a very small petrol engine we might
imagine it to be an indicator that the car was energy efficient. Analogously, given
that the brain has very little energy storage capacity (Ames [2000]), we might
arrive at the same conclusion. What has been established is that peak energy ex-
penditure is not substantially different from that of its mean (Raichle and Snyder
[2007]). Whilst it could be claimed that this mean is energy inefficient (which is
unlikely), the conclusion that we have to come to is that the functional activity
that we associate with cognitive tasks, does not result in significant increases in
energy expenditure, surely an indicator that the neural signalling that supports
these cognitive tasks is energy efficient.
We know that energy consumption of the brain is significant when considering
total human energy expenditure at rest. Although the human brain is only 2
percent of the body’s weight, it accounts for 20 percent of its resting metabolism
(Attwell and Laughlin [2001], Laughlin [2001]). Saris (Saris et al. [2008]) estimates
that in humans this may be as high as 20-25 percent. This is substantially
higher than that for other primates (8-10 percent) and non-primate mammals
(at 5 percent). It is unlikely that this relatively high metabolic cost would not
be subject to genetic adaptation through preferential selection. Some authors
(Laughlin et al. [2000] and Hasenstaub et al. [2010]) go as far as to propose
energetics as a single unifying principle in understanding brain signalling.
If we accept that evolution has played a role in improving energy efficient, we
might ask ourselves whether or not this is implied by any general characteristics
of neuronal signalling. Perhaps the most obvious area to consider is that of neural
inhibition. We know for example that cortical circuits rely upon GABAergic inhi-
221
8. New Model
bition to balance excitation and control spike timing (Mann and Paulsen [2007]).
Buzsa´ki et al (Buzsa´ki et al. [2007]) have also identified the role of inhibitory in-
terneurons as key in supporting energy efficiency. The ideas expounded in the rest
of this chapter, whilst originally inspired by certain dynamics of the dopamine
signalling, apply more generally to that of the action of inhibitory neurons, and
their role in supporting energy efficiency.
8.2.1 Dopamine Signalling and Energy Regulation
There is one significant feature of dopamine signalling that is potentially indica-
tive of neural adaptation that supports energy efficiency (see figure 8.2); after
training, a failed reward expectation results in the inhibition of dopamine phasic
activity below basal levels (Schultz [1998]).
Our hypothesis, portrayed in figure 8.3, is that during training we see a de-
cline in the intrinsic excitability of the dopamine neuron. However, this decline is
compensated by a corresponding increase in susceptibility or responsiveness (to
the activation of the efferent dopaminergic neuron) at the afferent target neu-
ron. Such adaptations would help explain the decline in dopamine output below
background levels, when a failed expectation presumably results in an ‘off’ in-
put signal to the dopamine neuron. If this model is reasonable, we also have to
consider the possible regulatory pathways through which this adaptation might
take pace. Three broad alternatives are portrayed in figure 8.4 which we term;
(a) auto-regulation, (b) modulatory regulation and (c) feedback regulation. Of the
three (c) appears a plausible explanation in the case of dopamine neurons, since
striatal neurons make inhibitory projections to the substantia nigra (the origin of
the dopminergic neurons). In this scenario, the output of the target neuron feeds
back to the innervating dopamine neuron, to down-regulate dopamine excitation,
and at the same time it increases its sensitivity to the input signal, to maintain
the modulatory impact of a reduced dopamine signal.
8.2.2 Intrinsic Versus Task-Evoked Brain Perspectives
One aspect of these hypothesis that is worth mentioning, as it relates to dopamine
phasic activity as portrayed in the schematic 8.3, is that it relies on four distinct
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Figure 8.2: dopamine phasic activity inhibited on a failure in an antic-
ipated reward. The charts correspond to time binned histograms of dopamine
phasic activity in three seperate experiments.“R” corresponds to the presentation
of a reward. “CS” corresponds to the presentation of a conditioned stimulus.
Note that in the third diagram, the average activation level is lower on the failed
presentation of a reward after training. Source Schultz [1998].
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Figure 8.3: Dopamine signalling energy regulation hypothesis: (A) De-
picts a dopamine neuron with a target neuron. When it is ‘off’, the dopamine
neuron exhibits signalling at background levels of activity. (B) When the input
is ‘on’ we have elevated signalling levels. (C) During training the excitability
of the dopamine neuron is gradually reduced, and the receptivity of the target
neuron is up-regulated. (D) Subsequent to training, when dopamine input is
once again ‘off’ (e.g. denoting a failed expectation), source output levels are sub-
stantially inhibited, below the background levels that were seen prior to training.
The downwards-pointing (filled, blue) triangle: denotes reduced excitation. The
upwards-pointing (empty, red) triangle: denotes enhanced receptivity.
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Figure 8.4: Energy Regulation Hypothesis: Three possible models that may
account for the changes that appear to take place in dopamine activation levels
during training. (a) Auto-Regulation; dopamine excitation down-regulation
and target neuron receptivity up-regulation are assumed to be self-regulating due
to some homeostatic regulation and hebbian adaptation respectively. (b) Mod-
ulatory Regulation; an external source provides a modulatory signal to both
source and target neurons. (c) Feedback regulation; in this the target neu-
ron, down-regulates the dopamine (source) signal, and a hebbian process adjusts
the target neurons susceptibility to this source signal. The downwards-pointing
(filled, blue) triangle: denotes reduced excitation. The upwards-pointing (empty,
red) triangle: denotes enhanced receptivity.
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Figure 8.5: Generic neuron energy regulation hypothesis: Whilst 8.4 in-
dicates the different possible mechanisms for energy regulation for use in the
modulation of the target of a dopaminergic neuron, any generic source neuron
might regulate a target neuron, either for purposes of modulation or transmission
via (a) auto-regulation, (b) modulatory regulation or (c) feedback regulation.
The downwards-pointing (filled, blue) triangle: denotes reduced excitation. The
upwards-pointing (empty, red) triangle: denotes enhanced receptivity.
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signalling patterns; (1) background, (2) elevated, (3) reduced elevation and (4)
inhibition. However, there is little support in literature for a distinct pattern
that corresponding to reduced elevation. We may be able to explain this by
suggesting, that after a process of adaptation, the dopamine signalling, tends to
the background level. The consequence of this, would be that dopamine neurons
that have been trained, are indistinguishable from other dopamine neurons that
have not been trained, if we were to look at their signal characteristics. In this
case an ‘adapted’ circuit, is not detectable by its signalling levels. It would only
be discernible by considering the excitation state of the source (dopamine in this
case) neuron, and the susceptibility or input weight of the pre-synaptic neuron
at the target neuron.
The conceptual implications of this are potentially far-reaching, as this im-
plies that inhibitory neurons are potentially engaged in activity that is intended
to down-regulate source neurons, when it is known that these neurons are likely
to be involved in significant signalling (offset by in up-regulation in target neuron
susceptibility). In this sense, inhibition denotes the importance of the signal that
originates from the source neuron. This changes substantially what we might
presume is a natural interpretation; that inhibitory neurons are “stopping” sig-
nalling that is unimportant. No doubt there are cases (particularly in interneu-
rons) where we see examples of competitive inhibition. However for non-local
inhibitory projects, it could potentially be the case that the functional role of
inhibitory neurons is to regulate the output of principal contributory source neu-
rons, quite possibly in the case of the Feedback Regulation model, by the very
target neurons that they innervate.
If key signalling is mediated by coupled neurons that engage in commensurate
source neuron (excitability down-regulation) and target (pre-synaptic strengthen-
ing) adaptation, then the energy footprint of active signalling would be reduced.
Such signalling would not necessarily be significantly greater in energy expendi-
ture than that of unadapted neurons at their rest metabolic state. Such adap-
tation is possible where signalling is intermittent, but in some sense predictable.
Bursts of elevated activity would still be seen when irregular or unanticipated sig-
nals occurred. Such signals might appear to correspond to novelty, or surprisal
(Palm [1981], Strange et al. [2005], Friston [2010]).
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Raichle ((Raichle and Gusnard [2002]), Raichle [2006]) differentiates between
intrinsic and task-evoked signalling. His view is that much of our understanding
of brain functionality is dependent on experimental methods that evoke neural
signalling as part of a task. He argues that this bias might significantly distort
our understanding of the brain, since it neglects what he terms intrinsic brain
activity.
Raichle does not specify what this intrinsic activity might be. A process of
active energy management (as outlined above), might seek to minimize high-
traffic connections through paired source and target neuron adaptation. Such
signalling would be functionally significant, but it not be highly visible.
228
8. New Model
8.3 The Neuron Model
8.3.1 Desired Characteristics
The following model is intended to capture certain features of the dopamine
neuron, specifically; an excitation factor that we can adjust to modify the firing
probability of the neuron. Characteristics that we require in such a model include;
1. The probability of the neuron firing should increase monotonically with an
increase in the neuron’s internal activation state.
2. The neuron should still fire stochastically even with neutral input.
3. We require an excitation parameter that allows us to adjust the probability
of firing.
4. It should be computationally simple to implement.
5. Ideally the formulation should support both spiking models and average
rate code models.
8.3.2 The Rayleigh Distribution
With these characteristics in mind, we arrived at a model that uses the Rayleigh
Distribution. The Rayleigh Distribution is a two-dimensional analogue of the
more widely known Maxwell Distribution. Imagine a square pool table, where
all collisions are perfectly elastic (i.e. energy is conserved), and all balls are
given an initial random velocity (whose horizontal and vertical components are
uncorrelated, generated from a normal distribution with the same variance). If we
then took the speed of each ball, we would find that the speeds corresponded to a
Rayleigh Distribution. If the pool table was mounted on a motorized platform, we
would be able to agitate the table, thus adding energy to the system, resulting
in an increased in the average speed of the balls, analogous to increasing the
‘temperature’ of the system.
The Rayleigh Distribution has a Probability Density function given by;
x
λ2
e−z
2/2λ2 (8.1)
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and a Cumulative Distribution Function given by;
1− e−z2/2λ2 (8.2)
Where z denotes the random variate and λ corresponds to a “temperature”
parameter, that determines the shape of the distribution.
8.3.3 Average Rate Formulation
In this section we describe the implementation details of our neuron model. We
arrive at a formulation based on the Rayleigh Distribution, which gives us a neu-
ron firing probability determined by a neuron activation level (or State) and an
excitation factor. Non-spiking neuron models of neurons typically have a single
output value that is intended to correspond to an average firing rate. A neuron
with a fixed probability of firing for a given activation level and excitation factor
would a generate stream of pulses whose average firing rate is directly analogous
with that of other average rate firing models. The biggest difference between our
formulation and that of other commonly used average rate firing models is that
the peak and base output values vary with excitation factor, together with the
shape firing probability curve. In GasNet and other adaptive network models (
described in Chapters 2 to 4), whilst the shape of the curve can be modulated,
the peak and base output levels are always mapped to a interval either 0 to 1, or
equivalently -1 to +1. This results in a model whose characteristics bear a closer
resemblance to biological neurons than other average rate code models, but with-
out involving the complexity and computational overhead of some spiking neuron
models.
In our neuron model, the probability of the neuron firing (p) is determined by
the Rayleigh Distribution’s cumulative probability function;
p = 1− e−z
2
2λ2 (8.3)
We define two new variables x and y, which correspond to our neuron excita-
tion factor, and activation state respectively. With an appropriate mapping,
the activation state (y) determines the λ of the distribution, such that an increase
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Figure 8.6: Neuron Model: (C) We map the neuron activation state to a
Rayleigh distribution Lamda value (A). The excitation factor acts a threshold
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Figure 8.7: Neuron Firing Probability: (A) Firing Threshold set by excita-
tion factor at 1.0. (B) Firing Probability at excitation factor at 1.0. (B) Firing
Threshold set by excitation factor at 0.5. (D) Firing Probability at excitation
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in the activation state corresponds to a decline in the value of λ, and vice-versa.
Qualitatively, we might imagine the activation state to be inversely related to
the ‘temperature’ of the Rayleigh Distribution. The excitation factor x acts as a
threshold value, and is mapped to the z variate of the Rayleigh Distribution.
Where x corresponds to the neuron’s excitation factor and z the cumulative
probability variate in the Rayleigh Distribution;
z = (k1 + k2x) (8.4)
and where y, corresponds to the neuron’s activation state and λ the “temper-
ature” parameter of our Rayleigh Distribution;
λ = (k3(1− y) + k4) (8.5)
we obtain the neuron firing probabability (p) given by;
p = 1− e
−(k1+k2x)2
2∗(k3(1−y)+k4)2 (8.6)
Neurons exhibit a wide range of firing probabilities ( see Branco and Staras
[2009] for a review).The constant values chosen for equation8.6 were intended to
reflect this. Striatal Medium Spiny Neurons are estimated to fire with a probabil-
ity between 0.42 and 0.72 (Ding et al. [2008]). In our model with the excitation
factor at 0.5 ( intended to be a neutral level ), the neuron will fire with a proba-
bility of between 0.2 and 0.8 (with activation levels at 0.5 and 1.0 respectively.
For all our experiments, the constant values are taken to be; k1 (0.4), k2 (2.0),
k3 (6.0) and k4 (1.5). The value for k1 (0.4) was chosen to that all neurons fire with
a small but non-zero probability even when the excitation factor (x) is zero, and
the activation state (y) is zero. The value for k2 (2.0) was chosen, to ensure that
the relatively small changes in excitation factor (x) will result in quite substantial
changes in the form of the neuron firing probability for the ranges λ, determined
by the activation state (y) variable. The values relating to activation state (y) k3
(6.0) and k4 (1.5) were chosen in conjunction with those for the excitation factor
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(x), to ensure firstly that; the firing probability (p) was close to 1.0, when the
neuron has an activation state of 1.0, and an excitation factor of 1.0 and secondly
that the firing probability (p) was not too high, when the activation state is 0.0,
with an excitation factor of 1.0.
This model is displayed graphically in figure 8.6. In figure 8.6, graph A shows
the Rayleigh Probability Density function for different λ values. For any given
Neuron activation level, we can determine the appropriate λ value to use, as shown
in graph B ( in line with equation 8.5). Once we have the appropriate λ value, we
can use this to determine the appropriate the curve for the Rayleigh distribution
cumulative probability function (graph C). The value of the excitation factor
determines the point on the Cumulative Probability curve that corresponds to
the current neuron firing probability (p), as shown in graph D.
The correspondence between the Rayleigh Distribution Cumulative Probabil-
ity Function and the Neuron Firing Probability (p) can be seen even more clearly
in figure 8.7. The upper two graphs show how the neuron firing probability curve
is generated when the excitation factor has the value 1.0. The intercept of the
cumulative probability curve’s ( which correspond to different neuron activation
levels) with the threshold determined by the excitation factor is shown for a
neuron activation of 1.0. 0.5 and 0.0. The horizontal arrows highlight these in-
tercepts (graph A). In turn, we can see the corresponding points on the neuron
firing probability curve in graph B. Similarly the lower two graphs show the same
cumulative probability curves, with a new threshold determined by the excitation
factor set to 0.5. ( graphs C and D).
The graph shown below in figure 8.8 illustrates the neuron firing probability
curves in more detail ( firing probability p as a function of activation state). Let
us consider the case where the excitation parameter is 0.5 ( the neutral excitation
level), the centre curve with a solid line. We can see that the neuron will fire with
a probability of around 83 percent when the internal activation state is 1.0, and
with a 7 percent probability when the activation state is zero. A reduction of the
excitation parameter to zero results in a very low level of neuron firing probability.
A high level of excitation results in guaranteed firing when the activation state
is 1.0. The graph shows results taken from the implemented model. Figure 8.9
shows the neuron firing probability as a heat map. In this case we can see how the
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variation of both excitation factor and neuron activation level affect the neuron
firing probability across a range of values.
In the experiments that are described in subsequent chapters, we add the
small perturbation so that neurons with the same Activation Value and excitation
factor never have exactly the same output values. This is useful where we want
to implement a winner-takes-all action selection algorithm, and we wish to see
stochastic outcomes even with nominally identical inputs. The final form of the
neuron firing probability is shown below, where δ corresponds to a very small
random value;
p = 1− e
−(k1+k2x)2
2(k3(1−y)+k4)2 + δ (8.7)
For reasons of computational efficiency, we created a two-dimensional look-up
table comprising 11 excitation factors and 41 activation levels, and employ linear
interpolation for intermediate values. This look-up table (together with a small
random value δ )is used in all experiments described in future chapters rather
than equation 8.7 for calculating firing probabilities.
8.3.4 Excitation Modulated Signalling
By varying the excitation factor, we are able to change the neuron transfer func-
tion. The two graphs shown in 8.10 show how we might support the process de-
scribed earlier this chapter, where a change in the excitation factor for a dopamine
neuron results in inhibited output when the input is weak. In the Top graph, we
can see transfer functions with the excitation factor of 1.0, 0.5 and 0.1 In our
hypothesis regarding the dopamine neuron, we are assuming that dopamine neu-
ron excitation declines over the course of training. If we start with an excitation
factor of 1,0 which declines over time to 0.1, we can see that an internal acti-
vation state of zero, would reduce in a substantially inhibited output train with
a firing probability of approximately 0.03, compared to a ‘background’ level of
0.18 (at point D) prior to the decline in excitation. Despite the decline in ex-
citation, however, if the internal state of the neuron is 1.0, the neuron will fire
with a probability of approximately 0.27. The lower graph shows a similar phe-
nomena at lower activation states. We could easily imagine a system of channels,
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Figure 8.8: Neuron Model- Firing Probability vs activation state: Here
we show the impact of varying the excitation factor. In both graphs above, the
upper line shows the effect of the excitation factor set to 1.0, and the lowest
line shows the excitation factor set to zero. Note that even when the internal
activation state of the neuron is zero, the probability of firing never goes to zero.
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axis the neuron’s excitation state. The neuron’s firing probability is displayed as
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differentiated only by their excitation factors.
8.3.5 A Spiking Formulation
It is relatively simple to generate a spiking version of this model. We can generate
a random variate (z) that corresponds to the appropriate Rayleigh distribution,
using the following formula;
z = λ
√
−2 ln(1− U) (8.8)
where U is a random variate drawn from a uniform distribution in the range 0
and 1, and where λ is determined by equation 8.5 as before, based on the current
neuron for an activation state y. We can then use the excitation factor as a
simple threshold level, such that the neuron is said to fire if the value of z is less
than the threshold ( with appropriate scaling factors analogous to those used in
equation 8.4). The implementation of this model is trivial, as shown in Listing
8.1. Note that the constants k1 to k4 correspond with those that are specified in
equations 8.4 and 8.5.
Listing 8.1: Spiking Formulation of the Model Neuron
/// Where fActv is the neuron Activation State (Level)
/// and fExct is the neuron Excitation State.
float CModel_Neuron :: Output( float fActv , float fExct )
{
// 0.4f (k1)
// 2.0f (k2)
// 6.0f (k3)
// 1.5f (k4)
float fLambda = 6.0f * (1.0f - fActv) + 1.5f;
float fThrs = fExct * 2.0f + 0.4;
float fRand = Get_Rnd_Real ();// (0.0 ,1]
float fRayl = fLambda * ::sqrt( -2.0f * ::log( fRand ) );
return (fRayl < fThrs ) ? 1.0 : 0.0f;
}
Through the generation of a binned histogram of 5 million samples using
equation 8.8, we verified that this form is equivalent to that of equation 8.7.
Although we have not used this model in experiments described within this thesis,
some consideration was given to how a Spike Timing Dependent Plasticity ( for
reviews see Dan and Poo [2004], Dan and Poo [2006], Natalia Caporale And Yang
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Figure 8.10: Neuron Model - Excitation Modulated Signalling: Here we
can compare the impact of changes in the excitation factor on competitive sig-
nalling between two neurons. (Top) Even if the excitation factor of a neuron is
reduced to 0.1, when its internal activation state is 1.0 (A), the probability of
firing is greater than a neuron with an excitation factor of 0.5 with a 0.67 acti-
vation state, and greater than a neuron with an excitation factor of 1.0 with an
activation state at 0.25. (Bottom) If a neuron has an excitation factor of 0.0, its
probability of firing when its activation state is 1.0(A), will still be greater than
that of a neuron with an excitation factor of 0.5, with an internal state of 0.38
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Dan [2008], and for a computational perspective see Roberts and Bell [2002] )
could relate to a spiking model.
There are two notable models that seek to relate Spike Timing Dependent
Plasticity (STDP) to Reinforcement Learning. Roberts et al (Roberts et al.
[2008]) propose a model where a STDP learning rule drives the spike probability
of a reward predicting neuronal population to a stable equilibrium. The model
proposed by Izhikevich (Izhikevich [2007]) is particularly interesting, since he pro-
poses a STDP learning model where dopamine neurons provide a reinforcement
signal capable of associating distal (prior) actions with a current reward. What
we propose here however is something entirely different. We are interested in
a simple mechanism that might support the differential regulation of connected
neurons, for the purposes of supporting energetic signalling, such that the source
neuron has its signal down-regulated, and the target neuron has its sensitivity
up-regulated.
Work by Markham and Tsodyks (Markham and Tsodyks [1996]) showed that
pairs of pre and post synaptic potentials affected synaptic efficacy, and not just
synaptic output. This is supportive of the idea of gain adjustment implied by
figure 8.11. Mark Denham (Denham [2001]) used this idea as the basis for de-
veloping a biologically plausible model which demonstrates that phase variations
in spike arrival at pre and post synaptic terminals can result in both long-term
potentiation (LTP) and long-term depression (LTD). He refers to the typical
spike-timing related plasticity response illustrated in figure 8.11. Pre-synaptic
signals that precede action potentials reduce synaptic efficacy, and pre-synaptic
signals that occur slightly after action potentials increase synaptic efficacy. This
is consistent with our model. Essentially, an anticipatory signal is theoretically
capable of down-modulating transmitter gain, and up-modulating a receiver gain,
resulting in energetic gains without information loss. This model qualitatively
concurs with the phenomena that appears to be present in reward-anticipatory
activity of dopamine neurons (Mirenowicz and Schultz [1994]). We also know
that dopamine neurons are implicated in both LTP and LTD, fitting suitably
with our model for a candidate anticipatory modulator. Ideally we would wish
to find a biological example of where the same dopaminergic circuitry was impli-
cated in both LTP and LTD where the candidate for LTP was subject to a phase
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Figure 8.11: Hypothetical STDP and Energy Efficiency: This graph shows
how a hypothetical neuron model could use where we have an Anticipatory Mod-
ulator, that through Spike Time Dependent Plasticity is able to improve Energy
Efficiency of Signalling.
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delay. Whilst we are not aware of such a simple circuit in current literature, we
do know that striatal cells respond in a fashion that anticipates reward (Schultz
et al. [2000]), consistent in our model with a modulator that is phase-delayed,
with regards the original anticipatory signal.
8.4 Experiment: Energy Savings in Feature De-
tection
This section describes an experiment which demonstrates energy savings through
a simple feature detection task. It makes use of a simple circuit comprising our
model neurons. We shall refer to our model neurons as Rayleigh neurons implying
the function used to calculate the effective output of these neurons. The circuit
used in this experiment is illustrated in figure 8.12.
8.4.1 Problem: The detection of combined features
We base this test on a simple problem that imagines the existence of a organism
in a simple environment dominated by two sensor domains. Domain A (e.g.
taste) has 32 possible states, and Domain B (e.g. colour) has 16 possible traits.
We assume to the existence of two feature detectors for each domain. A feature
detector is represented by a single neuron. For the two domains, we have a total
for four neurons comprising the input-layer to the circuit. At the start of each
trial we randomly select two values from each domain and associate each feature
detector with these values. At each simulation iteration we generate a random
value for each state that is deemed to correspond to the current environmental
state. When the environmental value corresponds to that of associated with a
feature detector, we set the corresponding neuron activation state to a value of
one. Otherwise the activation states of each neuron are set to zero.
In addition, at the start of each trial, we randomly select a reward state,
that corresponds to one specific combination of feature detection outputs. When
the feature detectors indicate that the environment state corresponds to this
particular combination of values (one from each domain), we assume the existence
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Figure 8.12: Simple experiment demonstrating energy savings: Here we
assume that there exist two sets of neurons intended for use in feature detection;
Domain A (e.g. taste) and Domain B (e.g. colour). The role of the output
neuron is to act as feature detector that is sensitive to the combination of inputs
that results in a reward. The reward signal has two effects; it adjusts weights
to increase sensitivity to the beneficial inputs, and down-regulates the excitation
factor of the input layer neurons over repeated reward signals.
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of a reward signal. Given the values chose, this corresponds to approximately 10
rewards in a trial comprising 5,000 simulation iterations.
The output-layer corresponds to a single neuron. In contrast to conventional
formulations we associate a synaptic weight with each of the possible combinations
of outputs from the input layer (see figure 8.12), rather than a single weight
per input layer neuron output. The goal of the experiment is to adjust the
weights of the output neuron so that it detects the particular feature combinations
that correspond to a reward, whilst at the same time reducing the total energy
dissipated in the transmission of data from the input-layer to the output neuron.
Initially we set the excitation values of the input-layer to 0.5, and the weight
values to 0.5.
8.4.2 Solution: A two layer network comprising Rayleigh
neurons
In solving this problem we devise two simple mechanisms that; to regulate weights
so as to detect the reward feature whilst down-regulating the excitation of neu-
rons. The essential features correspond to that of our prior discussions where we
down-regulate the excitation of source neurons whilst increasing the receptivity of
the target neurons. In this case the source neurons correspond to the input-layer
and the target neuron corresponds to the single output neuron.
8.4.2.1 Excitation down-regulation
Every time that a reward pattern is detected, we reduce the excitation factor of
the input layer neurons (representing feature detectors) according to the formula;
xr+1 = xr − α(xr − xb) (8.9)
where xr corresponds to input layer neuron excitation value at the simulation
iteration that a reward r is delivered, xr+1 corresponds to the new excitation
value, xb corresponds to some base level below which we do not want the excitation
factor to drop (taken in our case to be 0.25), and α which determines the rate at
which the excitation values change (taken in our case to be 0.33). Simply put,
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every time the reward pattern is detected, we reduce the current excitation factor
(α)by a value that corresponds to a third of the difference between the current
excitation value and the base level xb. As this difference tends to zero, so does
the change in the excitation factor.
8.4.2.2 Weight adjustment
The weight adjustment that takes place in the inputs to the output neuron when
a reward is detected, comprising to simple processes. The first is to increase
the weight of those inputs that were high relative to the average input, and to
decrease the weights of those inputs that contributed less than the average input.
In the former case, we limit the weight to a maximum value of 1.0, and in the
latter case we limit the minimum value to zero. When a reward signal is triggered,
we first calculate the average input value v across all input combinations, based
on current input weights w and outputs z from the input layer. Note that the
values for z are calculated using equation 8.6, where z corresponds to the firing
probability of the Rayleigh neurons that constitute the input layer. Note that
the activation value y is set directly as one or zero depending upon whether or
not the feature has been detected and xt represents the excitation factor used in
equation 8.6.
v =
N∑
n=1
wn(zj + zk))
N
(8.10)
In this case N corresponds simply to the total number of combinations of
input from the input-layer (in this example 4), wn corresponds to the weight for
a specific input combination (indexed by n). For a given combination n the values
of j and k are chosen so that we have a unique combination of inputs from the
two sensor domains A and B. Once we have this average value v we adjust the
weights according to;
wr+1n = w
r
n + β(1.0− wrn) where wn(zj + zk) > v, (8.11)
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and
wr+1n = w
r
n − βwrn where wn(zj + zk) < v. (8.12)
The value β determines how quickly the weights are adjusted, in our case we
took β to have a value of 0.5. The consequence of this weight update rule is that
weights for reward combinations increase to 1.0 whilst other weights decline to
zero. Note that this update only takes place when a reward has been signalled.
In addition to this weight update rule, we employ a second mechanism to en-
sure that the activation state of the output neuron is always 1.0 when the reward
combination input is signalled. It is this second mechanism that ensures that the
output neuron allows generates a high value when the reward input combination
is activated, irrespective of the absolute levels of the input combinations. It is
this mechanism in particular that compensates for a the decline in output values
of the input layer in response to reduced levels of activation. The mechanism
itself is quite simple, we just normalize individual input values (from different
combinations) such that the cumulative value across all inputs sums to 1.0.
8.4.3 Results and discussion
The results of these simulations are shown in table 8.1. The table illustrates the
average output level of the input-layer neurons over 5,000 time periods, shown for
5 independent trials. When we use our strategy to down-regulate the excitation
factors of the output layer over the course of multiple rewards, we can see that
the average activation level is 0.062. This compares will a figure of 0.105 if we fail
to down-regulate excitation levels. Assuming a linear correspondence between
average activation levels and energy dissipation, then our approach results in a
reduction of energy expenditure by approximately 40 percent. Without
any down-regulation of excitation values, we maintain excitation factors of the
input layer at 0.5, however with regulation we are able to reduce the excitation
factor from 0.5 to 0.25 whilst ensuring that the output neuron registers all reward
combinations. Whilst this toy experiment is very simple, it shows that potential
energy savings from such adaptive processes could well be quite considerable.
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Table 8.1: Input-Layer Output: Average Activation Levels
Run Index 1 2 3 4 5 Averages
Num Rewards 8 10 9 11 10 9.6
No Regulation 0.106 0.105 0.105 0.103 0.104 (a) 0.105
With Regulation 0.057 0.057 0.066 0.052 0.077 (b) 0.062
8.5 A Basic Circuit exhibiting Tri-Mode Action
Selection
On considering the properties of the neuron model, the idea arose that it might
help us to solve the exploration problem identified with the conceptual model
developed in chapter 7. Whilst we wish to bias action selection choices to path-
ways that have been demonstrated leading to a primary reward, if we have yet to
encounter a reward, we need to explore action selection options in some stochas-
tic fashion. At this point, we temporarily depart form our dopamine modelling
attempts, and see how this might help us solve the more general problem of state
space exploration through stochastic selection, whilst allowing for prioritisation
of option choices that lead to rewards, once rewards have been discovered.
8.5.1 Selection-Exploration-Exclusion
Initially we imagined a dummy experiment comprising a virtual world with a
mobile agent. The world comprises 5 locations. By visiting work, the agent
can earn money, which would allow the agent to buy food, which they could
take home, and eat. Thus eliciting a primary reward. The agent would have
explicit sensors for each location, state sensors for money and food, together with
indications if the different locations were open or close, and finally an indicator of
whether or not it was day or night. Whilst this virtual world concept might seem
overly complex, the basic idea is very simple. We want to imagine how the agent
would initially randomly explore this world, before subsequently biasing action
selection choices to those which would increase the likelihood of the primary
reward being attained in subsequent actions. We then relate this to the Neuron
Model outlined above.
247
8. New Model
The results of this thought experiment are shown in Figures 8.13 and 8.14.
The key conceptual result of this, was that three modes of activity naturally
emerge from this scenario. An intermediate neuron, is created initially when
the primary reward (eating food at home) is first experienced. Despite excita-
tion being gradually reduced after repeated rewards, the intermediate node still
supports three distinct selection modes; selection, exploration and exclusion.
When the same sensor pattern associated with the primary reward is discovered
the corresponding action is strongly selected (selection). When the sensor pat-
terns only partially match the those associated with the reward, the output of
the intermediate neuron is weak, such that any of the actions could be randomly
explored. Finally, when there is no match at all to the reward associated sen-
sor pattern, the specific action associated with the reward is excluded (as its
reduced excitation state ensures that its output is less than that of all the other
neurons ).
8.5.2 Basic Circuit
The simplest system that we can imagine is one which has exogenous inputs (
which will call sensor neurons), outputs ( which we will term motor neurons), with
a single action selection neuron, that supports a winner-takes-all comparison of
the signal outputs of the motor neurons. When a reward is discovered, we create
an intermediate neuron which has connections with the sensor neurons that were
active when the motor neuron was selected. Since we are not able to prejudge how
many sensor inputs need to be active either singly or in concert with other sensor
neurons to achieve the reward, it is necessary to create a combination of inputs,
whenever a primary reward is attained. The next chapter investigates whether or
not this implementation is capable of supporting the three action selection modes
which are characteristic of the thought experiment described in section 8.5.1.
The basic circuit is illustrated in figure 8.15. The left of figure 8.15 illus-
trates a simple circuit prior any reward adaptation. The architecture incorporates
(square)‘sensor’ neurons on the left, followed by (round) ‘motor’ neurons, which
innervate a single (square) action selection neuron. The centre section of figure
8.15 shows the changes that occur after a primary reward has been attained. In-
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Figure 8.13: Tri-State Mode Initial Adaptation:(Top) A primary reward is
detected when the agent arrives home with food. (Middle) In response an inter-
mediate is created, initially with the default (high) excitation state. (Bottom)
Over subsequent trials, repeated success results in a gradual reduction in the
intermediate node’s excitation factor. Input Sensor Abbreviations: H, Home;
W, Work; P, Park; M, Money; F, Food; E, Energy; S, Day or Night. Output
Abbreviations: E, Eat; S, Sleep; W, Work; M, Move.
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Figure 8.14: Tri-State Mode Circuit at Run-Time: At run-time we see three
firing patterns, corresponding to three modes selection, exploration and ex-
clusion. (Top) If there is a strong sensor pattern match with that of the primary
reward, the intermediate neuron ensures that the ‘eat’ action is selected, despite
the fact that its excitation state is low. (Middle) With a partial mismatch, the
intermediate neuron cannot compete with the other inputs, and stochastic ex-
ploration ensues. (Bottom) A reward pattern mismatch, will result in a very low
firing rate for the intermediate neuron, ensuring that the ‘eat’ action is excluded
from consideration. Stochastic selection takes place amongst the remaining op-
tions. Input Sensor Abbreviations: H, Home; W, Work; P, Park; M, Money; F,
Food; E, Energy; S, Day or Night. Output Abbreviations: E, Eat; S, Sleep; W,
Work; M, Move.)
250
8. New Model
termediate neurons are created, one for each combination of high sensor inputs
that are associated with the successful motor action. The right of 8.15 shows how
the circuit appears after a number of rewards have been detected under differing
action selection sequences. The number of input combinations increases, cre-
ating multiple intermediate neurons. This will occur when there are alternative
routes to attaining the reward, or where the reward is neutral to certain arbitrary
actions.
The process of intermediate node formation is illustrated in more detail in
figure 8.16. We create intermediate neurons dynamically every time a primary
reward is detected. The sensor neurons that were ‘high’, when the consequences
of the selected action (determined by the winning motor neuron) results in a
reward, are linked to the winning motor neuron by intermediate neurons. The
intermediate nodes will accumulate as sensor signals that have no predictive power
are mistakenly associated with the reward. In our implementation, care is taken
to ensure that multiple combinations are not duplicated. Note that in the middle
diagram, we create connections which relate to an alternative motor choice. This
could only happen if two motor actions resulted in a primary reward signal (i.e.
the actions were equivalent in their outcome).
Note that the intermediate nodes as they are presented hear are generated al-
gorithmically. This is not intended to be representative of the dynamic creation
of intermediate neurons or interneurons (although we might use that term) in
biological systems. Local neurons are interconnected via disperse dendritic trees,
such that any single arbitrary combination of source neurons have at some level, a
corresponding communication channel that in some sense represents a combined
signal to a target neuron. Representing such associations between a large number
of neurons in software would be prohibitive in both memory and computational
costs. Rather we limit ourselves to the simulation of combinations that are im-
plicitly related to the attainment of a reward. Whilst we generated these ’inter-
mediate’ nodes algorithmically, the biological analogue is of some strengthening
of a combinatorial signal pathway that already has some physical manifestation.
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Figure 8.15: Circuit Basic Idea: (Left) Our simple circuit starts with
(square)‘sensor’ neurons on the left, followed by (round) ‘motor’ neurons, which
innervate a single (square) action selection neuron. (Middle) When a primary
reward is attained, intermediate neurons are created, one for each combination of
high sensor inputs that are associated with the successful motor action. (Right)
After a number of simulations the number of possible input combinations in-
crease, creating multiple intermediate neurons. This may occur as a sensor input
that was high when a primary reward was experience may not be invariant with
respect to primary reward elicitation (i.e. it is falsely associated with a selected
action).
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Figure 8.16: Circuit Intermediate Node Formation: We create intermediate
neurons dynamically every time a primary reward is detected. The sensor neu-
rons that were ‘high’, when the consequences of the selected action (determined
by the winning motor neuron) results in a reward, are linked to the winning mo-
tor neuron by intermediate neurons. The intermediate nodes will accumulate as
sensor signals that have no predictive power are mistakenly associated with the
Reward. In our implementation, care is taken to ensure that multiple combina-
tions are not duplicated. Note that in the middle diagram, we create connections
which relate to an alternative motor choice. This could only happen if two motor
actions resulted in a primary reward signal (i.e. the actions were equivalent).
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Chapter 9
Simulation Environment for
Reward Adaptive Circuits
9.1 Introduction
This section describes the common experimental set-up used for the purposes of
exploring the incremental adaptation of simple circuits based on the proposed
neuron model. Before doing this, some details of the Agent and Neural Graph
Library for simulations are presented. This library forms the basis not only of
the neural network models, but is also used to support the agent simulations.
9.2 Agent and Neural Graph Library for Simu-
lations
The Lemon Graph library is a mature C++ library of classes written at the
Etvs Lornd University, Budapest and at the Budapest University of Technology
and Economics. The Lemon Graph library has at its core; nodes and arcs, with
the ability to assign arbitrary data values to each. It supports many common
graph algorithms such as; connectivity, shortest path and max-flow algorithms.
Although we do not use this functionality, it is conceivable that it could be of
some value in the future. We only make use of the graph data structure and the
ability to programmatically create nodes and define links between them.
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For our purposes the library underwent major augmentation to support sets,
groups, and simulation classes. Nodes that share common features or properties
can be aggregated as a group. A new graph class allows for the (hierarchic) inser-
tion of groups into set’s. A top-level set represents a domain. A node may have
simultaneous representations in multiple groups, sets or domains. These abstrac-
tions provide us with a rich vocabulary for building agent based simulations.
The simulation class incorporates one or more geographies, and one or more
populations. Each population member has a brain. A geography is a set of loca-
tion nodes, where arcs represent routes or paths in a spatial domain. A population
is a set of agent nodes, where arcs represent relationships (e.g. genetic, social or
economic) between agents. A brain is a set of neuron nodes, where arcs repre-
sent neuronal connections. The current implementation has been developed to
investigate reinforcement learning algorithms in single agents. The functionality
of the Lemon graph library is available throughout, with support for the dynamic
deletion and creation of nodes.
The simulation class also supports the concept of assets or endowments.
Agents (population nodes) visiting a location (a geographic node) are able to
acquire an asset or endowment. This asset or endowment is carried by the agent
to subsequent locations. The brain of each agent has sensors (neural nodes) for
these assets (and locations) such that neuron state elicits changes in motor state.
It is the motor state at the end of simulation period which determines subsequent
changes in agent location. The ‘brain’ domain allows us to implement adaptive
algorithms for agent behaviour modification.
The simulation class represents one implementation of a set of algorithms that
operate on members of sets and groups over graphs. The separation of simulation
functionality from the underlying classes that implement graph, group, set and
endowment concepts supports the highly flexible composition of agent simulation
implementations.
9.3 Simulation set-up
This section describes the simulation environment used to test the features of
model circuits. It has as its features;
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1. A graph of locations, which constitute a geography.
2. An agent that is able to visit locations in the geography; either moving to
another location or staying in the same place at each simulation time step.
3. Items are situated at some locations which correspond to assets, one of
which is reward asset. By visiting an asset location, the agent acquires the
asset.
4. An asset exchange policy exists, such that if an agent visits an asset loca-
tion whilst already owning an asset of another type, the asset type that is
associated with the location will replace the current asset possessed by the
agent.
5. One location is specified as the home location.
6. On returning to the home location whilst in possession of a reward asset, the
agent will receive a reward. All assets possessed by the agent on returning
to the home location, will then be deemed to be consumed.
7. Each agent possesses a brain, which comprises a graph of neurons, which is
used by the agent to determine which location to visit next.
9.3.1 Geography
The computer application that supports this simulation has parameters that con-
trol the total number of Geographic locations, and the total number of asset lo-
cations. There is only ever one home location, and there is only ever one reward
asset location. As we increase the number of Geographic locations, the average
reward received by an agent making random location selections will decline. Sim-
ilarly, as the number of asset locations increases, the average expected reward
rate also declines. The greater the number of asset locations, the higher the
probability an agent visiting a random location would lose any reward asset that
may be in their possession (due to the asset exchange policy).
Figure 9.1 shows two geographies. The top graph corresponds to a world with
a total of 6 locations. This comprises 1 home location, 2 asset locations (one of
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which is a reward asset location), and 3 Empty locations. The lower graph depicts
a geography comprising a total of 10 locations, comprising; 1 home location, 1
reward asset location, 3 other asset locations, and 5 empty locations.
9.3.2 Agents and Assets
As mentioned earlier, there is one asset location where a reward asset is located.
By visiting this location, and returning to the home location, the agent receives a
reward. Note that if an agent possesses the reward asset, but then visits a different
asset location, it will lose the reward asset, as the asset exchange policy ensures
that the new (worthless) asset replaces the existing reward asset. However, the
asset locations are deemed to be inexhaustible, such that whenever an agent
returns to an asset location, there will always be a new asset (irrespective of the
loss of a prior asset from this location). Figure 9.2 shows examples of successful
and unsuccessful paths through the world. In the top graph the solid arrows
show direct paths by which the agent may receive the reward. From any location
the agent can visit the reward asset location, and then in its next step go to the
home location. There are also indirect routes by which the agent may receive and
reward (examples of which are shown with dotted lines in the top graph). If an
agent visits the reward asset location, and then visits any other location avoiding
any other asset locations before returning to the home location, then the agent
receives a reward. Such paths we will term indirect paths. In the bottom graph,
we are illustrating the case where even after visiting the reward asset location, by
stopping at another asset location, the agent loses the reward asset. Returning
to the home location will not result in the agent receiving a reward.
9.3.3 Brain
The brain circuit is based on that outlined in the previous chapter. We have a
graph comprising a number of nodes, each of which corresponds to a neuron. See
figure 9.3 for a schematic diagram of the brain. There are three major Neuron
types; input(sensor), output (motor), intermediate, and action selection. The
sensor neurons have two sub-types. The first sub-type is the location sensor.
There is one sensor for each location in the world which is ‘high’ when the agent
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Figure 9.1: Simulation World geographies: (Top) A geography with a total
of 6 locations. This comprises 1 home location, 2 asset locations (one of which
is a reward asset location), and 3 empty locations. (Bottom) A geography
comprising a total of 10 locations, comprising; 1 home location, 1 reward asset
location, 3 other asset locations, and 5 empty locations.
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Figure 9.2: Successful and Unsuccessful Reward Paths: (Top) The solid
lines show direct paths that lead to a reward, the dotted lines show indirect paths,
by which the agent is also able to acquire the reward. (Bottom) If the agent
visits another asset location, whilst possessing a reward asset (acquired at L1),
they lose the reward asset. Returning to the home location in this case will not
elicit a reward.
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Figure 9.3: Basic brain Schematic: (Top) Here we can see an optimal brain,
where; sL1 corresponds to the reward asset location sensor neuron, sE0 corre-
sponds to the reward asset type, and m0 corresponds to the motor neuron that
selects the home location as the next destination. Subsequently, if the agent is at
location L0, or it possesses the asset E0, the m0 motor neuron will be strongly
activated, ensuring that at the next step, the agent returns to the home location,
and receives a reward.(Bottom) With the existing circuit model, it is possible
for false associations to be made. If the sL4 location sensor is active, this will
tend to activate the m0 motor neuron, biasing the agent to returning to the home
location. This will not result in a reward.
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Figure 9.4: Indirect Reward Paths Create False Associations: (Top) Here
the agent does not take the direct path ( solid line ), but the indirect path (dotted
line), before arriving at the home location whilst in possession of the reward asset.
(Bottom) The intermediate neurons i0, and i2 are created as a consequence. The
location sensor sL4 has an input to both these neurons. This means that a bias
will be created to activate m0, after visiting location L4, irrespective of whether
or not the agent possesses the reward asset.
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is at a location that corresponds to the sensor. The second sub-type is the asset
sensor. There is one asset sensor for each asset type in the World. There is no
specific sensor for the reward asset, as the type of the reward asset is unknown
to the agent. The motor neurons compete for the decision as to which location
should be visited next. There is, as a consequence, one motor neuron per world
location. The role of the Action Selection neuron is simply to look at each of the
motor neurons, and determine which has the highest output. The motor neuron
with the highest output at each simulation step, determines which location that
will be visited next. The Model Neuron described in the prior chapter is used for
the motor neuron.
Each time the agent receives a reward, new neurons are created. These are
the intermediate neurons (or nodes). When a reward is detected (by the agent
returning home, whilst in possession of the reward asset), those sensor neurons
that were high, when the successful motor neuron was selected, are connected
to the motor neuron by Intermediate nodes. The Intermediate nodes created,
correspond to one for each sensor neuron combination, comprising a power-set
of all connection combinations between the high sensor neurons and the selected
motor neuron.
Note one important aspect of the model. When a reward is received by the
agent, the excitation factor of the winning motor neuron can be adjusted. Down-
regulation will on subsequent simulation runs, have the effect of inhibiting the
output of this motor neuron, compared to other competing neurons (thus resulting
in the exclusion of this action choice). Unless the inputs to this neuron are
sufficiently activated, it will lose in competition against motor neurons with no
input Intermediate nodes. If the input signals to the motor neuron are high
enough, then the output of this motor neuron will be higher than the other
motor neurons, ensuring that the corresponding action is taken. This corresponds
to the selection mode in our tri-state mode selection model described in the
previous chapter. Note that in the initial stages, prior to any reward being
received, all motor neurons compete stochastically, resulting in exploration of the
action selection options. This results in the world being explored. Even after a
reward has been received, (unless the inputs to the prior winning motor neuron
are substantially high), exploration takes place between the non-winning motor
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neurons, as their excitation factors remain high. Thus, even after a reward has
been received, exploration will still take place.
Figure 9.4 shows how false associations can be made. An agent could arrive at
the home location, possessing the reward asset by an indirect path. In doing so, a
set of Intermediate nodes will be created whose inputs comprise a combination of
the sEO (asset sensor for the reward asset) and sL4 (location sensor for location
L4). Thus, a false association will be made between location L4, and the motor
neuron m0 that selects the home location L0, as the next action.
Finally it is worth mentioning that we do not explicitly model the signally
that takes place in dopaminergic neurons. The adaptation that takes place in the
dynamic creation of neuron connections and the adjustment of neuronal excitation
values are deemed to be implicit effects of dopamine modulation.
9.3.4 Simulation Application
Figure 9.5 shows a schematic of the simulation loop. Figure 9.6 shows a screen
shot of the simulation application. Key features of the simulation application
include certain real-time visualization features;
• Neuron activation state, and input weights.
• Dynamic creation of new intermediate neurons and connections.
• Automatic layout of new circuit configurations.
• graphs of dopamine tonic and phasic activity.
• Numeric display of neuron inputs and Outputs.
• Neuron oriented: connections coloured by activation state, internal neuron
state coloured.
• Connection oriented: neuron weights and activation states coloured in the
connections view.
In addition to this we have the facility to;
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• set simulation breaks, so that we can inspect the network on reward triggers.
• carry out batch simulations automatically.
• allow the user to adjust all simulation parameters from the parameter grid.
• generate all simulation and batch metrics and have them displayed in the
results grid.
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Figure 9.5: Simulation Schematic
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Figure 9.6: Simulation Application Screen Shot: (Top) Here we have a
screen-shot of the simulation Application. Network state is displayed in real time
in OpenGL windows (the screen-shot is shown in inverted grey-scale in print, in
colour in pdf format).(Bottom) Here we have a schematic that shows the function
of each window in the screen-shot.
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9.3.5 Incremental Changes
Whilst this chapter describes the essential features of the simulation environment
and the characteristics of Intermediate node creation, its description is limited to
that of the basic circuit outlined in the previous chapter. The next chapter seeks
to make incremental changes to the basic circuit, and through simulation show
how these incremental changes result in enhanced fitness of the agent.
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Model architectures and results
10.1 Introduction
This chapter describes a number of circuit architectures based on our new neuron
model. We start with a very simple network structure, and through incremental
changes develop increasingly complex structures. Through simulations that em-
ploy the world model described in the previous chapter, we are able to identify
the functional characteristics of these circuits. The direction of the incremental
changes in circuit complexity represent a manual exploration of circuit variants
that could be parametrized for the purposes of supporting evolutionary search;
the number of layers in each circuit, and the particular algorithm used for adapt-
ing the network on receiving a reward. The ‘fitness’ of each circuit variant relates
to essentially the same task, that of exploring a number of action selection op-
tions, and based on the presentation of a reward signal, exhibiting adaptation
that biases future actions in favour of repeating those that have historically been
associated with the discovery of the reward. This allows us to compare the relative
strengths of each circuit using a common base.
The simulation environment consists of 6 locations, comprising; 2 asset loca-
tions (one of which is the reward asset location), 1 home location and 3 empty
locations. The output of the action selection neuron (a common feature of all the
circuits), corresponds to the result of a ‘winner-takes-all’ algorithm, determining
subsequent agent movement. More complete details of the simulation task are
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described in the chapter 9. Note that all figures in this chapter that depict neu-
ral networks (other than the schematic illustrated in figure 10.3 that depicts the
architecture of a delta unit) represent results generated as part of a simulation
run.
10.2 Incremental Stages
10.2.1 Stage 1: Single Layer
This is the basic circuit described in chapter 6. It incorporates input (‘sensor’)
neurons, output (‘motor’) neurons, intermediate neurons created as a result of a
rewards. The intermediate nodes are created dynamically, and associate sensor
states with the winning motor neuron when a primary reward is detected. A single
action selection neuron uses a winner-takes-all algorithm to select the winning
motor neuron at each time step. Subsequent agent movement is determined by
this winning neuron.
By default, we implement a primitive failed-expectation algorithm that reduces
the weights of the inputs to the winning motor neuron, when its activation failed
to result in an anticipated reward. All weights start at 1.0. The weight reduction
factor is arbitrarily chosen to be 0.5. On a failed expectation, new motor input
weights are calculated by multiplying the input signal with this weight reduction
factor for each input to the winning motor neuron. In the summary section,
results are shown with and without this failed-expectation weight modification.
10.2.2 Stage 2: Dual Layer
The Dual Layer model corresponds to a duplication of the input stage of the basic
circuit model. sensor neurons are duplicated. intermediate neurons are created
via the same process as that which governs the creation of intermediate neurons
in the basic circuit. Duplicate intermediate neurons are created, one for each
combination of the active sensor-motor pairs, when a reward is received. Two
examples of Dual Layer circuits are shown in figure 10.1.
At face value, such an exercise may seem to have little value. However, it
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is of interest to us as unit duplication is seen as potentially one of the key pro-
cesses by which evolution in the brain takes place through mutation (Striedter
[2005]). Our goal was to see what impact, if any, this has on the fitness of the
agent. Specifically we are interested to see whether or not a duplication of in-
put units interferes with the functional operation of the basic circuit. If it does
not, then we have a potential evolutionary pathway, by which the basic circuit
can undergo complexification, as an intermediate step towards the more complex
circuits described later in this chapter.
10.2.3 Stage 3: Temporal Units
If we have a circuit that comprises duplicate sensor units, we can imagine a muta-
tion whereby the output of one sensor unit, becomes the input of the duplicated
sensor unit. With a suitable latching signal we could generate a memory buffer
capable of storing sequential sensor patterns. This is the idea behind our tempo-
ral unit circuit. We simply latch the contents of the current sensor inputs into
a secondary sensor unit at the termination of each simulation interval. When a
reward signal is detected we see the creation of two sets of intermediate nodes.
The first set of intermediate nodes connects the current active sensor units with
the current winning motor neuron. The second set of intermediate nodes connects
the prior active sensor units with the prior winning motor neuron. Two examples
of circuits incorporating these features are shown in figure 10.2.
10.2.4 Stage 4: Delta Units
Two examples of circuits incorporating a delta unit are shown in figure 10.5. Once
we have an arrangement of duplicate sensor units, whose contents are temporally
delayed we can consider a further adaptations. Let us assume that some state
variable exists that acts of a metric of the number of times that an individual
sensor neuron is active when its associated motor neuron elicits a reward. As-
sociations are captured by the intermediate nodes that are created in response
initially to the detection of a primary reward. By comparing this metric for all
sensor inputs associated with a winning motor neuron, we are able to identify
which of the inputs appear to contribute most significantly to the activation of
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Figure 10.1: Stage 2: Dual Layer (Top) A Dual-Layer circuit with false as-
sociations ( dotted lines). (Bottom) A Dual-Layer circuit, corresponding to the
optimal single layer circuit. The agent chooses to return to the home location
L0, when either in possession of a reward asset or being at the L1 location. The
signals provided by the Dual-Layer versus the Single Layer circuit are redundant,
however agent fitness is broadly similar.
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Figure 10.2: Satge 3: Temporal Units (Top) Here we have two sensor Units.
The lower sensor Unit has inputs that are current. The upper sensor Unit has
inputs that are delayed. We can see that the temporal unit has made a false
association with the m5 motor neuron, however this does not irrevocably damage
performance. (Bottom) A more efficient example of the same circuit is shown
here. All the temporal unit outputs lead to the selection of the m1 motor
neuron. This corresponds to a movement to location L1, where the reward asset
is located. The result of this is that the agent enters a loop, going from the home
location ( at L0) to the reward location L1, and back again.
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the winning motor neuron that successfully elicits a reward. Let us call these
sensor neurons, significant sensors.
The next key step, is to generate a signal that is activated when we see a
transition in the output of one of these significant sensors from zero to one. This
signal is responded to as if it was a reward signal in itself. We term this an
“implied reward” or Conditioned Stimulus trigger. This “implied reward” or
Conditioned Stimulus trigger can then be used in place of the primary reward
signal, to trigger the creation of intermediate nodes.
In the basic circuit, a primary reward signal elicits the generation of inter-
mediate nodes that associate the current sensor state, with the winning motor
neuron. In the temporal form, a primary reward signal elicits the same response.
In addition, associations are also created which link the prior sensor states, with
the prior winning motor neuron, to create in effect associations which support a
sequence of motor activations.
The delta unit form of the circuit responds in a similar fashion to that of the
basic circuit in its response to the first instance of a primary reward. However,
we do not use additional sensor buffer stores for storing sequential data. What
we do is to detect when we have a positive state in one of the significant sensor
neurons. We then use this as an implicit reward signal to trigger the creation
of intermediate nodes that associate the winning motor neuron that precipitated
this transition, with the sensor neurons that were active contemporaneously. The
effect of these newly created intermediate nodes will be to bias future motor
selection in favour of actions result in the activation of one of the significant
sensors. Whose activation in turn, promotes the motor action associated with
the primary reward.
The temporal unit form of the circuit is effective at learning motor actions
that should be executed in sequence (depending upon prevailing sensor inputs)
for the attainment of a prior reward. In contrast, the delta unit form responds to
significant sensor inputs, irrespective of whether or not the sensor was activated
immediately prior to eliciting the primary reward, or multiple time periods before
this. It does not respond to the strict time or sequence order in which sensor
signals are activated. Rather it responds to the average contribution to a primary
reward that sensor neuron elicits, and seeks to bias actions towards repeating the
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activation of this significant sensor neuron. This circuit form is ideally suited to
creating sensor-motor associations when prior actions contribute to a reward, but
do not necessarily have to take place in a strict temporal sequence..
A schematic for this circuit is shown in figure 10.3.
This circuit modification is motivated by the phenomena observed in dopamine
signalling where the peak of activity migrates from the primary reward to that
of the prior Conditioned Stimulus. The results of this effect can be seen in fig-
ure 10.4. In the terminology of our model, we imagine that after stabilization of
weights associated with the primary reward, a mechanism exists, whereby changes
to the inputs of the sensor neurons associated with the selection of the primary
reward, themselves trigger a Delta Signal. The Delta Signal itself triggers the cre-
ation of intermediate neurons as if a primary reward signal had been generated.
In this case however, we are creating associations between the motor neuron that
elicited changes to the primary sensor Unit key neurons, and the sensor inputs
that were active when this motor unit was triggered.
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Figure 10.3: Delta Unit Schematic: Initially a primary reward signal asso-
ciates the winning motor neuron, with combinations of the sensor neurons that
were active when the reward was triggered. This is done through the creation of
the intermediate nodes connected to the primary sensor Unit. After a period of
adaptation, the weights of the inputs to the motor neuron m0 will stabilize. The
inputs that make the greatest contribution to the selection of this motor neuron,
are monitored by a delta sensor. The delta sensor generates the delta signal
that stimulates the creation of intermediate neurons, in a fashion analogous to
that of the primary reward Signal.
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Figure 10.4: dopamine phasic activation shifts to the earliest event in
a reward chainThe charts correspond to time binned histograms of dopamine
phasic activity in three seperate experiments. Both the instruction and trigger
correspond to conditioned stimuli. What is important to note, but what is not
shown here, is that for a transient period high activation levels are coincident with
both the reward presentation and the presentation of the conditioned stimulus.
Source Schultz [1998].
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Figure 10.5: Stage 4: Delta Units (Top) A reward circuit with a primary
sensor Unit (lower) and a Delta sensor Unit (Upper) A false association is shown
with a dotted line. (Bottom) This corresponds to an optimal solution, but
contrasts significantly with that of the temporal unit circuit, in that very few
connections are made. The delta unit has identified a single sufficient sensor
condition to ensure that the agent Loops between the home location at L0 and
the reward location at L1.
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10.3 Results Summary
The results are summarized in Tables 10.1 and 10.2, together with the schematic
shown in figure 10.6. These represent the result of 30 trials for each circuit type,
with each trial comprising 250 simulation iterations. The schematic shown in
figure 10.6 is indicative of potential dimensions of evolutionary exploration, such
as; the number of ‘layers’ in a circuit, and the reward adaptation algorithm used
(e.g. for strict temporal sequence learning, or delayed rewards).
The maximum theoretical average reward score is 0.5. This corresponds to
an action sequence forming a loop between the home location and the reward
location, which results in 1 reward for every two simulation steps. The average
reward due to the random selection of actions at each iteration is 0.06. We use
this value as our base value for converting average reward values to relative fitness
values; an average reward value of 0.06 corresponds to a relative fitness value of
1.0.
The delta unit circuit form yields the highest average reward value of 0.38,
a relative fitness value of 6.3 ( i.e. the delta unit form yields rewards 6.3 times
greater than that which would be achieved due to random action selection). This
is shown as entry (f) in table 10.1, where the excitation factor of the motor neuron
remains unchanged at a value of 0.5 even after a reward has been attained. The
delta unit average reward corresponds to 76 percent of the maximum theoretical
value. In considering the complexity of the circuits generated ( see figures 10.1,
10.2 and 10.5), we can see that the delta unit generates the simplest networks.
Table 10.2 compares results where we adjust the weights of an input to the
motor neuron due to a failed expectation. This was initially thought to be a
useful feature of the model circuit, but the results indicate that it does not have
a substantial effect in this set of experiments. Whilst it is generally beneficial,
it marginally reduces the total fitness of the delta unit that has an excitation
of 0.47. By inspection the reason appears to be that false associations result in
the agent returning to the home location, even when not in possession of the
reward asset. Whilst this may appear to have a negative impact, this increases
the probability of the agent arriving at the home location. From there, prior
associations ensure that the agent returns to the reward location. Under these
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circumstances, returning early to the home location does not have a negative
impact on the average rewards attained.
Changes to the excitation factor of the winning motor neurons (when im-
plicated in a reward sequence) did not the anticipated effect. We hypothesized
that when a motor neuron is implicated in a reward sequence, a reduction in
its excitation factor would help to ensure that it would be excluded from future
action selections unless its inputs were strongly activated. It was imagined that
this would support a more efficient exploration of available action choices under
circumstances where exploration of the choice of actions was in some sense in-
complete. Whilst the logic of this hypothesis remains valid, the results for the
temporal unit form of the circuit show that this can reduce the average reward
payout. The optimal solution is one which forms the smallest loop between the
home location and the path that visits all the reward locations necessary to trig-
ger the primary reward. Whilst the temporal unit is able to discover the action
sequence that leads to the reward, there is no automatic closure of the loop. Clo-
sure of the loop requires that the action selected from the home location ensures
that the agent returns to the start of action sequence that results in triggering the
primary reward. Whilst it is possible for the temporal unit to discover this loop
closure ( assuming that there are sufficient layers in the temporal buffer), this typ-
ically does not take place at the very first attainment of the primary reward, since
it is achieved through random discovery. It is only due to subsequent exploration
from the home location that this loop closure takes place. Let us now consider
two cases where an initial primary reward has been attained ( resulting in circuit
adaptation that will increase the probability of the same reward action sequence
being repeated), but the loop has yet to be close. In the first case denoted by (a)
in table 10.1), the excitation factors of the motor neuron nodes implicated in the
reward chain are reduced from 0.5 to 0.45. Initially from the home location, no
strong association exists that will ensure that we return to the start of the reward
sequence. Random action selection from the home location could therefore result
in the agent visiting a location that is not involved in the reward chain. How-
ever, once this occurs, given that the excitation factors of those motor neurons
that are implicated in the reward chain are down-regulated, those actions which
result in a return to the home location are inhibited. This can result in a reduce
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probability of returning to the home location, and discovering the Loop closure.
Let us compare this with that of (b) in table 10.1, where the motor neurons ex-
citation remains unchanged at 0.5, even after it is implicated in a reward chain.
Under these circumstances, the probability of re-visiting the home location from
an arbitrary node that has no pre-existing associations is as high as it is for any
other node. This ensures that the motor activity that results in a return home
location is not excluded from the exploratory process. This increases the chance
of returning to the home location, and from there, discovering the action selection
choice which results in a closure of the optimal reward path, creating a loop. The
effect of down-regulating motor neuron excitability in this case, works against the
discovery of this optimal path. Similarly, a significant reduction in the excitation
factor of the motor neuron, when implicated in a reward sequence, also reduces
the average reward in the case of the delta unit form or the circuit.
In conclusion, both the delta and temporal circuit formats yield respectable
results, 75 percent and 66 percent respectively respectively. 100 percent is not
attainable since there is a necessary period of exploration required to discover
the optimum reward path. However, the optimal results are achieved without
the need for the down-regulation of motor neuron excitation levels.
The primitive Single and Dual-Layer circuits ( as a reminder the Dual-Layer
form is simple a redundant duplication of the Single-Layer form) attain lower
levels of relative fitness. However, such circuits could act as intermediary steps
in the emergence of the temporal and delta circuit forms, from an evolutionary
perspective since still improve relative fitness despite their simplicity.
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Table 10.1: Summary of Circuit Fitness
Circuit Avg. reward Rel. Fitness
Random 0.06 1.0
Single-Layer 0.15 2.6
Dual-Layer 0.13 2.3
(a) Temporal (Ex. 0.45) 0.21 3.6
(b) Temporal (Ex. 0.47) 0.33 5.8
(c) Temporal (Ex. 0.50) 0.33 5.8
(d) Delta (Ex. 0.45) 0.18 3.1
(e) Delta (Ex. 0.47) 0.36 6.1
(f) Delta (Ex. 0.50) 0.38 6.3
Table 10.2: Expectation Fail Weight Adjustment
Circuit Avg. reward Avg. reward
Expect. Fail Alg. ON Expect. Fail Alg. OFF
Random 0.06 -
Single-Layer 0.15 0.14
Dual-Layer 0.13 0.13
Temporal (Ex. 0.50) 0.33 0.33
Delta (Ex. 0.45) 0.18 0.17
Delta (Ex. 0.47) 0.36 0.38
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Figure 10.6: Relative fitness along hypothetical dimensions of evolution-
ary exploration: (A) agent making random choices has a fitness of 1. Expressed
in terms of Relative Fitness we can compare each of the incrementally modified
circuits. (B) A single-layer circuit could conceivably mutate to one with (C)
dual-layers, without significant changes in fitness. (D) A subsequent mutation
which supports the sequential latching of sensor data is able to learn simple se-
quences. A modification of this circuit, where a Delta Signal denotes a change in
the key inputs to the primary reward Unit, supports the backward induction of
beneficial sequences, although performance is sensitive to Excitation Factors (E)
and (F).
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10.4 Model Extensions
The simulations described above generate a reward when an agent collects an
asset at a single reward location and then returns to the home location. An
obvious question to consider is whether or not this model extends to arbitrary
sequences. As a preliminary investigation into this issue an extension of the
temporal configuration of the circuit was built. Rather than having two temporal
buffer units, the circuit contained three. We then carried out a number of batch
simulations comprising 30 simulations, each of 500 time steps (compared to 250
time steps used in the original experiments);
• Redundant temporal unit: This is a repeat of the experiments described
above, but using a temporal form of the circuit with three rather than the
original two buffer units. Note that the optimal solution only requires two
buffer units.
• Three Layer Temporal Units with Excitation Regulation: A pri-
mary reward is triggered when locations 2,1 and 0 are visited in strict
sequence. motor neuron excitation is down-regulated when a motor neuron
is implicated in a reward sequence.
• Three Layer Temporal Units without Excitation Regulation: A
primary reward is triggered when locations 2,1 and 0 are visited in strict
sequence. motor neuron excitation is left unadjusted when a motor neuron
is implicated in a reward sequence.
The results of these experiments are described below. The only modification
necessary was to introduce a refractory period, whereby a winning motor neuron
was inhibited from firing in the subsequent time-step. Under the original model
it is possible for a winning neuron to be activated repeatedly due to stochastic
effects. When we have a three temporal buffer units and only require the agent
to visit two locations to attain a reward ( e.g. through visiting a reward location
at index 1 and then returning to the home location at index 0), it is possible for
self-associations to be created ( e.g. of the order of location indices in the agent
path is 1-1-0). This is problematic, since a sensor state indicating that the agent
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is at location 1 will be associated with a motor action to visit location 1. This
can create a loop, whereby the agent is stuck at location 1. To avoid this we set
the activation of a winning motor neuron to 0 at the subsequent time step. This
ensures that the same motor neuron will not be selected in consecutive simulation
time steps, and preventing the creation of this loop.
10.4.1 Redundant temporal unit
The first of these experiments was conducted to see if there was a requirement
that the temporal buffer size match the sequence length for the circuit to be effec-
tive. As with the previous simulations the world geography comprises a total of
6 locations. In this case we have three temporal buffers, but the reward sequence
only requires that we visit two locations to achieve a primary reward (as is the
case in all previous simulations). What we are interested in knowing is whether
or not redundancy in the temporal form of the circuit has a derogatory impact
on discovering sequence lengths shorter than that required to achieve the reward.
The results of this experiment are shown in table 10.3. For comparison purposes
we have included the average reward per simulation time step due to random
action selection value of 0.06 (this corresponds to 1.0 in our relative fitness mea-
sure), and the maximum theoretical average reward value of 0.5 ( corresponding
to visiting the reward and home locations at alternative time steps).
The three buffer temporal circuit performance is close to that of the two
buffer circuit where motor neuron excitation is down-regulated to 0.47 after a
reward has been attained. However when we ensure that the excitation level
remains unchanged at 0.50 performance is inferior. The reason for the lower
average reward attained is due to the creation of loops where a third location is
included in a sequence path, where one is not required. This implies that path
discovery performance may be optimized when the number of temporal Buffer
Units is tuned to the length of the optimal action sequence. This is a negative
result, in that such tuning would require either prior knowledge when designing
the circuit, or we might need to use some other optimization technique (such as
genetic algorithms) to determine the optimal temporal Buffer Depth in a specific
case.
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Table 10.3: Temporal Circuit Fitness
Circuit Avg. reward Rel. Fitness
Random 0.06 1.0
2 Temporal Units (Ex. 0.45) 0.21 3.6
3 Temporal Units (Ex. 0.45) 0.22 3.7
2 Temporal Units (Ex. 0.50) 0.33 5.8
3 Temporal Units (Ex. 0.50) 0.26 4.3
Optimum 0.50 8.3
10.4.2 Three-Layer Temporal Units
Table 10.4 displays the results where a primary reward is only attainable if the
agent visits the two asset locations and home location in strict sequence (i.e.
the 2,1 and 0 indexed locations in that order without any interruptions). This
is different from all experiments up until this point, since previous experiments
relied upon the accumulation of assets by the agent in visiting a reward location.
The agent in prior simulations could visit a reward location, attain the reward
asset, and then visit other locations prior to returning to the home location to
attain a reward. However in this experiment, we are only generating a reward
signal when the agent visits the 2,1 and 0 indexed locations in strict sequence,
without any interruptions.
We also use a three layered temporal buffer storing sensor-motor activation
levels for the current state, the prior state, and the previous state before that.
Again we use a world geography comprises a total of 6 locations. For comparison
purposes we include the average reward per simulation time step for an agent
making random action choices 0.004 (shown in the table under the “Random”
entry), and the theoretical optimal which corresponds to the agent visiting the
locations 2,1 and 0 and then looping back to 2, such that the agent receives a
reward once every three time-steps i.e. an average reward of 0.33.
The first experiment involved the approach described in previous simulations
where we down-regulate the motor neurons that are implicated in a reward se-
quence once a primary reward has been detected. The reasoning here is that,
unless their inputs are specifically activated, we want other motor choices to be
explored (supporting exploration). This approach yields an average reward pay-
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Table 10.4: Three-Layer Temporal Units
Circuit Avg. Reward Rel. Fitness
Random 0.004 1.0
Down-Regulation (Ex. 0.45) 0.097 23.4
No Regulation (Ex. 0.50) 0.202 48.8
Optimum 0.333 83.3
out of 0.097 approximately 23 times superior to that of random activity. However,
problem occurs when the agent randomly selects a location that does not com-
prise part of the reward sequence immediately after having received a primary
reward. This can lead to the agent forming closed loops amongst the locations
whose corresponding motor neurons have not had their excitation factors down-
regulated, thus reducing the average reward payout. As a further investigation
the same temporal circuits were simulated without the down-regulation of excita-
tion. This allows the agent to re-enter the locations which constitute part of the
sensor-motor reward chains more easily. The results in this case are significantly
improved, resulting in an average fitness payout of 0.202, corresponding to 60
percent of the maximum theoretical payout of 0.333.
10.5 Discussion of Possible Functional Improve-
ments
Before considering the relative merits and de-merits of the alternative circuit
forms, it is useful to consider that the delta unit and temporal unit circuit forms
have complementary characteristics. The delta unit form is useful where we have
delayed rewards. In this case an agent is able to visit a reward location, accu-
mulate the asset, and then travel to intermediate locations before arriving finally
at the reward location. We might term such problems soft sequence problems,
since a terminal reward does not require a strict sequence of action choices to be
followed without interruption. The agent is able to visit intermediate states that
play no role in the reward payout without invalidating the reward, providing that
certain prior states have been visited. Since the delta unit form accumulates his-
toric state data that allows it to determine which state transitions are associated
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with a reward sequence, it is robust to discovering the sequence that results in
a reward. However, this circuit relies on repeated successful reward sequences to
identify which sensor state transitions are associated with the reward attainment.
The temporal unit is less well suited to such a task as it guarantees the learning
of all actions that immediately precede a reward payout. Given that the final
payout can be attained from visiting the reward location from an intermediate
node that does no contribute to the reward sequence, the potential to incorporate
inappropriate actions into a learned reward sequence is high.
In contrast, we can imagine another class of problems which we might term
hard sequence problems. A hard sequence problem is one which requires that the
agent visit a number of states in a strict sequence without interruption. Under
such circumstances the one-shot learning of the temporal unit, where all prior
actions are incorporated into the learned action sequence is more efficient than
the delta unit. This is particularly true where the number of states in the re-
ward sequence is large, and the space of alternative states is also large, since
the chances of discovering the reward sequence through random exploration on
multiple occasions (as required by the delta unit) is correspondingly low.
We might imagine that there exist complex action selection problems which
comprise both soft sequence and hard sequence sub-sequences, such that a hybrid
circuit comprising both delta and temporal Units working in conjunction may be
required. Investigating this hypothesis could be a target of future research.
Another issue worthy of future research is that of competition between tem-
poral Units of different buffer depth. The subsection entitled ‘redundant tem-
poral unit’ (section 10.4.1) discusses an experiment that compares the relative
performance of a dual-layered versus triple-layered temporal units. The opti-
mal sequence comprised only two steps. Whilst the three-layer version achieved
reasonable results the dual-layered version was superior. In the case of hard se-
quence problems, where we do not know the optimal sequence length in advance,
we might imagine that multiple temporal units working in competition might
achieve the best results. How to implement such a competitive circuit is another
topic for future research, however, one possible solution is to use tonic dopamine
levels as some basis for modulating banks of competitive modules. For exam-
ple, high tonic-levels associated with frequent use might be used as the basis for
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down-regulating the excitation of one competitive action selection unity versus
another. Thus resulting in a balance between exploration and repetition.
We have not as originally anticipated seen the benefits of excitation down-
regulation within the experiments described herein. However, the two research
topics identified; firstly that of combining temporal and Delta Units, and secondly
that of allowing competition between temporal Units of differing buffer depth
could well make use of this feature.
Given the simplicity of the current model, intentionality or control signals
intended to switch between different goal tasks is not supported. We previously
hypothesized action selection modes that comprise; selection, exploration and ex-
clusion) Of these only selection and exploration are evident in the model circuits.
The lack of a requirement for the down-regulation of motor neuron activity (once
it has been identified as part of reward chain) obviates the need for the exclu-
sion mode. However these simulations all relate to the attainment of a single
goal. If we were to build a more complex simulation that entailed learning two
different goal tasks, we might find that an exclusion mode (supported by the
down-regulation or motor neuron excitation) provided us with a mechanism by
which goal switching could be supported.
10.6 Comparable Networks and Alternative Ap-
proaches
10.6.1 Key Features of Our Approach
In this chapter 8 we covered a number of topics; a novel neuron model, where
signalling is modulated by excitation levels; a circuit example demonstrating
signalling adaptation resulting in energy savings; and a hypothetical model of
action selection based on the modulation of excitation factors. Distinctive in
the presentation of these examples compared with that for more conventional
models is that idea that energy efficiency may manifest itself in the functional
operation of neural circuits. In this chapter we described variations of the action
selection model presented in chapter 8, together with an example of the use of
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such neurons. It is worthwhile considering how this approach compares with that
taken by others.
The first thing to note is that the approach taken here incorporates a different
conceptual approach from that typically involved in devising conventional neural
networks. It starts from the axiomatic position that selection for energy efficiency
has shaped the evolution of neural networks, and seeks to explore the explana-
tory power of this axiom. One of the conclusions that results from this is that
variations in absolute or average signalling levels between two arbitrarily selected
signalling pathways does not necessarily indicate a difference in functional contri-
bution. Adaptation in the receptivity of target neurons affects the input signals
required to attain the same outputs (see 8.4). The most significant impact this
has on the creation of circuits that incorporate such features is that competition
between channels may occur based on the amplitude modulation, irrespective of
the semantic value of the information transmitted between these channels. This
corresponds to an additional degree of freedom, compared to circuits where the
semantic content of a signal relies upon the entire range of values between the
intervals of 0 to 1 or -1 to +1
The second key issue relates to how inputs are combined in our circuit mod-
els. It is intrinsic to the class of circuits explored in this chapter is the way in
which unique inputs are integrated to generate combinatorial intermediate sig-
nals. Although we refer to the dynamic generation of inter-neurons, this relates
to the abstraction used in implementing such circuits. The underlying idea is that
the densely interconnected dendritic structures that inter-leave source and target
neurons in biological systems support almost all combinatorial variations in sig-
nalling pathways that we can imagine. It is through the co-activation of source
and target neurons that we imagine combinatorial signalling pathways emerging.
Our dynamically generated ‘interneurons’ are intended to be representative of
these pathways.
These are the two key features that differentiate the reward adaptive circuits
that we have explored in this thesis; firstly, amplitude modulation of channels (as
distinct from signals), and the additional degree of freedom that this represents in
the construction of neural circuits, and secondly intrinsic support for functionality
that relies upon adaptive processes that relate to combinatorial inputs.
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There are other aspects of the circuits described here, that are more reminis-
cent of more conventional approaches. We can define a class of reward adaptive
action selection (RAAS) systems that incorporate the same essential features;
Any system that incorporates some ‘memory’ of a context that
exists when a beneficial action is selected, and has the potential to
detect this same context (through some comparison of memory with
current state) when it reoccurs, may might make use of this detection
signal to bias action selection in favour of choices that have historically
been associated with the attainment of a reward.
This may sound simple, but hidden within this description is one major prob-
lem, how do we determine which of the context features are significant, and
specifically;
1. does the action selected depend on a combination of sensor signals, and if
so which combinations?
2. which of the signals detected in the context is invariant with respect to
attaining the reward, and which ones neutral?
3. how do we support partial matches (i.e. is the system subject to graceful
degradation, where partial matches might still elicit favourable actions)?
4. how do we discriminate between competitive matches (i.e. what happens
where partial matches correspond to conflicting actions)?
5. how do allow for the discovery of new or novel actions, whilst continuing to
support ‘remembered’ actions?
In our approach we address the first issue through the dynamic creation of
‘interneurons’ each of which represents a specific combination of inputs. However,
we do so only after a reward has been detected. This avoids the need to represent
all input sensor combinations continuously, avoiding an explosion in the memory
and computational requirements that might otherwise be necessary. The delta
unit formulation (see section 10.2.4) is able, through a biologically plausible ana-
logue of back-propagation, to gradually determine which of the sensor signals are
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needed and which are superfluous to action selection, and thus addresses the sec-
ond issue. The second and third issues are addressed through our winner-takes-all
output stage. The last issue is more challenging. Whilst we originally anticipated
that the system outlined in section 8.5.1 would support selection, exploration and
the exclusion of actions through reward based adaptation that affected neuron
excitation levels, we found our results to be somewhat problematic. Our initial
approach allowed for the possibility of detrimental loops, whereby down-regulated
neurons associated with reward pathways, were potentially excluded from con-
sideration during exploration. In order to rectify this, it was necessary to avoid
the down-regulation of such neurons. This is arguably the area that requires the
most consideration in future research.
10.6.2 Alternative Approaches Compared
Jordan (Jordan [1986]) and Elman (Elman [1990]) circuits also fall into the class
of reward adaptive action selection systems described in the previous section.
Essentially the combinatorial problem is addressed by the fully-recurrent con-
nections between the sensor neurons and the hidden layer. The ‘context units’
provide the system with some basic memory such that prior states also effect cur-
rent signals. Jordan’s variation simply takes the input of the context units to be
that of the output layer, rather than the hidden layer. Both network varieties are
classified as simple recurrent networks. As mentioned previously our approach is
potentially more efficient, since it relies only on the processing of combinations
that have already been implicated in the attainment of a reward. Nodes grow
gradually, and could be subject to dynamic pruning. Our approach also allows
for arbitrary time or sequence periods. Elman circuit performance decreases as
sequence length increases (Portegys [2010]). Capi and Doya investigated a num-
ber of Elman like variants in a simple robot navigation task (Capi and Doya
[2005]). One of the conclusions reached was that an architecture that incorpo-
rates competitive memory modules out-performs a standard Elman circuit. This
provides a hint as to a possible direction in which our work could be improved,
as envisaged in section 10.5.
Whilst the Elman circuit could potentially be used as the basis for some kind
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of reinforcement learning system, its primary purpose was simply to demonstrate
how state behaviour over time could be incorporated into networks. The MAXON
architecture is more closely inspired by reinforcement learning systems (Crabbe
and Dyer [2001a] and Crabbe and Dyer [2001b]), and is therefore more directly
comparable with the circuits that we have developed. The MAXON architecture
is divided into two parts; the policy network and the value network. In some
ways it represents a broader scope than addressed by the circuits presented here.
The policy network is functionally equivalent to our reward adaptive circuits, in
that it selects an action based on current sensor state. What is missing from our
formulation is the value network, whose function is to allow for the prioritization
and disambiguation of multiple goals. If we were to incorporate such features,
this would represent an additional ‘layer’ on top of circuits that we have already
presented. Again this ties in the potential use of multiple competitive circuits,
with some system for arbitrating between them. Further inspiration for how such
functionality might best be implemented might be gained from a more detailed
consideration of the interior and exterior sections of the globus pallidus as they
relate to the striatum (see section 6.2).
The main reason for the switch in emphasis from the system view of chapter
7 to the neuron and circuit perspective of chapter 8 was the recognition that
the design of a reinforcement learning system, whilst informative, precludes the
use of the evolutionary robotics methodology. To be of value, a reward adaptive
circuit suitable for neuroevolution needs to be simple enough that it allows for
complexification through fitness dependent selection. However, an understand-
ing of the system perspective certainly should inform the decisions made in the
design of these ‘seed’ circuits. It is from the system level perspective, that we
are able to imagine the dimensions that should be explored. System level models
of reinforcement learning are quite well developed. We shall compare our model
with that of the PVLV model (Hazy et al. [2010]) in section 11.4, however other
models, such as those presented by Grossberg (from Grossberg [1992] to Gross-
berg [2011]), and a model intended to represent the pre-frontal cortex and the
striatum (Dominey [1995]), merit further consideration in pursuit of development
the models that we have presented in this chapter.
This thesis differs quite significantly from much of the work that has already
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been carried out on the topic of reinforcement learning, and associative memory,
shaped by rewards in the evolutionary robotics community (Whitley et al. [1993],
Yamauchi and Beer [1994c], Niv et al. [2002], Blynel [2003], Igel [2003], Taylor
et al. [2006], Whiteson et al. [2007], Izquierdo [2007], Schembri et al. [2007],
Soltoggio et al. [2008], Izquierdo et al. [2008]). To a certain extent we have
eschewed more conventional models for an approach built on a foundation of
energy efficient signalling inspired by biological systems. In doing so we have
arrived at a circuit model, that whilst it presents certain interesting features, has
yet to be fully explored in an evolutionary context. Another difference, is that
of a desire to identify complementary circuits, that when combined might yield
considerably more complex behaviour than we have as yet been able to achieve.
We are particularly interested in how GasNets and circuits intended to support
locomotion might integrate with reward adaptive circuits of the type described
here (we shall address this topic in more detail in chapter 12). This is another
reason for seeking to devise a circuit of minimal complexity, that might allow for
co-evolutionary approaches to the integration of complementary networks. Work
carried out by those authors cited earlier, will no doubt inform future work once
evolutionary experiments are revisited.
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Chapter 11
Biological Comparisons
11.1 Introduction
This thesis has been written from the perspective of an evolutionary robotics
researcher. Every effort has been made to arrive at a model of reward adaptive
circuits that is in some sense biologically plausible. It is however, only through
looking again at biological systems that we are in a position to determine whether
or not a claim of biological plausibility is in any way justifiable. It is no doubt the
case that the sense in which we use ‘biologically plausible’ here is less rigorous than
the sense in which someone working in the field of computational neuroscience
might use it. Despite this, there are certain aspects of the circuit models presented
that bear some correspondence with features discernible in the basal ganglia
system that we seek to identify in this chapter. Over the longer term, it is hoped
that the role of this chapter, is to provide us with some basis for considering how
we might extend our existing model. No doubt there are certain limitations of the
model that are worthy of further consideration. Our preference, if at all possible,
is to identify comparable features in biological systems and try to imagine how
such features might provide us with some basis for improving our model, rather
than seeking to make arbitrary improvements based on engineering considerations
alone (taking us in the direction of machine learning).
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11.2 Model comparison with the striatum
From a ‘bottom-up’ perspective in chapter 8, we considered energy efficiency
and possible adaptations that would help us to explain the depressed output
of dopamine neurons in response to failed expectations. We arrived at a sim-
ple model neuron whose transfer function could be modulated by an excitation
factor. We then posited the idea of tri-modal signalling, whereby a competi-
tive arrangement of such neurons would support action selection through three
distinct modes; selection, exploration and exclusion.
In work described in chapter 9 and 10 we started with a minimal imple-
mentation of a circuit constructed with such neurons, and sought to explore how
incremental adaptations might lead to increasingly sophisticated reward anticipa-
tory circuits. In doing so we arrived at two distinct forms comprising Temporal
Units and Delta Units, with complementary characteristics. Whilst Temporal
Units support the learning of strict sequences, Delta Units support the learning
of delayed rewards (where the reward payout is robust to the visitation of cer-
tain intermediate neutral states). A surprising result was that down-regulation
of motor neuron excitability was not necessary to support the efficient discovery
of reward sequences.
This lead us to the conclusion that Exclusion is not required to learn a single
task. One hypothesis is that they may underlie the ability to learn multiple reward
related tasks, through selective inhibition. One reason for continuing to believe
that this model may still have some validity lies in the properties of neurons in
the striatum;
1. The medium spiny neurons (MSN) exhibit what is termed ‘Up’ and ‘Down’
states (Wilson and Kawaguchi [1996]).
2. These Up-Down States are modulated by dopamine signals (Gruber et al.
[2003]).
In our original model the neuron switches from an excited state to a down-
regulated state on the receipt of a reward signal. To use the terminology of
the MSN, the pre-adapted state ( normal excitation ) corresponds to the ‘Up’
state and the post-adapted ( reduced excitation ) corresponds to the ‘Down’
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state. In our model, a neuron in the ‘Down’ state is typically unresponsive,
until its exact inputs are stimulated, in which case, its output exceeds that of
other competitive neurons. In the MSN these characteristics are mirrored exactly.
‘Down’ state neurons are unresponsive unless their specific cortical inputs are
stimulated. In our model, a neuron in its ‘Up’ state is one whose inputs have yet
to be closely associated with a specific reward. In comparison with neurons in
the ‘Down’ state, they are far more likely to fire with non-specific stimulation,
supporting the exploration mode. Through analogy, this model provides us with
a good functional description of the role of the medium spiny neurons found in
the striatum.
Similarities between our original model and the striatum are not limited to
the Up-Down states of the MSN. In our model it is a Primary Reward signal
that initiates the differentiation of neurons from their initially elevated excitation
states to their inhibited state. Similarly in the striatum, it is dopamine signalling
that supports the switching between the “Up” and “Down” states of MSNs in the
striatum (Gruber et al. [2003]). Work supportive of the tri-state mode switching
hypothesis includes studies showing that dopamine denervation of spiny neurons
in rat striatum results in enhanced excitatory synaptic transmission (Pang et al.
[2001]), consistent with the purported role of reward signalling in reducing the
excitation levels of motor neurons.
Further similarities extend as far as the mechanics the neuron model itself.
Despite referring to an “Excitation Factor”, this value is used to shift the thresh-
old value associated with a Rayleigh distribution that determines the probability
of firing. This is analogous to the role of (dopamine) D1 receptor activation that
raises the threshold for activation of action potentials (Surmeier et al. [1992]).
A comparison of our model with a more traditional model (Schultz et al.
[1994]) idea behind the cortical-Striatal relationship is shown in Figure 11.1 and
Figure 11.2.
In our simulations the Exclusion of a single action (supported by excitation
down-regulation) is not required for learning a single reward sequence efficiently.
Despite this, the original Selection, Exploration, Exclusion model appears to
conform very well with what we find in the striatum. In the absence of addi-
tional experiments we can only speculate as to why this might be. An obvious
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Figure 11.1: Traditional view of the role of dopamine in the striatum:
(Top) In the absence of dopamine signalling the impact of cortical input to stri-
atal neurons would be minimal, pathways between cortex and striatal neurons
have arbitrary weights. (Middle) Initially, a dopamine signal supports an im-
mediate focussing effect, where those inputs which are coincidently active are
strengthened.(Bottom) In a hypothetical learning mechanism, dopamine facili-
tates long-term changes. Arrow width represents the relative synaptic influences
on post-synaptic impulse activity by striatal neurons. Source Schultz et al. [1994].
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Figure 11.2: Proposed model of the Role of dopamine in the striatum:
(Top) In the absence of dopamine signalling weak, but extensive connections are
made between the cortex and striatal neurons. (Middle) Initially, a dopamine
signal supports an immediate focussing effect, where the inputs which are coinci-
dently active are strengthened, to form combinatorial inputs to the active striatal
neuron(s).(Bottom) Under circumstances where no immediate reward is detected
action selection is determined by the competitive activation of MSN neurons,
based on the complete or partial activation of their inputs from the cortex.
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hypothesis to propose is that striatal MSN activation is organized in a goal ori-
ented fashion, such that there exists a mechanisms whereby alternative reward
chains (supporting multiple goals) are selectively activated. The excitation down-
regulation supported by our model neuron provides us with functional support for
such a mechanism. In this case Selection, Exploration and the Exclusion concept
would relate to support for multiple goals rather than single actions.
11.3 Inferring the functional role of the basal
ganglia
The circuits described in this thesis are very simple. Their intended role is to sup-
port the learning of action sequences in response to reward signals. These circuits
represent the simplest form of reward adaptive circuits that we can imagine, that
still provide improved fitness for an artificial agent that may incorporate them.
The resultant circuits bear some resemblance to what we find in the striatum.
The sensor neurons correspond to cortical inputs, the intermediate neurons to
MSN weights, and the motor neurons to the outputs of the MSNs. The winner-
takes-all algorithm that we use to chose between motor actions corresponds to
the function of the globus palidus. The adaptation that takes place to create new
intermediate neurons on the receipt of a reward is analogous to that which takes
place in the striatum in response to dopamine phasic activity. If these circuits
capture aspects of proto-circuits that may underpin the emergence of the basal
ganglia over evolutionary time scales, we may make some inferences regarding
the functional role of the basal ganglia by comparison with the attributes of our
circuits.
The primitive circuits modelled here are intended to support the learning of
action state sequences, which in reinforcement learning would be termed policies.
When we refer here to action states, we are referring to action states that resemble
those of our robot in Chapter 5. These action states were labelled Wander, Eat,
Orient and Approach. Each action state comprises a selective input filter on
sensor data. A single action state constitutes a mapping of low-level sensor data
to the appropriate motor program. Selective High-level sensor data determines
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action state transitions and determines the current motor program. Action state
sequences, correspond to the state transitions in a finite state machine model. An
action state sequence in this context is not intended to refer to the coordination
of specific motor sequences (a role that is associated with the cerebellum, rather
than the basal ganglia). However, in as much as errors in an action state sequence
model would result in inappropriate initiation of motor programs, or potentially
corrupt action state sequence transitions, such a model is not inconsistent with
that of the role of the basal ganglia (defects of which result in motor control
problems in Parkinsons or Hodgekin sufferers).
As far as our model is concerned, usage of the terms sensor and motor are
primarily intended to signify input and output. If we were to apply our low-
level model to a robotics application, the inputs and outputs would correspond
to sensor inputs and motor hardware control signals. When seeking to look for
analogies between our model, and that of the role of the basal ganglia, such
terms may well be misleading. However, as our fundamental approach is that of
a roboticist, we shall stay with this convention, and seek to apply it as consistently
as possible.
Common amongst all the circuits that we investigated is the association be-
tween the sensor input and the motor output that is made via the creation of
the intermediate neurons. Comparisons with the striatum of the basal ganglia,
led us to the conclusion that the functional role of these intermediate neurons is
effectively embodied in the pre-synaptic weights of the cortical afferents to the
medium spiny neurons. Irrespective of this change in perspective, the funda-
mental idea encompassed by them is the association of environmental conditions
with actions. The purpose of which is to identify action sequences that lead to a
reward and ensure that future actions are biased towards repeating these actions
under similar sensor conditions to maximize future rewards.
We modified augmented the basic circuit (originally described in Chapter 6)
with additional sensor buffers, which gave primitive support to the two action’s
necessary to arrive at the optimal solution for the specific experimental simula-
tion; that of going to the Reward Location, and immediately returning to the
Home Location. We achieved this through two circuit configurations. The first
was the temporal form, where we stored the sensor and motor states of two simula-
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tion time steps, so that we could identify multiple actions that lead to the reward.
In the second configuration, the storage for prior sensor-motor states was used as
a delta-unit. In this latter case, we made associations between the sensor-motor
actions that would lead to a positive change in the input most strongly associated
with the primary reward. It is this latter circuit form that with appropriately
chosen excitation factors, lead to the highest average reward.
There appears to be a significant bias in the amount of research that focuses
on the corticostriatal connections, compared to that of the thalamostriatal. A
search for the terms corticostriatal ( or cortico-striatal) and thalamostriatal (or
thalamo-striatal) on the Pubmed website yields 1601 and 167 references respec-
tively. On Googlescholar the results are 23,650 and 3,091 respectively. This
indicates that approximately 9.5 (Pubmed) or 7.5 (Googlescholar) more papers
are written about the corticostriatal connections than the thalamostriatal con-
nections. Schematics for striatal connections very often leave out the thalamic
afferents completely. This bias may appear somewhat confusing, when we con-
sider that the number of thalamostriatal terminals in the striatum is of a similar
magnitude to that of the number of corticostriatal terminals ( Smith et al. [2004]
and Lacey et al. [2005]). Of the work that has looked at both classes of afferents,
(see Smith et al. [2004] for a review and Ding et al. [2008] on neuron charac-
teristics ) some clear differences have been identified. Whilst it was originally
understood that dopaminergic neurons converge with corticostriatal afferents,
rather than thalamostriatal afferents, these results have more recently been ques-
tioned. Moss et al found that (Moss and Bolam [2008]) found that the spatial
proximity of dopamine and thalamostriatal terminals to be comparable with that
of dopamine and corticostriatal terminals, arriving at the conclusion that thalam-
ostriatal afferents were just as likely to be influenced by dopaminergic neurons as
corticostriatal afferents. In other words, input from the thalamus to the striatum
is functionally as significant as that from the cortex.
From our perspective, in seeking to understand the emergence of reward antic-
ipatory circuits, it is also interesting to note that when we compare homologous
brain structures, the thalamostriatal connection is more prominent in primitive
organisms than the corticostriatal connection (Striedter [2005]). This by itself im-
plies a less significant role for the cortex than that of the thalamus in determining
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actions sequences in primitive organisms. From an evolutionary perspective, we
might reach the conclusion that it is the thalamus that initially dominated the
selection of action sequences. To summarize;
1. The relative number of thalamostriatal terminals compared to corticostri-
atal terminals implies a significant role for the Thalamus in determining the
output of the striatum.
2. Dopminergic neurons may play a similar functional role in the way in which
inputs to Striatal Medium Spiny Neurons are processed, irrespective of their
origin (Cortex or Thalamus).
3. The pronounced role of the thalamostriatal terminals in primitive organisms
might imply a significant role in reactive responses rather than considered
actions.
These factors alone seem sufficient for us to consider the importance and func-
tional significance of the thalamostriatal connection to its role of the basal gan-
glia. Whilst the conventional approach is to see the basal ganglia as comprising a
cortico-striatal-nigral-thalamic loop, we might well ask ourselves, whether or not
there exists a comparable loop in which the thalamostriatal link is strongly im-
plicated. The most obvious candidate for such a loop is that of the Nauta-Mehler
Loop (Kim et al. [1976], Gime´nez-Amaya et al. [1995], Mengual et al. [1999b]).
Lanciego et al (Lanciego et al. [2004]) have identified this as a potentially signifi-
cant pathway in determining basal ganglia function (this research also relates to
the rat). Their studies also show segregated pathways, in a fashion which could
be analogous to that which we see in the cortico-striatal-nigral-thalamic pathway.
It should be noted, that this particular loop is not generally well researched. As a
very rough approximation, this is evident from considering the number of entries
found in PubMed for each of the following terms; dopamine (122,663), corticostri-
atal (1601), thalamostriatal(167), and the Nauta-Mehler Loop(2). Using Google
Scholar the corresponding terms return the following number of entries; dopamine
(968,000), corticostriatal (23,650), thalamostriatal(3,091), and the Nauta-Mehler
Loop(20). It is clear from these figures that the results for Nauta-Mehler Loop
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are insignificant in comparison, and probably fair to say that this particular loop
is largely ignored in the majority of basal ganglia research.
The figure 11.3 displays a cortex oriented schematic of how we might imagine
the basal ganglia to work. In contrast and figure 11.4 shows a thalamic oriented
schematic. In this case, the reward sequences that are subject to undergo rein-
forcement learning are motor actions themselves. Effectively the thalamus routes
back the motor action states associated with an action selection for the purposes
of determining future motor actions. Rather than focussing on the association
that is made between sensor state and motor commands, in the attainment of a
Primary Reward, we can easily see how a simple sequence of motor associations,
could be made through essentially the mechanism (i.e. adaptation mediated by
dopaminergic signalling). In a cortex oriented model, we would associate a given
action with a particular set of environmental circumstances, in thalamus oriented
model we simply adapt the motor sequence associations to Primary Rewards.
Figure 11.5 shows an anatomical diagram of the principal pathways associated
with association learning in each case.
A combined cortical and thalamic perspective integrates both environmental
(in addition to proprioceptive and higher order associative patterns) together
with prior motor action. Such a perspective is different from the conventional
perspective that sees the cortex as the primary input to the striatum. Note
that in our simple simulations we had two sets of sensor data; endowments and
location. Given that our motor choices have a one to one correspondence with the
locations themselves, we can equivalently interpret our location sensors as prior
motor action selections, in a fashion that is directly analogous to the proposed
role that the thalamo-cortical projection plays.
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Figure 11.3: sensor-action vs action-action associations: (Top) So far we
have focussed on “sensor-motor” associations, as the basic building block of au-
tomatic action Selection. Simply put, a current sensor state, determines the next
selected motor action. (Bottom) A more primitive framework for automatic ac-
tion Selection could be based simply on the association of motor actions, which
lead up to the presentation of a reward.
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Figure 11.4: action-action association adaptation: (Top) This schematic
shows how automatic action Selection could be made through the association of
motor sequences. (Bottom) In the case where the agent experiences a Primary
Reward, we are able to adapt these motor sequence associations, strengthening
those that have lead to the Reward. Unlike in the case of sensor-motor Associ-
ations, there is no obvious analogy to re-adaptation based on anticipated sensor
states, however we could still adapt the associations based on the final success or
failure of the terminal motor action.
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Figure 11.5: Hypothetical sensor-action and action-action loops: (A)
The top diagram corresponds to our original model where the focus was “sensor-
motor” associations. (B) At the centre of the diagram we can see the Nauta-
Mehle Loop. Hypothetically this loop could support the learning of motor
sequences via associations between current and subsequent motor patterns. In
both cases the dotted line represents the dopaminergic Neurons originating in the
SNc. Abbreviations: GPe, globus palidus, external segment; GPi, globus palidus,
internal segment; SNr, substantia nigra, pars reticula; SNc, substantia nigra, pars
compacta; STN, subthalamic nucleus. Adapted from Wilson [2004].
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11.4 Comparision with the PVLV Model
The PVLV model (Hazy et al. [2010]) is perhaps one of the most developed com-
putational models of the brain circuits that support reward anticipation circuits
in the brain. One of the difficulties in comparing models is that the basal ganglia
supports multiple loops (Garret E.Alexander, Mahlon R. DeLong [1986], Garret
E.Alexander, Mahlon R. DeLong [1986], Haber and Calzavara [2009]), comprising
parallel circuits that implicate, Limbic, motor, sensor and Associative pathways.
Whilst the focus of our model is on the basal ganglia and Largely the motor path-
way, the PVLV model takes in the limbic system, and through the hippocampus,
potentially also incorporates some aspects of sensor and Associative pathways.
Given these limitations, where appropriate we will make comparisons,
The basic idea behind the PVLV model is that the basal ganglia system can
be broadly modelled as two complementary sub-systems; the first is a Primary
Value (PV) system, which governs how dopamine neurons respond to a reward (
a primary reward in our terminology ), and a Learned Value (LV) system, which
governs how dopamine cells respond to an conditioned stimulus ( an implied
reward). Its key results or hypothesis are listed below in the form of quotations,
followed by annotations and comparisons made by the author of this thesis.
Abbreviations used in the synopses of their hypotheses correspond to; condi-
tioned stimulus (CS), unconditioned stimulus (US),ventral striatum (VS), dopamine
neurons (DA) and central nucleus of the amygdala (CNA).
1. “The lateral hypothalamic area is the main site for the reactive
representation of US value for rewarding stimuli such as food, wa-
ter, etc., and this provides the main excitatory signal driving pha-
sic dopamine bursting after primary reward onset.”(p.707, Hazy
et al. [2010])
Here the assertion that the lateral hypothalamic area (LTA) is the origin
of the signal that we shall refer to as the“Primary Reward” signal is made.
This is not addressed by our model, but we are entirely happy to accept
that this is the case. Incorporating this feature does not change any of the
aspects of our model.
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2. “Patch-like GABAergic neurons in the ventral striatum are
the main substrate for the learned representation of a US ex-
pectation (PVi). Inhibitory projections therefrom to midbrain
DA cells shunt excitatory inputs thereby eliminating the phasic
burst for the US. The VS also projects via the pallidum to the
lateral habenular (LH) nucleus of the epithalamus, helping that
substrate to compute when an expected reward has been omit-
ted.”(p.707, Hazy et al. [2010])
The assertion here is that the striatum exhibits adaptation that in some
sense encodes anticipation of a “Primary Reward” ( note that the “Primary
Reward” signal is an Unconditioned Stimulus signal, they are not referring
here to anticipated Conditioned Stimulus). The role of detection of a failed
reward is assumed by cells in the Thalamus ( specifically the lateral habenu-
lar nucleus of the epithalamus ). Projections from the striatum that relate
to the anticipation of a Primary Reward inhibit the phasic response of the
dopamine Neurons. This is entirely consistent with our model, but expands
on the source of expected reward omission and identifies it with the lateral
habenular (LH) nucleus of the epithalamus.
3. “Multi-modal glutamatergic projection neurons of the medial
segment of the CNA are the substrate for the acquired repre-
sentation of CS reward value for the purpose of driving phasic
dopamine bursting at CS-onset.”(p.709, Hazy et al. [2010])
Here the authors propose that the Central Nucleus of the amygdala is the
source of signals corresponding to the value of a stimulus corresponding
to a Conditioned Stimulus ( an implied reward stimulus in our terminol-
ogy). Whilst this may be true of the model that they propose, it may not
necessarily be the case in our model. Incorporation of the amygdala may
imply some involvement in aversive as well as rewarded activity. Similarly
the close association of the amygdala with the hippocampus may also bring
in the involvement of the Limbic and Associative systems. In our model,
the “value” conditioned stimulus is not considered. It is through activation
competition in our analogy of the MSN neurons that action selection is
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determined, without consideration to value.
4. “The critical learning in CNA occurs at synapses between in-
coming CS sensory representations and multi-modal cells initially
responsive to US, and these are trained by phasic DA at the time
of US-onset only. CS triggered phasic DA signals do not train
associations in the CNA.”(p.709, Hazy et al. [2010])
Here the authors assert that the learning (that takes place in the central
nucleus of the amygdala) of the value of conditioned stimulus (implied re-
wards), takes place only at the onset of the conditioned stimulus (the pri-
mary reward). In our view, although the location at which learning takes
place may vary (as it may be loop specific), our model also ensures that
adaptation only takes place in response to the presentation of the Primary
Reward. In this respect the two models are analogous.
5. “With overtraining, phasic DA firing to CS-onset is signifi-
cantly reduced, but persists indefinitely. However, if there is a
CS2 prior to, and predictive of, CS1, DA firing to CS1 is elimi-
nated. These effects can be explained in terms of a CS activated
inhibitory representation (LVi) that inhibits the excitatory influ-
ence from the LVe (CNA).”(p.710, Hazy et al. [2010])
This corresponds to the widely observed migration of the dopamine activity
to the earliest predictive stimulus, i.e. the earliest Conditioned Stimulus
(”Implied Reward”). Suppression of dopamine activity to later Conditioned
Stimuli is suppressed. This is consistent with out model.
6. “DA firing to CS and US inputs is invariably in the form
of a phasic burst, even when these input signals persist for sus-
tained periods of time. The pedunculopontine tegmental nucleus
(PPT) or the midbrain DA nuclei themselves appear likely to
be responsible for producing this bursting property, in a manner
consistent with the temporal derivative Y mechanism now used
in PVLV.”(p.710, Hazy et al. [2010])
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The idea here is that adaptation in the system due to dopamine activity
is primarily in the form of a phasic burst, irrespective of the persistence
of the unconditioned stimulus (primary reward) and Conditioned Stimulus
(implied reward). This is not an issue that is addressed in our simplified
model, but there is nothing to suggest that such a view would be inconsistent
with our model.
In conclusion, it is reasonable to say that whilst the focus of attention of
the PVLV model is different from ours ( with regards to the specific loop that
is being addressed), there are no substantial contradictions between the two.
One important area of agreement is in system adaptation only to the Primary
reward presentation, rather than presentation of Implied Rewards ( or CS in their
terminology ). This is consistent with the conceptual schematic shown in figure
8.1 in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 12
The Adaptive Replicator Model
12.1 Overview
In this chapter we seek to fully express our notion of an adaptive replicator. We
first referred to a bauplan for an adaptive replicator in section 2.5.1 as a template
for the various processes encompassed by the evolutionary robotics methodology
in the generation of agents capable of exhibiting adaptive behaviour. Whilst
this bauplan provides us with a framework for understanding how genetic, on-
togenetic and continuous processes of adaptation are related, it does not specify
the functional details of its constituent parts. In this chapter we focus on one
particular level, that of the processes of continuous adaptation. These processes
support change in an agent, in a manner that is highly responsive to variations
in environmental and internal state. Inspired by Ashby’s model of ultrastability
(see section 2.5.2), we propose an archetype for adaptive organisms. It repre-
sents a hypothesis of the functional organization present in the neural circuity
of agents capable of exhibiting complex adaptive behaviour. The purpose of this
chapter is to present this model, use it as the basis for identifying complementary
functional circuits, and in the process justify the choice of GasNets and reward
adaptive circuits as the focus of research.
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Figure 12.1: Causation and Adaptivity: (a) One of the least adaptive ob-
jects is one whose internal reactive function remains constant. (b) An object
whose activity is contingent on complex internal and external states is capable of
exhibiting more complex behaviour. (c) An object that processes complex con-
tingencies and modifies the functional form and parameters of embedded reactive
functions is capable of even more complex behaviour.
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12.2 Causation and Adaptation
12.2.1 Causation and AI
The seminal text on causation as it relates to AI was originally published by
Judea Pearl in 2000. In this book he seeks to describe a formal framework by
which causal relationships might be inferred, providing an alternative approach
to a purely probabilistic argument, buy incorporating notions of causal structure
through graphical representations. Pearl’s goal is to seek to answer two key
questions;
How should a robot acquire causal information through interaction
with its environment? How should a robot process causal information
received from its creator-programmer? (p.413, Pearl [2009])
The second of these questions is of little relevance to the evolutionary robotics
methodology, since we seek to generate entities that are able to solve tasks through
adaptive processes, rather than those that require programming. Whilst the for-
mer of these questions is clearly of general relevance to those in robotics, it is
not a problem with which we are primarily concerned here. Our key concern is
in seeking to develop a conceptual structure that differentiates between differ-
ent kinds of causal relationships, and how this might relate to some functional
differentiation internally within adaptive systems.
Pearl’s perspective is typical of classical AI. We might imagine the construc-
tion of an artificial brain that enables a robotic to infer causal structure, and
through this, build internal representations of this structure. This might then
be subject to some symbolic manipulation in which this causal structure acts as
constraint on problems that are solved by the robot in the pursuit of certain goals.
In contrast, our approach merely acknowledges that causal structure exists (with
the world as its best model) and focusses on the functional systems by which
changes in the world elicit changes in behaviour.
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12.2.2 Causation and Adaptive Processes
The causal structure of the physical world determines the extent to which arbi-
trary changes might affect the organism. It also underlies and the effect of actions
or activities conducted by the organism. This causal structure is intrinsic to the
coupling that exists between the agent and its environment. From an alternative
evolutionary perspective, adaptive processes are those functional structures that
support the survival and reproduction of an organism in response to continuous
change and events both in the environment and internally. It does not seem un-
reasonable to conclude therefore, that these adaptive processes are in some sense
tuned to the causal structure of the world.
In an attempt to understand how adaptive processes have evolved to take
into account this underlying structure in the physical world, we seek to differen-
tiate between two classes of causality; continuous causation and event causation.
This is not intended to imply that two independent causal processes exist in any
physical sense. Ultimately, event causation is a macro-representation of complex
continuous processes. However, there are some benefits to be gained from employ-
ing dual representations of causality, where the two alternative representations
correspond to abstractions at differing levels. It allows us to present a single
model that integrates the two, and through this, explain functional organization
that encompasses both of these levels.
In doing so we seeking to define a functional archetype adopting a level of
abstraction comparable with that employed by Ashby. It is not intended to be
literal, but to capture some general principles that might help us to understand
the functional workings of a hypothetical brain. In the preface for ‘Design for
a Brain’, Ashby states that the book “considers mechanisms that change con-
tinuously” (page vii, Ashby [1960]). Ashby’s model of ultrastability comprises a
dual-loop architecture. The first loop controls reactive responses to changes in
the environment. The second loop modifies parameters of the first loop (the re-
acting part) when essential variables transgress beyond certain bounds. Despite
Ashby’s initial reference to continuous processes, step-functions play a key to his
model; “The step mechanisms affect the reacting part; by acting as parameters to
it they determine how it shall react to the environment” (page 98, Ashby [1960]).
313
12. Adaptive Replicator
Our model is in some ways an analogue of that proposed by Ashby. Where
we differ is in our focus on causation as an explanatory principle and in the
definition of internal functional structure using a set-theoretic approach (for an
extensive exposition of the potential role of category theory in neuroscience see
Ramrez [2010]). From our perspective, the first loop is primarily concerned with
processes of continuous causation and the second loop is concerned with event
causation. By augmenting our set-theoretic model with ideas that relate this to
causality, we illustrate how the internal functional structure of our model relates
to behaviour in the real world.
Note that typically causation is considered with respect to passive objects. In
this case, gravity acting on a falling apple might be considered the cause of apple’s
acceleration (an example of continuous causation), and a hammer striking a cup
might be considered the cause of it smashing (an example of event causation). We
wish to extend this idea to active objects. When we refer to continuous causation,
we imagine as an iconic example, the activity engaged by a man in placing a coffee
cup on a table. When we refer to event causation, we imagine the response of a
rabbit to the sound of gunshot. Intuitively we are able to recognize significant
qualitative differences between the two. In the first case, the man causes the
cup to move through the dynamic control of agonistic an antagonistic muscles
groups (an example of continuous causation). In the second case the sound of
the gunshot represents a discrete event, of some significance to the rabbit, that
results in it escaping (an example of event causation). An attempt is made to
capture these qualitative insights through defining certain functional structures.
We start from the idea that the internal functional structure of an object
determines its adaptive potential. Figure 12.1 illustrates schematically three ex-
amples of objects that possess varying degrees of adaptive potential. A simple
object is one that embodies a fixed function, whose output varies with environ-
mental state; figure 12.1 (a). An object whose activity is contingent on complex
internal and external states has the potential to exhibit more complex behaviour;
figure 12.1 (b). A reactive object that processes complex contingencies and modi-
fies the functional form and parameters of embedded functions is capable of even
more complex behaviour; figure 12.1 (c). We could imagine an object of arbitrary
complexity with an even greater capacity for adaptation. However, our goal is to
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seek to determine some general principles of functional organization that allow
us to envisage how sub-systems may be organized, integrated, and specialization
might take place. Ideally we wish to identify some canonical forms that exhibit
varying degrees of complexity and adaptive potential. Not only does this given
an insight into the functional integration of neural sub-systems, it also provides
us with clues as to how such systems might be created through approaches that
employ incremental evolution.
We arrive at the model of an adaptive replicator through incremental steps.
We first define what we mean by a reactive object. This is an abstract entity
capable of modifying its activity in response to continuously varying values or
in response to external events. We then define an adaptive object as a reactive
object that has the additional ability to modify its behaviour in response to
rewards. Finally we define an adaptive replicator as an variety of adaptive object
that is produced via the evolutionary robotics methodology (itself an abstraction
of biological evolution). The conjunction of these two perspectives results in
the model of a notional organism, comprising both; functional elements (that
imply the internal workings of the organism) and procedural elements (comprising
genetic, ontogenetic and continuous adaptive processes) that indicate how such
systems may be generated.
12.2.3 Continuous Causation
An example of continuous causation would be a man holding a cup by its handle,
thereby ‘causing’ the cup not to fall. We might imagine in such a case, that there
exists a control system that functions to maintain the cup in a stable position.
Such a system might control agonistic and antagonistic muscles to create a rigid
structure that allows for the support of the cup. The processes that support
such activity are engaged in what we might term continuous causation, and their
effect can be modelled by continuous functions with a minor change in notation
intended to reflect the existence of a causal relationship.
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12.2.3.1 Functions and Causation
When we see the words function and causation written together there is a cer-
tain jarring. The function is essentially a notion, whereas the roots of ideas of
causation originate in philosophy. It is unclear how we relate the two. We have
a strong intuitive sense of what we mean by causation. In its simplest form, it
comprises the following two elements;
• The change in object (P ) is sufficient to elicit a change in object (Q).
• The change in object (Q) occurs after that in object (P ).
Intuitively, if we apply a force to an object, then we would expect the object
to accelerate. This is typically expressed in the functional relationship;
F = ma (12.1)
Where F corresponds to force, m to the mass of the object and a to accelera-
tion. Alternatively we might write this relationship in a form where v represents
the velocity of the object.
dv
dt
= F/m (12.2)
In this case the we are referring to the infinitesimal change in velocity that
takes place over an infinitesimal period of time. In the domain of causation, we
acknowledge that the application of a force causes the acceleration of the object,
and implicit in this idea is that the force is applied prior to the acceleration taking
place. However, in the functional domain there is no recognition of this temporal
precedence. An alternative form, that might make explicit such a precedence is
rarely used;
v1 − v0
t1 − t0 = F0/m (12.3)
Such a formulation, whilst it implies that the application of the force precedes
the change in the velocity of the object, it loses the sense in which a continu-
ously applied force results in a continuous change in velocity. Equation 12.2 is
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an elegant shorthand for the mapping that exists between the set of values corre-
sponding to the velocity of an object at t to the codmain of values corresponding
to the velocity of the object an infinitesimal period afterwards under the applica-
tion of a force F that captures the continuous effect of this force. The relationship
that exists between the velocity of the object and that of the applied force is one
that we shall term continuous causation. Even though the functional descrip-
tion of this relationship does not make the precedence relationship that exists
between the two explicit (i.e. the requirement for the force to be applied prior
to the acceleration taking place), we cannot deny that it represents a functional
description of this causal relationship.
12.2.3.2 A Notation for Continuous Causation
Let us consider a general function of the form;
y = f(x) (12.4)
The explicit meaning of this equation is that there exists a domain corre-
sponding to a set of values, an element of which is represented by the dummy
variable x, that can be mapped via a function f to a codomain whose values
are represented by the dummy variable y. Sometimes we might refer to x as the
independent variable and y as the dependent variable, but even here we are not
explicitly defining a causal relationship, although the existence of such a function
might imply that a causal relationship might exist. In the context of our prior
discussion on causation, the meaning of this equation is now ambiguous. Whilst
it might describe the dynamics of a causal relationship (as in equation 12.2), the
functional description does not tell us if this is the case. If g is the inverse of
function f then we can just as equally write;
x = g(y) (12.5)
We remain uninformed as to the existence of any causal relationship that
might exist between the values of x and y. If we were to include such information
then we require an alternative notation, such as := where the colon side indicates
the dependent value. We are then able to rewrite the equations 12.4 and 12.5
317
12. Adaptive Replicator
where x is a causal value and y the dependent value in this form;
x =: g(y) or y := f(x) (12.6)
Returning to 12.2, we are then able to express causal relationships in the
following fashion;
dv
dt
:= F/m (12.7)
dv
dt
=: F/m (12.8)
Equation 12.7 might then refer to the application of a force (the cause) to an
object such that he object moves (the effect), equation 12.8 might refer to the
application of a force to an stationary object (the effect) due to the collision of
a moving object with it (the cause). The use of := notation is inspired by the
assignment operator used in some computer languages. For example in Pascal,
the following line of computer code results in the assignment of the value of x+ 1
to the variable x.
x := x+ 1 (12.9)
We shall adopt this notation to imply the existence of a causal relationship.
In this case := can be read as is caused by and =: can be read as causes.
12.2.3.3 Adaptation and Continuous Causation
When we consider adaptation we are concerned with changes that take place,
that are to the benefit of the entity that embodies these adaptive processes. If we
are to consider processes of continuous causation, the simplest causal relationship
may be represented by;
y := f(x) (12.10)
This is read as ‘y is caused by the function f of x’. There are two ways in
which we might imagine that a this causal relationship might be adaptive. The
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first is through parameter modification, of the form;
y := f(x,w) (12.11)
The second is through functional modification of the form;
y := f(x) where f = g[u] (12.12)
In this case we are employing g[] to represent a functor in the sense that it
is used in computer programming. By varying an index u, we are able to select
a function f from a finite set of functions that take the same parameters. By
combining the two we arrive at;
y := f(x,w) where f = g[u] (12.13)
Equation 12.13 then describes a process of continuous causation, where vari-
ations in w and u support parametric and functional adaptation respectively.
12.2.4 Event Causation
Intuitively we have a strong grasps of event causation. If a lighting bolt were
to strike a golfer, thus killing him, we would have no hesitation in saying that
the lighting bolt caused the death of the golfer. Although there may be some
continuous processes that underlie this event, we still see it as discrete event.
When we stop at a traffic light whilst driving a car, we wait for the lights to
change from red to green before proceeding. If a driver recommences their journey
when the light changes from red to green, we might also say that this event (the
light change) caused the driver to continue. However, there is a sense in which
this latter example is different from that of the former. We are conscious of the
fact that if the driver were waiting to pick someone up, then until this person
arrived, they would not proceed, irrespective of the colour of the traffic lights.
The light changing might not be sufficient to cause the driver to continue on their
way.
There are clearly differing degrees of event causation. We are able to differen-
tiate between them through the notions of sufficient, necessary and contributory
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Figure 12.2: Notions of causation: (a) Sufficient causation is where a
change in the value of vP always causes a change in the value zQ. (b) Nec-
essary Causation is where a change in the value of vP is necessary to change
the value zQ (i.e. it will not change without it), but is not guaranteed to do so.
An example of such a case where it does not do so, is where the change itself
is reliant upon some other internal state value.(c) Contributory Causation is
where a change in the value of vP is not necessary to cause a change in the value
of zQ (i.e. there is some independent process that might cause this change), and
even if there is a change in vP it does not to guarantee that a change in zQ will
occur.
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causation. Before discussing these however, it is worthwhile point out additional
point. When the lights change and the car moves, is it the lights changing that
cause the car to move, or the decision made by the driver to release the breaks
and press on the accelerator? When talking about causation it is useful to iden-
tify certain objects, that encompass properties, that have at any given point in
time, certain values. It is then through relating dependencies between values pos-
sessed by these various objects, that we are able to more clearly describe causal
relationships. In this case the traffic lights might correspond to one object, the
driver and car other objects. The property of illumination associated with the
traffic lights object, and their corresponding values (on or off) undergo changes
that elicit a cognitive responses on the driver object, that might cause them to
engage in certain actions.
Returning to the notions of sufficient, necessary and contributory causation,
let us define what we mean. Imagine that there are two objects P and Q, and
that P has a certain property that has the value vP . Object Q also possesses
a property whose value is given by zQ. Under these circumstances sufficient
causation is where a change in the value of vP always causes a change in the
value zQ. Necessary causation is where a change in the value of vP is necessary to
change the value zQ (i.e. it will not change without it), but zQ is not guaranteed
change even if vP does so. An example of such a case might be where the change
itself is reliant upon some internal state value of object Q. Contributory causation
is where a change in the value of vP is not necessary to cause a change in the
value of zQ (i.e. there is some independent process that might cause this change),
and even if there is a change in vP it does not to guarantee that a change in
zQ will occur. These definitions apply just as equally to continuous causation as
they do to event causation.
As mentioned earlier, our focus is on the functional structure that might
underlie such manifestations of causality. Figure 12.2 helps to illustrate possible
functional structures that would support the observed effects. When considering
have events are processed by the brain, we might imagine two classes of functions.
The first, which we shall term causal determinant functions and denote by the
symbol δ act as feature detectors. The second, which we shall term causal event
functions and denote by the symbol ε are responsible for the complex processing
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and mediation of detected features for the purposes of triggering internal changes.
It is the output of these event functions that associate with the idea of internal
events.
Whilst the terms sufficient, necessary and contributory causation are useful for
describing different varieties of causation, it is clear that a number of alternative
functional structures might underlie the processes of necessary and contributory
causation. They remain useful only from a very general perspective of illustrating
how different degrees or varieties of causality might manifest themselves. We
therefore concentrate on the functional structures themselves to illustrate how
systems that process events might relate to those of continuous variables. In
doing so we soon find that we are in need of quite a large repertoire of symbols to
explain the relationship between differing parts of the system. For this purpose we
are forced to introduce a new nomenclature before continuing with our exposition.
12.2.5 A Nomentclature for Reactive and Adaptive Ob-
jects
Figure 12.3 displays the nomenclature for object properties and their correspond-
ing values. We shall first explain these terms before going on to build a model
that employs them. Generally we shall use upper-case characters to denote sets
and lower-case characters to denote an element of a set. There is one exception
to this rule; that is in the use of the letters P and Q. We shall use these upper
case characters exclusively for representing objects. We shall use lower-case Greek
letters to denote functions and functors, and upper-case Greek letters to denote
sets of functions and functors.
12.2.5.1 Properties and Values
We start with an abstract set of objects. One such object might be a cup, for
example. To differentiate this cup from any other cup, we will assign it a letter,
unique to this object P . This object has a number of properties. The set of
properties for the object P is Ap. The cup might have a ‘number of handles’
property ap. If we wish to refer to another property, the ‘colour’ of the cup, we
need a way of differentiating between them. For this purpose we use an index
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variable. The ‘number of handles’ property is then aP,0. and the ‘colour’ property
is aP,1. This allows us to refer to an arbitrary property by the term aP,j, where j
is an index variable.
In addition to the set of properties Ap, the object P also has a set of values
Bp. For each element in the set Ap there exists a corresponding element in the
set Bp that represents the value of the property. For example, the value of the
‘number of handles’ property aP,0 is 1, the value of the ‘colour’ property aP,1 is
pink.
Now let us introduce a third property, corresponding to the ‘age’ of the cup.
Unlike the first two properties this property changes with time. So as to dif-
ferentiate between these two property types, we assign each property to subsets
containing elements of the same property type. The first subset ACP corresponds
to the set of constant properties, and the second subset ASP corresponds to the
set of properties that are time-dependent. The elements of the set ACP are now
aCP,0 and a
C
P,1 for the ‘number of handles’ and ‘colour’ properties respectively. The
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subset ACP only has one element a
S
P,0, the ‘age’ of the cup. For reasons of con-
venience we shall use aCP,j and a
S
P,j to refer to arbitrary elements in each of the
sets ACP and A
S
P , rather than a
C
P,j and a
C
P,i. Strictly speaking we should us both
i and j as indeces to indicate that we are referencing elements in different sets.
For convenience however, j is to be interpeted as a local index, specific to the
property subset, rather than an index that enumerates all properties in the set
Ap.
As mentioned previously, each property of object P has a corresponding el-
ement in the set of object values BP . Just as we wish to differentiate between
properties of a different type, we also wish to differentiate between their values by
property type. So in set BP (the set of object P values) there exists two subsets,
Sp (with members that correspond to time-varying values) and Cp (with mem-
bers that correspond to constant values). The value of the ‘number of handles’
property aCP,0, maps to cP,0 and the ‘colour’ property a
C
P,1 maps to cP,1. The value
of the ‘age’ property aSP,0 maps to sP,0. Note that we are no longer required to
employ a property type superscript when we refer to property values. We can do
this since for example, the S used to denote the subset of properties ASP,j and
corresponding members aSP,j, is also used to represent the set of time-dependent
values SP , with elements sP,j. Figure 12.3 displays this clearly in diagrammatic
form.
12.2.5.2 Event and Time Superscripts
It is sometimes the practice to refer to the value of a variable at different times
through the use of a superscript, for example s0P,0 might refer to the ‘age’ value
at time 0 and s1P,0 at time 1. In our model an object can exhibit value changes
that are continuously varying (continuous causation) and value changes that are
event dependent (event causation). Note that not all continuously varying values
are explicitly time dependent. However, for the purposes of this explanation,
we shall concentrate on those that are. For this reason we shall employ two
superscripts. The first superscript is used to indicate the number of events that
have occurred. The second superscript corresponds to the current time index.
Let us say we have a value y that is a function of both time and events. The
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term y0,0 has superscripts which indicate that zero events have occurred and that
the current time index value is zero. After one event has occurred we use the
term y1,0, after two events y2,0, and so on. If no events have occurred, but time
has progressed (indicated by a time index changing from 0 to 1), we use y0,1. If
for example two events have occurred, and a period of time ∆t has elapsed, we
would use y2,∆t. Note that the second superscript always refers to time, and the
first the number of events that have occurred. In order to avoid ambiguity we
shall use both superscripts even when the variable is only event dependent, or
only time-dependent. We shall only avoid using these superscripts when referring
to constant values. Generally speaking, we shall use a notation that is indicative
of a system that employs discrete time, although the model that we propose is
equally as valid for use with continuous time, with a minor change of notation.
Returning to our earlier example, let us consider again the ‘age’ property. We
shall use the character σP,j to indicate a function that is time dependent, where;
P identifies the object to which we refer and j denotes the index of the property
aSP,j, and sP,j refers to the time-dependent value (since SP,j represents the set of
all values that are time-dependent).
In section 12.2.3.2 when we first introduced the idea of continuous causation,
we used y := f(x) to indicate a continuous causal relationship between the causal
value x and the dependent value y, where the change in the dependent value y is
determined by the function f . We replace this notion with;
s0,1P,j := σP,j(s
0,0
P,j) (12.14)
12.2.5.3 A notation for functors
Previously in section 12.2.3.3 when discussing the ways in which continuous causal
relationships may be adapted we briefly introduced the notion of functors where;
y := f(x) where f = g[u] (12.15)
In this case g represents a functor. The value returned by g[u] is a function,
where g[u] corresponds to the selection of an element in a set of functions indexed
by the value u. We borrow our notation from the C and C++ programming
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languages (where g would correspond to an array of function pointers and f
would correspond to a function pointer variable).
We imagine a set of functors (denoted by Θ). An individual element in this set
is denoted by the symbol θj, where j represents an index into the set of functors
Θ. We also define a set of functor states U , whose individual elements correspond
to a functor state values uj. The current value of a functor state uj corresponds
to the associated functor index. For each entry in the set of functors Θ, there
exists a corresponding entry in the set of functor states U . The current functor
state value for a given functor defines a function σ;
σ = θj[uj] analogous to our original f = g[u]. (12.16)
12.3 Reactive Objects
Here we describe the functional structure of entities that exhibit both continuous
and event causation, starting from simple to increasingly complex systems. We
use the terms simple objects, reactive objects and adaptive objects to indicate
increasing levels of complexity and adaptive potential. This section is concerned
with the first two; simple objects, reactive objects. We shall deal with adaptive
objects in the following section (section 12.4).
12.3.1 Elements of an Reactive Object
Figure 12.5 illustrates the internal structure of two simple objects ; object P con-
tains processes that support only continuous causation, object Q supports event
causation, employing our new nomenclature.
In the case of continuous causation (figure 12.5(a)) we presume the existence
of a set of functions Σ, elements of which we denote as σ. We also assume the
existence of a set of continuously varying values S whose elements are denoted by
the symbol s. External objects that are the source of continuously varying values
that influence the simple object are denoted by the set Fobj., with corresponding
elements denoted by the symbol fobj.. It is the existence of functions of the form
σ(t, s, fobj.) (where time t denotes time) that determine the response of the object
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to continuously varying external values modified by internal state.
The comparable functional structure for simple objects that respond to ex-
ternal events is slightly more complex (figure 12.5(b)). In order to account for
varying degrees of causation we presume the existence of determinant functions
(δ) that act as feature detectors and event functions (ε) that trigger changes in
the object based on the processing of the output of these feature detection func-
tions (see figure 12.2). The determinant functions determine values d (elements of
the set of determinant values D) which in turn determine the output of the event
functions; the event values e (elements of the set of event values E). Individual
state values that are event-dependent are denoted by z, elements of the set Z.
We presume the existence of functions µ that determine how the values of Z are
updated due to the occurrence of events.
We used to the term simple objects in both cases, since they support processes
of continuous causation or event causation. What is of greater interest is how
two such systems might interact. The detection of the occurrence of an event
typically takes place at a discrete point in time, resulting in some step change
in some internal state values. In contrast the processes of continuous causation
occur continuously. It therefore seems reasonable to presume, that if two such
systems were integrated, that it would be the event detection system that is the
primary determinant of changes in the continuous causation subsystem.
We discussed earlier in section 12.2.3.3 how processes of continuous causation
might be subject to change via parametric or function adaptation. Our concept of
a reactive object incorporates both of these elements. Figure 12.5 (a) illustrates
a hypothetical functional structure where parameter adaptation takes place in
response to processes intended to capture aspects of event causation. Figure 12.5
(b) illustrates how processes associated with event causation are able to influence
function adaptation in continuous causal processes.
In the case of parameter modification (figure 12.5 (a)), the event-dependent
values (elements z of the set Z), are included as parameters in functions that
update continuously varying values of the form σ(t, s, z, fobj.).
Function modification is slightly more complex (figure 12.5 (b)). We imagine
that there exist values u (elements of the set of functor states U) that are also
event-dependent. We presume the existence of a set Θ, where each element
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corresponds to a functor. The functor state arguments determine the current
function δ that a functor θ expresses. The result of this is that functions of the
form σ(t, s, z, fobj.), are subject to modification, such that the function itself is a
variable whose value is determined by the functor state u; σu(t, s, z, fobj.).
We define a reactive object as an entity whose internal functional structure,
undergoes both both parametric and functional modification in response to the
occurrence of events. The functional structure outlined is neither radical nor com-
plex. It represents the simplest possible system that we are able to imagine where
processes associated with continuous causation are subject change in response to
event causation. The internal functional structure of a reactive object is depicted
in figure 12.7, and in a modified version in figure 12.8 (where the internal diagram
is intended to depict the functional structure underlying function adaptation).
12.3.2 The Reactive Object from an Ashby Perspective
The whole point of constructing the graph theoretic models of an adaptive object,
is to lay out an unambiguous model of how processes of event causation may
relate to those of continuous causation, and in doing so present a functional
model of primitive brain capable of supporting adaptive behaviour. Whilst an
internal diagram of the functional structure of the model has been constructed
that delineates this functional structure, there is also some value in comparing
our reactive object model with that Ashby’s model of ultrastability (referred to
in section 2.5.2).
There are a number of congruent features of the two models. The first is the
notion of a dual-loop structure. We have recreated the reactive object model
in a form that is comparable with that proposed by Ashby (see figure 2.10)
in figure 12.10. The structural similarities between the two are immediately
apparent. In our model the processes that relate to continuous causation, are
directly comparable with those of Asby’s ‘reacting part’. The processes that relate
to event causation replace the functionality that was fulfilled in Ashby’s model
by the maintenance of ’essential variables’ (justification for such a replacement is
supported by the work that we recounted in section 5.5.1).
Ashby identified two loops; the first loop, that was responsible for respond-
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ing to changes in the environment, and the second loop, which was responsible
for adjusting the parameters of the ‘reacting part’, when the essential variables
transgressed certain bounds. In the case of our reactive object model, the first
loop is engaged with processes of continuous causation, and the second loop with
those of event causation. Not only are there similarities in the structure of these
two loops, there are also similarities in the functional characteristics. Ashby re-
lates the first loop to continuously changing values, and the second loop to step
functions or mechanisms. This is entirely consistent with our model the dynamic
characteristics of our continuous and event causation sub-systems respectively.
The key differences between the two models are the extent to which we define the
internal functional structure of the reactive object, and the replacement of the
‘maintenance of essential variables’ feature of Ashby’s second loop. Another dif-
ference is in the use of concepts of causation in our explanation of the functional
significance of our architecture. We add further complexity to our model when
we introduce the notion of the adaptive object in the following section.
12.4 Adaptive Objects
So far in our reactive object model we have delineated a functional structure
whereby adaptation of continuous processes occurs through a system of event
processing. However, there is nothing intrinsic to this structure that ensures that
these changes occur so as to improve that ability of an organism to engage in
‘positive’ adaptation. In the case of an organism, positive adaptation might refer
to the ability of the organism to modify its behaviour such that its chances of
survival and reproduction were improved. For this we present the notion of an
adaptive object.
An adaptive object is one that exhibits the internal functional structure
of the reactive object, but also incorporates that promote learning (what we
have referred to previously as continuous adaptation). This we achieve with
the inclusion of two additional functional units; those relating to rewards and
memory. The functional integration of these units is displayed in figure 12.9.
Their incorporation creates a third loop, whereby rewards and memory become
part of the causal event processing system. It represents an inner loop, of the
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second loop primarily related to event processing.
Memory supports the persistence of external and internal state values. In
doing so, it allows for the possibility of state sequences as an input to the de-
terminant functions (feature detectors), thus allowing for more complex event
processing by the event functions. The reward system allows for the possibility
of parameter and function modification of the discriminant and event functions,
in addition to the role that the system might play in the identification of events.
The incorporating a rewards system into the model provides for some basis for
training adaptive objects. This addresses on of the principal weaknesses Ashby’s
homeostat (see section 2.5.2.2) as an alternative to automatic computation.
12.4.1 The Brain as an Adaptive Object
An obvious question to ask ourselves is whether or not the model that we have
proposed bears any correspondence at all with that of biological systems. There is
no doubt that such a comparison is highly speculative (and possibly without any
merit) but this should not preclude us from at least asking the question. At the
very least, it provides us with a model or hypothesis of functional organization in
the brain against which other hypothesis can be compared. The results of such a
comparison are illustrated in figure 12.11.
• Cerebellum: The cerebellum is the part of the brain that is most closely
associated with motor control, and as such maps to our notion of contin-
uous causation and the processes that might support it. Afferents to the
cerebellum would include in our model; signals that support its parametric
and functional modification through event-dependent (z) and functor state
values (u) respectively. Note that we briefly described a functional model
of the internal workings of the cerebellum, and how this might relate some
macro-model of brain functionality in section 5.5.1.
• Thalamus: The thalamus is generally characterized as fulfilling the role of
a matrix switch or relay. Its nearest correspondence in our model relates to
the switching that takes place in the cerebellum due to changes in functor
state (u). The determinant of such switching is our event-processing system.
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• Basal Ganglia: The basal ganglia is principally associated with reward
related activity in the brain. It is most closely analogous in our model
to systems that process events, and determine the impact that this has
on lower-level (continuous causal) sub-system. Within the basal ganglia
system the striatum fulfils the role of our determinant functions, and the
globus pallidus fulfils the role of our event functions.
• Cerebral Cortex: The cerebral cortex is primarily regarded as supporting
associative memory and feature mapping. Both of these attributes corre-
spond to inputs to our determinant functions.
We do not claim that this represents a definitive explanation of the func-
tional organization of the brain at a macro level. Our adaptive object model
however, does represent a first-approximation hypothesis. The most obvious crit-
icism that could be made of this model as a hypothesis of brain function is that
it does not incorporate the functionality of the hippocampus. The hippocampus
is implicated in prediction and sequence-learning (Lisman and Redish [2009] and
Okatan [2009], Ginther et al. [2011]), uncertainty (Harrison et al. [2006]), mem-
ory (Eichenbaum and Fortin [2009], MacDonald et al. [2011]), navigation (Morgan
et al. [2011]), conditioning (Melissa Flesher et al. [2011]), reinforcement-learning
(Hirel et al. [2010]) and goal directed behvaiour (Pennartz et al. [2011]). Such
a criticism would certainly be true. In fact, this entire thesis essentially ignores
the role that the hippocampus might play in reinforcement learning. This is not
however intended to signify a lack of importance of hippocampus, only that it
is beyond the scope of this thesis. Both the cerebellum and hippocampus are
highly complex structures in the brain that no doubt incorporate significant spe-
cialized functionality. In contrast with the basal-ganglia the hippocampus (given
its functional relationship with the amygdala) is likely to be the key organ that
mediates between goals, taking into account both negative consequences and pos-
itive rewards. The basal-ganglia in comparison is less complex. An extension of
the work described in this thesis would be to seek to develop a more sophisti-
cated functional model of the hippocampus and its relationship with other brain
systems.
339
12. Adaptive Replicator
At least as a first approximation however, the functionality identified by our
adaptive object model does appear to correspond (at least in the most vulgar
fashion) to that which we know to exist in the brain. The dopamine system
in particular is implicated in adaptation in both the cerebral cortex and basal
ganglia, representing the primary adaptive signal in our ‘third loop’.
12.4.2 Complementary Neural Systems
The idea that the brain comprises complementary neural systems is not new.
Grossberg proposed the idea that (originally in Grossberg [2000] and extended
considerably in Grossberg [2011]) the brain employs complementary circuits that
relate to ’what’ (spatial invariant object representations) and ’where’ (spatial
maps and movement). Whilst this may be the case, the version of complemen-
tary functionality to which our adaptive object model corresponds more closely to
that that outlined by Doya, where he identifies the cerebral cortx, basal ganglia
and cerebellum as distinct areas that are closely related to unsupervised learn-
ing, reinforcement learning and supervised learning respectively (Doya [2000]).
Together with Capi, Doya propose the idea that the functionality of evolved cir-
cuits are adapted to environmental dynamics (Capi and Doya [2005]). This is
essentially the idea that we are expounding here, however, we identify causality,
in its continuous and discrete forms, as the key world features to which adaptive
processes ultimately become shaped.
A common notion relating to complementary functionality in the brain is that
of goal-directed and stimulus driven attention (Corbetta and Shulman [2002]).
There is evidence to suggest that attention is focussed volitionally by ’top-down’
signals, as well as through ’bottom-up’ saliency signals (Buschman and Miller
[2007], Cabeza et al. [2009] and Cabeza et al. [2012]). This is not inconsistent
with our adaptive object model, since the ’top-down’ signals correspond to those
that originate from the ’third’ and ’second loops’ (part of our events system),
whereas the ’bottom-up’ signals correspond to factors that comprise inputs to
the determinant functions (that trigger changes in the events system) originating
in the systems of continuous causation. Corbetta et al refer to neural systems that
support ’reorienting’ (Corbetta et al. [2008]), that interrupts and resets ongoing
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activity in a fashion that is comparable to functionality supported by our events
subsystem.
12.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter is to multiple. In its most general sense it is intended
to bring together some of the ideas that have been developed over the course of
this thesis, through a general model of an adaptive replicator. In section 2.5.1.1
we identified three adaptive processes (genetic, ontogenetic and continuous) and
outlined their integration in what we termed a bauplan for an adaptive organ-
ism . An entity that complies with this bauplan and can also be modelled as an
adaptive object we shall term an adaptive replicator . Evolutionary robotics
as a methodology is challenging, since it requires a mastery of both these dimen-
sions. We need to conceive of a functional model of the agent’s neural systems
as a potential target for the evolution of more primitive circuits. The more com-
plex the system, the more difficult this becomes. It is for this purpose, that the
adaptive object concept is of particular use. It is an abstraction that describes
the macro organization of a hypothetical brain at a level higher than that of the
neural circuits themselves.
A superficial glance of this thesis may give the impression that it is disjointed.
We started by investigating GasNets and then shifted to reward adaptive circuits.
It is however the difference that exists between these two neural network classes
that attracts us to them, since our over-riding goal is to determine neural network
models that are both complementary and tractable to evolutionary search. Gas-
Nets represent a form of neural networks that have characteristics suited to that
of the processes of continuous causation. They accept exteroceptive and propio-
ceptive sensor inputs and generate motor outputs. These are typical of the kind
of circuits that we might expect to find in Ashby’s reacting part (comprising his
‘first loop’). The conditional circuits of the ’second loop’ segment and interrupt
the sensor-motor patterns of the ’first loop’, resulting in significant changes in
apparent behaviour. However it is through the ’third-loop’ that modulates the
discover and replay of these segments. Sensor-motor pattern sequences that result
in reward are reinforced so that there is a greater likelihood of being repeated.
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Although we know from earlier work that CTRNN’s (see chapter 3) are suited
to problems of locomotion, other researchers confirm they are less suited to solv-
ing problems whose solution represents some analogue of a finite state machine
(Phattanasri et al. [2007a]). This mirrors our findings with GasNets reported
in chapter 4. In seeking to explain this, the authors state; ”Rather, we believe
that it was the discrete combinatorial nature of the food edibility learning task
that made circuits so difficult to evolve.” (p 392, Phattanasri et al. [2007a]). The
combinatorial processing of multiple inputs is a core feature of the class of reward
adaptive circuits presented in this thesis (as demonstrated in its most simplest
form in section 8.4). The combination of these two circuit varieties is therefore
of particular interest.
Our adaptive object model helps us to understand how such complementary
circuits might be integrated. This integrative role is partly fulfilled by they ‘sec-
ond loop’, by the modification of the systems that relate to the processing of
continuous inputs, by an event processing system. We identified two routes by
which such modification might take place; that of parameter modulation and
function replacement. GasNets have the potential to undergo parameter mod-
ification through existing neuromodulatory processes. Parameter modification
is therefore trivial to implement. In addition, the output of our reward adap-
tive circuits can be used for the purpose of determining functor state (u values),
and therefore function replacement. This could be implemented via a system
that supports the selective activation and deactivation of independent GasNet
subsystems, in an architectural form similar to that outlined in section 5.5.1).
Whilst by no means complete, the work outlined in this thesis suggests one
possible solution to the problem of integrating reward-adaptive circuits with neu-
ron models supportive of locomotion. This may well be sufficient to allow us to
make considerable progress in our goal of simulating increasingly complex be-
haviour.
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Conclusions
This thesis commences with a comparative study of adaptive networks suitable for
neuroevolution. GasNets, together with some other forms of dynamic models of
neural networks, were shown to be particularly useful for the generation of sensor-
motor control circuits suitable for supporting legged locomotion. On discovering
that GasNets were less suited to problem domains that require some analogue of
a finite-state machine, an attempt was made to hand-code a solution to such a
problem, and in so doing, identify architectural features that might be significant
in solving such a class of problems. In comparing these features with biological
systems, the basal ganglia appeared to be a structure of particular significance,
and by implication, the role of dopamine as a neuromodulator implicated in
reinforcement learning.
One particular aspect of dopamine signalling appeared to offer a clue as to the
underlying processes that might regulate dopamine phasic signalling. This is the
effect that is observed, when dopamine signalling levels drop significantly lower
than basal levels, when an anticipated reward fails to materialize. Speculation
that this might be explained by some process whose function might be to support
energy efficient signalling, led us to the creation of a novel neuron model.
A small conceptual leap enabled us to imagine how a small group of such
neurons, in competition, could support a tri-modal action selection system, in-
corporating; selection, exploration and exclusion (see chapter 8). Similarities
with the role of the medium spiny neurons (MSN) in the striatum are striking,
potentially providing us with a functional explanation for the up-down states that
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Figure 13.1: Categories of Learning in the Brain: This schematic was pre-
sented by Doya to illustrate the complementary roles of basal ganglia and cere-
bellum. Supervised learning is commonly implemented through multi-layer
perceptrons. Unsupervised learning is implemented by self-organizing fea-
ture maps. The circuits presented in this thesis comprise a new class of reward
adaptive circuits that fulfil the role of reinforcement Learning. Source Doya
[2000].
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are characteristic of these neurons. It is interesting to note that these patterns
of activation are also prevalent in the cerebral cortex (Holcman and Tsodyks
[2006]), potentially implying some functional correspondence between the two.
There is evidence to suggest that this is also modulated by dopaminergic projec-
tions (Lewis and O’Donnell [2000] and O’Donnell [2003]).
Circuits comprising these model neurons (which we sometimes refer to as
Rayleigh neurons), have as an intrinsic feature, a reduction in excitation of the
source neuron with a concomitant increase in responsiveness of the target neuron),
as part of an energy regulatory regime. This occurs when an important input-
output (sensory-motor) association has been made. The concept of valued or
significant association pathways undergoing inhibition provides us with a poten-
tial explanation for the prevalence of inhibitory pathways in the striato-thalamic
loop. This model of excitation reduction in our neuron model (for the purposes
of supporting energy efficient signalling), potentially changes our perspective on
the role of non-local inhibitory pathways from one of blocking or stopping to one
of dynamic channel regulation through amplitude modulation.
In a more general sense these results are supportive of the idea that intrinsic
rather than task-evoked signalling should be given greater consideration (Raichle
[2006]) in seeking to understand the functional nature of the brain. The proposed
neuron model supports a hypothesis that under certain circumstances neural
signalling may take place close to some basal limit, and that excitation levels and
synaptic weights are dynamically adjusted to maintain energy efficient signalling
(a simple example of which is demonstrated in section 8.4). Whilst chapter 4
represents a crude attempt to incorporate energy efficiency into fitness measures
(from the perspective of energy expended in action), a shift in focus to the energy
efficiency of brain signalling systems may provide us with a more appropriate basis
upon which to evolve artificial neural circuits that are closer to those found in
biological systems.
Figure 13.1 illustrates three key brain regions and the categories of learning
that we associate with them (Doya [2000]). We associate the cortex with un-
supervised learning. Self-organizing feature maps are often used to model such
systems. We associate the cerebellum with supervised learning. We often model
such systems with multi-layer perceptrons. Whilst the basal ganglia is associ-
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ated with reinforcement learning, we do not have a class of simple connectionist
models that capture the characteristics of this system. Reinforcement learning
problems are usually solved through techniques and algorithms that originate
from dynamic programming or control theory. This thesis proposes a number of
simple circuits that with further development could provide us with connectionist
models that are useful in supporting reward adaptive learning.
Evolutionary robotics is at its foundation biologically inspired. It seeks to
prioritize biologically plausible models over more abstract models. Our ability to
extend this field of work is reliant upon our understanding of biological systems
(from which inspiration is drawn) and models that adopt the appropriate level of
abstraction. The models and circuits proposed here, are neither overly complex,
nor do they lack biological plausibility. At the same time, they complement
functionality that is already adequately provided by GasNets and other adaptive
networks for the purposes of robotic simulation. Work that combines these two
approaches offers us the potential of supporting increasingly complex behaviours.
We conclude the thesis with the portrayal of a formal model that may be of use
in understanding how complementary circuits might be integrated. This model
is inspired by the work of W. Ross Ashby (referred to principally in sections
2.5, section 5.5.1 and in chapter 12), whose ideas help to provide a common
perspective from which the seemingly disparate areas addressed in this thesis can
be seen to be part of a coherent whole.
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Appendix A
Software Application Framework
A.1 Application Framework Overview
The vast majority of time expended on the creation of software designed to sup-
port the work described in this thesis went into the creation of an application
framework in C++. It was designed from the start to be a framework targeted
to support high-performance simulation applications. It is a modern architecture
that has been designed with multi-threaded programming in mind. Through a
high degree of isolation between components it is also targeted at development
teams who may wish to work on individual components without the need to re-
compile the entire application. This supports large-scale development teams who
may well be geographically remote from one another.
This framework is intended to achieve the following goals;
• Flexibility: Applications can be composed in their entirety from a simple
application meta-program script. A minimal run-time engine instantiates
the script into a full application. Cutting and pasting of the segments of the
script allows for the creation of entirely new applications with a maximum
of code reuse.
• Performance: The use of computational resources is optimized through
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the use of multi-threading techniques in both component creation and com-
munication.
• Simplicity: The complexity of multi-threaded programming is hidden from
the user by the extensive use of threaded base classes.
• Efficiency: Serialization classes and utility tools are provided for the au-
tomation of labour intensive programming activities.
• Spreadability: Through the use of binary buffers and the support for
asynchronous and synchronous communication it should be relatively trivial
to convert an application from a stand-alone to a distributed application.
The main features of the framework are summarized below;
• Plug-in Framework: Plug-in based architectures are common in high-end
commercial applications where program modules are loaded dynamically at
run-time. Users are allowed to create their own plug-ins that significantly
extend and expend component functionality.
• Meta-program Language: A meta-program language was created (based
in Lua) that specifies the components that create an application and the
dependencies between them. This gives us a high-level abstraction of pro-
gram modules and allows for the maximum flexibility in the creation of
applications through the composition of plug-in modules. A meta-program
component exists that can instantiate its own application, supporting the
hierarchic composition of meta-programs.
• Binary Serialization: These classes allow for the automatic serializa-
tion of arbitrary data. These classes are used extensively in the framework,
supporting; the automatic display and editing of data in user interface com-
ponents, a common standard for communication between components.
• Component Communication: Communication between components can
either be synchronous or asynchronous. All communication between com-
ponents takes place via memory-mapped files which act as buffers for use
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by the binary serialization classes. Applications can be composed of com-
ponents that are coupled either synchronously or asynchronously.
• Threaded Components: Threaded component classes comprise the build-
ing blocks of the application framework. The application framework has
been designed and written from the start to support mult-threaded appli-
cations.
• OpenGL Components: Real-time visualization classes have been written
in OpenGL. Note that under windows OpenGL windows each have their
own thread, allowing for the construction of highly efficient visualization
applications on modern processors (each OpenGL render window has its
own thread).
• GUI Components: GUI components have been written primarily to sup-
port spread-sheet like parameter editing and simulation controls. They
have been written to allow for the integration of the application framework
within and existing windows based application (allowing for the creation of
child windows), as well as allowing for the creation of top-level windows.
• Physics Simulations: Components exits to support 3D (NVidia’s PhysX
library) and 2D (the Box2D Library) simulations.
• Utilities A code generator based on text templates has been created for
use in the creation of custom buffer classes (with automatic serialization
built-in).
A.2 The Meta-program Language
The application framework unique in that an entire application can be instantia-
tion from a simple text based script. This script comprises a meta-program lan-
guage that acts as a high-level description of the application in terms of a number
of components and the dependency relationships between them. A component is
a class instance created from a class factory contained in a Dynamic Link Library
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(DLL). On first running the run-time framework first examines the local directo-
ries for a plug-in manifesto (a text list of accessible DLLs housing components).
If one is not found, then one is created by first searching the local directories for
compatible DLLs. The plug-in manifesto stores the name and location of each
component accessible by the application. On parsing the meta-program script
the relevant DLL’s are loaded into application memory, components created, and
the dependencies between them instantiated. This section gives an over-view of
the meta-program script and how it relates to the composition of an application.
The meta-program script is written in Lua (an embeddable scripting lan-
guage). The meta-program script is written with a syntactic structure that acts
as a declarative language for the composition and structure of a component based
application. However, we are able to make use of the Lua run-time interpreter
for the execution of commands that allow for the dynamic modification of the
application. This description however focuses on the key characteristics of the
meta-program script in its declarative form. For readers unfamiliar with Lua
syntax we have also included C++ like pseudo-code listings to help explain the
significance of the meta-program code blocks.
A.2.1 Structure of a Meta-program File
A meta-program file comprises three key elements (see A.1);
1. Alias Table(s): The first part of a meta-program is a list of aliases to
which we can assign a component type. Quite simply, an alias corresponds
to a component type variable. Each component has a single string (written
as a literal string, corresponding to the components name) which we can
interpret as the type of the component. If we wish to update the application
to use a modified component, all we have to do is to assign the new com-
ponent name to the alias of the component type that we wish to replace.
This allows us a single point of change when modifying a meta-program
script to replace an existing component. It also provides us with a single
reference location for examining what components this application relies
on. We refer to this meta-program section as the table of aliases or alias
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table. It is possible to have multiple alias tables in a single meta-program
script.
2. Instance Table(s): This is the heart of the meta-program. A single in-
stance table, contains a number of collections. In each collection we have
(1) the names of instances of components to be created (paired with its
type alias), (2) the dependencies that exist between these components. We
refer to the declaration of instances as a instance list, and the declaration
of dependencies as the dependency list. A single instance table may have
within it multiple collections. We are able to differentiate between local
(component instances in the same collection) and non-local (component in-
stances in other collections) components in a dependency list through minor
changes in syntax. In the table of aliases we have an alias for every compo-
nent type. In a single collection we are able to create multiple instances of
the same component type, and differentiate between these instances when
we specify the component dependencies.
3. Application Table: Whilst a meta-program script may contain a number
of alias tables and instance tables, it will only ever contain one applica-
tion table. The application table lists the alias and instance tables that
comprise the application. When the meta-program script is parsed, this is
the first table that is inspected. The names of the alias tables included here
will first be parsed, before the named instance tables are parsed and compo-
nents created. The final stage of parsing is to instantiate the dependencies
that exist between created components.
The meta-program language is intended as a high-level language that hides
much of the implementation details of the components, whilst maximizing the
flexibility of application creation through component composition. A key part of
this process is in the high-level description of dependencies between components.
The meta-program describes the dependencies that exist between components
in the dependency lists present in each collection (found in the instance tables).
Currently there are four major dependency types;
1. Windows: This dependency type relates to graphical user interface (GUI)
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(1) Alias Table
Associates a type alias with a module type
(2) Instantiation Table
Defines the components to be created and the dependencies between them.
Collection 1
Lists module instances and dependencies
Collection 2
(d) Dependencies
Describes component dependencies
(c) Component Instantiation
Defines the component instances to be created
(3) Application Table
A list of all Alias and Instantiation Tables comprising this application
(3) Ports: Specified components have a communication 
channel between them.
(a) GUI Components
(b) Functional Components (non-GUI)
(1) Windows: Specified parent component acts as the host
window for the specified child components.
(2) Visualize: Specified child component acts as the target
for the specified render component.
(e) List of Alias Tables in this Application
(f) List of Instantiation Tables in this Application
(4) Serialization: Specified master component is used to 
Serialize data from the slave components.
Figure A.1: Meta-program Structure
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components. Currently there exist two component types that create win-
dows that act as a host for other meta-program components which create
child windows. One of these components creates a top-level window that
acts as a host. The other creates a host window inside an existing Windows
application. In either case, we are able to specify a dependency relationship
between the parent host window and any child windows created by other
GUI components. The role of these host windows is simply to manage and
arrange the child windows attached to them by this dependency relation-
ship. All windows management is taken care of by these host windows and
existing child window components.
2. Visualization: There is one particular GUI component type that re-
quires an explicit dependency associated with it. This is where we have
an OpenGL render component. The render component does not of itself
create a child window. It requires a separate child window component to
act as a render target. This child window also reflects back any user in-
teraction to the render component to allow it to modify the visualization
display. One of the reasons for the separation of the functionality of the
child window and the OpenGL render component is to allow for a more flex-
ible application framework. A standard child component allows us to route
user interactions to a render component without knowing how the image
is to be prepared. It allows us to replace the render component without
modifying the way in which the user interacts with the display.
3. Ports: At the core of meta-program application framework is the notion
of ports. A port is a bidirectional communication channel created between
specified components, allowing for synchronous and asychronous communi-
cations between components that may or may not be executing independent
threads. Port implementation details are described in section A.3. Commu-
nication through ports takes place through standardized binary serialization
buffers. The standardization of these buffers allows us to support commu-
nication between components without needing to know the implementation
details of either the transmitter or receiver. Providing the binary layout of
the serialization buffer remains constant, we are able to replace individual
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components significant upgrades without the need to replace the alternate
component that constitutes the communicating pair.
4. Serialization: Since the meta-program script supports the arbitrary com-
position of components, it is useful to have a standardized means by which
program state data can be saved to and retrieved from files. We have cre-
ated specialized components who act as managers for the serialization of
application wide (and component specific) data. We specify the name of
the component instance that is to act as the serialization manager and seri-
alization support will automatically be available to meta-program instances
should the need use of it.
A.2.2 A Minimal Simulation Application
As an aid to understanding we shall describe the key meta-program features in
the context of a minimal application comprising five components (see figure A.2).
This program comprises many of the key components that we might expect to
find in an application intended for simulation, and is based on a real application
used to investigate the characteristics of Self-Organizing Feature Maps (SOFMs).
The five components include;
1. Master Window Component: that acts as a top-level window under
the Windows operating system. Note that although we use a top-level
window here, it is possible to embed the entire framework within an existing
application providing we have access to a single window as host.
2. Simulation Component: This component hosts the simulation model for
the SOFM. It is threaded component that owns its own control and worker
thread. It is this worker thread that is responsible for carrying out the
simulation of the SOFM model.
3. Grid Component: On start-up the simulation component first publishes
the model parameters to the grid component. The user is then able to
modify these parameters by modifying the entries in the grid component.
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(1) Window Host Component(1) Window Host Component
(5) Simulation 
Component
(5) Simulation 
Component
(4) Render Component(4) Render Component
(2) User-Interface
Grid Component
(2) User-Interface
Grid Component
SOFM Weights
Model Params Display Params
Grid Value 
Update
Grid Values
Grid Value 
Update
User InputUser Input Training Vectors Block Display
Point Color Data
(3) Window Child
Component
(3) Window Child
Component
Figure A.2: Components for a minimal simulation application
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These modifications will be automatically reflected back to the simulation
component.
4. Visualization Component: For the purposes of understanding how the
model is performing we use an OpenGL render component. This component
allows us to render the SOFM in a 3-dimensional space. It also displays
a strip corresponding to the input vectors used to train the SOFM. The
OpenGL render component has its own thread.
5. Child Window Component: The visualization component is unable to
display anything without having a child window as its render target. This
child window allows for a seamless integration with the Host window (in this
case created by the Master Window Component). User interaction with the
child window is fed back to the visualization component so that the user
is able to interact with the display of the SOFM (in this application the
SOFM can be rotated in 3 dimensions).
Writing such an application from scratch would require an extensive knowl-
edge of both the Windows operating system and multi-threaded programming.
There are 4 threads intrinsic to this application; the main process thread (re-
sponsible for maintaining the user-interface and process Windows messages), a
control and worker thread in the simulation component, a render thread in the
visualization component. However, all these components are available to the pro-
grammer for modification and customization, with windows and multi-threading
details taken care of by existing classes or the meta-program run-time application.
Updating the application is a simple as replacing the functionality comprised on
one or more of the existing components.
Pseudocode for the meta-program script corresponding to this application is
shown in listing A.1. The key elements comprise the
• Alias Table: Here we can see the names of the component types that are to
be created.
• Instance Table: The instance table lists the instances of components to be
created, and specifies certain dependency relationships between them. Here
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we can see the creation of a Parent-Child window dependency, the associa-
tion of an OpenGL render component with a render target (a child window
component), the creation of three communication ports between the simu-
lation and render component, and the creation of a single communication
channel between the parameter grid GUI component and the simulation
component.
• Application Table: The application table stores the list of alias and instance
tables comprised in this application.
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Listing A.1: Meta-Program Pseudo Code
Aliases Types_01
{
// (a) GUI Components
<Host_Wnd > = "GM_Host_Wnd"
<Chld_Wnd1 > = "GM_Args_Grid"
<Chld_Wnd2 > = "GM_Rend_Child"
<Sofm_Rend > = "GM_Rend_OpnGL"
// (b) Functional Components
<Sofm_Rend > = "GM_Rend_OpnGL"
}
Instances Instances_01
{
Collection Collection_01
{
// (c) Instances
<Host_Wnd > Master_Wnd;
<Chld_Wnd1 > Common_Grid;
<Chld_Wnd2 > Rend_Chld;
<Sofm_Rend > SOFM_Rend;
<Sofm_Rend > SIML_SOFM;
// (d) Dependencies
Dependency("Parent_Chld_Window", Master_Wnd , Common_Grid , Rend_Chld );
Dependency("Parent_Chld_Render", Rend_Chld , SOFM_Rend );
Dependency("Port_Attach_Down_Stream", SIML_SOFM , SOFM_Rend , 3);
Dependency("Port_Attach_Down_Stream", Common_Grid , SIML_SOFM );
}
}
Application App_01
{
List_Aliases(Types_01 );
List_Instances(Instances_01 );
}
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A.2.3 Alias Table
The Alias table is where we define the component types. Listing A.2 shows how
this would appear in C++ like pseudocode, and listing A.3 shows the actual
implementation in Lua code. The function of this table is very simple. We are
simple assigning component types to aliases that we will use in our Instance
table. This allows us to rapidly change the component type without modifying
any other part of the meta-program script. This is intended to support the use
case in many research applications where we wish to incrementally modify an
existing algorithm, update the display of the algorithm results, or try alternative
formulations. Typically the dependencies between other components remains the
same.
Listing A.2: Alias Table in Pseudocode
Aliases Types_01
{
// (a) GUI Components
<Host_Wnd > = "GM_Host_Wnd"
<Chld_Wnd1 > = "GM_Args_Grid"
<Chld_Wnd2 > = "GM_Rend_Child"
<Sofm_Rend > = "GM_Rend_OpnGL"
// (b) Functional Components
<Sofm_Rend > = "GM_Rend_OpnGL"
}
In C++ code there exists the concepts of templates. In an analogous fashion
the type variable used in template classes acts as a place-holder for a concrete
type. Here the alias acts a place-holder for a component type. The corresponding
Lua code is more verbose. In the Lua code we are also able to define default
parameters for GUI components. This is particularly important for the Window
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Host component as this component specifies the an arrangement of child windows
via a layout template string. The Lua script also allows us to specify a file name
as an argument. The string associated with this file name will be passed to
the component as part of the component initialization process (thus allowing for
component specific files to be used for initialization purposes). We are able to
assign different alias names to components of the same type. This allows us to
create initialization parameters for individual components of the same type.
Listing A.3: Alias Table in Lua
App_DEFN=
{
["_TABL_Name"]="Types_01",
["_COMP_Info"]={
["_Script_Name"]="Default_Script",
},
["_COMP_GUI"] ={ -- GUI Components
["Host_Wnd"]={
["_Comp_Name"]="GM_Host_Test_Wnd",
["_Comp_Args"]={
["m_wTitle"]= "Host_Window", -- Window Title
["m_nX_Off"]= 0, -- Left Offset
["m_nY_Off"]= 0, -- Top Offset
["m_nWidth"]= 970, -- Width
["m_nHeigt"]= 546, -- Height
["_Layouts"]= {
["_Layouts_List"]= {
{
["_Layout_Name"]="Default",
["_Layout_Tmpl"]="a+2.0b",
},
},
},
},
},
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["Chld_Wnd_Lft"]={["_Comp_Name"]="GM_Grid_Multi_Table" ,},
["Chld_Wnd_Rgt"]={["_Comp_Name"]="GM_Rend_Child",},
["OGL_2D_Parts"]={["_Comp_Name"]="GM_EGn1_SOFM_Cam",},
},
["_COMP_FNC"]={-- Non -GUI Components
["SIML_SOFM"]={["_Comp_Name"]= "GM_EGn1_World_Sim",},
},
}
A.2.4 Instance Table
The instance table is the heart of a meta-program script where we specify the
components to be instantiated together with the dependencies that relate to them.
In the pseudocode listing of A.4 this is very succint. We simply associate an
instance name with a type alias. Subsequently we refer to the instance name
when we specify the dependencies between components. This is essentially the
same semantic construction as that of the Lua code listed in A.5. The only
significant addition is the inclusion of a initialization details for the master window
component. Here we refer back to the window arrangement specified as a template
string in the Alias Table entry for the host window. In the instance table we
assign specific component instances to the tokens specified in the Alias Table.
This ensures that the GUI components are assigned the appropriate dimensions
and relative positions when they are created. Note that the syntax used for the
alias types corresponds to that used in Lua when we are referring to entries in
other tables. The dot notation allows us to make a global reference to an external
table (in this case the Alias Table).
Theoretically we could have multiple alias tables referenced by the same in-
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stance table. The dependency section of the meta-program lists four dependen-
cies. The Parent-Child Window dependency refers to the relationship between a
host window and the child windows of the GUI components. The Parent-Child
Render dependency associates an OpenGL render component with a specific child
window. This child window becomes the render target of the OpenGL component,
in turn the child window routes user interaction (either mouse or keyboard com-
mands) from the child window to the render component for display modification.
The Port Attach Down-Stream dependency type is used to create communication
channels between the simulation component and firstly the visualization (ren-
der component) and secondly the grid component (used to display simulation
model arguments, and support parameter modification). Further details of these
communication ports are display in figure A.4.
Listing A.4: Instance Collections in Pseudocode
Instances Instances_01
{
Collection Collection_01
{// (c) Instances
<Host_Wnd > Master_Wnd;
<Chld_Wnd1 > Common_Grid;
<Chld_Wnd2 > Rend_Chld;
<Sofm_Rend > SOFM_Rend;
<Sofm_Rend > SIML_SOFM;
// (d) Dependencies
Dependency("Parent_Chld_Window", Master_Wnd , Common_Grid , Rend_Chld );
Dependency("Parent_Chld_Render", Rend_Chld , SOFM_Rend );
Dependency("Port_Attach_Down_Stream", SIML_SOFM , SOFM_Rend , 3);
Dependency("Port_Attach_Down_Stream", Common_Grid , SIML_SOFM );
}
}
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Listing A.5: Instance Collections in Lua
App_INST =
{
["_TABL_Name"] = "Instances_01",
["Coll_Parent_Child1"] = {["_User_Note"] ="Host_Window_and_Child_Grid_Control",
["_Coll_List"] = {-- (c) Instances
["Master_Wnd"]= App_DEFN._COMP_GUI.Host_Wnd ,
["Common_Grid"]= App_DEFN._COMP_GUI.Chld_Wnd_Lft ,
["Rend_Chld"]= App_DEFN._COMP_GUI.Chld_Wnd_Rgt ,
["SOFM_Rend"]= App_DEFN._COMP_GUI.OGL_2D_Parts ,
["SIML_SOFM"]= App_DEFN._COMP_FNC.Simul_Sofm ,
},
["_Dpnd_PreP"] = { -- (d) Dependencies
{["_Dpnd_Type"] = {"_Parent_Child_Wnd",},
["_Dpnd_List"] = {"Master_Wnd","Common_Grid","Rend_Chld" ,},
["_Dpnd_Maps"] = {
{["_Dpnd_Map_Type"]="_Wnd_Arrangement",
["_Dpnd_Map_Arrangement"]="WndArr1",
["_Dpnd_Map_Layout_Name"]="Default",
["_Dpnd_Map_List"]={
{["_Name"]="a",["_Comp"]="Common_Grid" ,},
{["_Name"]="b",["_Comp"]="Rend_Chld",},
},
},
},
{["_Dpnd_Type"]={"_Parent_Child_Render" ,},
["_Dpnd_List"]={"Master_Wnd","Rend_Chld","SOFM_Rend",},
},
{["_Dpnd_Type"]={"_Port_Attach_Down_Stream" ,},
["_Dpnd_List"]={"SIML_SOFM","SOFM_Rend","SOFM_Rend","SOFM_Rend" ,},
},
{["_Dpnd_Type"]={"_Port_Attach_Down_Stream" ,},
["_Dpnd_List"]={"Common_Grid","SIML_SOFM",},
},
},
},
}
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A.2.5 Application Table
The application table is the simplest part of the meta-program. We are simply
agglomerating the alias and instance tables in two lists. The application table
essentially defines the program application in terms of the corresponding alias
and instance tables.
Listing A.6: Application Definition in Pseudocode
Application App_01
{
List_Aliases(Types_01 );
List_Instances(Instances_01 );
}
Listing A.7: Application Definition in Lua
App_TABL =
{
["_TABL_Name"] = "App_01",
["_App_DEFN"] = { Types_01 , }, -- A List of all component atom tables.
["_App_INST"] = { Instances_01 , }, -- A List of all component instance tables.
}
A.3 Component Communication
Communication between components takes place via component ports (not to be
confused with internet ports). Ports are mediated by the use of memory mapped
files, mutex delimited access to these files and event signalling to coordinate
between the transmitter and receiver. We refer to the transmitter as the author
and the receiver as the editor. Despite this terminology ports are symmetric in
structure offering bi-directional communications. In cases where the data flow
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is primariliy in one direction we sometimes refer to the transmitting component
as upstream and the receiving component as downstream. In this case if the
downstream component is sending a signal to the upstream component we refer
to this as retrograde signalling.
The essential structure of a port is illustrated in figure A.3. There are nine
steps in a typical port interaction;
1. The upstream component first acquires the mutex that controls access to
the author buffer. Note that the author buffer is a named memory mapped
file. As part of the meta-program initialization process all ports are created
in a fashion that each component is passed details of the component to
which it is coupled.
2. The upstream buffer then writes to the author buffer.
3. Once this has been done a named event is signalled indicating to the re-
ceiving component that the buffer has been modified.
4. The thread in the upstream component will then enter a blocked state.
The named event signalled in the upstream component releases the editor
thread in the downstream component from a blocked state.
5. The editor thread in the receiving component then acquires a mutex guard-
ing the editor buffer. Note that this editor buffer is the same memory
mapped file as that which corresponds to the author buffer. During compo-
nent initialization the sngle name that corresponds to this memory mapped
file is passed to both the upstream and downstream components so that
they both share access to this memory mapped file.
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6. The editor thread then copies the contents of the editor buffer to a swap
buffer. Note that the editor buffer is the same memory mapped file as the
author buffer, so we are effectively just copying the contents of the author
buffer (controlled by the upstream component) into buffer controlled by the
downstream component.
7. Once it has finished copying the editor buffer then signals a named event.
8. This named event becoming signalled then releases the blocked author
thread. The editor thread continues to release the mutex guarding access
to the editor buffer.
9. The author thread also releases the mutex controlling access to the au-
thor buffer. The editor thread carries out any additional processing that is
required by the downstream component.
10. Once the editor thread has completed processing the newly arrived data it
returns its dormant blocked state.
This example illustrates how asynchronous communication takes place be-
tween differing components. There is also support for synchronous communica-
tion where prior to the final step 10, the editor thread indicates that all processing
has been completed through signalling an additional event. Depending upon the
message type sent by the author thread, it will either continue without waiting
for this event to become signalled (aysnchronous mode) or await the signalling of
this event (synchronous mode).
Figure A.2 shows what ports are constructed in support of the minimal sim-
ulation application illustrated in figure A.4.
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